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The Poetics of Alterity:
Post-Colonialism and the Writing of Cultural Identity in the Work of
Robert Kroetsch
The work of the Canadian poet, novelist and critic Robert Kroetsch offers an
exemplary meditation upon the question of post-colonial identity. In a special
"Canadian issue" of the journal Boundary 2, Kroetsch defined his poetics as a
challenge to "the American and English languages" that prevent him from "hearing his
own tongue." The difficult task of exploring individual and cultural identity in a
"mandarin language" is the central theme of his writing.
This thesis will argue that Kroetsch's response to the predicament of being
caught between two worlds is to conceive post-colonial identity as the dialectical
relationship of the "other" to the "same." It will accordingly chart Kroetsch's quest for
a dialogical form capable of expressing this duplicitous condition. Each stage in
Kroetsch's novelistic career, from the realism and pastiche of his early novels to the
carnivalesque and Barthesian themes of his later fiction, will be considered in detail. A
discussion of Kroetsch's poetry will also establish the philosophical background to his
work, and explore the phenomenological and post-structuralist readings of history
presented in his longer poems. By bringing together Kroetsch's artistic and theoretical
interests in this way, it is possible to shed light upon both the shifting narrative
strategies that his writing employs and the postmodern vision of the Canadian cultural
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The work of the writer and critic Robert Kroetsch is little known outside his
native Canada. The relative neglect of the Kroetsch oeuvre seems curious for at least
two reasons. First, the last twenty years have seen the talents of a number of writers
(particularly Margaret Atwood, Alice Munro, and Margaret Laurence) bring Canadian
fiction to the attention of an international audience. Meanwhile, the thematic and
stylistic development of Kroetsch's work, as well as his activities as a critic and cultural
commentator (culminating in his co-editorship of Boundary 2, a "Journal of
Postmodern Literature"), have placed him at the centre of the debate about post-colonial
identity.
It is unfortunate that Kroetsch's work has not received the recognition that it
deserves because it focuses insistently upon the questions of identity, history, and
difference that weigh so heavily upon the post-colonial imagination. Before I begin to
develop these themes more extensively, a few words should be said about the meaning
of the term 'post-colonial' in the Canadian context. In general terms, the description
'post-colonial' refers to a period in which a society begins to explore its historical and
cultural identity in the aftermath of the imperial process of colonisation. Where the
imposition of the colonising presence has been both physical and violent - in Africa, for
example - the struggle for independence has taken the form of a war of national
liberation. Because of Canada's status as a settler colony, the post-colonial revolt
against the physical presence of the coloniser is transformed into a resistance to the
enclosure of 'Canada' within the discourse of imperialism. From the first, the
Canadian post-colonial experience challenges the implicit division between the unity
and self-identity of the imperial centre and the fragmentation and formlessness of the
colonial 'other.' However, this impulse towards cultural redefinition is complicated by
the fact that any contestation of imperial history must be conducted within the language
of the coloniser. The registration of cultural and historical difference is therefore
contaminated by the systemic codes through which the hierarchical structure of imperial
power was enforced and perpetuated.
For the Canadian writer, then, alterity and difference is always already inscribed
within the process of self-identification by virtue of the language that he or she uses.
An alienating distance is introduced between self and place by the imposition of
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imperialist discourse onto the new land. The question of post-colonial identity is
compromised and displaced from the beginning by the position of colonial culture as an
'other' to another culture. The term 'post-colonial' (which admits in the temporizing
adjustment 'post' the tension between two different stages of cultural development)
suggests that the image of the post-colonial is in fact constituted by this reciprocal
exchange of identity and difference. The importance of Kroetsch's work to this area of
concern is that his writing takes the relationship of the "other" to the "same" as its
central theme.
It is not the place here to analyse the formation of the dialectic between "same"
and "other" in its development from Hegelian philosophy through Sartrean thought into
the contemporary continental philosophical tradition. The important point for a study of
Kroetsch's work is that post-colonial discourse, in concert with postmodern and post-
structuralist thought, wishes to respect the otherness of the "other" without compelling
it to speak from the position of the self-identical or "same." Kroetsch's desire to think
identity dialectically and to recover the marginalised "other" narratives of colonial
history helps to account for his commitment, in both his artistic and critical work, to the
self-reflexive and self-differing discourses of post-structuralism. For post-
structuralism, particularly in the phase of its development consonant with Derridean
'deconstruction,' is perhaps best understood as a critique of the monolithic construct of
the 'West' with its confident assertion of its own cultural unity and self-identity and its
unacknowledged investment in the totalitarianism of the "same."
The connection between the post-structuralist assault upon the 'metaphysical'
oppression of alterity and the Western incorporation and sublation of the cultural
"other" can be made with reference to one of the primary texts of contemporary
philosophical thought. In Of Grammatology Jacques Derrida explicitly links the
critique of "logocentrism" (or the valorisation of speech and presence over writing and
the dissemination of differences) with an "ethnocentrism" which is fundamentally
"nothing but the most original and powerful ethnocentrism, in the process of imposing
itself upon the world."1 Picking up on this theme, Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak has
drawn a comparison between the absolute self-identity of logocentric discourse and the
imperialist construction of an image of Europe in which "Europe had consolidated itself
as sovereign subject by defining its colonies as 'Others,' even as it constituted them for
purposes of administration and the expansion of markets, into programmed near-
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images of that very sovereign subject."2 Approaching this ground from a different
angle, Edward Said has observed the complex interrelationship between historicist
forms of cultural analysis, which reassimilate alterity into a universalised narrative of
Western history, and imperialist strategies of domination:
So far as Orientalism in particular and the European knowledge of other
societies in general have been concerned, historicism means that the one human
history uniting humanity either culminated in or was observed from the vantage
point of Europe, or the West. . . . What . . . has never taken place is an
epistemological critique at the most fundamental level of the connection between
the development of an historicism which has expanded and developed enough
to include antithetical attitudes such as ideologies ofWestern imperialism and
critiques of imperialism on the one hand, and on the other, the actual process of
imperialism by which the accumulation of territories and population, the control
of economies, and the incorporation and homogenization of histories are
maintained.3
Kroetsch's work is, in a certain sense, an artistic response to the difficult
project that Said outlines here. His seven novels and collected poetry represent a
continuing attempt to re-open the question of Canada's position as an "other" to
Western cultural discourse. As such, these texts resist the collusion of historicism and
imperialism, inscribe difference within the "sovereign subject" of European cultural
hegemony, and endeavour to think identity otherwise. Kroetsch's subaltern refusal to
subordinate alterity to the demands of an homegenising history is most immediately
evident in his prose fiction. Here, the connection Said hypothesises between an
"antithetical" historicism and the "actual process of imperialism" directly informs the
discursive strategies of Kroetsch's writing.
The typical structure of a novel of Kroetsch's middle period (The Studhorse
Man, Gone Indian, and Badlands ) involves the struggle between two opposed
characters for recognition, independence, and authority. In The Studhorse Man
Demeter Proudfoot writes a biography of Hazard Lepage that is continually brought
into disrepute by Hazard's refusal to conform to the stereotypes that Demeter fashions
for him. Gone Indian, meanwhile, charts the fatal tension between Mark Madham, a
professor of English Literature at the State University ofNew York at Binghamton, and
his doctoral student Jeremy Sadness, who leaves the American east to explore his own
cultural identity in the untamed wilderness of the Canadian northwest. Finally,
Badlands presents the battle for control of the Canadian past between the archaeologist
William Dawe, who enters the dinosaur bone-beds of the Albertan badlands to establish
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his own everlasting reputation, and his daughter Anna, who retraces her father's
footsteps a half-century later to register the fact of her presence (and her difference)
within a masculine discourse of history that has appropriated and colonised the site of
Canadian history itself.
The importance to these three novels of the binary relationship between a
representative of cultural order (Demeter, Madham, William Dawe) and a marginalised
"other" that contests its position within a discourse that pretends to articulate its
experience locates the dichotomy between "same" and "other" within the basic structure
of meaning of Kroetsch's fiction. More than this, however, the correspondence
Kroetsch creates between the textual manoeuvres of his paranoid narrators and the
construction of images of colonial identity suggests that imperialist 'history' is a
discourse of exclusion that expels alterity in order to universalise a particular set of
ideological premises. This point becomes clear if we remember that Demeter's history
of the rural Canadian west, Madham's cultural critique of Canadian identity, and
Dawe's excavation of the lost fragments of New World origins demand the death of
Hazard, the disappearance of Sadness, and the marginalisation of the female experience
of history.
In opposition to these coercive forms of dominant cultural discourse, Kroetsch
offers a textual space in which a counter-discourse of post-colonial history can be
developed as a dialectical response to the hegemony of the "same." The ironic
commentary that Sadness's tape-recorded messages deliver upon Madham's colonising
discourse of history is one such example of this dialectical response. Kroetsch's
poetry, which cannot easily reproduce the complex dialectical structure provided by the
interchange of first-person narratives, inscribes difference within identity by
appropriating the deconstructive logic of Derridean differance. Thus The Ledger
exploits the status of language as an open field for the play of differences to deconstruct
the closed book of colonial history and rehabilitate the "other" record of the settler
experience. Meanwhile, Seed Catalogue problematises the metaphorics of closure by
exploring the connection between 'organic' or self-identical discourses of cultural
identity and the murderous exclusions of modem totalitarian politics.
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Rroetsch's repeated emphasis upon binary structures, antagonistic narrators,
and double plots should be seen as an effort to ensure that alterity is not envisaged
simply as a perspectival or relational concept, but rather as part of a political
relationship in which terms are assigned a definite ideological position. By breaking
with both a universalised and monological perception of alterity, Kroetsch hopes to
avert the dangers of a naive identification with the "other" in which the experience of
marginalisation and displacement becomes a form of interiorised oppression. The
problems posed by the "other's" uncritical acceptance of its designation as "other" are
familiar from some forms of feminist thought, in which women's historical exclusion
from the grand narrative of Enlightenment rationalism leads to a politically dubious
valorisation of the irrational. The principal difficulty of the "other's" identification of
itself as "other" in the context of a post-colonial cultural politics is that alterity tends to
become a monolithic concept negatively defined against the logic of the "same."
The internalisation of an ideological image of alterity not only compels the
"other" to reinscribe the principle of centrality and self-identity that it nominally
contests; it also threatens to engender an equally virulent politics of exclusion in which
the "same" becomes an "other" for the "other." In Badlands Kroetsch satirises
precisely this unconscious investment in the semiotics of imperialism by showing how
Anna Dawe's 'feminist' counter-discourse of history reproduces the exclusions on
which her father's phallocentric narrative is based. The intriguing alternative that his
work extends is that the monological perception of post-colonial cultural identity should
be abandoned in favour of a dialogical model which theorises identity in terms of the
dialectical play between opposites. The advantage of conceiving identity as part of a
dialogue with the "other" is that "same" and "other" are brought into a relationship of
mutual definition: the "other" is both "other" and "same" at different moments of the
dialogical interchange. Because of the dialectical and open-ended nature of the
dialogical model, lack and incompletion are inscribed within the primary act of self-
identification. The dialogical construction of individual and cultural identity therefore
becomes an excellent form in which to express the lack of 'origin,' centrality and self-
identity that define and produce the post-colonial experience of history.
The influence that dialogical thought has had upon Kroetsch's work emerges in
an important recent essay "Disunity as Unity: A Canadian strategy." "Disunity" is
significant because it translates Kroetsch's artistic interest in the reciprocal relationship
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between identity and difference into a critical theory of Canadian cultural production.
The essay evolves from the premise that the "shared story" is "basic to nationhood";
these shared stories are then cast in the role of those "meta-narratives" that traditionally
circumscribe and define discussions of national identity.4 As an example of this
"dominant narrative" Kroetsch cites the modem myth of "The American Dream." Yet
in contrast to the "centripetal power"5 of cultural meta-narratives of this type, the
Canadian national story is presented as a series of fractured narratives without centre,
plot, or familiar patterns of development. In what is perhaps the text's pivotal moment,
Kroetsch registers the incommensurability between overlapping versions of the post-
colonial story and then paradoxically hypothesises this narrative disunity as the
unifying feature of Canadian cultural identity:
To make a long story disunited, let me assert here that I'm suggesting that
Canadians cannot agree on what their meta-narrative is. I am also suggesting
that, in some perverse way, this very falling-apart of our story is what holds
our story together.6
It is this transition from a monological to a dialogical vision of cultural identity
that liberates Canada into its own national story. Putting the matter in extreme terms,
Kroetsch suggests that the "willingness to refuse privilege to a restricted or restrictive
cluster of meta-narratives becomes a Canadian strategy for survival."7 Noting
Lyotard's influential description of postmodernism as "incredulity towards meta-
narratives" Kroetsch declares "that by Lyotard's definition, Canada is a postmodern
country."8 The defining feature of this cultural postmodernism is a "celebration of
multiplicity" and a resistance to meta-narratives that reflect European and American
cultural hegemony. It should be remarked that Kroetsch's critique of the repressive
force that Western meta-narratives exert upon the expression of post-colonial cultural
difference challenges the view put forward by Bill Ashcroft, Gareth Griffiths, and
Helen Tiffin that America is a typical post-colonial culture because it remains in a "state
of tension" with "imperial power."9 For Kroetsch, however, the "unity of story and
narrative" imposed by the "current domination"10 of American cultural discourse is
merely one more incidence of the imperialism of the "same." Consequently, the
"fragments" of the Canadian narrative of marginalisation, displacement, and exile can
only speak their "incompleteness" when Canadians "come to a Bakhtinian version of
the dialogic, in which the possibility of a simple or privileged voice announcing the
right version of the narrative is talked away."11
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In a revealing passage from the same essay, Kroetsch remarks of his
postmodern "strategy for survival" that "[t]he trick is, I suppose, to resist the meta-
narrative and still avoid Riel's fate."12 The arduous task confronting the post-colonial
writer wishing to explore and redefine cultural identity is to assert difference while
acknowledging that alterity is always already implicated in a difficult and dangerous
relationship with established discourses of authority and power. What I am calling here
the "poetics of alterity" is a provisional name for Kroetsch's prolonged effort to
conceive identity in its dialogical relationship with the "same." The work he has
published over the last twenty-five years continually searches for new and more
challenging forms in which to present this dialogical vision. Thus his first two novels
But We Are Exiles and The Words ofMy Roaring combine a fundamentally mimetic
impulse with the suspicion that mimesis, which in its desire to eradicate the space
between experience and representation tends to incorporate the "other" into the "same,"
is a problematic medium in which to articulate post-colonial difference. Following on
from the troubled realism of these texts, Kroetsch begins to develop the properly
dialogical fictive model outlined in his critical writing. This process of experimentation
produces the three novels of his middle period which, I shall suggest, are linked by
Kroetsch's desire to create a counter-discourse of Canadian history that dialectically
engages with the meta-narrative constraints ofWestern cultural discourse. Badlands
and What the Crow Said, which show the interdependence of Kroetsch's artistic and
critical thought, present the poetics of alterity in their most sophisticated form. The
complex dialogue between identity and difference is also heard in Kroetsch's poetry,
which develops from a phenomenological investigation of colonial origins into the
deconstructive and psychoanalytic examination of alterity that characterise his most
recent work. I will therefore seek to outline the consistent development in Kroetsch's
poetry and prose of his dominant themes and strategies, while showing the
amplification and enlargement that these issues have received in his various interviews,
reviews, and critical essays.
Due to the relative lack of critical commentary upon Kroetsch's work, his
readers often feel the absence of a proper context in which to examine his artistic career.
An important (if highly personal) context for Kroetsch's writing is provided by his own
critical corpus, and I have followed him in applying the discourses of post-
structuralism and postmodernism to his work. There are also a number of exciting,
informative, and sometimes controversial critical articles on Kroetsch which I have
introduced and discussed in this study. Outside these articles and Kroetsch's own
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critical intervention, two sustained influences on my approach have been the full-length
studies on Kroetsch (both entitled Robert Kroetsch ) written by Peter Thomas and
Robert Lecker.
The chief interest of Peter Thomas's book is the attention it pays to the influence
upon Kroetsch ofNorth American mythology. Thomas is particularly astute about the
centrality to Kroetsch's vision of the trickster figure: the contradictory and schismatic
figure of the trickster, who injects disorder into order and challenges established
notions of form, structure, and meaning personifies for Kroetsch the disjunctive
narratives of Canadian cultural discourse. In addition, Thomas's examination of the
role played by the fluid and open-ended narratives of the oral tradition in Kroetsch's
work bears out Kroetsch's remark that "[t]he whole business, I guess, is one of
capturing process - especially in a country like Canada where things are being shaped
but aren't already shaped, that's very important."13 I have drawn on Thomas's
perceptive reading of oral culture and the mythological background to Kroetsch's
writing in my chapters on The Words ofMy Roaring and Gone Indian.
Robert Lecker's recent study of Kroetsch situates his work more securely
within the traditions of postmodern fiction. In Lecker's terms, Kroetsch's artistic
stance is that of the "borderman"14 who replicates in his textual practice the schisms
and bifurcations of postmodern culture. Lecker's singular focus upon the "multiplying
set of tensions between extremes"15 that inhabit Kroetsch's work allows him to
delineate very clearly important dichotomies in Kroetsch's work between east and west,
male and female, the institution and the individual, and America and Canada. Lecker's
conviction of the intrinsic doubleness of Kroetsch's imaginative vision also enables him
to emphasise the importance of the doppelganger figure to Kroetsch's fiction.
Kroetsch often employs doppelgangers to suggest the sense of inauthenticity that
haunts the Canadian imagination; identity, he remarks to Margaret Laurence, only
becomes real to Canadians when they embrace "the doppelganger thing" and "meet"
themselves "in another form."16 Meanwhile, Lecker's astute presentation of the
dialectic in Kroetsch's work between creation and decreation implies that Kroetsch's
stated intention to discover "the name under the name"17 of Canadian identity can never
transcend the fact that "[i]n a sense, we haven't got an identity until somebody tells our
story. The fiction makes us real."18
9
The weakness of both of these critical studies of Kroetsch, however, is that
they often do not take sufficient account of the crucial tension in his work between
post-colonial identity and colonialist discourse. Because of his concern to establish the
importance of the mythological background to Kroetsch's work, Peter Thomas
sometimes neglects the subversive political effect that Kroetsch's employment of
mythic archetypes produces. My reading of The Words ofMy Roaring and Gone
Indian seeks to redress this imbalance by considering Kroetsch's satiric use of
shaman, trickster, and doppelganger figures. Although Robert Lecker takes more
cognizance of Kroetsch's radical discursive strategies, he too fails to identify the
political and philosophical background of Kroetsch's writing. Lecker's concept of the
"borderman" is the main source of difficulty here, because this metaphor merely holds
in place the schisms and tensions that Kroetsch seeks to displace and deconstruct. In
contrast to Lecker, I will suggest that Kroetsch's continual elaboration and subversion
of binary structures is not an unexamined feature of his textual practice, but rather a
device that enables him to inscribe difference within the discourse of the "same." The
deconstructive play between "same" and "other" is what in fact constitutes the act of
self-identification in Kroetsch's work: his writing discovers disunity in unity, identity
in difference, and the prior implication of the colonial 'margin' within the discourse of
the imperial centre. Rosemary Sullivan, who has proved herself one of the subtlest of
Kroetsch's critics, is wrong to suggest that for Kroetsch "only when we decreate
ourselves and the inauthentic borrowings from other cultures which we have guarded
with colonial tenacity, will authentic self-definition be possible."19 Authentic self-
definition is established in Kroetsch's work by the constant act of decreation itself. By
subordinating Kroetsch's deconstructive strategies to the fixed structure of a binary
vision, Lecker often ignores the allegorical force of Kroetsch's work in which a binary
model is used to construct and deconstruct the relationship between imperial and post-
colonial culture. This failure to discern the wider political context in which Kroetsch's
poetics of alterity is articulated blinds Lecker to the dialectical conception of post-
colonial identity that Kroetsch outlines in "Beyond Nationalism: A Prologue":
Canadians seek the lost and everlasting moment when chaos and order were
synonymous. They seek that timeless split-second in time when the one, in the
process of becoming the other, was itself the other.20
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This thesis seeks to challenge the emphasis of contemporary critical discussions
of Kroetsch's work by exploring the broader political implications of his reflections
upon post-colonial and postmodern cultural identity. It is also my intention to establish
a more concrete connection than has hitherto been made between Kroetsch's artistic and
critical meditations on these themes. My analysis of Kroetsch's texts will consequently
draw upon the phenomenological tradition that links Edmund Husserl and Jacques
Derrida, as well as the post-structuralist writings of Michel Foucault and Jacques
Lacan. The influence of phenomenological and post-structuralist thought upon
Kroetsch's work will be outlined in Chapter One, which contains a reading of five of
Kroetsch's longer poems. Each of the next seven chapters is devoted to a consideration
of one of Kroetsch's novels, which are approached in chronological order. Because
Kroetsch speaks simultaneously of his native Canadian west and the impact upon the
New World of Western cultural discourse, I have, to avoid confusion, adopted his
typographic habit of assigning the lower case to descriptions of his home place.
Documentation throughout is in accordance with the latest MLA guidance.21
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Chapter One
From Immanence to Differance:
The Construction of Identity in Kroetsch's Poetry
In this opening chapter I wish to explore some of the issues raised by my
introductory remarks in relation to a number of Kroetsch's long poems. Although
Kroetsch has written poetry for over thirty years, and published it at intervals over the
last twenty, his poetic output has received far less critical attention than the seven
novels that have appeared during the same period. One of the primary impulses of this
chapter is to redress this critical imbalance by relating Kroetsch's poetic explorations of
place, history, and subjectivity to the broader theme of post-colonial cultural identity
that this thesis will address.
My discussion of Kroetsch's poetry is organised around a consideration of five
poems: "Stone Hammer Poem," The Ledger, Seed Catalogue, The Sad Phoenician and
"Sketches of a Lemon." In these readings I will seek to identify a progression within
Kroetsch's work that takes him from a phenomenological approach to history and place
("Stone Hammer Poem") through a deconstructive revision of discourses of historical
and cultural identity {The Ledger and Seed Catalogue) to an imaginative exploration of
the constitution of subjectivity by language {The Sad Phoenician). Because Kroetsch's
poetry simultaneously develops and re-examines these core themes I have taken
"Sketches of a Lemon" from its proper chronological position at the end of this
sequence and considered it in relation to "Stone Hammer Poem." By juxtaposing
Kroetsch's early phenomenological poetry with a more recent poem that meditates upon
the limitations of a phenomenological poetics, we can judge more successfully the
reasons behind Kroetsch's adumbration of a deconstructive form that problematises the
relationship between language, history, and identity. Another advantage of sharpening
the critical dialogue between poems from different periods of Kroetsch's work is that it
allows us to gain a firmer impression of the consistency of his underlying themes and
concerns.
Perhaps the central fact around which discussions of post-colonial culture
revolve is the tension between history and place implicit in the locution 'post-colonial'
itself. One of the abiding ironies with which writers exploring cultures formerly
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colonised by the European powers have to deal is that the prefix "post," with its
confident prediction of a new beginning in the wake of the imperial experience, in fact
posits an historical 'origin' prior to the defining moment of independence.
Consequently, the formative identificatory gestures of post-colonial societies often
betray a nostalgic longing for a time before the colonial subject understood itself to be
the product of historical 'difference.' Alternately, the post-colonial writer who seeks to
exploit the potential for cultural redefinition that the fact of difference extends must
accept that the language that he or she uses is the same language of the imperial centre
that formerly repressed the expression of native 'colonial' experience. The concealed
imperial presence within the post-imperial word helps to explain the curious 'other-
worldliness' of post-colonial culture, which exists both in and between the worlds of
European cultural discourse and the home place. Similarly, the interdependence of Old
and New World discourse defines the tenor of post-colonial responses to the complex
relationship between language, history, and identity, which range from silence at one
extreme to the deconstruction of hegemonic readings of colonial cultural history on the
other.
In an important passage from his critical writing, Kroetsch has related the
questions of deconstruction and difference to the Canadian search for a post-colonial
identity:
The Canadian writer's particular predicament is that he works with a language,
within a literature, that appears to be authentically his own, and not a
borrowing. But just as there was in the Latin word a concealed Greek
experience, so there is in the Canadian word a concealed other experience,
sometimes British, sometimes American.
In recent years the tension between this appearance of being just like
someone else and the demands of authenticity has become intolerable - both to
individuals and to the society. In recent Canadian fiction the major writers
resolve the paradox - the painful tension between appearance and authenticity -
by the radical process of demythologizing the systems that threaten to define
them. Or, more comprehensively, they uninvent the world.1
These words, which posit the "uninvent[ion]" of "the systems that threaten to define"
Canadian experience, anticipate the deconstructive revision of colonial history which
finds its finest expression in The Ledger. The tension that Kroetsch identifies here
between the specificity of Canadian experience and the 'foreigness' of the language in
which it is inscribed is also present in early work such as "Stone Hammer Poem."
However, the latter poem is best understood not as a deconstructive intervention into
the codes of imperial history, but rather within the set of tensions Kroetsch's critical
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work institutes between history and archaeology, and between metaphor and
metonymy.
The dichotomy that emerges in Kroetsch's critical work between history and
archaeology is of central importance to an understanding of his work. The distinction
between these two terms is valuable to Kroetsch because if language represents at once
a liberation and a new kind of imprisonment for the post-colonial subject, the discourse
of 'history' presents problems of an equally pressing kind. As Kroetsch remarks, "[i]n
this postmodern world, we trust a version of archaeology over the traditional versions
of history. History, in its traditional forms, insisted too strongly on a coherent
narrative."2 In The Ledger and Seed Catalogue, as well as the novels of his middle
period, this "coherent narrative" is linked directly to the completed text of imperial
history. With the material interest of expansion in mind, the discourse of colonialism
imposes an alien identity and history upon the new land through the bestowal of
language. Because the colonial subject is historically defined as "other" to this
discourse, it necessarily occupies an ambiguous position within the enlightenment
narratives of European historiography. In a later phase of cultural development, the
post-colonial writer finds that his or her share of the common inheritance is a history of
roots and beginnings represented to it in a language that simultaneously establishes its
'otherness' and its distance from any authentic sense of historical origins. Kroetsch
reproduces this dual experience of self-registration and alienation in his poetry by
showing how a variety of Canadian voices are excluded from the closed ledger of
Canadian history or relegated to the margins of the historical page. His poem The
Ledger is therefore a meditation upon history that feeds upon its own emptiness,
supremely conscious of the stories that the book of history excises, bewailing the secret
absence at its core.
'History,' then, becomes a deeply suspect empirical category for the post-
colonial imagination. Kroetsch has written movingly of his youth in the Canadian west
that "[t]he authorized history, the given definition of history, was betraying us on those
prairies."3 His response was to search for a way of exploring the past that allows the
Canadian voice to speak outside the "authorized text"4 of its colonial history. A
provisional answer to this dilemma becomes available to him by modelling his writing
upon the local juxtaposition of historical evidence intrinsic to the archaeological
method. In his remembrance of his adolescent experience of alienation on the prairies
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Kroetsch declares "I was that day on my way to embracing the model of archaeology,
against that of history."5 "Archaeology" signifies here for Kroetsch a syncretic form of
cultural analysis: the discovery and juxtaposition of archaeological fragments offers a
tentative discourse of history that emphasises the local and particular against the closure
and "system" of imperial codes of recognition. The significance of the archaeological
reading of the past is that it is fundamentally a discontinuous discursive activity that
leaves an interstertial space through which neglected layers of story can be recovered to
our attention. Kroetsch underlines the discontinuity and ellipsis of his archaeological
poetics by making a metaphorical connection between the counterpoised fragments of
the archaeological site and the play of meaning between signs in the postmodern literary
text. The new archaeological text imposes no hierarchy between discordant readings of
its details; its closest affinities are with the work that Derrida describes as "henceforth
no longer a finished corpus of writing; some content enclosed in a book or its margins,
but a differential network, a fabric of traces referring endlessly to something other than
itself, to other differential traces."6 As Kroetsch puts the matter in an interview:
I suppose one of the things the archaeological model allows us to do is keep
those systems very tentative. Instead of a sense of failure at not being able to
put it all together, what excites us is that very incompleteness. Systems are
open to adjustments, to change, to game, to our elaboration. And I think we are
more at ease with that tentativeness.7
A tentative connection can also be made between Kroetsch's employment of the
term 'archaeology' and Foucault's more celebrated usage. Foucault introduces the idea
of archaeology to signal his dissent from the continuity and teleology of the post-
Cartesian 'history of ideas' with its faith in the onward, omnivorous march of reason.
In particular, he deplores the process by which the history of ideas remaps and
transforms existing disciplines in order to re-interpret them from the outside. Against
this linear, totalising translation of phenomena into 'coherent' bodies of discourse,
Foucault posits an archaeological reading which resists such translation, acknowledges
contradiction and discontinuity between discourses, and challenges the conventions that
order canonical notions of 'history':
In its most general form, it can be said that it [the history of ideas] continually
describes . . . the transition from non-philosophy to philosophy, from non-
scientificity to science, from non-literature to the oeuvre itself. It is the analysis
of silent births, or distant correspondences, of permanences that persist beneath
apparent changes, of slow formations that profit from innumerable blind
complicities, of those total figures that gradually come together and suddenly
condense into the fine points of the work. Genesis, continuity, totalization:
these are the great themes of the history of ideas, and that by which it is attached
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to a certain, now traditional, form of historical analysis. In these conditions, it
is normal that anyone who still practices history, its methods, its requirements
and possibilities... cannot conceive that a discipline like the history of ideas
should be abandoned; or rather, considers that any other form of analysing
discourses is a betrayal of history itself. But archaeological description is
precisely such an abandonment of the history of ideas, a systematic rejection of
its postulates and procedures, an attempt to practise a quite different history of
what men have said.8
The identification of Kroetsch's archaeological poetics with Foucault's
archaeological method must remain tentative because there is, as my reading of "Stone
Hammer Poem" will reveal, a recuperative movement in Kroetsch's early poetry
towards a pre-linguistic moment of origin that Foucault's thought simply will not
countenance. However, if we concentrate instead briefly upon Foucault's antagonism
towards the urge to "totalization" reflected in the great themes of the history of ideas, an
analogy can be made with Kroetsch's hostility to those European and American meta-
narratives that hierarchise and order other discourses of history. Kroetsch's desire to
preserve the uniqueness and specificity of the open 'site' of Canadian experience, and
his resistance to the translation of that experience into the closed "system" of certain
forms of historical narrative, has concrete implications for his textual practice. This
becomes most immediately apparent in his valorisation of ^ver metaphor and
his search for a rigourous 'metonymic' poetics. Clearly, if Kroetsch envisages his
archaeological method as a 'postmodern' disruption of closed textual and historical
structures, it is complemented by the trope of which emphasises the local,
discrete, and particular by enforcing a contiguous relation between signs. Conversely,
the analogous and substitutive movement ofmetaphor provides a tropological model for
precisely that 'translation' of one form of experience into another that Kroetsch's early
'archaeological' poetry is determined to contest.
The importance that Kroetsch attaches to the distinction between metaphor and
is more easily understood if the pioneering work upon the two tropes by the
Russian formalist critic Roman Jakobson is taken into consideration. Jakobson sets out
his analysis in the following terms:
Similarity in meaning connects the symbols of a metalanguage with the symbols
of the language referred to. Similarity connects a metaphorical term with the
term for which it is substituted. Consequently, when constructing a
metalanguage to interpret tropes, the researcher possesses more homogeneous
means to handle metaphor, whereas metonymy, based on a different principle,
easily defies interpretation.9
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which in Jakobson's words "easily defies interpretation" and frustrates the
construction of a "metalanguage," resists hierarchical structures of meaning and
therefore problematises the relationship between narrative and meta-narrative. The
'horizontal' metonymic tension between signs is therefore far more appropriate to
Kroetsch's poetics than the "notion of trans-ference" involved in the "vertical"
metaphoric relation between language and meta-language:
The notion of trans-ference that's
involved in metaphor moving from one place to another And I think its that
moving that we distrust That's why we aren't historians we're
archaeologists We want to see the thing in its place what we want to do is
record exactly where its sitting where it's found and not make any
assumptions not disrupt the ground and then read from there 10
"Stone Hammer Poem" combines the impulses of an archaeological and a
metonymic poetics. It explores the imaginative possibilities suggested by a particular
fragment of cultural history within a discourse that endeavours to "see the thing in its
place" by circumscribing the metaphoric potential of language. Interestingly, the desire
to find an exact and necessary relation between the object of poetic discourse and the
language in which it is described is fundamental to the artistic movement known as
Imagism. A fascinating parallel between the imagist desire for a proper language of the
object and Kroetsch's search for a rigourously local discourse in which to inscribe the
unwritten landscape of the Canadian imagination is provided by T.E. Hulme.
Travelling in Canada at the end of 1906 Hulme, one of the leading theorists of Imagist
poetics, was convinced of the need to redefine the relationship between language and
landscape by his experience of the "virgin" prairie of western Canada. "Speaking of
personal matters," he reflects, "the first time I ever felt the necessity or inevitableness of
verse, was in the desire to reproduce the peculiar quality of feeling which is induced by
the flat spaces and wide horizons of the virgin prairie of western Canada."11
Commenting upon this passage, George Woodcock has noted "the sense of locality
which is indispensable to a consciousness of regional identity."12 "Stone Hammer
Poem" is written out of the "peculiar quality of feeling" produced by Kroetsch's
simultaneous "consciousness of regional identity" and his sense of the failure of the
Canadian "locality" to receive representation in a discourse of its own.
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The Problem of Origin: "Stone Hammer Poem"
and the Poetics of Place
"Stone Hammer Poem" is an appropriate text with which to begin a discussion
of Kroetsch's poetry because it brings to a crisis the tension implicit in post-colonial
culture between the new country and the old language while drawing attention to a
fundamental contradiction in Kroetsch's 'archaeological' poetics. Both of these issues
have their basis in the rhetorical question about language Kroetsch addresses to himself
in his critical writing: "How do we lift an environment to expression? How do you
write in a new country?"13 Language is a problematic medium for Kroetsch because it
is contaminated by the residues of the discourse of colonialism and therefore remains
awash with the silt of the imperial inheritance. Instead of providing the post-colonial
writer with the means to forge an independent identifying relationship between self and
place, language imposes an inherent sense of otherness upon him or her because its
fundamental nominative gestures name the land with the words of the former colonising
power. Thus the old language always introduces a lost point of 'origin' into
discussions of New World identity, contaminating identity with the experience of
difference, and placing the Canadian imagination at one remove from an authentic
experience of the home place.
Kroetsch's hypersensitivity to the alienating distance that inhabits even the most
rudimentary discourse of post-colonial self-registration is doubtless responsible for his
somewhat confused initial response to the problematic status of colonial history. For
"Stone Hammer Poem" bears witness to two irreconcilable tendencies in his work that
both make use of his theoretical distinction between archaeology and history. In order
to remove this preliminary obstacle from critical discussions of Kroetsch's writing, I
intend to retain the notion of the 'archaeological' only after enforcing a firm distinction
between the two available meanings of the term. The first sense in which 'archaeology'
should be understood in the poem is in terms of the 'horizontal' metonymic relation
between signs. In this reading, the poet's interest in the prehistoric hammer possesses
a deep symbolic significance: it introduces the idea of the archaeological site in which
meaning is produced by the local juxtaposition of fragments outside the totalising
narrative of Western history. Kroetsch's metonymic version of history accordingly
promises to reproduce the elliptical and discontinuous relationship between
archaeological fragments by means of a fractured and disjunctive poetic syntax that
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compels the reader to make connections across the space between individual words. In
place of the inherited story of colonial history, Kroetsch's dislocated series of poetic
metonymies seek to recover the fragments of Canadian experience without surrendering
them to the rhetorical transference ofmetaphor.
One of the most striking features of Kroetsch's writing, given the amount of
credence that commentaries on his work accord to his valorisation of mutp- over
metaphor, is the sheer difficulty of identifying concrete examples of this metonymic
textual practice. The fact that his emphasis upon the metonymic connection between
archaeological fragments clearly functions as a metaphor for the act of writing offers
some insight into the problems raised by a doctrinaire distinction between the two
tropes. Indeed, I will argue at the end of this section that the theoretical distinction
Kroetsch employs between metaphor and mc-to^'w^will not stand UP to the rigour of a
deconstructive examination. While it is true that Kroetsch does structure "Stone
Hammer Poem" around the juxtaposition of textual fragments, this strategy is better
understood as a rudimentary deconstruction of the notion of organic form. Robert
Lecker explains Kroetsch's insistence upon the integrity of discrete shards of meaning
in precisely this way when he writes of Section Six of the poem that "[i]t is a mistake to
give these lines a specific order, or to treat the sections as fragments working towards a
whole. The poem invites its self-destruction by supporting contra-diction, it asks us to
explore the chaos ofmeaning produced in wedding oppositions."14
There is, however, another way of interpreting metonymy and 'archaeology' in
"Stone Hammer Poem." In this alternative reading of Kroetsch's textual strategies, the
metaphor of the archaeological/linguistic site is used by Kroetsch in his search for a
moment of epistemological presence prior to the operation of language. By the physical
act of entering the ground the archaeologist identifies a stratum of Canadian history
uncontaminated by the binary codes of imperial discourse. Consequently, the
archaeological fragment constitutes a point of historical origin anterior to the experience
of difference and otherness.15 Far from offering a postmodern or "intertextual"16
model for cultural discourse, Kroetsch's archaeological poetics are much more
concerned with establishing a pre-linguistic moment of historical origin. It is in the
context of the impulse to recover a unity of experience prior to the alienations of
language that Kroetsch's 'metonymic' repression of the metaphoricity of language
attains its full importance. In fact, his archaeological poetics of origin admit an implicit
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distinction between conscious experience of the land and the medium by which that
experience is related. By privileging the integrity of individual conscious experience
over the 'impure' semantic associations of an alien language in this way, Kroetsch
attempts to circumvent the problem of writing in colonial space by means of a direct
engagement between the intending consciousness and the unwritten history of the
Canadian past.
For the current purpose of a discussion of "Stone Hammer Poem," I will use
the term 'archaeology' to signify this desire on Kroetsch's part for a pre-linguistic
experience of historical origin. As such, this section will plot the narrative of his
inevitable disillusionment as he comes to realise that experience and representation
cannot be distinguished from each other in such absolute terms. Indeed, he will later
satirise precisely this nostalgic longing for a pre-discursive union with the land in the
figure of William Dawe in Badlands. Before this narrative begins, though, it might be
helpful to explore the broader intellectual context that informs some of Kroetsch's
central ideas. A useful analogy can certainly be made between Kroetsch's need to posit
experience before the sign in order to discover a necessary and unmediated relationship
between place, history, and consciousness, and some of the theoretical predicates of
Husserlian phenomenology. Indeed, the opaque internal argument of "Stone Hammer
Poem" is greatly elucidated if it is understood as an attempt to unravel the tangled
relationship between language, meaning, and epistemological 'presence' that appears in
Husserl's writings.
Before we can begin to explicate this nexus of somewhat complex terms, it is
necessary to consider the benefit accrued by reading Kroetsch's poetics of place from a
phenomenological perspective. Such consideration focuses attention upon the primary
features of Husserlian thought. The fundamental axiom of phenomonology is that
consciousness is intentional (it is consciousness of something): every act of
consciousness therefore has to have an object. Consciousness is the absolute condition
of the possibility of knowledge; and the world is the totality of objects that can be
known through conscious experience. Crucially, the object of consciousness is never
given to us all at once; it is revealed through and across the infinity of its different
aspects. Consequently, sensory perception is the primary mode of cognition of things
because there is no level of experience more 'deep' or 'essential' than an experience of
the object perceived perspectivally and non-absolutely. To sum up: the sensible object
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is revealed to consciousness through sensory perception; and what is known through
sensory perception without mediation is real. All knowledge of the world can be
traced back to the original founding intuition of the thing perceived; so all worldly
knowledge is predicated upon the originary 'presence' of the intending consciousness.
The possibilities opened up to Kroetsch by phenomenological methodology
emerges from this brief rehearsal of Husserlian axiomatics. Because Husserl's
philosophy accords primacy to experience and grounds knowledge in epistemological
presence, the post-colonial experience of displacement by language is deferred. With
the value ascribed to direct and unmediated intuition of the object, consciousness
becomes sovereign and meaning is generated by the primary ontological act of being.
Wolfgang Walter Fuchs, upon whose seminal essay on the philosophy of Husserl
entitled Phenomenolgy and the Metaphysics ofPresence most of these remarks on
phenomenolgy are drawn, points out that for Husserl "the only ultimately validating
criterion of knowledge is that evidence which is self-evidence, that which is obtained
through direct intuition, that is, an intuition of the object in its 'bodily presence.'"17
Thus the direct intuition of the object provided by the "act" of evidence offers a "mode
of experience of truth"18 that reciprocally guarantees the identity of the intending
subject. Through the act of evidence in this strong sense, consciousness coincides with
itself and knows itself fully for what it is. Intention is completely fulfilled in the object;
it refers "to nothing 'other,' nothing alien, nothing absent to what is given; the object in
total presence."19 Since the relationship of consciousness and being to truth is
underpinned by the act of evidence, alterity is expelled, and identity comes to reside in
the privileged sphere of the "same":
The relation of being and truth, as Husserl makes clear, is that of two sides of
the same meaning. Being is manifested as truth; that which is manifested in
truth is absolute being. The experience of truth, the experience which brings
absolute being to presence, is the experience of evidence. Evidence as the
experience which manifests truth is the act which brings truth and absolute
being into presence. Evidence brings to presence what is, as it is, without
otherness, and thereby negates absence and negativity. Evidence is the
experience of absolute being absolutely present across truth.20
However, Husserl's negation of absence and negativity is undermined by the
philosophy of language upon which he bases his thought. Because his understanding
is that "it is the meaning which is essential, whereas the words themselves are
contingent," he believes that as long as one can discover the necessary relationship
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among meanings "one will have determined necessarily the relations possible among
certain types of signs which express their meanings."21 Yet the Saussurean critique of
language, which ushers in the modem discipline of structural linguistics, begins from
precisely the opposite premise: meaning, for Saussure, is produced by the differential
tension that operates between words in the absence of the complete set of linguistic
permutations that comprises an individual language. The radical Saussurean
intervention has a consequence devastating to the Husserlian emphasis upon meaning
as presence: absence becomes the ground of presence and meaning. Absence,
manifested in the "langue" or complete system of language from which the individual
word is selected, determines the meaning of the sign and in so doing comes to govern
the boundaries of the iterable.
With the recognition that the fact of difference, rather than the state of presence,
underlies and produces meaning, Husserlian phenomenology is forced to admit, in
Spivak's words, that "[t]he structure of alterity (otherness and absence of meaning or
self) must be operative within the sign for it to operate as such."22 The presence of
absence and 'otherness' within the sign itself introduces an inevitable degree of
mediation into the relationship between world and consciousness. In his subsequent
work, Kroetsch discerns that the over-determination of the sign consequent upon its
implication within a system of differences makes it impossible to sustain one single
unitary image of Canada as 'other' and therefore helps him to resist the closure of
colonialist meta-narratives of history. But in "Stone Hammer Poem" his discovery of a
'difference' within the phenomenological moment of presence robs him of the illusion
of absolute interpretative agency and compels him to re-examine the relationship
between language, history, and identity.
"Stone Hammer Poem" reproduces the foraging movement of the intelligence
searching for its identity among the leavings of history. It takes as its subject an
archaeological relic - a stone hammer found by the poet's grandfather - and examines it
as an historical index of the relationship between the post-colonial subject and the land
that sustains it. If the Husserlian emphasis upon the primacy of experience and the
sovereignty of the intending consciousness is kept in mind, we can see that Kroetsch's
aim is to create a phenomenological poetics of place in which a direct intuitive
experience of the evidence of the past provides a moment of supreme conscious self-
knowledge. Consequently, the poem records the movement of Kroetsch's eye across
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the inexhaustible aspects of the hammer's profile, which are revealed perspectivally in a
welter of visual fragments. Because the hammer is given to Kroetsch's sensory
perception "as a possible infinite series to [the] consciousness that perceives it,"23 it is
only recovered by him in its bodily self-presence by the synthesising power of his
imagination. By predicating the existence of the object upon his unmediated intuitive
experience of its multifarious aspects, Kroetsch therefore simultaneously privileges the
founding 'presence' of his own consciousness and secures an unbroken connection
between self and place.
Yet Kroetsch's desire to develop a reading of the Canadian landscape "that
would bring back, in all its purity, the distant, precarious, almost effaced light of the
origin"24 is gradually compromised by his realisation that the stone hammer is also in
fact a linguistic construct whose existence is inextricably linked to the language in
which it is described and represented to consciousness. At the very moment that
Kroetsch celebrates his transformation of the "other" (language and colonial history)
into the "same" (the founding 'presence' of the intending consciousness), alterity is
reinscribed by the fact of descriptive language. Because this dialectic between identity
and difference characterises all of Kroetsch's writing, the tension in "Stone Hammer
Poem" between the existential and the textual acts as an exemplary preface to the
development of his art as a whole.
"Stone Hammer Poem" begins by placing the hammer firmly before the
interrogatory gaze of the poet:
This stone
become a hammer
of stone, this maul
is the colour
of bone (no,
bone is the colour
of this stone maul).
The rawhide loops
are gone, the




shaped like the skull
of a child.25
24
The immediately noticeable feature of these lines is that Kroetsch's careful scrutiny of
the stone hammer slowly brings the object into presence. It is a language of revelation
and embodiment; the stone emerges directly out of Kroetsch's intuitive exploration of
its attributes. The tone of magical invocation ("This stone / become a hammer / of
stone") is exactly right because a transformation is taking place. The hammer is totally
present to the poet's consciousness; he is fulfilled and made whole by the act of
perception. Already, at this early stage, Kroetsch's declarative style and confident use
of subject/predicate structure show him in direct contact with the truth of the object
before him; and truth, in phenomenological terms, is "the manifestation of being
itself."26 Kroetsch makes the connection between truth, being, and presence by means
of a visual pun; the typographic lay-out of the stanza's final clause ("the stone is /
shaped like the skull / of a child") mimics the hammer's coming-to-presence by
reproducing the physical shape of a hammer in the spatial disposition of its lines. The
idea of the object is made tangible; it becomes a palpable presence before the poet's
phenomenological vision.
Another aspect of the stone hammer evident from this stanza is that it is initially
divorced from historical context and cut off from human association. It is at first a pure
symbol of a pre-linguistic origin of meaning. Robert Lecker notes that the poem opens
with "virgin element - stone undefiled, alone. This will be a stone to return to, the state
before the poem, a tabula rasa as well as a responsibility to go back before
becoming."27 But by the act of bringing the stone to presence before his registering
gaze, Kroetsch also gives expressive form to a series of isolated fragments of history
that lie outside established discourses of Canadian self-identification. The poet's
synthesising consciousness makes a connection between the undefiled surface of the
stone "tabula rasa" and the uninscribed narratives of the Canadian past. In the third
stanza Kroetsch discovers a suitably fractured spatial syntax with which to record the
stone's concealed and discontinuous history of usage:
Grey, two-headed,
the pemmican maul
fell from the travois or
a boy playing lost it in
the prairie wool or
a squaw left it in
the brain of a buffalo or
25





water (or blood) or (FN 14)
It is therefore appropriate that the hammer is found by Kroetsch's grandfather, a man
whose native adherence to a foreign language ("This stone maul / stopped a plow / long
enough for one / Gott im Himmel.") excludes him from his share of the common idiom
of the New World and leaves him at the mercy of those with access to the language in
which history is written.
However, by juxtaposing the newly realised historical presence of the the stone
hammer with the absence of certain stories from the historical record, Kroetsch
inadvertently focuses attention upon tensions apparent elsewhere in the poem. These
tensions are the result of his desire to disengage conscious experience from the
diacritical movement of language. If we return momentarily to Section One, it is
evident that Kroetsch's phenomenological perception of the hammer is accompanied by
a rigourous delimitation of the referential potential of words. Thus the first seven lines
of the poem are spent in an effort to establish the proper sequential order between three
basic nouns "maul," "colour," and "bone." Throughout the poem the move towards
analogy is carefully policed; transitions between ^ are frequently effected by a
form of metonymic cutting between the hammer's different titles: "stone,"
"paperweight," and "pemmican maul" for example. This extreme form of semantic
invigilation becomes explicable if we understand that Kroetsch's language of
embodiment is intended to be a transparent idiom that provides unmediated access to the
object of the mind's attentions. Unfortunately his wish to enforce an ontological
separation between language and experience is frustrated because the hammer may also
be interpreted as a symbol for the semantic duplicity of language. It is both a physical
object and a verbal construct, created, in Section One for example, by the delicate play
of assonance between "stone," "bone," and "buffalo." The ambiguity of the hammer's
status is the explicit theme of Section Two:
This paperweight on my desk
where I begin
this poem was




Cut to a function,
this stone was
(the hand is gone- (FN 13)
Kroetsch begins this passage by perceiving the hammer solely in terms of its
physical function: it is the "paperweight" on his desk; and it has been given a point of
origin from its initial appearance in his grandfather's "wheatfield." Yet this attempt to
preserve the integrity of the historical object founders because of the polyvalency of the
term "paperweight" which functions simultaneously as the sign of the stone hammer
and as a metaphor for the acts of spacing and deferral ("paper-wait") that produce
meaning by the temporal dislocation of referents across the space of the printed page.
The ineradicably textual character of historical experience becomes apparent through
Kroetsch's increasing inability to keep the referents "hammer" and "poem" apart. By
the middle of Section Two they are virtually interchangeable terms, held together within
the privileged space of a parenthesis. Later, the brief seventh section completely
eradicates the identificatory space between the historical and the textual and destroys the




until it is shaped
like the stone
hammer, the maul. (FN 16)
By introducing in his play on "paperweight" the idea of language as a diacritical
process in which elements function and signify only by refering to other past or future
elements in an economy of traces, Kroetsch acknowledges "the co-primordiality of
presence and absence; that is to say, the non-absolute nature of the presence of
meaning. "28 No matter how committedly the subject endeavours to establish the
quiddity of experience through a meaning given to consciousness in perceptive
intuition, the recovery of that experience in language reintroduces the series of absences
upon which meaning is predicated in a structural system. The interdependence of
epistemological presence and linguistic 'absence' is elucidated by Derrida in a remark
that points out the impossibility of attaining a pure meaning in language uncontaminated
by difference:
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In the extent to which what is called "meaning" (to be "expressed") is already,
and thoroughly, constituted by a tissue of differences, in the extent to which
there is already a text, a network of textual referrals to other texts, a textual
transformation in which each allegedly "simple term" is marked by the trace of
another term, the presumed interiority of meaning is always worked upon by its
own exteriority. It is always already carried outside itself. It already differs
(from itself) before any act of expression.29
The implications of this statement are radical. Kroetsch's phenomenological
response to the alienation of post-colonial subjectivity, which underpins identity by
appropriating and sublating alterity within the consciousness of the experiencing self, is
undone by the systematic dissemination of differences within the language by which
that identity is articulated. Meaning is not produced and guaranteed by a single
originating intention; the phenomenological assimilation of difference into identity is
frustrated by the play of differences through which language signifies. The
contradiction between Kroetsch's desire to establish an intuitive and personal ground
for experience outside language and his recognition that 'history' as a category of
experience is indissociable from the interweaving of textual traces by which it is
communicated emerges in the sixth section of the poem. Here the poet's confidence in
his own phenomenological poetics collapses as the imperative "I have to /1 want to
know," which insists upon an intuitive and foundational connection between world and
consciousness, comes into conflict with the parenthetical rejoinder "not know," which











?did he try to
go back
?what happened
I have to/I want
to know (not know)
?WHAT HAPPENED (FN 16)
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This unresolved tension between Kroetsch's demand for historical evidence (or
an intuitive knowledge of historical origins vouchsafed in a moment of epistemological
presence) and his sense of the implication of 'history' in the play of differences by
which language produces meanings ruptures the poem's closed structure. Although the
numbered sections of "Stone Hammer Poem" offer it an ostensible formal unity, it
lacks the univocity of a final statement of fact. Bereft of the epistemological centre that
Kroetsch's excavation of the past promised to provide, the poem dissolves into a series
of different registers, such as the clipped objectivism of Section Seven or the formal
elegy of Section Ten. Paradoxically, however, the over-determination of the linguistic
sign, which frustrates Kroetsch's efforts to establish an intuitive connection between
the hammer and its place of historical origin, opens the way for another approach to the
ambiguities of colonial history. The outlines of a different strategy of reading the past
are clearly visible in the first half of Section Five:
It is a stone






retreating Indians (FN 15)
In this passage, Kroetsch exploits the resistance of language to fixed points of
semantic resolution in order to undermine closed structures of historical classification.
At one level these lines, with their reference to "the retreating / buffalo, the / retreating
Indians," offer a poignant image of the eclipse of an historical era. Yet there is a
countervailing force at work here centred upon the phrase "recreating ice" that denies
the prevalent theme of declension, loss, and abandonment, and suggests the possibility
of regeneration and renewal. Significantly, the idea of resurgence only becomes
available if we adopt a new politics of reading. In stark contrast to his use of orthodox
predicate grammar at the beginning of the poem, Kroetsch asks us to attend here to the
differential play between words and to read with the grain of that difference. There is,
after all, only the difference of a letter between "retreating" and "recreating"; but the
dialectical tension between the two words breaches the surface of the text and opens a
space in which another history might be articulated.
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After "Stone Hammer Poem" Kroetsch's poetry increasingly demands that we
read against the letter to recover the repressed material that the official historical record
conceals. His work begins from the premise that linguistic transactions create a surplus
of meaning that cannot be totalised; he then disseminates this surplus throughout his
writing by means of a sophisticated form of lexical play which problematises the
connection between word and world and compels us to reconsider the relationship
between discourse, history, and cultural identity. In an important reversal he decides
that instead of attempting to extirpate the post-colonial experience of 'difference' by
repressing the signifying possibilities of language, it is more productive to use the
referential excess of language to disorder totalising forms of historical representation.
A deconstructive reading of history facilitates this enterprise by ceaselessly exploring
the boundary drawn between identity and difference and thereby challenging the
assumed 'otherness' of post-colonial subjectivity. Fittingly, then, the stone hammer is
last pictured lying on the poet's desk, occasion and symbol for a poem that traverses
the unploughed field of Canadian history, opening up its historical possibilities in time
to the disorderings and reconstitutions of language.
"Stone Hammer Poem" is at once the beginning and the end of Kroetsch's
phenomenological poetics of place. Throughout the 1970's he develops a
deconstructive reading of Canadian history that examines the hierarchical oppositions
and metaphors of totalisation by which the discourse of colonialism has constructed
Canada as "other." The crucial factor behind this transition is his recognition that the
fundamental post-colonial experience of alterity is most effectively contested by a mode
of writing that exploits the play of linguistic difference to deconstruct the narrative
frames in which colonial history has been written. We should note that this decision to
open up the narrative of history to the repressed metaphoricity of language deals a
mortal blow to Kroetsch's dream of establishing a metonymic poetics that eschews the
"temptation to read metaphorically."30 Such a project would have foundered in any
case since the trope of may be shown to depend upon the metaphoric
principle of analogy.
The concealed metaphoricity of the metonymic function can be explored with
reference to Derrida's critique of traditional theories of metaphor in his essay "White
Mythology: Metaphor in the Text of Philosophy." The logical development of the
argument of "White Mythology" is important and needs to be outlined in some detail.
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Derrida begins with the idea that Western metaphysics is merely a series of dead
metaphors - figural representations of the sensible whose origins have been erased.
He then outlines the Nietzschean position: the sensible origins of philosophical
metaphors are irretrievable. However, Derrida goes on to assert that what has been
obscured in this call for philosophy to recall its metaphorical origins is the process of
metonymy. Metaphysical concepts are not merely sensory perceptions elevated to the
ideal (that is, brought into language); they were linguistic in their origins. They did not
arise from a single perception of resemblance but were constituted by the systematic
process of signs.
At this stage, Derrida's position corresponds to Kroetsch's desire to bring
metonymic processes into the examination of a history of concepts. But Derrida
proceeds to make a further point that questions the presuppositions and possibilities of
the critique ofmetaphor he has just outlined. He asserts that the idea ofmetonymy can
only arise if one has already established the similarity between one system and another.
In Derrida's case this resemblance is established between the system of economy and
the system of signs; in Kroetsch's case it inheres in the juxtaposition of archaeological
fragments and the system of signs. In either context it is clear that the fundamental
metonymic relation can be grasped only through the metaphoric process of analogy.
Derrida therefore acknowledges the metonymic origins of signification while pointing
out that such origins can only be conceived ex postfacto as metaphors. In words that
have a particular pertinence to Kroetsch's deconstructive poetics he concludes that
"there is no access to the usure of a linguistic phenomenon without giving it some
figurative representation."31
This metaphoric movement within the trope of metonymy suggests how Robert
Lecker can describe the n o u 3 alignment of word and world in Kroetsch's volume
The Stone Hammer Poems as the issue of a "metaphoric complexity."32 It also helps
to account for the curiously paradoxical status of the practice of 'archaeology' in
Kroetsch's work, which stands simultaneously for a metonymic connection between
fragments and as a metaphor for the fictive process of unearthing the Canadian past. In
conclusion, the significance of "Stone Hammer Poem" is that it records the
disintegration of Kroetsch's ^poetics of origin under the pressure exerted
by the differential tension between signs. In many ways, Kroetsch's transition to the
deconstructive poetics of The Ledger may be seen as the consequence of his experience
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of the repressed metaphoricity of language. His subsequent appropriation of the
discourse of post-structuralism, which posits the impossibility of enforcing a
permanent alignment between signs, may therefore be seen as a strategic harnessing of
the metaphoric potential of language to disorder closed textual and historical
structures.33
"Sketches of a Lemon": From a Phenomenological
to a Deconstructive Poetics.
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We may gauge this occultation of a metonymic practice more successfully ifwe
juxtapose "Stone Hammer Poem" with "Sketches of a Lemon." "Sketches" occupies a
curious place in the Kroetsch canon: it has received little critical attention, a fact due
mainly to its uncertain location between the registers of meditation and comedy,
philosophical speculation and play. Responses to the poem have ranged from the
assertion that within it Kroetsch uses language "as a signifier of 'absence' within
'presence'" thereby "foreground[ing] language as an open field for the play of
difference"34 to the more dismissive view that "Sketches" "means nothing ... it is
about unconnection, about the poet's inability to write the poem."35 Although
"Sketches" provides space for both these interpretations, it is most usefully approached
as a satire upon the very possibility of the phenomenological discourse of the object that
"Stone Hammer Poem" strives so hard to establish. By reading the later poem as a
parodic reinvestigation of the relation of world to consciousness, we can shed light
upon the contentious meaning of "Sketches" while clarifying the importance of the re-
emergence ofmetaphor in "Stone Hammer Poem."
The identification of "Sketches" as a parodic and satiric response to "Stone
Hammer Poem" is crucial to its meaning. The interrelationship of the two texts is
obvious at the level of content because they both explore the nature of the connection
between the perceiver and the object of consciousness. The 'plot' of "Sketches" is
perfectly simple: Kroetsch examines a lemon in his kitchen, and tries to put into words
the essential qualities that make a lemon a "lemon." Behind this somewhat rudimentary
form of enquiry lies a further set of questions that take us back to Kroetsch's primary
artistic concerns: How can we know otherness? What is the relationship between the
individual and what lies outside its conscious domain? How is identity established
through language? These questions return Kroetsch to the dilemma that confronted him
in "Stone Hammer Poem." Since, in phenomenological terms, the perceptive intuition
of the object reciprocally constitutes the intending subject as an awareness, the
concreteness of the relationship between subject and object is of vital importance.
However, Kroetsch's experience as a perceiving subject in "Sketches" is continually
confounded by his experience as a writer, which alerts him to the systematic and
differential possibilities of language. The discovery that Kroetsch is led to in
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"Sketches" is, contra the first half of "Stone Hammer Poem," that meaning is not
guaranteed in a moment of epistemological presence, but is produced by the endless
self-difference of language. In a sense that is a little dialectical, it might be said that
meaning for the phenomenological subject is always on the point of collapse in
"Sketches"; and that this collapse is what gives the poem its meaning.
"Sketches" offers an ironic commentary on the epistemological crisis that
fractured "Stone Hammer Poem." Its action takes place in the gap between experience
and representation, meaning as intentional event and meaning as grammatical structure.
The poem offers entrance to a world thoroughly mediated by language, in which the
desire to ground meaning in presence has become a distant dream. Our sense of the
evanescence of Kroetsch's phenomenological dream of origin is reinforced by his
playful retention in "Sketches" of the dislocated form of "Stone Hammer Poem."
Indeed, "Sketches" evinces a comic delight in detailing the lemon's inexhaustible
phenomenal aspects. Yet Kroetsch does not linger over the infinite series of the
lemon's profiles in order to privilege perception as a type of intuition to which the
object is given in its bodily self-presence; on the contrary, "Sketches" begins from the
premise that truth is missed in its meaning as soon as one attempts to account for
phenomena outside the language by which it is represented to consciousness.
Poetic form in "Sketches" is then, to borrow the words of Paul De Man, "never
anything but a process on the way to its completion."36 The intrusion of language as a
system of structural possibilities into the field of consciousness explains the radical
incompletion of Kroetsch's relation to the object. His attempt to grasp the fact of the
lemon in its essential 'lemonness' and thereby establish an original truth immune to
breakdown into prior intention or structure is permanently frustrated by the process of
deferral and difference through which the sign "lemon" is brought into presence.37 As
if to emphasise this point, the implication of the object in the logic of displacement and
temporisation by which meaning is produced across the intervals of the signifying chain
is enacted in the poem as Kroetsch's "lemon" eventually dissolves back into its various
phonic possibilities. The transition in Kroetsch's poetics from a theory of presence to a
celebration of process reaches its apotheosis as the lemon is converted into a symbol for
the play of differences that constitute the literary text.
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It should be remarked that Kroetsch's insistence that every fundamental truth
constitutes itself in the discrepancy of its identity (a belief signalled by his
deconstructive acknowledgement of the paradoxical slippage of notions like 'truth' and
his constant reassertion of the excess of meaning with regard to a single concept)
registers a blow against interpretative expropriation that is political in its consequences.
By emphasising the over-determination of the sign in relation to the epistemological
moment, and therefore its constitutive self-difference from its own meaning, he shows
that the acts with which we represent and control meaning are always themselves a little
out of control. Meaning, in Kroetsch's deconstructive poetics, is always at a structural
distance from itself: the possibility of the sign's other meanings, in other places and at
other times, becomes the condition of its identity. The recognition that identity and
meaning are an effect of difference inscribes alterity within the logic of the "same" and
reveals the "other" to be a product of discourse. Once the transition from the self-
presence of consciousness to the self-difference of discourse has been made, the
absolute distinction between identity and difference is exposed as fraudulent, and the
question of alterity is opened to political contestation.
From the poem's opening lines, Kroetsch shows himself to be trapped between
the demand for a direct intuitive experience of the object and his sense of the inexorable
mediation of language:
A lemon is almost round.
Some lemons are almost round.
A lemon is not round.
So much for that.
How can one argue that a lemon
is truly a lemon
if the question can be argued?
I said, to Smaro
(I was working on this poem)
Smaro, I called, is there
(she was in the kitchen)
a lemon in the fridge?
No, she said.
So much for that. (FN 123)
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This section is inhabited by a doubt concerning the relation of world to
consciousness that was conspicuously absent in the declarative beginning of "Stone
Hammer Poem." In place of perception and intuition, Kroetsch relies upon a naive
syllogistic logic for knowledge of the object. He is displaced, somewhat against his
will, to the arena of argumentation and the conditional mood: "How can one argue ...
if the question . . . ." The poet's unsettling sense of the interpretative distance that
language imposes between subject and object is comically heightened by his inability to
guarantee the individual status of the text's referents. Everything seems to be on the
point of dissolution: Kroetsch has to interrupt his text to underline his (and Smaro's)
physical existence in a couple of clumsy parantheses. Meanwhile, the lemon, whose
ontological essence it is the purpose of the poem to discover, isn't even present. All
Kroetsch has is the words on his page, the ironic refrain "[s]o much for that"
punctuating each stanza in a sardonic echo of Vonnegut's "so it goes," hinting gently at
our inevitable failure either to separate world from word or to exhaust worldly being in
language.
Kroetsch's unhappy awareness of the interdependence of the existential and the
textual forces him to revise his interrogatory tactics. Perhaps, he argues, the quiddity
of the object can be established by direct appeal to the visual sense. But this gesture,
which tries to make a tentative distinction between the sensual and the discursive,
results merely in a hermeneutic circle:
What about oranges?
At least an orange
looks like an orange.
In fact, most oranges
bear a remarkable resemblance
to oranges. (FN 125)
If we examine these lines closely, it is easy to see why they represent a subtle
form of defeat for the phenomenological poet. Kroetsch's attempt to privilege the
visual over the discursive is the outward expression of his desire to return to the thing
itself; but the recovery of the visual in linguistic terms demands the semantic
equivocation of similie. An orange looks like an orange; it bears a remarkable
resemblance to other oranges. This move from the ontological spe ficity of the
individual case to the rhetorical generalisation of a hypothesised collectivity undermines
Kroetsch's ambition to "see the thing in its place." From here, it is but a short step to
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working "by a kind of analogy" and readmitting the metaphorics of displacement that
his archaeological poetics of origin were committed to expunge:
I went and looked at Francis Ponge's poem
on blackberries. If blackberries can be
blackberries, I reasoned, by a kind of analogy,
lemons can, I would suppose, be lemons.
Such was not the case. (FN 124)
By embracing the analogous and substitutive logic of metaphor, Kroetsch
signals his recognition that difference is inscribed within identity itself. Metaphor, as
his critical reflection on 'archaeology' suggests, is the perfect trope by which to express
difference: the tension between tenor and vehicle encapsulates the dialectical play
between identity and difference in a single rhetorical gesture. The development in
Kroetsch's work away from a metonymic poetics bespeaks his willingness to think
identity differently: from this point on, he consistently exploits the fact that rhetoric
cannot be monadic (or tied to a single meaning) in order to suspend the linguistic
gesture towards closure between multiple and incompatible meanings. In The Ledger,
this deconstructive practice implies that 'history' is a totalising discourse of power that
marginalises and effaces the visible sign of difference. Kroetsch's reversal of the
stance of "Stone Hammer Poem," and his insistence that absence is the prior discursive
condition of presence, is comically outlined in Section Four of "Sketches," where the
eponymous lemon is described in terms of anything except its quintessential being:
Sketches, I reminded myself,
nor of an apple,
nor of a peach,
nor of a banana
(though the colour
raises questions),
nor of a nectarine ... (FN 124)
In an exquisite parody of what form an undifferentiated identity might take,
Kroetsch tries to ground being in the grammatical structure of subject and predicate.
Section Six of the poem accordingly suggests that the essential structure of truth and of
the proposition is a response to the intrinsic structure of the thing described. The
semantic order of language therefore becomes an effect of the absolute self-identity of
geometrical logic:
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Smaro is rolling a lemon on the breadboard.
The breadboard, flat, horizontal, is motionless.
The lemon rolls back and forth on the motionless surface.
Smaro's hand moves horizontally, back and forth,
One could draw a diagram of the three related objects,
deduce therefrom a number of mechanical principles.
(FN 125)
Yet this quest for an a priori grammar underlying linguistic exchange is vulnerable to
the Heideggerian critique of Western ontology, which questions the "natural" relation
between the thing and the linguistic unit, and asks whether it is not the structure of the
proposition that determines the way we envisage the world:
But this "natural" opinion is absolutely not natural. This means that its
supposed firmness dissolves itself into a series of questions. These run as
follows: Was the essential structure of truth and of the proposition suited to the
structure of the things? Or is it the opposite: Was the essential structure of the
thing as a bearer of attributes interpreted according to the structure of the
proposition, as the unity of "subject" and "predicate"? Has man read off the
subject of the proposition from the structure of the things, or has he transferred
the structure of the proposition into the things?38
Heidegger's conclusion, which is that man has "read" the thing in a manner
dictated by the structure of the propositions with which he relates the objects to
consciousness, posits the construction of the world by language. In accordance with
the logic of the Heideggerian critique, Section Nine of "Sketches" identifies the object
as the product of difference, brought to presence by the network of its phonic
possibilities:
If someone asked me,




I'd say, a lemon is shaped
exactly like an hour.
(Now we're getting somewhere.)
(FN 126)
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In this passage, the lemon is "shaped" by the play of assonance between
different signifying possibilities. The lemon is a "lemon" precisely because it is not
"salmon" or "oven." Kroetsch's emphasis here upon the arbitrariness of the signifying
process has several important consequences. Put simply, if there is no natural or
necessary relationship between signifier and signified, meaning is determined by the
social and cultural practices within which language is used. Kroetsch makes this point
by his use of street-slang: to be a lemon is, in the American argot, to buy a second-hand
car. This insight into the social and cultural construction of identity obviates
Kroetsch's need to search for essence and origin; instead, he begins to conceptualise
history as a thoroughly mediated category of human experience sustained and regulated
by those granted access to the order of discourse. His recognition that reality is
constructed by the temporal play of meaning along the signifying chain also serves to
reintroduce time into his closed phenomenological poetics; the lemon is, in its latest
incarnation, "shaped exactly like an hour": now, as Kroetsch notes with satisfaction,
we're really getting somewhere.
"Sketches" offers clear retrospective evidence of the transition in Kroetsch's
work from a phenomenological to a deconstructive poetics. His initial determination to
repudiate alterity by asserting identity in a moment of adiscursive epistemological
presence is transformed into an awareness that discourse structures the history that we
inhabit as subjects. Meanwhile, the inextricability of the historical and the textual opens
the question of alterity up to radical re-examination since linguistic meaning, in its
resistance to totalisation, defiantly refuses to coincide with itself and reproduce identity
indefinitely through time. The delight that "Sketches" takes in the hostility of language
to closure offers an interesting clue to the direction that Kroetsch's writing was to take
in the years after "Stone Hammer Poem." Thus in the 1970's Kroetsch begins to use
the self-differing discourse of post-structuralism to deconstruct the unilinear narrative
of colonial history and to articulate the silences and absences at that narrative's core.
Indeed, he develops a counter-discourse of national self-identification in which the
erasure of indigenous history is transformed into a 'postmodern' history of erasure.
For this important transition in Kroetsch's artistic career we need to consider The
Ledger, his deconstructive history of nineteenth-century provincial Ontario.
An Other History / An Other Language: History and
Differance in The Ledger
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In my discussion of "Stone Hammer Poem" I made reference to a significant
contradiction in Kroetsch's 'archaeological' poetics. On one hand archaeology
connotes a metonymic and discontinuous textual practice that resists the substitutive
logic of metaphor, on the other hand, it symbolises Kroetsch's desire to dispense with
the mediation of language in order to establish an intuitive connection between the
intending consciousness and the scattered fragments of Canadian history. We have
seen that the discrepancy between Kroetsch's archaeological poetics of origin and the
structuralist philosophy of language upon which his early work is predicated forced
him to reconsider the relationship in his writing between language, history, and
identity. Such reconsideration was inevitable given the manifest failure of his
'archaeological' poetry to sustain a discourse of self-registration uncontaminated by
difference and alterity. "Sketches" offers a comic insight into the unresolved tension
between identity and difference that lies at the heart of Kroetsch's metonymic revision
of colonial history.
Somewhat against his expectation, however, Kroetsch's inability to suppress
the tropological "trans-ference" of metaphor must be counted one of the key turning
points of his career. In particular, his discovery that meaning is an effect of difference
opens up the narrow narrative boundaries of colonial history to modification and
displacement. Because "no element can function as a sign without reference to another
element which itself is not simply present"39 in the order of spoken or written
discourse, difference is always already inscribed within the meta-narrative of colonial
history. In accordance with this deconstructive logic, Kroetsch sets himself the task in
The Ledger of reconstructing colonial history as a network of textual traces which are
ordered and hierarchised by the discourse of colonialism. By using the spatial
possibilities of the typographic page to counterpoint hegemonic accounts of Canadian
national development with the marginalised narratives of the first pioneers, Kroetsch
continually dissolves meta-narrative into a series of fragmentary narratives. Kroetsch's
vision of colonial history in The Ledger as the relentless totalisation of a discursive
multiplicity that will always reassert itself is repeatedly enacted across the typed
columns of the poem, as the voices of the forgotten and the dispossessed clamour for
inclusion into the history that excluded them.
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Kroetsch's commitment to the dissemination of the play of linguistic difference
throughout the official ledger of nineteenth-century Canadian history betrays the
influence upon him of the discourse of Derridean "deconstruction." Following "Stone
Hammer Poem," which was composed in the late 1960's and published in Creation in
1970, Kroetsch's artistic and critical work begins to inhabit a new idiom: it speaks of
"difference," "trace," "erasure," and "deconstruction" in order to explore the
textualisation of historical origins. Kroetsch's co-editorship of Boundary 2 (a
"Journal of Postmodern Literature") with the Heideggerian William V. Spanos
throughout the 1970s provides an important critical focus for this theoretical move.
One of the most significant features of Derridean thought for our discussion is
his radicalisation of Husserlian phenomenology. As we have seen, Husserlian
phenomenology endeavours to establish a personal ground for experience in
consciousness. However, Derrida's critique of Husserl revises the relationship
between language and consciousness by positing the sign as anterior to thought
itself.40 The sign therefore becomes the first stage in the production of knowledge.
Since the written sign is a typographic 'presence' that 'stands in' for the absence of
immanent or transcendent meaning, the prior implication of conscious experience
within the movement of signification institutes an originary difference between being
and meaning.41 Consequently, the foundational "origin" of history produced by the
self-presence of thought to itself is displaced into the "non-origin" of language
generated by the ceaseless circulation of signs. Derrida names this "originary" non-
origin as dijferance.42
The idea of signification as a "non-origin" that originates meaning and history is
important to Kroetsch because it offers a metaphoric 'translation' of the colonial
experience of history. Seen from the perspective of a colonial culture, history has no
authentic point of origin because the language in which its experience is recorded and
communicated is always already contaminated by the discourse of colonialism. Indeed,
for many colonial peoples language symbolises the conflictual moment when the
cultural codes of European colonialism were transferred to the unwritten spaces of the
new place. Here we must mark a simultaneous process of identification and
displacement: the colonial space is represented and transfigured by language in the same
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instant. The language that appears neutral and possessed of a certain "discursive
transparency"43 discriminates/rom the very firstmoment between "the mother culture
and its bastards, the self and its doubles, where the trace of what is disavowed is not
repressed but repeated as something different - a mutation, a hybrid."44 Homi Bhabha,
whose words I have just quoted, has shown how the rhetoric of colonialist
discrimination receives an archetypal representation in the image of the English Book
discovered amid an alien cultural environment:
The discovery of the book installs the sign of appropriate representation: the
word of God, truth, art creates the conditions for a beginning, a practice of
history and narrative. But the institution of the Word in the wilds is also an
Enstellung, a process of displacement, distortion, dislocation, repetition - the
dazzling light of literature sheds only areas of darkness.45
In a move that challenges the primacy of the Ur-texts of European culture,
Derrida's deconstructive displacement of 'history' and 'meaning' into the process of
signification subverts the idea of an origin that was not already an effect of differance.
He works unceasingly against a "metaphysical" concept of history that envisages
"history as the history of meaning . . . the history of meaning developing itself,
producing itself, fulfilling itself."46 Instead he tries to gain an understanding ofplural
histories "different in their type, rhythm, mode of inscription - intervallic,
differentiated histories."47 This notion of an infinite series of heterogeneous and
stratified histories which continually undermine the metaphysical connection between
being and meaning has a powerful appeal for a post-colonial culture that has hitherto
experienced history as the narrative of its displacement from a lost moment of origin.
In particular, Derrida's reconceptualisation of the past as a general text which
overflows the limits of a discourse of history regulated by ideas of essence, meaning,
and truth, presents history as the movement of differance itself. It therefore provides a
philosophical ground for Kroetsch's strictures against the "coercive" narrative of
Western history which "begins from meaning instead of discovering meanings along
the way."48 Kroetsch's artistic response to Derrida's assault on the metaphysical
concept of history emerges in The Ledger, where he opens up the closed narrative of
colonial history to the systematic play of differance.
Deconstructive practice has had a profound and lasting influence on Kroetsch.
But before his work is uncritically situated within the economy of differance, it is
necessary to make a distinction between Derridean 'deconstruction' and Kroetsch's
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deconstructive poetics that will assume increasing importance as Kroetsch's career
progresses. To do so, we will need to return momentarily to the sometimes neglected
axiomatics of Derrida's work. For Derrida, the deconstruction of metaphysics is a
systematic exposure of the effacement of certain key binary terms - writing before
speech, unreason before rationalism, the realm of the sensible before the intelligible, for
example - within Western thought. His intervenrion is explicitly directed towards the
historical configuration of epistemic production. As Jonathan Culler observes, "in its
critique of philosophy and of other essentializing discourses, deconstruction
emphasises that discourse, meaning, and reading are historical through and through,
produced in processes of contextualization, dcontextualization, and
recontextualization."49 Derrida is scornful of the idea that there is a position 'outside'
language or metaphysics from which one could overturn the traditions of Western
conceptualisation.50 Reason, in the form of the Logos, will always reconstitute itself
by virtue of the "violent hierarchy"51 through which it sustains its governing binary
distinctions. Deconstruction is therefore a game played within rigourous constraints; an
endless struggle against an indefatigable opponent.
The deconstructive incision accordingly opens a gap in Western metaphysics
that will always close. There is no simple choice for Derrida between the historical and
textual: he asserts the historicity of discourse at the same moment that he reminds us
that 'history' is a weave of differences. "If the word 'history' did not in and of itself
convey the motif of a final repression of difference," he writes, "one could say that
only differences can be 'historical' from the outset and in each of their aspects."52 The
rich legacy that the deconstructive approach leaves Kroetsch is the correspondence it
identifies between the effacement of various binary terms and the production of
historical meaning. In The Ledger, perhaps Kroetsch's finest poem, he makes
exemplary use of this insight by showing the connection between the marginalisation of
certain forms of discourse and the consolidation of the narrative of Canadian
nationhood. However, there is at times a contrary impulse at work in Kroetsch's
poetics that degrades the rigour of dijferance to 'difference' or a simple celebration of
linguistic play. Consequently, Kroetsch's poetics sometimes display a regrettable
tendency to ascribe a positive value to semantic indeterminacy outside the historical
conditions in which it is produced.
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The problem with Kroetsch's valorisation of semantic 'difference' is the
damage it inflicts upon the integrity of the historical referent. A poetics that continually
dissolves the historical scene of writing into the associational patterns of language is
pushed towards the uncomfortable position that historical contexts do not help to
determine meaning. Such a stance makes it particularly difficult for a post-colonial
writer to contest the hegemony enjoyed by imperial cultural codes in the construction of
colonial identity. The tension in Kroetsch's work between his fascination with the
discursive hierarchy of colonial history and his promotion of a dehistoricised poetics of
'difference' is, I believe, the reason behind his transition, in The Sad Phoenician, to a
search for cultural renewal in the politics of the 'decentred' subject. I shall therefore
chart the gradual dissipation of historical energy in Kroetsch's poetry, implicit in his
substitution of 'difference' for differance, through a sequential reading of The Ledger,
Seed Catalogue and The Sad Phoenician, and a brief examination of his critical
writings.
Kroetsch's concern with the textualisation of historical origins is reflected in the
titles of the three poems I am about to consider. Thus Seed Catalogue employs the
taxonomical procedures of horticultural classification in order to explore 'organicist'
metaphors of place and identity, while The Sad Phoenician investigates the relationship
between language and desire through a ludic examination of the structures of the
Phoenician (and now Western) alphabet. Meanwhile, the title The Ledger refer
simultaneously to a book of financial accounts kept by Kroetsch's grandfather during
his residence in a small Ontario community in the middle of the last century and the
larger historical record of the pioneer enterprise. It is a poem written about Canadian
history that inspects the ways in which Canadian history has been written. By placing
textual fragments of pioneer history into the economy of differance, Kroetsch
challenges the process of historical and linguistic exclusion by which narratives of
identity and place are constructed and legitimatised.
We can better explore the imbrication of the historical and the textual by means
of a brief incursion into the history of the poem's publication. Thus the cover of the
1975 Applegarth's Follies edition of The Ledger reproduces a map of Bruce County,
Ontario, where Kroetsch's family settled during the last century. This edition also
incorporates a page of the ledger that detailed the family accounts upon their arrival in
Ontario. The map of Bruce County is marked by a black circle that rings the notation
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"Saw m." Next to it, a scrawled message proclaims "Yes, that's the place. RK." As
Linda Hutcheon points out, "[t]his contextualizing and personalizing signing is omitted
in the later reprinting, but its presence is a postmodern signal of the meeting of the past
and the present."53
Kroetsch's concern in The Ledger is to challenge the hermeneutic principles by
which we record, structure, and represent historical experience. What, he asks, is
carried over in the act of translation between the past and the present? Is it possible to
reach back across such temporal distances and communicate the meaning of the original
event, and, if so, what would the consequences of such a univocal History be? A few
lines from the English Modernist poet Roy Fisher shed some light upon the principal
themes of the poem:
this backward image-trail
projects farther
on a straight alignment
across what looked to be emptiness,
checked as void
and suddenly locates the dead,
the utterly forgotten.54
The "backward image-trail" of Kroetsch's poem follows the trajectory of Fisher's lines
in exploring "what looked to be emptiness" and suddenly locating "the dead, / the
utterly forgotten." In the scant details of the Bruce County ledger, he finds the traces of
a number of unrepresented lives that have been effaced by the univocal narrative of
Canadian history. In fact, 'trace' is an important term in any discussion of The Ledger
because it provides a clue to the deconstructive strategies that Kroetsch pursues in his
examination of a lost stratum of the pioneer experience.
In contrast to the positivist position which holds that a knowledge of the past
can be obtained by direct reference to the given facts, Kroetsch insists that there is no
way back through language to meaning that is not itself a product of differance. Above
all, he refuses to avoid the question of the historicity of historical discourse: he knows
that there is no extra-discursive domain called the 'real' where historical facts can be
guaranteed; and that it is the lesson of differance that "no movement of experience can
present itself except as re ference to what it is not, what differs from it."55 In this space
between event and representation, Kroetsch's poem undertakes its subversive
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manoeuvres. Notably, he does not attempt to reassimilate the fragments of the ledger's
biographical details into a coherent and continuous narrative; rather, the lives of his
forebears exist as a series of fractured voices that echo across the discontinuous space
called history. 'History' has no meaning in The Ledger except as the reproduction of
this discursive difference. Kroetsch's here is to give differance a human
context by drawing a comparison between the prior inscription of absence and lack in
linguistic meaning (through the "langue" or system of absent lexical possibilities) and
the effacement of the narratives of Theresia Tschirhart and Haag's son from the
mercantilist discourse of Canadian history. In this emotionally charged
correspondence, the process of difference and deferral by which identity is produced is
reinterpreted in terms of human powerlessness and loss. Meanwhile, the paradox by
which meaning must presume a presence which precedes writing but which in fact is
constituted by writing is expressed by the collocation and interdependence of the text's
various idioms, as they subvert the idea of history as an unconditional ontological
category and dissolve it once again into the plurality of its various discourses.
Kroetsch's refusal to locate historical identity outside the differential locus of
language, the medium of distantiation and deferral, has direct implications for the form
that The Ledger takes. Kroetsch's poem, like the Bruce County ledger, is a "book / of
/ columns" (FN 23) built out of vertical and horizontal slats of language. In the same
spirit as the postmodern poetics of John Ashbery and J. H. Prynne, Kroetsch impedes
the sequential logic of reading by redistributing narrative units across the typographic
space of the printed page. Our experience of time is displaced into an experience of
space as we struggle to reconstruct a sense of the past from the poem's disjunctive
columns of print. The dislocated and oppositional form of The Ledger enables
Kroetsch to undermine our hopeless desire for an absolute understanding of history:
although we must become effectively co-producers of the art-work, as we try to create
correspondences between discrete textual fragments, the boundless possibilities opened
up by Kroetsch's technique of juxtaposition and superimposition show that history is a
field of reference whose meanings always exceed a unitary reading. Maud Ellmann has
written of some lines of Pound ("And even I can remember / A day when historians left
blanks in their writings /1 mean for things they didn't know / but that time seems to be
passing"56) that The Cantos "try to bring the blanks back into history."57 The Ledger
is just such an open form: it offers a formalism (the formalism of the account-book with
its columns of profits, losses and balances) that momentarily organises the welter of
experience only to succumb to the disorder of language. In the radical dissociations of
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Kroetsch's verse, postmodern knowledge deconstructs the book of history: he
accentuates the division between experience and representation, multiplies the overlap
of semiotic codes, and, in the ontological gap so produced, redefines our relation to the
past. As images bleed into each other from different segments of the poem, history
becomes fissured by lack and difference, invaded by the radical alterity of other
discourses, opened to the movement of differance.
The Ledger begins by questioning our assumptions about the form that a
historical record should assume. In place of the consecutive logic of a linear
progression, Kroetsch explores the marginal spaces offered to him by the typographic
page:
the the ledger survived
ledger
because it was neither
itself human nor useful (FN 23)
It is obvious from these brief lines that the spatial syntax of Kroetsch's style imposes
no necessary order between vertical and horizontal modes of reading. Some sense may
be made of this passage if we choose to read either down or across the page. The
striking feature of these lines is the lingering attention they pay to the process of
deferral by which meaning is reconstituted after the "infintesimal and radical
displacement"58 of differance. Although the ledger may be thought "neither human nor
useful" it "survived / itself" because it lends a degree of formal unity to the
overwhelming experience of fragmentation that Kroetsch's poem expresses. The line-
break between "survived" and "itself is crucial because it opens the passage up to two
different interpretations. Naturally, the ledger "survived" itself because it has, in a
practical way, outlasted its immediate function; but it also survived "itself' because it
offers ways of interpreting the acts of pioneer settlement that far exceed the narrow
economic determination advanced in its own pages. Kroetsch's writing, with its abrupt
shifts and punning associations, is fully alive to the play of mental events that his
splintered form sets in train: the mind, repeatedly recovering moments of significance
from a succession of images that have always moved on, is constantly in arrears as it
tries to arrange fragments of text into an experience of continuous process. Hence the
studied irony of Kroetsch's technique: it may seem that syntax will rescue order from
randomness ("the / ledger / itself') but this order is immediately subverted by the poet's
insistence that meaning is always posthumous, a product of the connections we choose
to make (or ignore) between the pages of a textualised history.
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The production of meaning by deferral and difference is the explicit theme of the
poem's opening pages. Accordingly, a dictionary definition of "ledger" as a site of
resolution and closure ("in bookkeeping, the book of final entry, in which a record of
debits, credits, and all money transactions is kept") is instantly problematised by
Kroetsch's representation of the ledger as "the / book / of / columns" which
emphasises, by means of the curious isolation of the phrase on the wide white page, the
importance of the margin, spacing, and difference to the relation between signs. The
sense of incompletion that this new definition of "ledger" leaves is then translated into
economic terms. The ledger "doesn't balance": an unevenness (a sense of lack) appears
in each column's reciprocal image of identity. There is, in the first moments of the
poem, a continual oscillation between the figurative and the economic: the notion of
economy as monetary exchange (the life-blood of a mercantile community) and the
post-structural definiton of economy as the circulation of signs (or those discourses by
which a community comes to recognise and understand itself) are interlinked. At one
point, Kroetsch advances a textual metaphor to describe his sense of the radical
contingency of history:
some pages torn out (
by accident)
some pages remaining (
by accident)
(FN 24)
Later, however, the economic and the graphic are juxtaposed in a section that
simultaneously presents the ledger as the repository of a concluded history and an
artistic "search for the dead" that will never be completed because each moment of
"finding" is invaded by distance and longing:
EVERYTHING I WRITE
I SAID, IS A SEARCH
(is debit, is credit)
is a search for some pages
remaining
(by accident)
the poet: finding the column straight
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in the torn ledger the column broken
FINDING
everything you write
my wife, my daughters, said
is a search for the dead
the book offinal entry
in which a record is kept
(FN 25)
Two of the ways in which Kroetsch's deconstructive emphasis upon differance
achieves a political force are its refusal of any formal division between language and
meta-language and its exposure of 'history' as a discourse created by the purposive
totalisation of difference. The Ledger works against meta-language and the hierarchy
of discourse that meta-languages impose by bringing different discursive registers
together without any degree of narrative contextualisation. In the following extract,
Kroetsch employs a series of narrative dissolves borrowed from the montage
techniques of cinema to underline the latent rapacity of the pioneer enterprise. Thus an
initial definition of "ledger" as timber for construction and shelter is quickly displaced
by the authentic idiom of nineteenth-century mercantilism reflected in The Canada
Gazette. Once this displacement has been effected, two sharply opposed versions of
pioneer history are provided. One, Father Holzer's, invokes the optimistic platitudes
that were used to sell the colonies to prospective settlers. Yet Holzer's idealising
portrait of provincial Canadian life, which Kroetsch satires in the repeated phrase "A
Pristine Forest," is contested on the other side of the page by a passage which ironically
appropriates the antiphonal rhythm of the Christian litany to uncover the violence of the
act of settlement:
b. 'a horizontal piece of timber secured to the uprights
supporting the putlogs in a scaffolding, or the like.'
The Canada Gazette, August 17, 1854:
"Notice is hereby given that the undermentioned
lands ... in the County of Bruce, U.C., will be open
for sale to actual settlers ... The price to be Ten shil¬
lings per acre ... Actual occupation to be immediate
and continuous ..."
To raise a bam;
cut down a forest.
To raise oats and hay;
bum the soil.
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'As to the climate of the district,
Father Holzer cannot praise it
enough. He declares that during
the first nine months of his resi¬
dence here they had only one





The collagiste tendency of The Ledger, by which it counterpoints different
orders of discourse within a single moment of critical attention, lays lasting claim to our
attention in the correspondence it creates between textual inscription and historical
'presence.' The poverty of the account-books details, which elide human and
economic worth in its columns of credit and debit, represents, in symbolic form, a
comment upon the impoverishment of those lives for which the book of history can
provide no account. Paradoxically, Kroetsch's tactical preservation of the integrity of
discrete narrative units reinforces our sense of the discursive hierarchy that underpins
the dissemination of power. In the section where the discourse of mercantilism and the
numbed response of the immigrant settler are brought together within the unforgiving
ratchet of profit and loss, it is all to clear with which narrative the "balance" of social
power rests:
'. . . a specimen of the self-made men who have made Canada what it is, and
of which no section has brought forth more or better representatives than the
County of Bruce. Mr Miller was never an office-seeker, but devoted himself
strictly and energetically to the pursuit of his private business, and on his death
was the owner of a very large and valuable property ...'
Have another glass, John.
Ja, ja. What the hell.
What's the matter, John?
My bones ache.
Take a day off, John.




Here, the monosyllables of John, the harried worker, suggest that those who
are isolated by language are placed outside the perimeter of historical representation:
effaced, occluded, unremembered. Kroetsch makes this point with a grim pun: John
has "[n]o time"; the alien strain of his expression can find no place within historical
narratives of provincial life. He extends this thought with a salutary reminder that if
linguistic competence underpins both cultural identity and social authority, those denied
their share of a common idiom are uniquely vulnerable. Consequently, Kroetsch's
recollection that "Gottlieb Haag's only son / grew up to be the first man / hanged for
murder / in the County of Bruce" (FN 31) plays on the lexical similarity of "Haag" and
"hanged" to show that for people(s) left outside the confirmatory structures of
language, etymology can become destiny and words can kill.
As The Ledger gradually unfolds its details, the process of historical erasure
slowly becomes visceral. True to his sense of the "essential paradox" by which "[e]ven
abandonment gives us memory,"59 Kroetsch encounters the series of textual absences
he detects in the "torn ledger" in all their mortal forms. The correlation he discovers
between wordlessness and exclusion from the historical record is developed in one of









The poignant minimalism of "blank: born dead" holds our attention. The precise
"balance" of this cursory phrase gives an ironic twist to the phrase "DEATH
PROHIBITED / ON THESE PREMISES" (FN 39) since to lack the "premises" of a
common discourse (a name, a birthplace, a history) is to exist beyond the margins of
the recording page.
The overwhelming impression left to Kroetsch by the Bruce County ledger is
that the community's understandable desire to establish its own corporate identity in the
new place demands the expulsion of cultural and historical alterity. Linguistic
difference (such as Gottlieb Haag's reaction to the shores of the New World "Das ist
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doch nicht moglich" ) is treated with suspicion and even hostility. Language is the
medium by which social contact is established, but it also creates distinctions between
people from different ethnic and cultural backgrounds. The tension that language
engenders between identity and difference emerges in Kroetsch's elegy for his great-
grandmother, Theresia Tschirhart:
bom in Alsace, she spoke
German with a French accent,
English with a German accent,
looked down on all Bavarians
for being the tree-chopping
beer drinkers they all were:
Married three Bavarians.
Buried three Bavarians.
What did most men feel
in her presence?







Theresia is, in many respects, the personification of the difference that the
townspeople seek to exclude. Bom in Alsace and fluent in several languages, her
presence disturbs the self-assurance of a community held together by its possession of
a common idiom. Kroetsch catches something of the threat that Theresia's foreignness
signifies in the half-rhyme between "married" and "buried." Confronted with the sign
of alterity, the men's only response is to propose to Theresia and subordinate difference
to the social compact of marriage. But Theresia's great-grandson, who understands the
power that alterity possesses to challenge repressive discursive structures, insists that
we must "[m]arry the [t]error" (FN 43) in a quite different spirit by reading against the
grain of the official record. Not surprisingly, then, the passage ends with his
paranthetical refusal to believe his eyes and endorse the connection between language
and self-presence that his ancestors demanded.
The intensity with which Kroetsch applies himself to the deconstruction of
provincial Ontario history is perhaps best understood as the discharging of a familial
debt. The question "what do I owe you?" (FN 39) resonates through the final sections
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of the poem as Kroetsch tries to write the silences and blanks of an unacknowledged
experience back into the ledger of Canadian history. In the poem's last pages, the
proud record of nineteenth-century mercantilist progress dissolves into a plurality of
contending discourses that undermine the possibility of a unitary narrative of Canada's
colonial history:
f. 'a book that lies permanently in some place.'
A man that lies permanently in some place.
A woman that lies permanently in some place.
A resident. Obsolete.
The book of final entry.
The timber supporting the putlogs
in a scaffolding:
in the chaos
in the dark night
in the beautiful forest
'With no effort or pretension to literary merit, the object will be rather to present
a plain statement of facts of general interest which bear upon the past growth
and development of this wonderfully prosperous section of the Province, in
such manner as to render future comparisons more easy, and offer to the rising
generation an incentive to emulation in the examples of the pioneers, whose
self-reliant industry and progressive enterprise have conquered the primeval
forests, and left in their stead, as a heritage to posterity, a country teeming with
substantial comforts and material wealth, and reflecting in its every feature the
indomitable spirit and true manliness of a noble race, whose lives and deeds
will shine while the communities they have founded shall continue to exist.'
The book
of columns.
The book that lies
permanently.
e.g., the poem
Gottlieb Haag's only son
(for the first murder






In this passage of sustained disjunctions, the closed "book of final entry" is
transformed into "the book that lies permanently in some place." Typically, Kroetsch
insists on both meanings of the word "lie": it connotes both permanent residence and
semantic duplicity in the same moment. By enmeshing these two irreconcilable
meanings in an unresolvable tension, he manages to articulate the permanent duplicity
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of the historical data he has excavated. Encouraging us to "see / the confusion again /
the chaos again" (FN 34) from which the discourse of 'history' emerges, Kroetsch
asks what single narrative could reconcile the studied neutrality of a discourse that
constructs an image of Canada "with no effort / or pretension / to literary merit" with
the bleak fate reserved for Haag's unnamed son? At the last, his answer is to go
"beyond the last turned page / beyond the last / entry" to the image of his great-
grandmother, symbol of an irreducible otherness, whose final ironic gesture is to be
buried beside the ledger that demanded a level of self-effacement she could never
sustain.
By demonstrating that language both constructs and deconstructs cultural
identity, The Ledger becomes a poetic exploration of what Dominick LaCapra has
referred to as "a reconceptualisation of culture in terms of collective discourses."60 In
its refusal to separate historical value from the textual work in which it is inscribed,
Kroetsch's poem insists that identity is historically determined by the discursive rules
and prohibitions that regulate the act of enunciation. The Ledger concludes with an
appeal to the reader to "[m]arry the [t]error" and begin a transformational reading of
Canadian historical discourse which exploits the radical alterity of language to
reinscribe the effaced presence of an unrepresented historical experience. Holding to
the double register of deconstructive poetics, which simultaneously records and
overturns the "metaphysical" conception of history as presence, Kroetsch's radical
suggestion is that the "concealed other experience"61 within the Canadian word is the
history of Canada itself. Only by rethinking identity and deconstructing hegemonic
narratives of history can post-colonial culture move beyond the "authorized text" of
colonialist representation and risk the "nightmare and the welcome dream of Babel"62
that displaces Canada from an historical "origin" it never really knew.63
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Against Totality: Seed Catalogue and the Critique of Cultural Holism.
In his essay "Disunity as Unity: A Canadian Strategy" Kroetsch identifies the
plurality and disjunctiveness of Canadian cultural discourse(s) as the energising force
behind the nation's postmodern openness to influence and change. His keen awareness
of the "extreme intertextuality of Canadian culture"64 leads him to develop an aesthetic,
and a cultural politics, that privileges "traces, lies, misreadings, concealments,
fragments"65 over Northrop Frye's "unifying sense of what a mythic vision is."66
Against the implicit teleology (the rags-to-riches narrative) of "The American Dream,"67
with its nostalgic longing for "the story of the place and moment of origin,"68 Kroetsch
savours the historical ambiguity of "that old new place called Canada."69 As he
observes, "[a] great deal of Canadian writing centres on the small town or the isolated
community - and I suspect this is revealing in the way it announces the hesitation we
feel about our meta-narrative."70 Because of this instinctive refusal to valorise a
restricted and restrictive cluster of meta-narratives, Canadians "survive by working
with a low level of self-definition and national definition." "We insist on staying
multiple," Kroetsch reminds us, "and by that strategy we accommodate to our climate,
our economic situation, and our neighbours."71
The Ledger reveals the influence that Kroetsch's cultural politics have had upon
his textual strategies. By charting the movement of differance through the text of
Canadian history, Kroetsch opens the past up to critical reinterpretation and manages to
articulate the alterity of the colonial experience. In accordance with this deconstructive
revision of history, Canadians must prepare to "uncreate themselves into existence"72
by deconstituting unitary versions of the Canadian story. Yet this radical opening
becomes possible, Derrida notes, "only if differance is determined outside any
teleological or eschatological horizon."73
Kroetsch takes up the challenge of inscribing the alterity of the post-colonial
experience outside a teleological or eschatological horizon by deconstructing organicist
metaphors of identity and place. In Seed Catalogue he considers the way in which
conceptions of history and subjectivity transplanted from the life-cycle of the vegetable
organism have been used to underpin assimilative and teleological discourses of cultural
identity. The significance of organicist thought to Kroetsch is that its emphasis upon
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the reconciliation of oppositions and discordances within the natural totality of the
vegetable model contradicts the post-colonial need to seek disunity in unity and identity
within difference. His writing consequently explores the repressive influence that
social and political discourses indebted to the germinative model of organic
development (with their demand for unity, holism, and self-identity) have had upon the
legitimate expression of cultural difference. The connection between organicism and
the gradual elimination of heterogeneity is strengthened by the implicit teleology of the
organic model, in which "any human product or institution is envisioned as
germinating, without anyone's deliberate plan or intent, and as fulfilling its destiny
through an inner urgency, feeding on the materials of its time and place in order to
proliferate into its ultimate and living form."74 It is therefore no coincidence that
Kroetsch's ironic vision juxtaposes a playful examination of the closed 'organic'
society of 1930's Heisler, Alberta, with the devastations wrought by the totalitarian
cultural logic of Hitler's Germany.
In Seed Catalogue Kroetsch investigates the cultural and political consequences
for a rural Canadian community of the homogenising discourse of organic unity.
Perhaps the most influential exposition of the totalising character of the idea of the
organic whole is to be found in Coleridge's description of the poetic faculty:
He [the poet] diffuses a tone and spirit of unity, that blends, and (as it were)
fuses, each into each, by that synthetic and magical power, to which we have
exclusively appropriated the name of imagination. This power, first put in
action by the will and understanding, and retained under their intermissive,
though gentle and unnoticed controul (Iaxis efferteur habenis) reveals itself in
the balance and reconciliation of opposite or discordant qualities: of sameness,
with difference; of the general, with the concrete; the idea, with the image; the
individual with the representative; the sense of novelty and freshness, with old
and familiar objects; a more than usual state of emotion, with more than usual
order; judgement ever awake and steady self-possession, with enthusiasm and
feeling profound or vehement; and while it blends and harmonises the natural
and artificial, still subordinates art to nature [emphasis added]; the manner to
the matter; and our admiration of the poet to our sympathy with the poetry.75
The distance that Kroetsch must impose between the discourse of organic unity
and his own cultural politics is evident from this passage. In stark contrast to the
disjunctive and pluralistic ideal of "Disunity as Unity" Coleridge's organicist aesthetics
seek to reconcile sameness and difference within a more general "balance and
reconciliation of opposite or discordant qualities." Coleridge's formulation also
deliberately naturalises the movement of writing: the sign becomes a secondary effect of
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"that synthetic and magical power" by which the imagination replicates the internal
order of the vegetable organism. Writing is therefore transformed into the unfolding of
a poetic unconscious, in which the mind achieves a mystical harmony with the rhythm
of natural generation. As M. H. Abrams remarks:
[t]he momentous historical shift from the view that the making of a work of art
is a supremely purposeful activity to the view that its coming-into-being is,
basically, a spontaneous process independent of intention, precept, or even
consciousness, was the natural concomitant of an organic aesthetics.76
The full significance of Coleridge's borrowings from German Romantic
Idealism can be seen in the poetry of Wordsworth. In Wordsworth's poetry we see
that the "beauteous forms"77 of organic nature have a direct effect upon the poet's
moral sensibility. If we examine Wordsworthian moral consciousness more closely,
we encounter a development important for later theories of political nationalism.
"Tintern Abbey," which meditates upon the interrelationship of memory, nature, art,
and consciousness, offers an excellent example of the strand of Romantic aesthetics that
will come to concern us in Seed Catalogue. Through the transfiguring power of
recollection Wordsworth re-experiences the triadic structure of Romantic moral
consciousness, which we may schematise here as experience, self-abandonment, and,
finally, a mature understanding of heightened individuality articulated through a mature
bond with elemental nature. This form of the Wordsworthian dialectic is observable in
the following passage:
For nature then
(The coarser pleasures ofmy boyish days,
And their glad animal movements all gone by)
To me was all in all. -1 cannot paint
What then I was. The sounding cataract
Haunted me like a passion: the tall rock,
The mountain, and the deep and gloomy wood,
Their colours and their forms, were then to me
An appetite; a feeling and a love,
That had no need ofa remoter charm,
By thought supplied, nor any interest
Unborrowed from the eye. - That time is past,
And all its aching joys are now no more,
And all its dizzy raptures. Not for this
Faint I, nor mourn nor murmur; other gifts
Have followed; for such loss, I would believe,
Abundant recompense. For I have learned
To look on nature, not as in the hour
Of thoughtless youth; but hearing oftentimes
The still, sad music of humanity ... [emphasis added]
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If we focus our attention upon the italicised antithetical stage of this
Wordsworthian dialectic, it becomes apparent that an abandonment of self is induced in
the sensitive observer of the natural scene; overpowered by the force of natural
plenitude the registering consciousness wilfully suspends its ratiocinative faculties.
The temporary obliteration of personality prompted by the suspension of active being is
caught in these lines from the "Ruined Cottage" section of The Excursion:
Far and wide the clouds were touched,
And in their silent faces could he read
Unutterable love. Sound needed none,
Nor any voice of joy; his spirit drank
The spectacle: sensation, soul, and form,
All melted into him; they swallowed up
His animal being; in them did he live,
And by them did he live; they were his life.
In such access ofmind, in such high hour
Of visitation from the living God,
Thought was not: in enjoyment it expired™
[emphasis added]
In these lines we encounter a form of spiritual possession, a making-over of the self to
a power greater than the self. The effect of intoxication produced by the profusion of
paratactic clauses underlines this swoon of the spirit. An important feature of Seed
Catalogue is Kroetsch's political radicalisation of this form of Romantic self-
abandonment. Accordingly, the poem points out the connection between the
bewitchment of the Romantic sensibility by the organic power of nature and the
exploitation of a collective political unconscious by the advocates of an 'organic'
national cultural holism. By highlighting the transition from the discourse of organicist
aesthetics to the practice of closed political systems, Kroetsch is able to develop his
ironical thesis in which the catastrophe of Nazi politics is seen to be a savage extension
of the 'organic' community of Heisler, Alberta. The location of these societies as two
widely divergent points within an ideological continuum is illustrated by the irony of
Kenneth MacDonald's terrible return with "a cargo of bombs" (FN 65) to Cologne, the
birthplace of his great-grandmother Anna Weller. Interestingly, however, Seed
Catalogue argues that the dangers of the closed political society are not solely to be
eradicated through the onslaught ofMacDonald's cataclysmic homecoming, but must
rather be resisted at the level of that discursive appropriation which would redefine
culture, place, and identity in "terrible symmetry" (FN 65) with the organic ideal.79
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Seed Catalogue seeks then to call into question the role that organicist
metaphors play in the construction of individual and collective identity. Kroetsch
makes his intentions plain by ironically appropriating an organicist trope central to
Romantic poetics and presenting his poem as an autobiographical account of the growth
of a poet's mind. The complexity of Kroetsch's meditation upon both organicism and
Romantic notions of subjectivity may be gleaned from the tone of the "Author's Note"
that he appends to his Completed FieldNotes:
I did not realise until I heard the dialogue of "Seed Catalogue" with "The
Ledger" that I had in effect commenced a series of related poems that would in
devious ways seek out the forms sufficient to the project (I leave it nameless)
announced by Wordsworth and Whitman and rendered impossible by the
history and thought and art of the twentieth century.80
These words simultaneously introduce and problematise the Romantic project. The
idea of a "dialogue" between The Ledger and Seed Catalogue is significant because the
latter makes use of the deconstructive textual strategies of the former to put in question
the discourse of organic holism. This "devious" breach or act of opening is necessary
because the forcible closure of the organic body politic has had such murderous
consequences in "the history and thought and art of the twentieth century."
The effect of organicist discourse upon a Canadian search for self-definition is
ironically reflected in the poem's title, where "Seed Catalogue" refers simultaneously to
a book of horticultural classification and a record of a poet's imaginative development.
The idea of a "catalogue" or index of classification also carries with it an attention to
origins that is particularly relevant to the poem's meaning. This becomes clear if we
consider Paul de Man's description of Romantic visions of the natural object:
By calling them natural objects, we mean that their origin is determined by
nothing but their own being. Their becoming coincides at all times with the
mode of their origination: it is as flowers that their history is what it is, totally
defined by their identity. There is no wavering in the status of their existence:
existence and essence coincide in them at all times.81
In contrast to the coincidence of existence and essence that Romantic discourse
presumes, Kroetsch insists that the idea of 'origin' has no meaning outside discourse.
He therefore seeks to rupture the false immediacy of this permanent organic origin by
showing language to be "a non-origin which is originary."82 To do so, however,
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Seed Catalogue must undo the totalising metaphor of organic unity with which its
narrative commences.
From the first moments of Seed Catalogue Kroetsch engages himself in the
search for a language appropriate to "the home place" (FN 49). In an acute comment
upon the poem Peter Thomas has observed that its "search for an adequate language" in
which to explore post-colonial identity "is essentially the same as the quest for an
authentic self, to be defined by words somehow drawn from the very ground of
identity."83 Yet Kroetsch, unlike Thomas, is unwilling to speak so unequivocally of a
"ground of identity" since his deconstructive stance emphasises that this "ground" is
simultaneously constituted and deconstituted by the play of language. Indeed, the
opening lines of Seed Catalogue show how grounding discourses of identity and place
often depend upon an a priori correspondence between human and vegetable models of
development:
No. 176 - Copenhagen Market Cabbage: 'This new introduction, strictly
speaking, is in every respect a thoroughbred, a cabbage of highest pedigree,
and is creating considerable flurry among professional gardeners all over the
world.'
We took the storm windows / off
the south side of the house
and put them on the hotbed.
Then it was spring. Or, no:
then winter was ending.
'I wish to say that we had lovely success
this summer with the seed purchased
of you. We had the finest Sweet
Com in the country, and Cabbage
were dandy.'
- W. W. Lyon, South Junction, Man.
My mother said:
Did you wash your ears?
You could grow cabbages
In those ears. (FN 47)
This passage systematically exploits the undecideability of reference between
the human and non-human worlds in order to show the effect that organicist discourse
has upon our modes of perception. The first hint of semantic transference between
these two different worlds is given by Kroetsch's ambiguous employment of "flurry."
As a term to describe a type of human reaction, the word seems curiously misplaced;
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"excitement" would appear to be a more appropriate choice. But "flurry" suits
Kroetsch's purpose admirably because it refers at once to a human and an elemental
process. Similarly, Kroetsch's mother's complaint that "[y]ou could grow cabbages in
those ears" and the hired man's urge to plant "the little bugger" in the ground and "see
what grows" (FN 48) expose the implicit organicism of the Romantic image of the poet
as a force of nature. Yet Kroetsch resists the unconscious introduction of organicist
metaphors into our social and cultural discourse by continually stressing the
metaphoricity of the comparison between natural and human processes. Thus the seed
catalogue "bloomed / a winter proposition" (FN 48); while Hubbard Squash has a
"matchless variety of superlative flavour" (FN 51). With "proposition" and
"superlative" (terms which simultaneously facilitate statements about the world and
advert to the linguistic process by which the world is represented to consciousness)
Kroetsch disputes the possibility of a natural origin where existence and essence
coincide. Instead, he resituates the doctrine of organic unity back within the differential
exchange of language.
Peter Thomas has noted that the "closed structures of the agrarian mythos"
impose themselves upon Kroetsch's poetic autobiography through a series of
questions: "How do you grow a gardener?" "But how do you grow a lover?" "How
do you grow a prairie town?" "How do you grow a past . . .?" "But how do you
grow a poet?" "How / do you grow a garden?" 84 However, Kroetsch resists the
inscription of organicist teleology within the movement of subjectivity by locating these
identificatory gestures within a system of difference. His refusal to subordinate his
keen sense of alterity to the closed form of an imposed identity emerges with his
recollection of adolescent sexual experimentation:
Adam and Eve got caught
playing dirty.
This is the truth.
We climbed up into a granary
full of wheat to the gunny sacks
the binder twine was shipped in -
we spread the paper from the sacks
smooth sheets on the soft wheat
Germaine and I we were like / one
we had discovered, don't ask me
how, where - but when the priest said
playing dirty we knew - well -
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he had named it he had named
our world out of existence
(the horse was standing still) (FN 52)
Kroetsch's use here of an artificial line-break enables him to re-emphasise the
movement of differance in the form of the semiotic barrier between "like" and "one."
The natural unity demanded by the verb "grow" in the organicist discourse that orders
the text is therefore seen to be predicated upon a metaphorics of sameness. The image
of Adam and Eve "playing dirty" is appropriate because it was the desire for
unmediated knowledge of alterity that precipitated the banishment from the garden and
the falling-away from presence into the sign-system of language.85 By contrast, the
priest names the lovers' world out of existence because he takes the sign as a
transparent token of the divine Word rather than a node of hermeneutic struggle, and
thereby denies the experience of difference that underpins any post-colonial discourse
of self-identification.
In absolute contradistinction to the self-presence of the organic model, where
essence and existence are identical to themselves, Kroetsch defines prairie identity as
the product of a series of historical erasures and dislocations. "Everything in between"
the past and the present has somehow been "lost"; the prairie town is founded upon this
sense of historical "absence" (FN 53). In Seed Catalogue the gopher becomes the
native model for this experience of discontinuity: it is momentarily tall upon the vast,
open spaces; a flickering presence that vanishes suddenly into the anonymity of the
land:






gopher was the model. (FN 53)
Once the narrative discontinuity of the prairie experience has been established,
the organic model of Canadian identity {"How do you grow a past / to live in")
becomes ripe for appropriation by Kroetsch's deconstructive poetics. In Section Four
of the poem, Heisler is "defined as a series of absences, the whole passage being a kind
of antisong."86 But absence is by this stage not simply the expression of loss but also
a positive force for cultural renewal:
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How do you grow a past
to live in
the absence of silkworms
the absence of clays and wattles (whatever the hell
they are)
the absence of Lord Nelson
the absence of kings and queens
the absence of a bottle opener, and me with a vicious
attack of the 26-ounce flu
the absence of both Sartre and Heidegger
the absence of pyramids
the absence of lions
the absence of lutes, violas and xylophones (FN 54)
Kroetsch doubtless injects a note of genuine regret into the absence from Heisler of
"sailing ships," "ballet and opera" and "lutes, violas and xylophones." But the entry
that registers "the absence of both Sartre and Heidegger" makes a direct reference to the
criticisms of Western ontology that form the basis of Kroetsch's own deconstructive
poetics and affirms a vision of post-colonial identity transfigured by the experience of
alterity. It is therefore particularly fitting that this sequence of absences should
conclude with "the absence of Aeneas" and the displacement of one of the founding
mythologies of imperialist discourse.
Even at those moments where Kroetsch, overpowered by the endless series of
absences that frame the pioneer experience, seeks solace in the continuities of organic
process, his brief experience of plenitude is subverted by the paralogical play of
language:
I planted some melons, just to see what would
happen. Gophers ate everything.
I applied to the Government.
I wanted to become a postman,
to deliver real words
to real people.
There was no one there to receive
my application.
I don't give a damn if I do die do die do die do die do die
do die do die do die do die do die do die do die do die do
die do die do die do die do die do die do die do die do die
do (FN 55)
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The poet's first attempt to secure a ground from which to monitor the world
around him is a comic disaster; gophers, the visible symbols of ellipsis and
discontinuity, erase everything in sight. Next, he expresses his desire to establish an
authentic self that might experience language as a simple reflection of consciousness by
trying to deliver a message (and write a text) that can be totalised without leaving a
supplement of signification. But Kroetsch's ambition to circulate "real words" to "real
people" is frustrated by the absence of a reliable addressee. His playful admission that
there was no one to receive his message introduces an important theme: How is identity
produced and communicated across time? Kroetsch's implicit conclusion, namely that
identity and meaning are always prevented from attaining absolute self-presence by
their dependence upon the referrals, detours, and postponements of language, becomes
explicit as his text disintegrates into a random exchange of phonemes. Language
creates its own vectors and fields of meaning: the wail of a police siren detectable in "I
don't care if I do die do die do die ..." gently mocks Kroetsch's attempt to construct a
rigid linguistic order. In one of Seed Catalogue's many ironies, the authentic self of
the postman/poet is discovered, at the last, to be a random collection of letters.
The narrative forms appropriate to this suspension of established identificatory
motifs are the tall-tale and the extended anecdote. Kroetsch has confessed that he is
"still tempted by oral models where the story in the act of re-telling is always
responsive to individuals, to the place, to invention."87 The dependence of oral
narratives upon embellishments, additions, and acts of re-telling make them particularly
apposite forms through which to express the pervasive post-colonial sense of
experiencing history at one remove. Authenticity remains a problematic term for post-
colonial cultures because they are themselves the imaginative products of Western
cultural discourse. The Canadian story is therefore always already textualised: "Once
upon a time in the village of Heisler," Kroetsch begins, before he realises his first-order
discourse is already second-hand, "Hey, wait a minute. That's a story" (FN 57). But
if oral modes point out the prior mediation of Canadian experience, their dialogical and
open-ended structures include a space from which the colonial "other" can speak. Like
the eclectic narratives of Chaucerian fabliaux, prairie oral discourse works to
reincorporate the "absent texts, all the stories we're promised and never given"88 into
the public domain. This expansive, inclusive, and inherently democratic tradition
makes its ironic appearance in Seed Catalogue in the context of an organist metaphor
that it effortlessly exceeds:
How do you grow a prairie town?
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Rebuild the hotel when it burns down. Bigger. Fill it
full of a lot of A-l Hard Northern Bullshitters.
-You ever hear the one about the woman who buried
her husband with his ass sticking out of the ground
so that every time she happened to walk by she could
give it a swift kick?
-Yeh, I heard it. (FN 55)
In his prose fiction, Kroetsch frequently returns to the fluidity and
indeterminacy of oral art forms because their open narrative structures suggest "the
absence of any final, unalterable text"89 of colonial experience. The tension between
oral and typographic culture in Kroetsch's work is the central theme of What the Crow
Said, his sixth novel. In Seed Catalogue, the improvisatory character of western oral
culture (particularly the vertiginous play in the tall-story between form and the collapse
into formlessness) inspire him to develop a poetics of absence and displacement in
which individual and cultural identity are inscribed in an economy of traces:
This is a prairie road.
This road is the shortest distance
between nowhere and nowhere.
This road is a poem.
Just two miles up the road
you'll find a porcupine
dead in the ditch. It was
trying to cross the road.
As for the poet himself
we can find no record
of his having traversed
the land/in either direction
no trace of his coming
or going/only a scarred
page, a spoor of wording
a reduction to mere black
and white/a pile of rabbit
turds that tell us
all spring long
where the track was (FN 58-59)
This sparse, beautiful lyric figures Canada as a palimpsest: a text in which the
sign of an original presence is effaced by the continual rewriting of post-colonial
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identity. Against the defective totality of the organicist metaphor, which naturalises the
relationship between place, culture and subjectivity, Kroetsch argues that identity is
never experienced in an originary moment, but is always constructed afterwards as an
effect of language. The poet, like the land itself, is "a scarred page / a spoor of
wording." Language supplements identity and brings it to presence, but it also
introduces an idea of anteriority that renders meaningless the rhetoric of natural origins.
The "trace" or logic of the supplement exposes presence to the mark of an emptiness; it
consequently becomes an excellent metaphor for the ambivalent post-colonial response
to origin:
It [the supplement] adds only to replace. It intervenes or insinuates itself in-the-
place-of; if it fills, it is as if one fills a void. If it represents and makes an
image, it is by the anterior default of a presence. Compensatory and vicarious,
the supplement is an adjunct. ... As substitute, it is not simply added to the
positivity of a presence, it produces no relief, its place is assigned in the
structure by the mark of an emptiness.90
By developing a deconstructive poetics to inscribe absence within full presence,
Kroetsch overturns and displaces the organicist connection between identity and place.
Other attempts to write the vast Canadian spaces into history are more problematic. If
we remain with Derrida for a moment, the potentially dangerous relationship between
writing and representation becomes clear:
Writing is dangerous from the moment that representation there claims to be
presence and the sign of the thing itself. And there is a fatal necessity, inscribed
in the very functioning of the sign, that the substitute makes one forget the
vicariousness of its own function and make itself pass for the plenitude of a
speech whose deficiency and infirmity it nevertheless only supplements. . . .
The supplement adds itself, it is a surplus, a plenitude enriching another
plenitude, the fullest measure of presence. It cumulates and accumulates
presence. It is thus that art, techne, image, representation, convention, etc.,
come as supplements to nature and are rich with this entire cumulating
function.91
The danger of this textual plenitude from Kroetsch's perspective is that it reconstitutes
difference as identity and negates alterity altogether. In Seed Catalogue, this form of
writing is exemplified in the work of Rudy Wiebe, who is presented as the theorist of
an overwhelming narrative totality:
Rudy Wiebe: 'You must lay great black steel lines of
fiction, break up that space with huge design, and, like
the fiction of the Russian steppes, build a giant
artifact. No song can do that...'
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February 14, 1976. Rudy, you
took us there: to the Oldman River
Lorna & Byrna, Ralph & Steve and me
you showed us where
the Bloods surprised the Crees
in the next coulee/surprised
them to death. And after
you showed us Rilke's word
Lebensgliedes.
Rudy: Nature thou art. (FN 59)
The contradiction inherent in Wiebe's project is that his desire to "break up that
space with huge design" and create a monolithic discourse of Canadian history is
ahistorical to the extent that it situates 'history' beyond the play of the signifier. His
investigation of the political and ethical construction of narratives of Canadian
nationhood is duplicitous because it assumes that that these discourses exist outside
(and determine) writing itself.92 To underline the naturalisation of the sign and the
occlusion of alterity in Wiebe's writing, Kroetsch's back-handed compliment "Rudy:
Nature thou art" subtly resituates Wiebe's work within the discourse of organic holism
that Kroetsch has spent the entire poem striving to escape.
Kroetsch devotes the climactic ninth section of the poem to a meditation upon
the political consequences in "the history and thought and art of the twentieth century"
of organicist discourses of culture, identity and place. In a passage significantly
entitled "The danger of merely living," where the adverb "merely" indicates the
subsumption of active moral invigilation by the overpowering experience of natural
plenitude, he brings together the themes of Romantic self-abandonment, loss of ethical
agency and the perilous negation of alterity:
The danger of merely living.
a shell/ exploding
in the black sky: a
strange planting
a bomb/ exploding






It was a strange
planting.
the absence ofmy cousin who was shot down while bombing
the city that was his maternal great-grandmother's
birthplace. He was the navigator. He guided himself
to that fatal occasion:
- a city he had
forgotten
- a woman he had
forgotten
(FN 64)
In this section, Kroetsch undertakes a deconstructive examination of the
metaphor of organic process. He proceeds by exposing the closed organic model to the
rival semantic associations of language. Thus the image of "a shell / exploding / in the
black sky" combines in the first noun the antagonistic associations of the fecund and the
munitionary, thereby suggesting the hidden costs incurred by the discourse of organic
self-presence. This deconstructive reversal of a 'natural' process is continued by the
record of MacDonald's "strange planting" of bombs on his great-grandmother's
Cologne. The loss of critical distance that these lines impose between 'natural' and
'political' discourses of self-identity culminates in a perverse image of infanticide, in
which the tragic muse of twentieth-century European history feeds her "far" colonial
children back into the bloodsoaked soil of Hitler's Germany:
A strange muse: forgetfulness. Feeding her far children
to ancestral guns, blasting them out of the sky, smack/
into the earth. Oh, she was the mothering sort. Blood/
on her green thumb. (FN 65)
It is tempting to read MacDonald's untimely demise in the air over Anna
Weller's birthplace as an irony that underlines the fate reserved for the post-colonial
subject within totalising meta-narratives of political and cultural identity. Certainly, the
memory of his first cousin's death before the "ancestral guns" of wartime Europe is
sufficient for Kroetsch to fracture the formal logic of the politics of cultural totality:
He intended merely to release a cargo of bombs on a
target and depart. The exploding shell was:
a) an intrusion on a design that was not his, or
b) an occurrence which he had in fact, unintentionally
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himself designed, or
c) it is essential that we understand this matter
because:
He was the first descendant of that family to return
to the Old Country. He took with him: a cargo of bombs.
AnnaWeller: Geboren Cologne, 1849.
Kenneth MacDonald: Died Cologne, 1943.
A terrible symmetry. (FN 65)
Kroetsch's inability to understand the "design," "occurrence" or "matter" of
MacDonald's death is, these lines suggest, the logical consequence of the effacement of
alterity within totalitarian discourses of cultural order. In response, these disconnected
and open-ended clauses mock our ability to order chance and randomness into a
discourse of national or racial identity. True to the cultural critique advanced in
"Disunity as Unity," Kroetsch's fragmented and dislocated textual structures seek to
inscribe the mark of an emptiness within the "unified world view" of the "old stories"93
ofWestern cultural discourse.
The disintegration of unity into disunity at the end of Section Nine is followed,
at the beginning of Section Ten, by the inscription of differance within the teleology of
natural process:
After the bomb/ blossoms
After the city/ falls




to love our dying.
West is a winterplace.
The palimpsest ofprairie
under the quick erasure
of snow, invites a flight.
(FN 66)
In this passage the rhythm of natural renewal, which predicts the resurgence of
"blossoms" after the "bomb" has fallen, is interrupted by a deconstructive discourse
that conceptualises identity as the effect of differance. Against the coercive unity of the
organicist metaphor, the Canadian poet discovers himself on the "palimpsest of
prairie." The prairie becomes, in this image, an overdetermined textual space: a spatial
metaphor for "the lack at the origin that is the condition of thought and experience."94
By placing the prairie "under erasure" Kroetsch invites us to flee the notions of
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presence and origin that underwrite the closed politics of cultural totality. In a world
where the old myths of culture and identity no longer hold {"Adam and Eve got
drownded - Who was left?") the phrase "invites a flight" asks us to look beyond the
rhetoric of the seed catalogue and recall that archetypal Canadian, Kenneth MacDonald,
who hovered uncertainly between the Old and New World, and whose final "absence"
inspires the text that records his fall.
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Deconstruction and the Uncertain Ground of History
Speaking at The John Hopkins University in 1966, Derrida, in what is perhaps
the inaugural moment of the post-structuralist challenge to the Western academy,
outlines two different responses to the question of interpretation. One, which he
characterises as the "saddened, negative, guilty, Rousseauistic, side of the thinking of
play" is turned "toward the lost or impossible presence of the absent origin," while the
other is the "Nietzchean affirmation, that is the joyous affirmation of the play of the
world and of the innocence of becoming, the affirmation of a world of signs without
fault, without truth, and without origin which is offered to an active interpretation."
These two contrasted responses to play, interpretation, and origin are then brought
together in a famous and much-contested passage:
There are thus two interpretations of interpretation, of structure, of sign, of
play. The one seeks to decipher, dreams of deciphering a truth, or an origin
which escapes play and the order of the sign, and which lives the necessity of
interpretation as an exile. The other, which is no longer turned toward the
origin, affirms play and tries to pass beyond man and humanism, the name of
man being the name of that being who, throughout the history of metaphysics
or of ontotheology - in other words, throughout his entire history - has dreamed
of full presence, the reassuring foundation, the origin and the end of play. . . .
For my part, although these two interpretations must acknowledge and
accentuate their difference and define their irreducibility, I do not believe that
today there is any question of choosing - in the first place because here we are
in a region (let us say provisionally, a region of historicity) where the category
of choice seems particularly trivial; and in the second, because we must first try
to conceive of the common ground, and the diffe'rance of this irreducible
difference.95
Although it has become a critical commonplace to identify the second of these
positions - the Nietzchean affirmation of the play of the signifier over "an origin which
escapes play and the order of the sign" - as the hermeneutic stance of deconstructive
enquiry, it is clear from this counterpoised passage that the two modes of
interpretation are irreducible.96 If we follow Derrida's prompting and consider the
differance of this irreducible difference, we recognise that the symbiotic relationship of
origin and play is established by the structure of the sign itself. Thus the positivist
assumption that the sign can somehow embody and represent the presence of meaning
comes into inevitable conflict with the structural nature of signification, in which the
sign is repeated in different contexts, takes on new meanings, stands at a semantic
distance from its original manifestation. The point is that neither the idea of the sign as
presence nor the emphasis upon its dissemination of play and difference can be isolated
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as its primary cognitive mode; the differential and self-divided status of the sign
supplements its claim to be the grounding presence of meaning. The axiom of non¬
closure that the play of differences introduces suggests the possibility of origin, truth,
and presence at the same time as it prevents them coinciding absolutely with
themselves. In the typically paradoxical Derridean formulation, "[d]fferance produces
what it forbids, makes possible the very thing that it makes impossible."97 However,
the reciprocal and indissociable tension between play and origin is not only the
condition for the possibility of meaning and interpretation; the refusal of simple identity
at the origin and the displacement of presence into the process of difference and deferral
makes possible the concept of history:
But I have never believed that there were metaphysical concepts in and of
themselves. No concept is by itself, and consequently in and of itself,
metaphysical, outside all the textual work in which it is inscribed. That explains
why, although I have formulated many reservations about the "metaphysical"
concept of history, I very often use the word "history" in order to reinscribe its
force and in order to produce another concept or conceptual chain of "history":
in effect a "monumental, stratified, contradictory" history; a history that also
implies a new logic of repetition and the trace, for it is difficult to see how there
could be history without it.98
Derrida's reflection in these passages upon the constitutive tension between play
and history, such as his assertion that the play of meaning is indissociably linked to the
"play of the world" (or the endless series of "connections, correlations and contexts"99
by which we seek to interpret our lives), sheds light on both the strengths and
weaknesses of Kroetsch's most recent poetry. As The Ledger and Seed Catalogue
demonstrate, Kroetsch's work achieves its maximum political force when it exploits the
radical alterity of language to open up closed structures of historical representation. By
deconstructing the official ledger of pioneer history or subverting the metaphorics of
organic totality Kroetsch shows that identity is produced by the reciprocal play between
absence and presence. The textual logic of deconstructive poetics is well-suited to
Kroetsch's artistic revision of post-colonial identity: deconstruction's remorseless
undermining of binary structures, and its ability to overturn and displace concepts while
retaining an impression of their force in the interim, provides a space from which the
"other" can speak alongside an acknowledgement of the historico-political constraints
placed upon the expression of alterity. The effect of deconstructive practice upon
Kroetsch's cultural politics is evident in "Disunity as Unity," where an embattled,
pluralistic vision of post-colonial identity is established by the deconstitution of
Western meta-narratives of culture and place.
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Despite the artistic success of The Ledger and Seed Catalogue, there is,
however, a shift in Kroetsch's perceptions during the late 1970's that inaugurates a
new phase of his work. Put simply, his poetic output after Seed Catalogue charts a
movement away from a consideration of the historical inscription of post-colonial
identity toward a concern with the constitution of subjectivity in general. This
transition is marked in his critical writing by his belief that he has, by some unspecified
act of theoretical transcendence, "come to the end of deconstruction."100 In the
remarks that follow I want to suggest that Kroetsch's poetry of the decentred subject is
remarkable for its detachment of one aspect of the deconstructive process (the Derridean
emphasis upon the play of the signifier) in isolation from its broader historical
concerns. Kroetsch's work is based, in other words, upon a choice between play and
history that Derrida's writing simply refuses.
Although this change in Kroetsch's artistic stance produces, in The Sad
Phoenician, some of his finest poetry, it is predicated upon a confusion concerning the
nature of deconstuctive poetics that is particularly widespread today. By charting in
some detail the contradictions in Kroetsch's recent statements on deconstruction,
history, and textuality, I hope both to contribute towards an understanding of the latest
phase of his work and recover the practical value of deconstructive thought for
discussions of post-colonial identity. With these aims in mind, I intend to draw upon a
series of interviews he gave to Shirley Neuman and Robert Wilson, which were
published in 1982 under the title Labyrinths of Voice. Because of the improvisatory
nature of the interview format, we should be wary of treating Kroetsch's conversational
formulations as evidence of a set of final ideological positions. Given, however, the
range and depth of these encounters (stretching from April to November 1981), as well
as the fact of their subsequent publication, we are entitled to consider them as
comprising at the very least a provisional history of Kroetsch's theoretical beliefs and
commitments.
The text of these interviews is a remarkable document because of the clarity
with which it presents the dissociation and disintegration of Kroetsch's deconstructive
poetics. If The Ledger and Seed Catalogue explored the complex and necessary
tension between origin and play, Labyrinths of Voice shows Kroetsch advocating
grounded and groundless theories of interpretation at the same time. The two poles of
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Kroetsch's thought have swung apart: on one hand he endeavours to establish the
material conditions of signification; while on the other he asserts the ultimate
indeterminacy of meaning. The effect of this bifurcation in Kroetsch's approach to
language and literature has profound consequences for his 'postmodern' fiction, most
notably The Studhorse Man and Gone Indian. In his recent poetry, however, it is
marked by his increasingly defiant abandonment of historical context and his
concomitant celebration of the boundless possibilities of linguistic play.
In retrospect, it becomes clear that sometime during the 1970's Kroetsch's
work was invaded by a terrible doubt concerning the implication of differance for the
discursive hegemony of the author. This doubt has its basis in the contradiction
between the post-colonial writer's desire to question Western representations of history
and the need to offer a new vision of post-colonial history and culture on the writer's
own terms. The tension between Kroetsch's manifest distrust of 'history' and his urge
to name his own n^w world is evident everywhere in Labyrinths of Voice. What are
the consequences for the artist's sovereign control of his own imaginative world, he
reflects, of a deconstructive practice that problematises univocal definitions ofmeaning?
The more Kroetsch ponders this problem, the more intractable it appears: "Some kinds
of criticism may in fact be calculated to beat the author," he complains, "I think my
ultimate anxiety about deconstruction, or even structuralism, is its built-in objective of
winning over the author."101 At first Kroetsch attempts to resolve the contradiction
between authorial autonomy and the deconstructive subversion of closure by seeking a
point of lasting compromise between deconstruction and positivism. "I guess I have
the absurd hope that if I provide twenty names," he explains," then somewhere I will
reach a point where they all connect and become more realized or identifiable."102 But
he is too subtle a critic not to be aware that the radical instability of the act of
nomination is inscribed within the thinking of differance. Confronted with the schism
between his attempt to retain a residual univocity of utterance and the "certain pure and
infinite equivocality"103 that characterises deconstructive logic, Kroetsch can only
shore up his position by reintroducing the metaphysics of presence through the back
door. It is Kroetsch's nostalgic longing to ground meaning in the self-presence of the
authorial voice that ties behind his curious statement that "there is no difference finally
between written text and spoken text."104 The same need to regulate the dissemination
of difference informs Kroetsch's most sweeping remark on the relationship between
writing and interpretation: "I have a particular faith, still, in the occasion of speaking,
and I have, maybe, more trust of that occasion than the writing that I engage in."105
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This is an extraordinary point for such an avowedly post-structuralist writer to
make; it constitutes a reversion to the most uncritical logocentrism. As a statement of
theoretical principle it utterly contradicts Kroetsch's actual textual practice, which
foregrounds the tension between oral and graphic formations. Significantly, however,
Kroetsch's acknowledgement that he is in fee to the notion of presence that he
elsewhere challenges leads him to swing to the other extreme and repress the
nominative function of language altogether. The first sign of this tendency of his work
is perceptible in his admission that he is attracted to "deconstructionist critics like
Derrida" because they "talk about violence and free play. The writer asserts his
writerlinesss by doing violence."106 Kroetsch's valorisation of "free play" is revealing
because it suggests that "deconstruction" has become, by this stage of his career,
primarily a way of transferring value to the order of the signifier. Unable to sustain the
critical relationship between the repeated semantic displacements of his poetry and the
hypothesised univocity of his own authorial position, his response is frequently to
dissolve the historical scene of writing into the chain of its significations. The primacy
that Kroetsch accords the 'textual' over the 'historical' leads him to make some of his
most problematic remarks, such as "I might take the extreme position that there are no
'correct' accounts."107
Appropriately enough, the uncertainty that Kroetsch displays over the
establishment of a univocal ground for those discourses that he sets in play can be
illustrated by his recourse to the term "ground" itself. As we read the transcript of his
interviews with Neuman andWilson, it becomes apparent that the signifier "ground" is
placed under tremendous semantic pressure; it is not only used interchangeably as verb
and noun, but often employed in both positions simultaneously. This process reaches
its apotheosis in an exchange near the conclusion of Labyrinths ofVoice:
I'm talking about what we call "serious" writers I guess: there's almost a sense
of joking when they're being mimetic.... One of the things is that readers read
novels for information . . . read a new book to find out what its really like in
Washington or wherever ... so now there is a kind ofmockery in our sense of
security in the mimetic. But I think there is also another grounding and for me
it's very important to go back and test what I really call ground, using that
word deliberately. Ground as something that precedes interpretation or
categorization - or what I'm calling meaning.108
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In this passage "ground" is fulfilling two functions at once: it refers both to the primary
ground of human experience and the general text of differance that precedes our
conscious appropriation of the world. Eventually, then, Kroetsch's turn "toward the
lost or impossible presence of the absent origin" and his simultaneous "affirmation of a
world of signs without fault, without truth, and without origin" forces him to declare
both the primacy of difference before identity and the primacy of identity before
difference.
The complex and shifting relation to different strands of post-structuralist
thought outlined in Kroetsch's interviews and critical writings doubtless requires the
scope of a separate study. It remains, though, to point out that his increasing neglect of
the historical contingency of the deconstructive intervention precipitates an important
change of direction in his poetic outlook. After the publication of Seed Catalogue,
Kroetsch exchanges a broad historical canvas for a series of mediations upon the
character of subjectivity. In particular, Kroetsch extends Derrida's strategic emphasis
upon semantic indeterminacy to make a provocative connection between the historical
displacement of the post-colonial subject and the primary alienation of the
psychoanalytic subject divorced by language from an experience of originary plenitude.
Consequently, the new phase of his work, which encompasses poems such as The Sad
Phoenician and The Silent Poet Sequence and his most recent novel Alibi, becomes
available to a Lacanian reading. In the last section of this chapter, I want to explore the
possibilities of a discourse of the 'decentred' subject with a discussion of The Sad
Phoenician. I will then conclude this reading with some remarks upon the political
potential of a radical poetics of the subject for Kroetsch's broader cultural and historical
concerns.
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The Sad Phoenician: Towards a Poetic Economy of the Self
The trader invents a series of graphic signs which in its principle is no longer
attached to a particular language. This writing may in principle inscribe all
languages in general. It gains in universality, it favors trade and makes
communication "with other people who [speak] other languages" easier. But it
is perfectly enslaved to language in general the moment it liberates itself from all
particular languages. It is, in its principle, a universal phonetic writing. Its
neutral transparence allows each language its proper form and its liberty.
Alphabetic writing concerns itself only with pure representers. It is a system of
signifiers where the signifieds are signifiers: phonemes. The circulation of
signs is infinitely facilitated.109
With the publication of The Sad Phoenician in 1979, Kroetsch's poetic career
enters a new and distinctive phase. In contrast to The Ledger and Seed Catalogue,
which meditate powerfully upon the textualisation of historical origins, The Sad
Phoenician records the attempt of the conscious mind to construct self and world from
the shifting patterns of language. Kroetsch's concentrated emphasis here upon the
relationship between language and subjectivity is noted by Robert Lecker when he
writes "[t]hroughout the poem the Sad Phoenician reminds us that his quest is self-
reflexive: his word-trading allows him to explore both the nature of poetic language and
his nature as a being defined by language."110 Lecker's characterisation of the
Phoenician as "a being defined by language" is well-judged, because Kroetsch's poem
is marked by its refusal to believe that the world exists for us prior to language or that
subjectivity is always already coherent, always already at the centre of things. Instead
the Phoenician, with his hypersensitivity to the motion of writing and to the plurality of
disconnected voices that make up the modem cultural sphere, personifies the dispersed
subject of postmodernism, who is emancipated from the tyranny of the requirement to
produce and exhibit a perfect identity with itself, but who must also construct an image
of selfhood (and a politics) from the repeated dislocations of language.
The connections that Kroetsch makes in The Sad Phoenician between
polyvocality, a release from the constraints of the coherent self, and a revision of
cultural identity, emerge forcefully from his various critical remarks upon the poem. In
an interview with his wife, Smaro Kamboureli, he comments that the work combines
"the searching or longing for home, the looking for home again" with "the awareness
that home is not a final place, not a fixed place."111 Meanwhile, he states on the cover
of the original Coach House Press edition of the poem that his interest in the figure of
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the Phoenician was stimulated by the disordering effect that their peripatetic trading
activities had upon established networks of social and cultural affiliation. Typically for
Kroetsch, the idea of identity is inextricably linked with language as a model of
representation and communication. The Phoenicians therefore become important
because of their demystification of the sacred properties of the Word; in one of the
strategic inversions of hierarchical order so vital to acts of cultural redefinition, they
"moved writing from the temple, down to the wharf." By treating language as a simple
medium of exchange, their desacralisation of writing worked against immanent or
transcendental theories of value to free us from the "fixed image" of meaning into "the
pattern and tumble of sound."112
The generic noun "Phoenician" in the poem's title works simultaneously at two
levels: it ascribes an identity to the poet, the "Sad Phoenician of Love" (FN 88), whose
refusal to place himself at the centre of his imagined world is reinforced by the
continual displacements of his text; and it symbolises an historic rupture in the
relationship between epistemology, subjectivity, and language. The Phoenician
development of alphabetic writing introduces, in Derrida's words, a system of
signifiers where the signifieds are themselves signifiers, infinitely facilitating the
circulation of signs. The substitution of this universal trading language for local or
regional modes of transcription significantly expands the global possibilities of
communication at the same time as it introduces difference and deferral into the
production of meaning. Both the freedom and the terror engendered by this endless
displacement of the identifying relationship between self and world are experienced by
the poet as he describes a life constructed and deconstructed by the materials of
language. His fascination with the potential of typographic form is important because it
offers him an escape from the order imposed by the organs of speech and vision.
Idiom and dialect commit us to social identities; while sight places the speaker at the
centre of the phenomenal world. But Kroetsch's poet withdraws into a private
subjective space occupied only by memory and the letters of the alphabet. Here, the
self no longer seeks coherence in the evidence of vision for that is constantly disturbed
by the possibilities ofmemory, while the continuity ofmemory is itself broken by the
radical disjunctions of language. Liberated from the imaginative limits set by the single
voice, the Sad Phoenician's poetic autobiography produces a multiple syntax that
enables a range of voices to flicker across the surface of the text. An aesthetics of
discontinuity is thereby created which inscribes heterogeneity within the poet's primary
act of self-registration.
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Kroetsch's attention in The Sad Phoenican to the contingent, his insistence on
the impossibility of unifying experience except at the cost of repression, and his refusal
of a unitary voice pick up themes from his cultural criticism. Indeed, the Sad
Phoenician's discovery that his life can only be written as the record of a continual
displacement from self-identity echoes the conclusions of "Disunity as Unity," where
the tensions of the "Canadian story" reveal a disunity "so radical that it physically splits
the hero" but which paradoxically offers the "discovery of unity."113 Individual self-
estrangement therefore becomes a metaphor for cultural dislocation and renewal. It is
the purpose of this section to argue that the link Kroetsch seeks to establish between
decentred subjectivity and cultural redefinition is problematic for a radical post-colonial
cultural politics. Before this criticism is made, though, I want to suggest that the
relationship between language, identity, and alterity that The Sad Phoenician proposes
is most profitably considered within the discourse of Lacanian psychoanalysis. This
thesis will explore the relevance of Lacanian thought to Kroetsch's work more
extensively in Chapter Two and Chapter Eight; some brief remarks on the subject here,
however, may serve to illustrate the difference between The Sad Phoenician and
Kroetsch's previous poetry while prompting reservations concerning an examination of
post-colonial alienation within a Lacanian economy of the subject.
Lacanian psychoanalytic theory offers an interesting context for Kroetsch's
work because it shows how identity is constituted by the subject's entry into the
differential exchange of language, and is therefore always already underscored by
division and difference. Thus for Lacan, the primal stage of identity constituted by the
mother-child dyad is fractured by the acquisition of language; at this point the subject
differentiates not just between self and other but between self and an entire series of
others. An alienation occurs because the subject's sense of self is constituted by
something outside of it. The mark of this alienation is the distinction between the
subject and the ego. As Fredric Jameson remarks, with the acquisition of language "the
pronoun, the first person, the signifier, results in a division of the subject or Spaltung
which drives the 'real subject' as it were underground, and leaves a 'representative' -
the ego - in its place."114 The ego is therefore constituted by the symbolic order. It
becomes the self that 'I' represent to myself; the 'subject' denotes the self that does the
representing. The gap between the subject and the ego inscribes lack at the heart of
subjectivity. As a subject, 'I' want to overcome my alienation from the other; to do so
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entails a return to unity with the primordial mother. Since nothing can ever fulfil this
function (short of death) T seek this other through my engagement with all other
subjects who become substitutes for my desire for primordial unity. A continual series
of displacements begins in which the desire for identity unmediated by language slips
over into a desire for others which fills the lack that characterises my subjectivity.
The move into the symbolic order of language therefore marks a transition
beyond the absolute identity of the pre-linguistic stage. With the entry into the realm of
signification, identity becomes intersubjective - an effect of the positions opened up for
the subject by language. Following the subject's admission into a pre-existent
symbolic order, moreover, its self-representations become inescapably mediated by
language. From this moment on the subject takes up the path of the signifier: multiple,
overdetermined, continually displaced from itself by the signifying chains of language.
In the words ofMalcolm Bowie,
Whereas the ego, first glimpsed at the mirror stage, is the reified product of
successive imaginary identifications and is cherished as the stable or would-be
stable seat of personal 'identity', the subject is no thing at all and can be
grasped only as a set of tensions, ormutations, or dialectical upheavals within a
continuous, intentional, future-directed process.115
The discovery that identity and meaning can be grasped only as a set of
tensions, displacements, or mutations is the central theme of the poem's opening
section:
but the woman in Montreal is not so evasive, not so given
to outright lies, deceptions
and when she gets the letter I wrote last night, she'll say
but darling, I was following a fire truck
and quite by accident found the divine, ha, flicker
but if I don't even bother to mail the letter she'll learn
what it feels like to be ignored ... (FN 77)
These early lines are suggestive of Kroetsch's general poetic strategy in The Sad
Phoenician, which is to refuse context in favour of text, familiar continuity in favour of
fresh juxtapositions. It becomes clear, for instance, that meaning is not expressed here
by a mimetic relationship between sign and referent but is produced by the semantic
tension between individual words. Thus the line "and quite by accident found the
divine, ha, flicker" opens itself through a complex series of puns to multiple
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interpretation. Our attention is occupied at one level by the simple juxtaposition of
"divine" and "found," which both inhabit the same semantic space. Yet if we return to
the wider associations introduced by the complete line, we see that the collocation of
"accident," "found," and "divine" usher in one of the contradictions that give the poem
its meaning. By reversing the printed order of these words, we arrive at the sacred site
of the "divine/found/accident" (the birth of Christ), the moment of incarnation where
the sacred and profane worlds were brought into alignment to foreclose on difference in
general. But Kroetsch's ludic refusal to privilege one mode of interpretation over
another severs the connection between signifier and signified and displaces the reader
from one context to the next. The priority Kroetsch accords to puns, ellipses, and
juxtapositions draws attention to the fractures in the text and cautions us to read
forwards, backwards and between the lines of the Phoenician's address. Meanwhile,
the poem's ceaseless subversion of consecutive logic is emphasised by the bipolar
structure of "and" and "but" which assert and then suspend judgement, leaving each
poetic statement at the mercy of the following line.
Identity and value are then to be discovered through the poetic economy of
language: they are contingent effects of the circulation, trade, and exchange of signs.
The Phoenician composes his own history by "trading in language" (FN 79): he has no
existence outside the 26 characters of the alphabet that divide each incomplete chapter of
his life. It is significant that every one of the alphabetic characters that heads a segment
of text is obscured, partly hidden, on the point of dissolution back into the virgin
blankness of the page. In this way, Kroetsch reminds us that writing is a process
invaded by a radical alterity; this gesture effacing the presence of a thing and yet
keeping it legible alludes momentarily to the complete semiological system that defines
each signifier as a product of difference. The sign, in the Phoenician's dislocated
textual universe, is always already inhabited by another sign that never appears as such.
His "nominal poetics of accretion, process and participation"116 therefore exploit
language as an open field for the play of differences within the closed structure of the
Western alphabet.
By placing presence under erasure, Kroetsch is able to show that the
Phoenician's identity is an effect of his "astounding fall from innocence" (FN 78) into
the discordant kingdom of language. It is no longer possible to speak of the Phoenician
in terms of a coherent self, because he exists everywhere and nowhere, composed and
81
deconstituted by the restless sea of language. Consequently, his wry remark "I don't
think a little frankness would kill any of us" (FN 78), with its punning emphasis upon
"frank" as both a token of sincerity and an official guarantee of identity, is a calculated
act of dissimulation. For the Phoenician's diffuse identity is in fact produced by the
principle of non-identity inscribed in language as a structure of difference and
deferment. He alludes to his dependence upon this linguistic double dealing when he
admits that he lives "by a kind of resistance" (FN 90) in which "the poem must resist
the poet" (FN 82). Similarly, the reader can only construct a fleeting image of the
speaker by attending to the trading surplus amassed by individual signs within different
contexts of exchange. In Section C, the Phoenician transforms our hermeneutic
dilemma into his own axiom of artistic intention:
and virtue will out; I have my integrity; I know my own
worth
but I do have feelings, just because I'm a poet doesn't mean
I have no feelings ofmy own, poets are human; I am, you
might say, a kind of Phoenician, with reference, that is,
to m> trading in language, even in, to stretch a point,
ha, my being at sea
and the Phoenicians gave us the whole works (FN 79)
Two different orders of statement are evident in this passage. At the level of
brute fact, the poetic 'I' is granted a minimal form of identity: he is a "poet," a
"Phoenician," a wordsmith. However, the same words that vouchsafe these tenuous
autobiographical details conceal the identity that they claim to uncover: unassuming and
conversational, they are always surplus to requirements. The vertiginous gap between
sign and referent is initially suggested by the abundance of qualifiers that constrain the
Phoenician's testimony: the locutions "you might say," "with reference," "a kind of,"
"that is," "even in," "to stretch a point," and "ha" do not contribute to the impression of
a simple revelation of self. Our sense of disorientation increases with the realisation
that these words parody cartographical or fixed representations of identity, playfully
aligning "reference" and "point" while pointing to the trade "in language" that
exchanges presence for signs. The Phoenician's dissolution of presence into the
associational patterns of language eventually becomes overt with his reference to his
"being at sea" which asks us to see the connection between "sea" and "C", the title of
this section of the poem.
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The secret of the Phoenician's play between letter and concept is, as Lecker
suggests, "to expand the metaphoric associations made with each letter of the alphabet
while simultaneously denying the value of this expansion."117 Another example occurs
in Section F, in which "foot" provokes a reflection on "the shoes I'm wearing this
morning" and "the foot as we refer to foot in / the line of poetry" (FN 82). By charting
the random associations of the signifier in this way, Kroetsch attempts to create a new
language appropriate to the elisions, juxtapositions, and displacements of mental
process. As a figure representing the lexical possibilities of the Phoenician alphabet,
the speaker continually reminds us that he is constituted by the 26 scriptable characters
that he disseminates. The ontological gap between experience and representation
therefore has no meaning for him as he is endlessly remade by the protean flux of
language:
and any port in a storm they say: the dreamer, himself:
lurching, leaping, flying; o to be mere gerund; no past,
no future: what do you do in life: I ing
but the door, cracked, opened; the lover who would, did; the
night knelt into morning
and is it not true that black is the absence of deceit...
(FN 80)
To exist at the level of what Seamus Heaney calls "pure verb"118 is to
experience a form of absolute present that subordinates historical consciousness to the
perpetual flow of becoming. Kroetsch's achievement in The Sad Phoenician is to
show that the Phoenician's luxuriance in the signifiying possibilities of language is the
exercise of a treacherous freedom born out of an inevitable sense of incompletion and
loss. In the following extract the submerged pathos of the poem, engendered by the
Phoenician's urge to reclaim a lost subjective unity that is always already inscribed with
difference and lack, becomes an almost tangible event:
and the theory itself fails, the doctrine of, I forget what;
not the chain of being, Christ knows, I've tried that
one on
but I can love, even the black holes, even the gaited sun,
the galloping night, the earthworm riding the silver
grass
and the bursting guts of this old cinder
but I'm down today, I'm don't
and take it from me, I am dwarf to her needments, I lug
them, after, uphill
but every cloud has (FN 87)
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On the surface this dense passage, with its breezy colloquialisms ("I've tried
that one on"; "the bursting guts of this old cinder") and its strained archaisms ("even the
gaited sun, / the galloping night"), appears merely one more rhetorical gambit to
reconcile the Phoenician to the "black holes" at the core of his being. But if we pay
close attention to the poem's delicate exchange of phrases, a rather different picture
emerges. In the spatial juxtaposition and elision of the "silver" grass, the phrase
"dwarf to her needments" and the broken sentence "but every cloud has" we gain a true
measure of the speaker's desperation. Using the semantic pressure applied by "silver"
and "cloud" upon the middle phrase, Kroetsch metamorphoses "needments" into those
"needles" that underpin the adage "every cloud has a silver lining." By this most suave
of phonetic associations, Kroetsch uncovers the yawning emptiness that pervades the
Phoenician's text, personified by the spectral women who offer brief moments of
emotional empathy, but are always already elsewhere, lost in his intricate web of
words.
The Phoenician's response to his experience of alienation and lack is to take
refuge in the multiple chains of the signifier and to challenge the positions assigned to
the subject by language:
but I'll tell you something, I'll let you in on a secret
and why the ladies haven't guessed my longing, that
buffaloes me
but here goes: throw salt over your left shoulder, avoid
cracks, ha, walk away rather than toward, spell
pig backwards
and say funny
but I mean: all things being equal, fight fire with fire
and might not the flame be me, get it; he is a manifestation
of I
but haven't we met (FN 88)
A longing for wholeness and plenitude is transformed here into an acceptance of the
intersubjective relation. The inextricable relationship between the subject and the
"other" that reciprocally defines it emerges in the observation that "he is a manifestation
/of I." The same impulse towards difference and equivocity characterises his remarks
upon his own textual practice. Tired of being "galley slave to a penny's worth of /
words" (FN 83) he sings the praises of "Miss Reading" (misreading) and the "woman
in Nanaimo" (no name) who follows his trajectory from the single to the plural since "x
marks the known, the spot where she was / but isn't" (FN 82).
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In concluding my remarks upon The Sad Phoenician I want to suggest that
Kroetsch's drift towards a Lacanian poetics of the subject is problematic for a
postmodern revision of post-colonial identity. In making this statement, I am not
alleging the illegitimacy of Lacanian psychoanalysis for a political critique of discursive
formations: on the contrary, Alibi, which shares many features with The Sad
Phoenician, is a provocative and largely successful account of the effect hegemonic
discourses of cultural order have had upon the expression of post-colonial difference.
Yet if we ponder the word "discourse" in the previous sentence we come, I believe, to
the heart of the problem. Thus Kroetsch's novels, which are remarkable for their
double plots, dual narratives, and mutually antagonistic narrators, incorporate the
Phoenician's postmodern poetics of language and desire into a discursive form that
enacts the struggle between contending interpretations of history, culture, and
subjectivity within its basic structure of meaning. The fundamental tension in
Kroetsch's work between identity and difference, and between singularity and
diversity, is expressed, in texts such as The Words ofMy Roaring, Gone Indian, and
Badlands, through powerful political meditations upon discourse, power, and the cost
of historical and cultural dispossession. In contrast, the disembodied voice of The Sad
Phoenician separates the play of the signifier from what Derrida calls "the play of the
world." It therefore explores identity exclusively in terms of the multiple displacements
of language in blithe disregard of the question of the subject's access to, or exclusion
from, the order of discourse.
To put this another way, The Sad Phoenician is notable for its attempt to
express the alienation of the individual subject without considering that alienation is a
political and historical fact as well as a psychological experience. If we return to my
earlier caveat about the word "discourse," it seems that what is lacking in Kroetsch's
poem is some form of concentrated attention to the ways certain discourses of history
and identity are privileged over others. Why, in other words, are some discursive
positions unavailable to the alienated post-colonial subject? And what material forces
preserve the contract between the logocentric denial of difference and the imperialist
vision of history? As Edward Said has written:
What forces keeps all these ideas glued together? What forces get them into
texts? How does one's thinking become infected, then taken over by those
ideas? Are all these things matters of fortuitous coincidence, or is there in fact
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some relevant connection to be made, and seen, between the instances of
logocentrism and the agencies perpetuating it in time?119
If the dehistoricised world of The Sad Phoenician is reticent about the historical
conditions that exist prior to certain experiences of alienation, Kroetsch's openness to
the Lacanian economy of the subject merely compounds the problem. A difficulty
arises because psychoanalytic discourse attempts to discover the grounds for
subjectivity in general. By examining the experience of alienation solely in terms of the
subject's divorce from primordial plenitude, Kroetsch loses the historical specificity of
post-colonial displacement. In contrast to The Ledger and Seed Catalogue, which
explore the interpenetration of historical and textual constructions of alterity, The Sad
Phoenician suffers from what the Phoenician himself calls "the / prevalence of same"
(FN 94). Ironically, then, a decade after Kroetsch began to re-examine the otherness
of the post-colonial experience, his poetics of alterity speak only of the collective
displacement of humanity from a moment of originary unity. If Kroetsch's
archaeological poetics of origin foundered because of its misguided attempt to convert
the "other" into the "same," the emphasis of The Sad Phoenician on the constitutive
alienation of subjectivity demands that the "same" (human experience in general) be
seen as the "other." If we are to find a way beyond this connundrum we must explore
the textual strategies of Kroetsch's seven novels, which offer an exemplary meditation
upon identity, alterity, and the politics of representation.
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Chapter Two
The Problem With Mirrors:
But We Are Exiles and the Limits of Mimesis
The question of identity is not exactly the Canadian question. That is an
interpretive matter for people who already have their story. We ask, rather,
what is the narrative of us? We continue to have a crisis about our own story.
The very ability to see ourselves is based on the narrative mode: the I telling a
story of I, of we, of the they who mirror us. We name, from the world's story-
body, the recurrences and obsessions and strategies that become, in turn, the
naming of a culture called Canada.1
My readings of Kroetsch's poetry in the preceding section of this thesis have
attempted to show that his examination of cultural history and identity may be most
profitably understood as a problematisation of the relationship between language,
history and subjectivity. Following Kroetsch's evolution from the broadly
phenomenological stance of "Stone Hammer Poem" to the deconstructive and
psychoanalytic discourses of the subject that characterise his later poetry, I have argued
that the conceptual development within Kroetsch's poetics has coincided with a
deepening awareness of the ideological content of historical and cultural discourse. We
might best sum up his position by stating that what began as the desire to create an
unmediated discourse of historical origins metamorphosed into the need to decreate the
official record of Canadian history. We should note that in this second
"deconstructive" position the meaning of the term "post-colonial" has broadened from a
concern for the immediate political status of a cultural environment to an exploration of
the signifying process by which that environment is represented. Consequently,
Kroetsch's poetry searches for a form of expression in which to describe a culture
alienated from historical 'origin' by the nature of the language that it uses. In his best
work this process culminates in the discovery of startling metaphors for the experience
of cultural displacement, seen either as the originary non-origin of writing or the
alienation of the psychoanalytic subject from the wholeness of primal plenitude.
The dialectic in Kroetsch's work between the desire to create a new language of
place and the experience of cultural displacement is symptomatic of a more general
tension within post-colonial writing. It arises from the paradoxical situation in which
the post-colonial subject is compelled to articulate its experience within the constraints
of a "mandarin language."2 Within Kroetsch's critical lexicon, this term refers
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specifically to those European and American discourses of value that project their own
cultural codes onto the "uninscribed" territory of the Canadian "other." By this
process, the difference that the "other" signifies can be recuperated within the systemic
codes of the colonising culture. In the imperial context, post-colonial difference is
interpreted as an aberration that can only be corrected by the liberal application of
'truth,' 'order' and 'reason.' Through this strategic transposition of values, the
problematic of cultural difference is removed and a hierarchical structure of power
perpetuated. The alienating effects produced by the superimposition of imperial codes
onto post-colonial culture is described by Ashcroft, Griffiths, and Tiffin:
The most widely shared discursive practice within which this alienation can be
identified is the construction of 'place.' The gap which opens between the
experience of place and the language available to describe it forms a classic and
all-pervasive feature of post-colonial texts. This gap occurs for those whose
language seems inadequate to describe a new place, for those whose language is
systematically destroyed by enslavement, and for those whose language has
been rendered unprivileged by the imposition of the language of a colonizing
power. Some admixture of one or other of these models can describe the
situation of all post-colonial societies.3
The same critics have noted that "[t]he alienation of vision and the crisis in self-
image which this displacement produces is as frequently found in the accounts of
Canadian 'free settlers' as of Australian convicts, Fijian-Indian or Trinidadian-Indian
indentured labourers, West Indian slaves, or forcibly colonized Nigerians or
Bengalis."4 The seven novels that Kroetsch has published during the last three decades
respond to this predicament by investigating the relationship between images of
Canadian cultural identity and the sites from which discourses of Canadian history are
produced. In particular, these texts are remarkable for their sustained effort to hold
within a common imaginative space both those dominant discourses of identity and
value that exclude the heterogeneous from the domain of utterance and images of
Canadian "difference" that resist such discursive enclosure. Behind this strategy of
contestation lies a profound unease regarding the efficacy of mimesis as a means of
recovering the quiddity of Canadian experience. As I will shortly show, mimesis is of
dubious value for a radical post-colonial poetics because its claim to provide
unmediated access to a 'reality' behind and prior to the text in question reproduces the
colonising gesture of imperialist discourse which reassimilates post-colonial
"difference" within an already-given matrix of identification and value. What is
denounced in mimesis from the heterological stance of post-colonial culture is that
moment of recuperation which Fredric Jameson describes in another context as
a system of allegorical interpretation in which the data of one narrative line are
radically impoverished by their rewriting according to the paradigm of another
narrative, which is taken as the former's master code or Ur-narrative and
proposed as the ultimate hidden or unconscious meaning of the first one.5
Against the subordination of indigenous narratives of Canadian experience to
the "master code" of European and American cultural discourse, Kroetsch's fiction
develops from the 'limited' or 'troubled' realism of his first two novels towards a
parodic and deconstructive form that considers the way discursive practices construct
the objects that they explicate. The difficulty of the subversive allegories of power that
Kroetsch presents in his mature 'postmodern' writing arises because they recreate as
well as examine the strategies of domination that concern them. By demanding that the
reader struggle for a version of the truth between the antagonistic narratives of figures
such as Mark Madham and Jeremy Sadness, Kroetsch inscribes the post-colonial
tension between different discursive structures into his own texts. Crucially, his novels
resolutely refuse to resolve this discursive difference into a single field of meaning;
instead, these texts strive to create an "antitranscendent hermeneutic model"6 for the
experience of cultural displacement. By forestalling the move into an order of meaning
'behind' or 'outside' the signifying process, Kroetsch inhibits the construction of a
meta-narrative for Canadian experience and links the question of identity to those orders
of discourse that demarcate Canada as "other" to their own cultural traditions.
Kroetsch's texts map out a cultural topography where binaries meet and come
into conflict. His novels register the fateful encounter of east and west, male and
female, oral culture and post-Gutenberg print-consciousness, the transgressive play of
desire and the closed structures of tradition. These conflicts, as well as the
transmutations that define them, are expressed in the metaphor of the border that
defines, fragments, and reconstitutes the world of Kroetsch's fiction. In his first two
novels, the structure of binary oppositions that dominates his artistic vision is calculated
to reflect the contradictory position of a people which has historically received a
representation of its experience in the discourse of another culture. By exploiting the
intrinsic binarism of the structuralist semiotic paradigm, Kroetsch reveals in these texts
the internal division of the post-colonial subject trapped between the opposed cultural
codes of New and Old World discourse. But as I shall argue in Chapter Four, the
dependence of a structuralist poetics upon the opposition of differences without positive
terms leaves Kroetsch locked within a closed synchronic system that generates meaning
solely through the internal relation between the twin elements of the dyad. Such a
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system is perfectly able to reflect the paralysis of a life lived according to the "equally
matched opposites"7 of Canadian cultural discourse; but it is quite unable to show that
binary structures are historically constituted forms whose appearance of equivalence
merely disguises a hierarchical relation of domination between the two opposed terms.
On one hand, the refusal of structuralist analysis to discuss one term without reference
to an other that reciprocally defines its meaning lends Kroetsch an ideal framework in
which to examine the identification of Canada as an "other" within European and
American cultural discourse; but on the other hand, the atemporal conceptual doublings
of structuralist poetics denies him a position from which to consider the historical and
political forces that introduce the question of alterity into discussions of post-colonial
cultural identity.
If we pursue this criticism, we can see that Kroetsch's difficulty with the
unaccented differences of the structuralist paradigm is that they do not consider the
effects of violence and contamination by which the "other" of dominant cultural
discourse is constructed, established, and perpetuated. His transition from a realistic
'reflection' of the stasis produced by the collision of opposed cultural codes in The
Words of my Roaring to a 'postmodernist' investigation of the construction of
discourses of the subject in his mature fiction is provoked by his recognition that there
is no position from which the "other" can speak simply as "other" without recourse to
the violent system of totalisation that produces the notion of alterity itself. Kroetsch's
response must therefore be to deconstruct Western constructions of colonial
subjectivity. The necessity of this shift towards a deconstructive poetics can be
illustrated by brief reference to Derrida's critique of the thought of Emmanuel Levinas
and Michel Foucault. Levinas's philosophical project is characterised by the desire to
achieve an experience of the "other" as "other" in a moment of pure revelation. This
identification of the "other" is non-violent because Levinas wants to experience alterity
as a "positive infinity," as everything that exceeds the boundaries of conceptuality
which in turn subordinate the notion of alterity to the demand for self-identity. But for
Derrida, the non-violent revelation of the "other" outside the totalising logic ofWestern
philosophical discourse is an impossible dream. As he remarks of Levinas's project,
"the nudity of the face of the other - this epiphany of a certain non-light before which all
violence is to be quieted and disarmed - will still have to be exposed to a certain
enlightenment."8 Here Derrida's ironic emphasis on the idea of "enlightenment" insists
that any attempt to escape the violence of metaphysics is doomed because itwill always
be forced to speak from within metaphysics itself. Consequently the "other" can
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never be experienced as radically "other" but to be discussed must first be reassimilated
within the sphere of conceptuality (thought, writing, speech, iterability in general)
which defines it as "other." Alterity can therefore never be experienced as a pure term:
it must be negatively defined against sameness. As such, the non-violent gesture
towards otherness is instantly reincorporated within the violent process of absence,
exclusion, and totalisation by which meaning is produced from an infinity of signifying
possibilities. The violence of conceptualisation and representation cannot even be
alleviated by an escape into the self-presence of speech. For as Derrida points out,
"[t]he limit between violence and nonviolence is perhaps not between speech and
writing but within each of them."9
Derrida's rejection of the idea of a pure revelatory experience of the "other"
outside the determination of Western metaphysics and his emphasis on the implicit
violence of the signifying process are central to a discussion of Kroetsch's work. All
of Kroetsch's writing explores the problem of inscribing post-colonial identity in a
language rich with the alluvia of its colonial inheritance. His gradual acceptance of the
proposition that it is impossible to speak from the position of the "other" within the
confines of a "mandarin language" leads him to develop a series of double plots in
which the transcendent dream of identity as pure alterity is confronted with the
impossibility of defining identity outside Western discourses of the subject. The
experience of Jeremy Sadness, Anna Dawe, and William Dorfendorf are graphic
illustrations of this process. Discussions of post-colonial identity, in other words, are
always already contaminated by the discourse of colonialism. To show more clearly
what is meant by the term "contamination" we need look no further than Derrida's
devastating critique of Foucault's desire to articulate the discourse of madness in
Madness and Civilisation. Derrida's drift in this essay is that Foucault's claim to have
recovered the original language of madness by placing on one side the apparatus of
enlightenment logic is fatally flawed. It is flawed because as soon as Foucault commits
himself to writing a history of madness, he is forced to acknowledge the implicit
division between reason and madness on which enlightenment thought is based,
thereby perpetrating violence on madness once again. Derrida describes the
contamination of Foucault's history of madness by enlightenment discourse in his
discussion of Foucault's claim to have rewritten the former as an archaeology of
silence:
But, first of all, is there a history of silence? Further, is not an archaeology,
even of silence, a logic, that is, an organized language, a project, an order, a
sentence, a syntax, a work. Would not the archaeology of silence be the most
efficacious and subtle restoration, the repetition, in the most irreducibly
ambiguous meaning of the word, of the act perpetrated against madness - and
be so at the very moment when this act is denounced? Without taking into
account that all the signs which allegedly serve as indices of the origin of this
silence and of this stifled speech, and as indices of everything that has made
madness an interrupted and forbidden, that is, arrested, discourse - all these
signs and documents are borrowed, without exception, from the juridical
province of interdiction.10
The idea of a history of silence in which madness articulates its own dispossession
depends upon the same logic of division by which madness is defined as "other" to
reason. As Derrida concludes, in a memorable jibe against Foucault's failure to see the
inevitable contamination between these two terms, one would have to be mad to think
otherwise.
Kroetsch's development of a deconstructive poetics is therefore a response to
the task of exploring the question of alterity in a (Western) discourse that depends upon
the division between imperial identity and colonial difference as its basic strategy of
meaning. His abandonment of literary realism is in turn a consequence of his
unhappiness with the relationship that mimetic discourse evinces between experience
and representation. The mimetic notion of language as a neutral nomenclature whose
function it is to reflect the presence of an already constituted reality is contradicted by
Saussure's emphasis upon the implication of the linguistic sign within a system of
differences. If, as Saussure argues, meaning is produced by the systematic ordering of
a series of internally related signs, the claim of mimesis to represent a world 'out there'
at an ontological remove from the linguistic sign becomes untenable. Instead, as
Catherine Belsey points out:
If discourses articulate concepts through a system of signs which signify by
means of their relationship to each other rather than to entities in the world, and
if literature is a signifying practice, all it can reflect is the order inscribed in
particular discourses, not the nature of the world. Thus, what is intelligible as
realism is the conventional and therefore familiar, 'recognisable' articulation and
distribution of concepts. It is intelligible as 'realistic' precisely because it
reproduces what we already seem to know.11
The discovery that language produces and transforms the world that it describes
is of profound importance to a discussion of post-colonial textual politics. As Kroetsch
demonstrates in The Studhorse Man and Gone Indian, imperialist discourse insistently
naturalises the divisions and distortions that it projects onto colonised landscapes. By
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denying the role of discursive formations in differentiating between different orders of
experience, mimesis colludes with the naturalising strategies of colonialist politics. In
this way the simple division between European 'civilisation' and the 'primitivism' of
other cultures appears as an existential fact when it is really the external manifestation of
a concealed premise within the discourse of colonialism. In an important theoretical
essay Homi Bhabha has noted the incompatibility between the mimetic claim to provide
unmediated access to a given pre-constituted reality and the fate of the colonial subject
imprisoned within a discourse that circumscribes and mediates its experience.
Observing that "[t]he unmediated reality that an authentic literary tradition must ideally
reveal... can hardly be written in a language and literature of colonial imposition,"12
Bhabha identifies the danger to the colonial subject of the naturalising strategies of
mimesis:
To represent the colonial subject is to conceive of the subject of difference, of
an-other history and an-other culture. This requires a notion of literary
representation that does not conceive of the problem of representation as the
presentation of different images of the colonial, some more progressive than
others. It requires an end to the collusion of historicism and realism by
unseating the Transcendental subject, the origin of writing as linear time
consciousness. It denies its teleology, the natural and necessary unfolding of
meaning and consciousness, by conceiving of writing as a signifying practice.
That is to say a process which conceives of meaning as a systemic process
within determinate institutions and systems of representation - ideological,
historical, aesthetic, political. It is crucial for our purposes that this does not
permit meaning to be recuperable through a direct reference to the 'origins' of
mimetic reflection or authorial intention. . . . [This revisionary process]
demands a theoretical self-consciousness of those critical practices which in
claiming to restore the 'natural' and 'reasonable' meanings of texts, are in fact
engaged in strategies of naturalization and cultural assimilation which make our
readings unwillingly collusive and profoundly uncritical.13
The problem with a hermeneutic process that seeks to establish meaning
"through a direct reference to the 'origins' of mimetic reflection or authorial intention"
is that it takes no account of the extent to which subjectivity is itself a discursive
construct. An additional difficulty, as I argued in Chapter One, is that the entire notion
of 'origin' is deeply problematic for a culture whose formative acts of self-identification
acknowledge a tension between the "home place" and the trace of the European
colonising presence. The most pressing task for the post-colonial writer therefore
becomes the need to discover a language capable of inscribing this experience of
difference within its nominative gestures. Kroetsch's transition from a realist to a
deconstructive poetics is, in one sense, the logical culmination of his search for a
discursive mode that would reintroduce the divisions within the surface of
representation effaced by mimetic 'reflection.' As such, this development in his
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approach answers Bhabha's call for an "other view" which might represent the colonial
subject as the product of difference:
There is, however, another way of raising the issue of the representation of the
colonial subject which questions the collusion between historicism and realism.
It proposes that the category of literature, as of its history, is necessary and
throughly [sic] mediated: that its reality is not given but produced; its meanings
transformative, historical and relational rather than revelatory; its continuity and
coherence underscored by division and difference. This other view demands
quite another notion of the historical inscription of literature and entails a
critique of representation as simply given.14
The role of mimetic art in expelling "division" and "difference" from its mode of
representation make it an unlikely form in which to inscribe the history of the alienated
post-colonial subject. Indeed, Kroetsch's desire to examine post-colonial subjectivity
as the product of cultural "difference" quickly come into conflict with the discursive
organisation of classic realist fiction. Such conflict is inevitable because one of the
defining features of the classic realist form is the establishment of an unspoken meta-
narrative that prevents semantic spillage by providing a series of interpretations for the
narrative it offers. In other words, classic realism eliminates difference by naturalising
the process of representation itself. As Colin MacCabe observes, the classic realist text
relies upon an unacknowledged division between its various object-languages and the
meta-language that surrounds them and orders them into a "specific hierarchy"15 for
critical interpretation. He continues his analysis in terms which render unavoidable a
comparison between the meta-narrative of realist discourse and the naturalising
strategies of imperialism:
The meta-language within such a text refuses to acknowledge its own status as
writing - as marks of material difference distributed through time and space.
The text outside the area of inverted commas claims to be the product of no
articulation, it claims to be unwritten. This unwritten text can then attempt to
staunch the haemorrhage of interpretations threatened by the material of
language. Whereas other discourses within the text are considered as materials
which are open to reinterpretation, the narrative discourse functions simply as a
window on reality. This relationship between discourses can be taken as the
defining feature of the classic realist text.16
By establishing a hierarchy of discourses in a text without admitting the
materiality of its own discursive function, the meta-language of realism reproduces a
dominant trait of the discourse of colonialism. As MacCabe remarks, the meta¬
language of realism "regards its object discourses as material but itself as
transparent."17 In his own critical writing, Kroetsch has drawn a parallel between the
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meta-language of realism and the function of European cultural discourse in privileging
its own interests over the expression of the "particularly Canadian experience." While
discussing Timothy Findley's The Wars, he argues that any escape from subjection
within the discourse of colonialism is inextricably linked to the deconstruction of "the
traditional authority of the novel":
Timothy Findley in his novel The Wars gives an account of the particularly
Canadian experience. His protagonist, Robert Ross, in the course of being
destroyed by and in a marginal way surviving the FirstWorld War, acts out for
the colonial society the destruction and the loss of its European centres, cultural,
political, economic. For Findley, form and content speak each others plight in
The Wars as the traditional authority of the novel itself begins to falter. He
resorts to an archival approach, using letters, photographs, interviews, family
history, to recover the story, allowing the reader in turn to wonder how the
fictional narrative centre relates to the writer writing. A doubt about our ability
to know invades the narrative. What we witness is the collapse, for North
American eyes, of the meta-narrative that once went by the name Europe.18
Here the urge to break free of "the meta-narrative that once went by the name Europe"
and to "recover the story" of the Canadian past necessitates the development of an
archival and archaeological approach to the fragments of Canadian history. Against the
meta-linguistic function of European colonialist discourse, which orders and explains
the relation of the discourse of Canadian history to the world, Kroetsch posits a
discourse of history that operates at the level of the fragment itself, dissolving meta¬
language into the play of signification. As he writes in another context, "[t]o uninvent
the world. To unconceal. To make visible again. That invisible country, Canada. Our
invisible selves."19
The difficulty for the post-colonial writer in recounting the colonial experience
ofmarginalisation in a mode which provides an internal constraint upon the expression
of division and difference is evident in Kroetsch's work from its earliest moments. It is
customary to consider the primary phase of Kroetsch's writing in the context of
mimetic art; Russell M. Brown's canonical comment in The Oxford Companion to
Canadian Literature that But We Are Exiles is "written largely in the realistic
tradition"20 is a typical response of this kind. In fact, Kroetsch's writing is
characterised from the outset by a powerful discursive ambivalence: its detailed
exploration of the Canadian experience of alienation is accompanied by an assault upon
the naturalising strategies of realism. To illustrate this point, it is instructive to consider
an example of Kroetsch's pre-novelistic fiction such as "That Yellow Prairie Sky," a
short story he published in Macleans magazine in 1955. At first glance, this story
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appears to fit neatly into the conventions of realistic narrative that dominated small-
magazine fiction in the first half of this century: its workaday plot, describing a
courting, a wedding and a minor domestic tragedy does little to disturb this initial
conviction. The story is remarkable, however, for its self-conscious ironisation of the
traditional paradigms of prairie fiction. In particular, its narrative is divided between a
realistic account of the prairie experience and an unattributed discourse which parodies
the way that this experience is customarily narrated.
The space that Kroetsch identifies between experience and representation
declares itself in the opening sentence of the story:
I was looking at the back of a new dollar bill, at that scene of somewhere on the
prairies, and all of a sudden I was looking right through it and I wasn't in
Toronto at all any more -1 was back out west.21
This concentrated image juxtaposes a powerful sensation of disorientation and
placelessness with a mass-circulation representation of history and place. The
speaker's sudden experience of inauthenticity is linked directly to his reflection upon
"that scene of somewhere on the prairies" offered by the commercial dollar bill. It is
only by "looking right through" this image that he is able to find his way "back out
west." Kroetsch also underscores the contradiction between image and reality in the
phrase "and I wasn't in Toronto at all anymore," which, by introducing a reference to
the emotional dislocation of the heroine of The Wizard ofOz, makes a comic reference
to the role fictions play in ordering our experience of the world. In just four lines,
Kroetsch's protagonist progresses from identity into alienation as he returns to a west
that has still to find a way of articulating its own story.
Kroetsch's dissent from the mimetic presupposition that the real can be
displayed in a perfectly transparent language takes hold at a structural as well as a
symbolic level. If "That Yellow Prairie Sky" is read as a problematisation of the
mimetic signifying process, the meaning of its rather baffling juxtaposition of styles
becomes evident. For the textual surface of Kroetsch's story is riven between a
quotidian first-person narrative and a sentimental re-creation of prairie life. The latter is
set apart from the main body of the text by its appearance in italicised script:
We didn't have all the fancy courting facilities that folks here in the east have,
but we had lots of space and lots of sky. And we didn't miss much on a frosty
night, the old buffalo robe doing whatever was necessary to keep warm....
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the northern lights in the winter sky were a silent symphony: flickering
white, fading red and green, growing and bursting and dying in swirls and
echoes of swirls, in wavering angel-shadows, in shimmering music. And on
one edge of the wide white prairie shone a solitary light, and toward itmoved a
sleigh with the jingle of harness, the clop of hoofs, the squeak of runners on the
snow; and the jingling, clopping, squeaking rose up like the horses' frozen
breath to the silentmusic in the sky.22
If we return to MacCabe's analysis of the realist text, we can gain a valuable
insight into the vertiginous experience of Kroetsch's story. As MacCabe observes,
classic realism naturalises the meta-language that orders and interprets the products of
discourse. However, if the materiality of the meta-language is exposed, it is forced,
like any other discourse, to enter the differential exchange of language and can therefore
no longer guarantee the reader's place within the production of meaning. In this
context, we can see that the disorientating effect of Kroetsch's juxtaposition of narrative
codes is caused by his violation of the norms of realist discourse. By refusing textual
privilege to the ordering mechanism of a meta-language, Kroetsch creates a situation in
which the italicised passages slip their moorings and float across the surface of the text
bereft of an interpretative context for the images they produce. Kroetsch's decision to
abandon the notion of an internal hierarchy of discourse removes the interpretative rules
by which his story may be read. It is simply impossible to detach a single meaning
from a piece of writing that elides a colloquial idiom which speaks of "fancy courting
facilities" with a self-regarding "poetic" language that identifies the northern lights as
"wavering angel-shadows" and a "silent symphony." Unconstrained by a dominant
discourse within the text, the italicised passages disrupt the spatial and temporal
continuities of realist fiction and prevent the reader from making the correspondence
between word and world on which mimesis depends. Denied what MacCabe calls "a
point of insertion for our own discourses within an agreed hierarchy of dominance,"23
readers of "That Yellow Prairie Sky" are compelled to become producers, rather than
consumers, of meaning. By declining to subordinate the meanings of his text to the
meta-language of realism Kroetsch thus not only focuses attention on the way language
forms and deforms reality; he also asks his audience to question the stereotypical
representations of Canadian experience that they habitually receive.
A connection can be made between Kroetsch's violation of the internal order of
realist discourse and the influence upon him of the work of Joseph Conrad. The
significance of Conrad's writing for a reading of Kroetsch's fiction is that it combines a
fascinating exploration of the colonial enterprise with a modernist assault upon the
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narrative conventions of the realist novel. For Conrad's description of the moral
corruption that the desire for absolute order brings is accompanied by a systematic
disordering of the discursive organisation of mimetic art. Far from offering a simple
'reflection' of the colonial struggle in the Third World, his texts present a complex
meditation upon the discourse of colonialism itself. Sixteen years after the publication
of his first novel, Kroetsch underlined the importance to his work of Conrad's
experimentation with the narrative order of the realist novel:
Now Conrad was an influence. When I was in Grade Four I accidentally read
The Nigger of the "Narcissus," and I knew then, as a kid, that something had
happened. When I was a graduate student reading Conrad and I came to that
book, it was like opening a grave, or an archaeological dig. "There is another
way to tell a story" is what The Nigger said when I read it. I could remember
entire phrases from the book which I don't ordinarily do. It has been a great
influence.24
Three features of Conrad's work are of central importance to Kroetsch's attempt
to tell the story of the post-colonial search for cultural identity. Conrad's use of both
frame-narrative and the figure of the doppelganger are aspects of his writing that
become of permanent structural value to Kroetsch's fiction. Meanwhile his deeply
ambivalent attitude to the civilising mission of colonialism and his ironic presentation of
colonialism as a discourse of enlightenment form the background to Kroetsch's
examination of the thematics of imperialism in The Studhorse Man and Gone Indian.
In Conrad's fiction both frame-narrative and the figure of the doppelganger are
devices which expose the rapacity and violence that underpin a stringent discourse of
order. Both these devices can be seen clearly at work in Conrad's novella Heart of
Darkness. Here Marlow's account of his journey into the African interior and his
mortal struggle with Kurtz is mediated by an unspecified listener on the deck of the
Nellie. The effect of this mediation ofMarlow's narrative is to establish an ironic space
in which Marlow's claims, protestations, and explanations are made available to a
variety of interpretations. In contrast to the omniscient authority of the narrator of the
realist novel, Marlow's statements are revealed to be partial judgements issued from a
particular point-of-view. Conrad's subversion of the disinterested integrity of
Marlow's position continues his problematisation of third-person narrative begun in
The Nigger ofThe 'Narcissus'. Here, the narrator of the tale introduces the collective
pronoun "we"25 into an impersonal record of the misfortunes of the Narcissus in order
to juxtapose a symbolic reading of the crew's fate with a powerful autobiographical
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account of the hardships of nautical life. In Heart ofDarkness, the juxtaposition of
Marlow's narrative with the description of him provided by the first narrator establishes
a connection between the imposition ofMarlow's discourse onto the African experience
and the horror of the events that he recounts. Thus Marlow's belief that the violence of
colonialism can be redeemed by its embodiment of an idea that "you can set up, and
bow down before, and offer a sacrifice to"26 is undercut by an earlier image of him as
an "idol" with "sunken cheeks," a "yellow complexion" and an "ascetic aspect" (HD
6). Similarly, Marlow's assertion that he "hate[s], detest[s] and can't bear a lie"
because of the "taint of death" and the "flavour ofmortality" (HD 38) that lies represent
is parodied by Conrad in the final scene between Marlow and Kurtz's Intended, where
Marlow lies in order to give the woman "something-to-to live with" (HD 110). With
this exchange the novella describes a full circle, since Marlow's eventual recognition
that fictions impose their own order on history is foreshadowed by the first narrator,
who characterises Marlow's tale as merely one more of his "inconclusive experiences"
(HD 10).
By employing the device of frame-narrative to expose the principles of selection
and exclusion that underpin Marlow's story, Conrad makes a connection between
violence and representation that is of considerable significance for Kroetsch's work.
Thus in the 'postmodern' phase of Kroetsch's fiction that commences with The
Studhorse Man, he demonstrates that discourse is not a neutral reflection of experience
but rather a material event which imposes order on disparate phenomena by a.
act of violence. Conrad's denaturalisation of Marlow's meta-narrative, which works
by progressively revealing the power of constraint his narrator exercises over the
historical material open to him, provides an ironic method for Kroetsch's assault upon
those meta-narratives that circumscribe Canadian discourses of self-identification.
Conrad also records Marlow's fall from omniscience into ambivalence by his strategic
deployment of the figure of the doppelganger. The appalling irony at the centre of
Heart of Darkness is that Marlow's journey toward self-knowledge leads him to
encounter, in Kurtz, a dark manifestation of his own personality. Both Marlow, as
narrator, and Kurtz, in his final burst of eloquence, are defined by the "voice" (HD 69)
that discourses through the African darkness; both men are complex products of the
idea of "Europe" (HD 71) that lies behind the colonialist endeavour, while the early
image ofMarlow as an idol foreshadows Kurtz's terrible appearance as a pagan god to
the native African population. Accepting the "unforeseen partnership" that lies between
them, Marlow remembers that after Kurtz's death he was also "numbered with the
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dead" (HD 97). Marlow's struggle with Kurtz is important for Kroetsch's work
because it demonstrates the dependence of the enlightenment ethic upon the very forms
of unreason that it attempts to eradicate.
In his depiction of the conflicts between Demeter Proudfoot and Hazard
Lepage, and Mark Madham and Jeremy Sadness, Kroetsch examines in his own work
the effect of contamination between discourses of enlightenment and the forces of
anarchy. Conrad's short story "The Secret Sharer" also describes the blow dealt the
subject by an encounter with an "other" version of the self. Here the unnamed
narrator's rescue of the fugitive Leggatt from the sea begins a complex process of
symbiosis through which the two men come to share one personality and a single
destiny. In this vein, Conrad introduces us to the sight of a "double captain busy
talking in whispers with his other self."27 Meanwhile Leggatt's sense of outrage at a
hypocritical moral order where "an old fellow in a wig and twelve respectable
tradesman"28 would decide his fate creates a schism between the narrator's unexamined
social values and the ethical imperatives of natural justice. In this tightly focused use of
the doppelganger theme, the motif of the divided self offers Kroetsch a powerful image
with which to express the contradictory position of the post-colonial subject caught in
an uncertain position between Old and New world cultural discourse. We should note
that But We Are Exiles borrows heavily from the narrative structure of both Heart of
Darkness and "The Secret Sharer." Like Conrad's story, Kroetsch's dramatic
exploration of the antagonism between Peter Guy and Michael Hornyak in the context
of their mutual attraction to Kettle Frazer makes use of a binary opposition within a
larger ternary relationship. In so doing, it reproduces the discursive organisation of
Heart of Darkness, which introduces Kurtz's "intended" into the binary struggle
between Kurtz and Marlow, and "The Secret Sharer," where the relationship between
the narrator and Leggatt is given definition by the threatening presence of the skipper of
the Sephora.
A third aspect of Conrad's influence upon Kroetsch relevant to our purposes is
his ambivalent attitude to the colonial process. Throughout his work, Conrad couples
an intense rage to order with an instinctive awareness of the corruption that such
absolute order brings. This ambivalent stance is crucial to the meaning of Heart of
Darkness. In his most penetrating exploration of the colonialist imagination, Conrad
simultaneously sanctions Marlow's metaphoric use of light to stand for the act of
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enlightenment while revealing the darkness and disorder implicit in the imposition of
imperial order. Marlow's rhetorical distinction between the 'light' of the civilising
process and the 'darkness' of the African interior is made at the beginning of the text.
In Marlow's account, London is a "luminous space" (HD 5) resting under a sky that
reflects a "benign immensity of unstained light" (HD 6). Meditating on the role of the
Thames in the act of imperial expansion, he declares that "[l]ight came out of this river"
(HD 8) and characterises the merchant ships that sailed to India and America as
"bearers of a spark from the sacred fire" (HD 7). Turning his attention to the political
discourse that legitimated intervention in the affairs of other nations, he confides that
the imperial agent was envisaged as an "emissary of light, something like a lower sort
of apostle" (HD 18). Not surprisingly, then, Marlow is aware that his departure for
the Belgian Congo sanctified his existence and threw "a kind of light on everything
about me" (HD 11).
However, Marlow's experience of the imperial process problematises his
rhetorical alignment of colonialism and enlightenment. His impending disillusionment
is signalled by the first narrator, who follows Marlow's peroration concerning "[t]he
dreams of men, the seeds of commonwealth, the germs of empire" with the ironic
observation that "[t]he sun set" (HD 7). The first hint Marlow receives of the dark
character of the imperial ideal occurs when he arrives in the "whited sepulchre" (HD
14) of Brussels to find two old women guarding the "door of [d]arkness" (HD 16)
concealing the entrance of the trading company. As he "penetrate[s] deeper and deeper
into the heart of darkness" (HD 50) Marlow is transported into the "lightless region of
subtle horrors" that Kurtz has created; an environment in which "pure uncomplicated
savagery was a positive relief, being something that had a right to exist - obviously - in
the sunshine" (HD 83-84). In Marlow's climactic struggle with the dying Kurtz, he is
forced to fight his way through an "impenetrable darkness" (HD 99) as the light of
colonialist beneficence drains away: "I looked at him," he remarks of Kurtz, "as you
peer down at a man who is lying at the bottom of a precipice where the sun never
shines" (HD 99). This image of Kurtz outside the light is a cruel echo of Marlow's
first encounter with the African natives, whose dying bodies lie "half effaced within the
dim light, in all the attitudes of pain, abandonment, and despair" (HD 24). By the end
of his African voyage, Marlow had "no particular desire to enlighten" anyone (HD
102). His final scene with Kurtz's "intended" offers a fme symbolic demonstration of
the corrosion of the Western enlightenment mission. During this meeting the woman's
"pale visage" and "pure brow" (HD 106) are slowly eclipsed by the deepening
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darkness of the night outside. And so, within the text's economy of light and
darkness, the dream of empire is corrupted by the malevolence at its core. It is left to
Marlow to find an appropriately racist image for this loss of imperial innocence, as he
transposes the body of the martial native woman onto the white body of the European
lady:
'She put out her arms as if after a retreating figure, stretching them back and
with clasped pale hands across the fading and narrow sheen of the window.
Never see him! I saw him clearly enough then. I shall see this eloquent
phantom as long as I live, and I shall see her, too, a tragic and familiar Shade,
resembling in this gesture another one, tragic also, and bedecked with
powerless charms, stretching bare brown arms over the glitter of the infernal
stream, the stream of darkness.29
Conrad's subversion and parody of Marlow's attitudes provides an instructive
lesson in the rhetoric of colonialism. But another, more subtle, aspect of his art was to
leave a more lasting effect on Kroetsch's textual practice: his emphasis upon the implicit
violence of the act of representation itself. This point may be illustrated with reference
to the tension that exists between two consecutive paragraphs early in the novella:
'Now when I was a little chap I had a passion for maps. I would look for
hours at South America, or Africa, or Australia, and lose myself in all the
glories of exploration. At that time there were many blank spaces on the earth,
and when I saw one that looked particularly inviting on a map (but they all look
that) I would put my finger on it and say, When I grow up I will go there. The
North Pole was one of these places, I remember. Well, I haven't been there
yet, and shall not try now. The glamour's off. Other places were scattered
about the Equator, and in every sort of latitude all over the two hemispheres. I
have been in some of them, and . .. well, we won't talk about that. But there
was one yet - the biggest, the most blank, so to speak - that I had a hankering
after.
'True, by this time it was not a blank space any more. It had got filled
since my boyhood with rivers and lakes and names. It had ceased to be a blank
space of delightful mystery - a white patch for a boy to dream gloriously over.
It had become a place of darkness.30
In the first paragraph we are upon familiar historical terrain. Marlow's
adolescent passion for exploration demands a hubristic act of self-assertion that reflects
in microcosm the colonialist mission. The fundamental quality of his response is the
urge to inscribe his own personality onto the "blank space" of an alien environment - a
blankness that would come as some surprise to the native inhabitants of the area. But if
we continue to peruse this passage, we find that the moral value of the term
"blankness" shifts with the arrival of the European presence. Thus the second
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paragraph dwells on an African interior rewritten by colonialist discourse, which, as
Marlow remarks, has been "filled since my boyhood with rivers and lakes and names."
Yet it is at precisely the moment when Africa is inscribed with European values and
ceases to be an empty playground for the Western imagination that it becomes a "place
of darkness." In this often unnoticed transition from "blank space" to "place of
darkness" Marlow unwittingly identifies a crucial tension within the discourse of
colonialism. On one hand, colonialism is logically dependent on the chaos that it
orders; its ability to depict "blankness" as "chaos" or "barbarism" enables it to present
itself as a "noble cause" (HD 13). But on the other hand, colonialist discourse must
provide a space for colonial "difference" to be articulated in order to reinforce the
impression of its own cultural superiority and justify the constraints it imposes upon
another people. Conrad's illumination of this contradiction within colonialist discourse
is of crucial importance to Kroetsch because his art revolves around the problem of
discovering a position from which the post-colonial "other" can speak. His calculated
response to the "darkness" that descends following the repression and marginalisation
of colonial difference is to develop a deconstructive poetics that increasingly locates the
question of difference within the process of signification itself. By means of the
techniques of literary pastiche, postmodern parody, and the textual ploys of the
carnivalesque, Kroetsch sets himself the task of deconstructing the oppositions on
which hegemonic Western representations of Canada are predicated. It is therefore
richly ironic that in Gone Indian, a text which more than any other of Kroetsch's
works dramatises the discursive constraints placed upon the expression of Canadian
experience, Madham's insertion into Sadness's narrative of the passage from Heart of
Darkness quoted above exposes the violent imperialism of the Professor's project.
But We Are Exiles, Kroetsch's first novel, offers eloquent testimony to the
influence of Conrad's work on Kroetsch's imagination. In particular, it makes
exemplary use of the Conradian themes of estrangement, self-division, and the
dangerous journey through an encounter with "darkness" and mortality toward a deeper
understanding of the self. Exiles explores the relationship between Peter Guy, pilot of
the towboat Nahanni Jane, Michael Hornyak, and Kettle Frazer. The novel begins
with Guy and the crew of the Nahanni Jane dragging the Mackenzie river for the
scorched body of Hornyak. Hornyak had arrived earlier that day after buying the
Nahanni Jane in order to convert it from a towboat into what Guy caustically terms a
"goddamned fish bin."31 Within hours of his appearance Hornyak is dead, consumed
in a ball of flame that erupts after he lights a lamp in a barge full of diesel fumes. Guy,
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who "led Hornyak into the engine-room and had silently let him pick up a lamp that
didn't have a shield over the bulb" (E 27), can only watch as Hornyak hurls himself to
his death in the Mackenzie. The significance of Guy's ambiguous implication in
Hornyak's death is that his position as pilot of the Nahanni Jane is a form of self-
imposed exile provoked by Homyak's seduction of his fiancee, Kettle Frazer, six years
earlier. The reappearance of first Hornyak and then Kettle, his widow, on the deck of
the Nahanni Jane forces Guy to confront his own refusal to come to terms with the
dislocations of the past and his subsequent withdrawal from the world around him.
The pressure that the past exerts upon Guy's "concluded but garrisoned self'32 is
emphasised by Kroetsch's tactic of intercutting narrative accounts of the events of six
years ago into the story of the Nahanni Jane's perilous journey into the Canadian
northwest. The interdependence of the present and the past is also underlined by
Kroetsch's use of the doppelganger motif to suggest that Hornyak represents a
malevolent aspect ofGuy's personality which Guy must overcome in order to break out
of his isolation and re-establish an emotional relationship with others.
Exiles broods powerfully upon relationships that can never be recovered in
their original innocence. But Guy's exile from his former life is merely an individual
symptom of a collective historical crisis. For Kroetsch uses the passage of the Nahanni
Jane from a familiar landscape into a treacherous environment where established
practices and values are no longer appropriate as a metaphor for the post-colonial
divorce from a sense of historical 'origin.' When the phrase "But we are exiles" is
relocated within the context from which it is originally taken, the idea of an historical
and cultural displacement becomes more clear. The full couplet from the "Canadian
boat-song" reads "Fair these broad meads - these hoary woods are grand / But we are
exiles from our father's land." The idea of exile presented here is a consequence of a
banishment from "our father's land," which, in Kroetsch's appropriation of the phrase,
refers to the privileged codes of the imperial centre. In these terms, Guy's exile from
family, community, and history becomes emblematic of a wider crisis of cultural
identity. As Robert Lecker observes, "[i]n metaphoric terms Guy becomes Kroetsch's
Canadian Everyman searching for a new future in a wilderness divorced from historical
association."33 Kroetsch also reinforces the symbolic power of his novel by
establishing an allegorical connection between the Nahanni Jane and the Canadian
body politic. The social structure of nautical existence lends itself easily to
metaphorical appropriation by other forms of cultural environment: its hierarchy of
ranks, decks, and functions offers a microcosmic vision of collectivity in splendid
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isolation. Conrad's influence here is again apparent: his Narcissus is presented as "a
small planet" and "a fragment detached from the earth"34; while its captain appears as
"the ruler of that minute world" beneath whom "common mortals led their busy and
insignificant lives."35 Kroetsch develops the correspondence between ship and society
by populating the Nahanni Jane with a representative cross-section of Canadian
society. Commenting upon the toponymic dimension of Kroetsch's fiction, W. F. H.
Nicolaisen has shown how the "named crew" function as as "anthroponymic
microcosm of symbols for a country's human ingredients":
Take the names of the crew of the M. V. Nahanni Jane, for example, with
whom Peter Guy, the third person narrator - the guy - used to disguise first-
person experience, in But We Are Exiles, has to face the shared hazards of the
Mackenzie River in the approaching winter: Captain McAlpine; Bill Arnafson,
the engineer; Jonas Bird, the first pilot; Jeremiah Pottle, the red-headed
Newfoundland Mate; Angi Boyle, the boat's cook; Jimmie Kartuk, the eskimo;
Billy Abraham, a squat and fat-faced half-breed; Johnny Louttit and Mud whose
"nickname reflected his ability to look dirty from head to foot even when he
hadn't been on land for a week" and who ironically is "the white deckhand" on
the boat. It could be argued that any of these names might be found in any boat
crew on the Mackenzie. It might also be said that each individual name,
through its linguistic and ethnic associations, conjures up successfully
stereotyped characteristics for each name bearer. It is, however, only when
perceived as a set of names, as as anthroponymic "field," that the cumulative
effect becomes clear and in him informs each individual name. What we have
here is a cross-section of Canada's heterogeneous society - McAlpine, the Scot;
Arnafson, the Icelander; Bird, the Indian; Boyle, the Irishwoman; Pottle, the
Newfoundlander; Kartuk, the Eskimo; Abraham, the half-breed; Louttit, the
Frenchman - destined to work together as a crew with a definite objective in
mind, in face of the same dangers both defying and relying on the same river,
Almost helpless individually but strong in co-operation, without demanding
assimilation into ethnic anonymity - the named crew as anthroponymic
microcosm of symbols for a country's human ingredients.36
If Exiles is concerned at one level with the meaning of post-colonial cultural
displacement, it considers at another level the question of how that experience should
be narrated. As "That Yellow Prairie Sky" suggests, Kroetsch's interest in the politics
of representation is linked at this stage of his career to a problematisation of the mimetic
signifying process. In this context, it is surely significant that the two images that
dominate Exiles are the mirror and the lamp. It will be remembered that it is by means
of a development from the first to the second of these two figures that M. H. Abrams
defines the transition in romantic poetics from a mimetic to an expressive aesthetic
theory:
To put the matter schematically: for the representative eighteenth-century critic,
the perceiving mind was a reflector of the external world; the inventive process
consisted in a reassembly of 'ideas' which were literally images or replicas of
sensations; and the resulting art work was itself comparable to a mirror
presenting a selected and ordered image of life. By substituting a projective and
creative mind and, consonantly, an expressive and creative theory of art,
various romantic critics reversed the basic orientation of all aesthetic
philosophy. Consider now the the further innovative possibilities in
Coleridge's archetypal plant. Through this perspective, Coleridge saw the mind
as growing into its percepts, conceived of the activity of the poetic imagination
as differing from this vital, self-determining, assimilative process in degree
rather than kind, and thus was able to envision the product of artistic genius as
exhibiting the mode of development and the internal relations of an organic
whole.37
The tension that Abrams outlines here between reflective and expressive modes
of perception is certainly present in Exiles. In a world dominated by mirrors and the
reflective surfaces of water, where McAlpine stares at "the unbroken mirror of water
surrounding the bow" (E 30) and a "willow-covered island awash in its own
reflection" (E 31), the explosive force of the lamp that kills Hornyak utterly transforms
the crew's relationship with past and present alike. But before following Lecker in
asserting that that "the lamp (and Hornyak) represents everything the mirror is not:
freedom from verisimilitude; an emphasis on subjectivity; and an ability to create
significance, rather than to receive it"38 we should note that although the lamp injects a
necessary degree of disorder into the sterile lives of the ship's crew, it provokes a
disturbance within the mode of mimesis. This point is supported by the fact that the
text's sustained meditation on identity, alienation, and difference is carried out solely in
terms of its economy of specular images. The mirror, as I shall shortly show, is a
complex image in Kroetsch's novel: it stands, at different moments, for both the urge
for absolute self-identity and the fundamental alienation from self that are the defining
moments of the myth of Narcissus. It is in this schism between two differentforms of
the narcissistic relation to identity and alterity that the real significance of the struggle
between Guy and Hornyak emerges. For it is in these characters' very different
attempts to deal with the claims of the past that Kroetsch outlines the political options
open to a culture which retains the mark of its difference from 'origin' in its most
fundamental gestures of self-identification.
To explore the tension between Guy and Hornyak, it is interesting to begin with
an examination of the ending of the novel. This unusual strategy is rewarding because
Exiles moves towards its conclusion with a prolonged flash-back to the events that
precipitated Guy's exile on the Mackenzie. In this narrative sequence, Guy, who is
travelling west to take up holiday employment and keep a rendezvous with Kettle
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Frazer, meets Hornyak for the first time and enters a relationship that will end in
Hornyak's death and his own emotional isolation. In the first moments of their
encounter, Hornyak's behaviour is already marked by an extreme voluntarism.
Wheeling his car around from east to west to accommodate Guy's travel plans, he
introduces himself with the remark "Christ, Hornyak can turn this jalopy around" (E
134). The elision of these two proper names in Hornyak's mind will become
significant as the novel proceeds. Hornyak has been described by commentators as
embodying a principle of creative disorder that challenges Canada's filiation to the
bankrupt past of "our father's land." In these readings he becomes a figure whose
anarchic activities distinguish him as "in many respects the Kroetschian equivalent of
the modern-day romantic in that he defies received meaning and transforms his
environment according to his own internal and impassioned codes."39 But in fact
Hornyak may be shown to assert his own unyielding principle of order and exclusion.
This aspect of Hornyak's behaviour appears in the following description of his
progress through the prairie landscape:
West on Highway One they went, west on One, through the hard-rock cuts, a
straight road but up and down, like the roll of waves; a straight-through road,
but instead of a park they found a burnt-off country; miles of tree-trunks -
black, gaunt, crooked - the ground strewn with boulders and rock. And the sun
blazing down and all the time, out there ahead, the prairies. 'Chaos,' Mike
said. 'We've got some chaos to contend with. . . . Chaos, boy. Stay young
and hang loose.' And Mike fed more gas to the wild horses under the hood of
that black Rolls.
And the flat country then. Dusty and dry. Dry and dusty and hot.
Wheat country. And the first elevator. There at Dufresne, alone and reaching,
like a great damned phallus, like one perpetual hard-on, Mike said, trying to
make eternity. (E 135)
This passage provides an excellent introduction to Hornyak's personality. In
particular, it firmly establishes the phallic narcissism of his response to the post-
colonial experience of displacement and marginalisation. Earlier in the novel, Kettle
describes Hornyak's complete rejection of history: "You know something. In all those
six years. He didn't tell me where his home was. No relations phoned to say they
were passing though town. No mail came. Nothing" (E 52). In Kroetsch's
description of Hornyak's journey through the prairie it becomes apparent that
Hornyak's desire to transcend the material fact of post-colonial alienation from the
imperial father is linked to his projection of images of phallic power onto the Canadian
landscape. The only way that he can "contend" with the "chaos" he perceives in the
process of historical change is by establishing the universal presence of masculine
identity in the external world. In his bizarre acts of transference even a grain elevator is
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transformed into "a great damned phallus, like a perpetual hard-on ... trying to make
eternity." By investing the prairie landscape with an unambiguous phallic identity,
Hornyak clearly embodies the imperatives of the phallocentric self which Luce Irigaray
defines in terms of
the process of production, reproduction, mastery, and profitability, ofmeaning,
dominated by the phallus - that master signifier whose law of functioning
erases, rejects, denies the surging up, the resurgence, the recall of a
heterogeneity capable of reworking the principle of its authority.40
If Hornyak's behaviour is judged within the context of this analysis of
phallocentric discourse, the meaning of his voluntarism and desire for a particular form
of male transcendence becomes clear. For Hornyak's actions are impelled by precisely
this urge to prevent the "recall of a heterogeneity" capable of questioning the principle
of his own (phallic) authority. He denies the constitutive post-colonial experiences of
difference and displacement in favour of a pure statement of self. "My problem," he
tells Guy six later on the Mackenzie river, "is I know my own mind. And that's a
terrible thing" (E 9). Far from representing what Lecker calls an "open-ended,
deconstructive embrace of antiform,"41 Hornyak's extreme phallic narcissism
subordinates world to self by positing an original core of personality prior to the effects
of discourse and temporality. Indeed, his refusal to accept the 'deconstructive' position
that subjectivity is an effect of difference is perfectly encapsulated in his wish to prevent
"damned signs" (E 141) intruding upon his consciousness. Kroetsch underlines
Hornyak's belief in subjectivity as pure presence by describing his behaviour in a
manner that invites a scriptural interpretation. Thus Hornyak's odyssey through the
western plains is presented as a quest for the security of source and origin suggested by
"the first mountain stream and the first lake" (E 142). Similarly, both his demand to
know the location of the "eternal fountain" (E 138) and his injunction to the attendant at
the Hot Springs that "[y]ou can't pay ... to be reborn" (E 144) aspire to provide a
religious solution to the theme of alienation that dominates the novel. Hornyak's appeal
to the transcendent unity of redemption is later remarked upon by Guy, who portrays
him as "some great bloody redeemer" (E 35), and Pottle, who suggests that Hornyak's
corpse would "rise of its own accord after three days" (E 16). The tension between
Hornyak's desire for everlasting life and Guy's need to come to terms with the
narrative of Canadian cultural dispossession is expressed in an exchange that
counterpoints the former's insatiable appetites with the latter's familial memories:
'You've got to keep young,' Hornyak said, half as a joke, half desperate.
That's the whole secret, boy.'
And remembering an old brick house in Ontario and china in the
windows. A story for every cup. A fence out back; a stone fence older than the
house; as old as a farm that was older than the town. Apple trees and oak trees
gone crooked with age. The stories his mother told, of apple trees and fences;
of the spring-time of the dead.
Mike looked at all the licence plates as he whipped by. The colours and
numbers and slogans and signs. A little bison. Wheat Province.' A potato.
'Tradition,' Mike said. 'It's an old tradition of mine to have breakfast at noon.
Let's stop somewhere and start my old tradition.' (E 137)
This dialogue between desire and memory is the fulcrum upon which the plot of
Exiles turns. Hornyak's claim that he can simply "stop somewhere and start my old
tradition" offers a concise illustration of his need to define identity outside the
restrictions imposed by historical discourses of the subject. The associations of
community, progress, and continuity signified by the word "tradition" are introduced
merely to justify the satisfaction of a momentary fancy. Conversely, Guy's response
to his implication in Hornyak's picaresque adventures is to remember the "stories his
mother told" of the "spring-time of the dead." This last phrase captures perfectly the
renewing force of the imagination as it communicates experience across the generations
and acts as a valuable corrective to the permanent present enforced by Hornyak's
narcissistic self-regard. However, Guy is forced by Hornyak to endure in his own life
the conflict between the demand for pure self-identity and the need for a mature
understanding of past experience. Following their arrival at the Banff Springs Hotel,
Guy returns from a meeting with his employer to find Hornyak in bed with Kettle
Frazer. In an image which is replayed throughout the novel, he sees the "image of two
raging bodies" (E 145) reflected in a mirror. The impact that this encounter has upon
him fractures his personality and alienates him from his former life. In his moment of
betrayal Guy is divided between the self who observes and the self who experiences :
"He fled and went on searching and could not see himself. Stay out, the voice said.
Peter? the voice said." Guy's flight from Banff, which leads him to spend six years
traversing the northern stretches of the Mackenzie river, is accompanied by his
perception of himself "caught there, trapped, doomed in th[e] long mahogany frame" of
the bedroom mirror. In this single image Kroetsch expresses Guy's agonised self-
estrangement and opens the text up to a reading of narcissism as an experience of
alienation that is firmly opposed to Hornyak's phallic repudiation of alterity.
It has been necessary to outline the genesis of the relationship between Guy and
Hornyak at some length because it demonstrates that there are in fact two types of
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narcissism at work in the novel. It will be my purpose here to show that both
Hornyak's phallic expulsion of alterity and Guy's experience of alienation within the
act of self-recognition correspond to particular moments within the myth of Narcissus.
Furthermore, my reading of Exiles will argue that Kroetsch exploits the tension in the
Narcissus narrative between identity and alienation to explore the relationship between
the nostalgic longing for a lost image of Canadian historical 'origin' and a vision of
post-colonial identity erected upon the experience of difference from imperial culture.
Finally, I want to suggest that the novel's preoccupation with the reflection and division
of the narcissistic image calls into question the ability of realist poetics to express the
profound linguistic alienation enforced upon the post-colonial subject by the
"transportation of language from its place of origin and its imposed and imposing
relationship on and with the new environment."42
Kroetsch's concern in Exiles with the reflection and division of the narcissistic
image is emphasised by the epigraph to the first edition of the novel, which is taken
from Golding's version of The Metamorphoses:
This Lady bare a sonne
Whose beautie at his verie birth might justly love have wonne.
Narcissus did she call his name. Of whom the prophet sage
Demanded if the childe should live to many years of age,
Made aunswere, yea, full long, so that him selfe he doe not know.
The story of Narcissus attracts Kroetsch because it offers an ironic metaphor for the
difficult and dangerous journey towards self-knowledge. More importantly, the myth
insists upon the irreducible tension between the subject's demand for absolute self-
identity and the division that the act of representation imposes between the subject and
its own experience. The paradox of Narcissus's position is that his desire to eradicate
the space between subject and image by joining with his own reflection is frustrated by
the difference that his reflection inscribes between experience and representation. His
death at the altar of his own image is therefore the direct consequence of his inability to
accept the importance of alterity to the act of self-definition. In a subtle modulation of
the myth, Kroetsch reworks the story of Narcissus by cleaving it between two opposed
characters. Thus Hornyak dies because, like Narcissus, he forecloses on difference by
presenting himself as the embodiment of will. In allegorical terms, Hornyak's death is
inevitable because he denies the originary difference that underwrites post-colonial
existence. Conversely Guy survives his entanglement with Hornyak and the perils of
the trip down the Mackenzie River because he comes to understand that the narcissistic
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alienation from a unified self also describes the dislocation of the Canadian historical
experience. Alone of all his companions he is able to renounce the seductive allure of
the past as a lost origin ofmeaning and accept the principle of alterity symbolised by his
Echo (Kettle Frazer).
The relationship between identity, alienation and identity can again be
illuminated by brief recourse to the work of Jacques Lacan. His work is relevant to our
concerns because of its identification of the "mirror stage" as a formative period in the
process of human development. According to Lacan the child's recognition of its
specular image between the ages of six and eight months offers it its first independent
confirmation of its identity. From this moment the child experiences itself as a
"coherent and self-governing entity."43 As Lacan points out:
This jubilant assumption of his specular image by the child at the infans stage,
still sunk in his motor incapacity and nursling dependence, would seem to
exhibit in an exemplary situation the symbolic matrix in which the / is
precipitated in a primordial form, before it is objectified in the dialectic of
identification with the other, and before language restores to it, in the universal,
its function as subject.44
However, this "jubilant" moment of self-recognition is purchased at a high price
because the production of an image of the child which establishes a space between the
subject and its representation compromises any sense of complete or self-sufficient
identity. In Anika Lemaire's words, the mirror stage "realises the conquest of the
totality of one's own body, but it does so by way of a narcissistic identification with the
image of the self and with others."45 Consequently an alienation is inscribed within
the act of specular identification:
But the important point is that this form situates the agency of the ego, before its
social identification, in a fictional direction, which will always remain
irreducible for the individual alone, or rather, which will only rejoin the
coming-into-being of the subject asymptotically, whatever the success of the
dialectical syntheses by which he must resolve as I his discordance with his
own reality.46
An understanding of the "irreducible" or "asymptotic" distance between subject
and representation is useful to a reading of Exiles. Guy's narcissistic experience of his
own image compares closely with the child's perception of its specular representation,
which "symbolises the mental permanence of the I, at the same time as it prefigures its
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alienating destination."47 His task in the novel is therefore to come to terms with the
"assumption of the armour of an alienating identity"48 by learning that post-colonial
subjectivity is defined by its reciprocal relation with alterity. Guy's narcissistic
identification with an image of the self as "other" is shown at the very beginning of the
text when he encounters his own reflection below him in the Mackenzie river:
He glanced up at the breath-tripping hush; at the broad river, mirror-smooth in
the afternoon sun; at the old riverboat where she lay tied up beside her two
black steel barges. No one had seen the canoe stop. The lifting bow bobbed
gently. He looked down again at the water and this time saw his own face
watching him; the prematurely balding blond head, the full lips and squinting
deep-set eyes suggesting a moodiness that didn't belong with his tall and hard
body. He studied the reflection as if not sure whom he might see.
The image mimicked his hesitation, mocked his doubt by repeating it.
The deep-set eyes worried against the slant of light. The mouth, pursed and
offering a kiss, in its subtle retreat, threatened now to open and drown. Peter
shook his head to be certain it was himself he saw. A drop of water from the
rising line scarred the face, exploded its frail composure. (E 2)
In this passage Guy identifies simultaneously with two different versions of the
self. Kroetsch has remarked that "[i]n But We Are Exiles you have the literal surface
of the water as your dividing point; you're above and you're below."49 This fracturing
of the subjective position is repeated as Guy "studie[s] the reflection as if not sure
whom he he might see." His experience of self-division is represented by Kroetsch as
an encounter with an other self: Guy's reflection "mimicked his hesitation, mocked his
doubt by repeating it." Yet the disintegration of the primordial unity of the subject is
also perceived as the gratification of a repressed desire. The relationship between Eros
and Thanatos emerges most clearly in the sentence "[t]he mouth, pursed and offering a
kiss, in its subtle retreat, threatened now to open and drown." Indifferently positioned
between two opposed subjective positions, Guy has no option but to enter the "dialectic
of identification"50 between self and "other" that constitutes alienated subjectivity and
which compensates the individual for the loss of its original illusion of autonomy. The
shock that this engagement with alterity produces is revealed as Guy shakes his head
"to be certain it was himself he saw." But the "frail composure" of the unified self has
disappeared, to be replaced by the perception of identity as a temporal construct defined
by its intersubjective relationship with others.
In contrast to Hornyak's voluntarist assertion of personality, then, Guy is to
learn that identity is an intersubjective effect produced by reflexive play across the
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categories of "self' and "other." Peter Thomas has observed that the narcissistic self
must "resist the self-in-time" because it cannot yield to "the aggregate of otherness
which is the past."51 This is only true of the narcissist who denies the alienating effect
of the split between subject and image; we will see that Exiles concludes with an
explicit reference to Guy's rebirth. However, Guy's initial response to the crisis of
identity that engulfs him after Hornyak's seduction of Kettle is to erect a barrier
between himself and the world. In a grotesque parody of Hornyak's repudiation of
alterity, he breaks all ties with the past and defines himself as a man outside time:
But he didn't go east again. He went into the north. He might have gone east
to his sister's graduation from university, if he hadn't got so drunk in Fort
Smith that the stewardess wouldn't let him board the plane. He might have
gone home to his mother's funeral, but word got to him in Yellowknife three
weeks after the burial. A month later in the mail he received a shoe-box full of
old family photographs and one hundred shares in a railway that had gone
bankrupt. He tried three times to write his father an explanation; then he threw
his legacy into the river. (E 10-11)
From the moment that he leaves Ketttle's hotel bedroom, Guy's existence is
dominated by the need to recover the subjective unity that is shattered by his alienating
narcissistic identification with his specular image. The only solution that he finds to his
chronic self-division is to deny his own personality altogether by redefining himself in
terms of his nautical function:
A man at the wheel and a man in the engine-room. Joined by an indicator hand
and the jingle of bells. Here the pilot's eyes and hands were in isolated yet
absolute command. Pure. He wanted to shout the word. This is mine. Storm,
ice, wind, rock - those can challenge me. But here a man is defined free from
the terrors of human relationships. A man's function is so clear that each is
simply called chief, skipper, second, pilot. And in a few minutes they'll be
settled down again: the deckhands sleeping and standing watch and scrubbing
and painting and waking the next shift and sleeping again; the skipper and the
first pilot asleep in the lazy afternoon, the cook up from the galley to take a
short nap before supper, the second in the din of the engine-room reading a
frayed and greasy magazine he has read twice before, the mate dawdling over a
cup of coffee in the galley, his only worry a fresh cake the cook thinks is
hidden, and should or shouldn't he dare cut himself a piece. Six on and six off
neatly portioning the day, the absolute responsibility of the wheel and the fine
irresponsibility of a private cabin, with a few books to read, clothes to wash,
sleep to be got in preparation for the next watch. No confusion about who is to
do what and who did what. From bunk to galley to the wheelhouse again, six
hours on, six hours off, and always out beyond the wheelhouse the thin band
of shoreline and trees, separating water and sky. An order maintained as
precariously as that maintained by the hands on the wheel. The chaos held in
check... (E 19)
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"Running" the Nahanni Jane up and down the Mackenzie river becomes the "essence"
of Guy's life because it allows him to leave "that tiny blotch of civilization and the
shore people and Kettle Frazer behind" (E 18). Only by this continual act of departure
can the "chaos" in Guy's life be "held in check."
The irony of Guy's attempt to ward off the chaos of history by establishing an
inflexible personal order is that his new identity is simply a mirror-image ofHornyak,
the figure who torments him. Kroetsch underscores this point by employing the motif
of the doppelganger to suggest that Hornyak represents an atavistic side of Guy's
personality. Speaking of Exiles, he has remarked that "[t]he hero's almost split in that
book, with two possibilities existing side by side."52 Thus Guy's acknowledgement
that he is the "goddamn saviour type" (E 75) associates him with Hornyak's messianic
zeal while his initial surprise at finding Kettle on board the Nahanni Jane makes him
start back "as if he had nearly stepped overboard" (E 32) in an unsettling reference to
Hornyak's deathly trajectory. The diminution of identificatory space between the two
men is eventually accepted by the crew who "had somehow come to assume that the
body [of Hornyak] was Peter's" (E 100). More generally, Guy embodies the same
"drunk, stumbling rage to make his terrifying isolation an absolute" (E 52) that infects
Kettle's father Gordon Frazer. Indeed, Frazer's emphatic injunction "[y]ou mustn't
make strange" (E 53) captures perfectly Guy's steadfast refusal to confront his own
self-estrangement. Ironically, however, it is Frazer who, in a key exchange with Guy,
widens the text's discussion of the question of alienation to include an account of the
devastating effects of colonialism:
Frazer lowered his voice as if to confide a secret. But his voice came loudly
hoarse. 'And I killed her mother. In my own fool way. Can't you guess that,
Guy? She wanted to be in Scotland with her hundreds of damned relatives.
And I brought her into this goddamned godforsaken country because the
Hudson's Bay could buy young Scots cheap to do their adding and subtracting.
And it killed her.'
Peter offered him the little rum remaining in the bottle and he shook his
head.
'The only decent thing I ever did in my life was saving enough money
to get that child out of this place.' (E 46)
Hornyak's death announces the beginning of the end of Guy's exile from the
past. With the disappearance of Hornyak's principle of pure presence, Guy finds that
his life has been given "another meaning" (E 19). The fact of Hornyak's mortality
flatly contradicts his "own belief that "he was indestructible" (E 11) and inscribes
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lack, or the "idea of the lived drama of an irreversible incompleteness,"53 at the heart of
subjectivity. Hornyak's fall from the Nahanni Jane also constitutes a symbolic fall for
Guy because it propels the self back into time. His narcotic passage up and down the
Mackenzie can no longer disguise the dependence of the self upon a reciprocal
relationship with alterity. Kroetsch conveys Guy's slow awakening from his absolute
self-enclosure and his recognition of his need for others through the text's economy of
specular images. Robert Lecker has written that Guy associates these images with
"safety" and draws a parallel between the novel's "ever-present mirrors" and "the
mimetic notion of 'truth.'"54 Conversely, I believe that by introducing flash-backs to
the split in Guy's personality that accompanied his alienating identification with his
own reflected image, Kroetsch's use of specular images reinforces our awareness of
Guy's self-estrangement. Thus a description of Hornyak's last moments is juxtaposed
with an emotionally charged account of the violent effect his seduction of Kettle has had
upon Guy's life:
He had led Hornyak into the engine-room and had silently let him pick up a
lamp that didn't have a shield over the bulb. And 'Forget it' he told Hornyak as
they stood in the doorway of the engine-room, when Mike thanked him for
finding the equipment. And the soft irony ofMike's own 7 neverforget'for an
instant sent hate into his hands. For he had notforgotten either, had not been
able to forget that night in the mountains when he opened the door of the room
where Kettle was supposedly resting, sleeping after their hike up the glacier,
when he saw the image ofKettle, of the two of them, caught in a mirror; and
remembering that moment, that moment that had become six years, he could
have killed Hornyak . .. (E 27)
Later in the text, however, the episode in the hotel bedroom is introduced in terms that
foreshadow Guy's reunion with Kettle by linking the experience of alienation to the
impulse of desire:
Time came back into this room, into this bed of a child, and it was not time
present for Peter but the slow, seeping time of another place and another
occasion; and he looked into a hotel room, started to walk in and saw them, this
woman and what he thought was his best if very new friend; and in the slightly
archaic splendour of that carpeted and marbled and faded room he believed he
did not want to believe what he saw, the eloquence of flesh and desire caught
dispassionately in the glass mirror inside the door... (E 48)
The phrase "the eloquence of flesh and desire" is interesting because its
reference to the interdependence of sexuality and language implicates the object of
desire in the chain of substitutions that govern the movement of the signifier. In
Lacanian terms,
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every object of alienating identification will reveal itself to be necessarily
ephemeral and destined to be supplanted because it is incapable of stopping up
the lack inscribed in the subject from the start by the very fact of his being
eclipsed in the signifier.55
Following his reunion with Kettle on the Nahanni Jane Guy's narcissistic experience
of lack and division becomes the basis on which his relationships with others are
formed. The denial of the self-presence of the subjective position is shown as Guy
once again registers Kettle's movements in a bedroom mirror. He does not "turn
towards her but watch[es] in the mirror" as she moves about the room, attracted to the
"mirrored darkness" (E 77) of her body. But his need for intersubjective contact is
shown when, in attempting to avoid the reflection of his own face, he flips his shaving
mirror only to find "Kettle's image dropping] down from above and crowding]
against his shrunken face" (E 75). Kettle's reappearance as the desired "other"
reinforces his sense of lack and incompletion: "He was afraid he could not endure the
isolation for another day, for another hour even" (E 56). The prospect of living free of
the terror of human relationships no longer consoles him, but instead conjures up the
image of Hornyak "wheeling bird-free through the dry prairies" (E 64). Guy realises
that he could "live like that for a season, for a year, seeking, free and seeking . .. and
nothing would be enough to kill the isolation. Nothing. Nothing to kill the nothing."
Instead of seeking to kill the nothing that his life has become, he finally accepts the
decentred subjectivity of the narcissistic condition. After depositing Kettle with her
father at Aklavik, he experiences an epiphany that holds the ideas of life, alienation, and
rebirth in permanent tension:
The thought [of leaving Kettle] was nearly unbearable, for it meant he would
extend and fix this day's pain and make it into his future. Unless Kettle joined
him. It was he who had burst back to life. And the birth was a throbbing
awareness of his isolation. (E 57)
It should be evident by this point that in But We Are Exiles Kroetsch uses the
myth of Narcissus as a metaphor for the difficult choices that confront a post-colonial
culture exiled from the predatory embrace of the imperial father. The myth is
appropriate to Kroetsch's purposes because Narcissus's crisis of self-recognition
dramatises both the experience and the expulsion of alterity. In the figure of Peter Guy,
Kroetsch seeks to demonstrate that the experience of alienation implicit within the
narcissistic act of identification is in fact a liberation for the post-colonial subject whose
history is routinely subsumed within the meta-language ofWestern cultural discourse.
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Paradoxically, Guy's shattering experience of self-division reveals to him for the first
time that his identity inheres in the fact of alienation itself. Given Guy's transindividual
status as the Canadian Everyman, Kroetsch implies that it is only by means of the
defamiliarisation of established images of colonial subjectivity that the Canadian subject
will be able to articulate its difference from the imperial centre. Meanwhile in the
character of Michael Hornyak he outlines the consequences of a paralysing infatuation
with the illusion of absolute self-identity which denies difference and attempts to
eradicate the hermeneutic space between experience and representation. Both Narcissus
and Hornyak are driven by their self-love to repudiate the existence of alterity: both men
die agonising deaths-by-water. The allegorical meaning of Hornyak's tragedy is clear:
by denying the originary experience of alienation by which post-colonial identity is
constituted, the Canadian subject denies itself an enunciative position from which to
speak. But if Exiles dramatises two different allegorical responses to the Narcissus
narrative, it also offers two contradictory reactions to Hornyak's voluntarist example.
For Guy's liberating experience of estrangement from a moribund past in the wake of
Hornyak's demise must be contrasted with the quite different conclusions drawn by the
the crew of the Nahanni Jane.
For McAlpine's crew, Hornyak's body becomes a locus of lost presence that
they must recover in order to restore their former sense of security. The commercial
purpose of their journey is quickly eclipsed by their obsessive need to redeem
Hornyak's corpse from the frozen waters. If we recall the allegorical designation of the
Nahanni Jane as the Canadian body politic, and add to that the fact that Hornyak, like
the imperial centre, projects himself as a node of absolute self-presence uncontaminated
by difference, the crew of the Nahanni Jane are embarked on a search for a moment of
originary unity that the ruptures of colonial history deny. In fact, the dismal end that
meets their collective effort to reverse time and restore their loss suggests a close
affinity between Hornyak and Coleridge's albatross. The connection between the quest
for Hornyak's body and the crew's need for an unmediated signifying relationship
between self and place is highlighted by Kroetsch's decision to begin the novel in
media res. In the uncertain seconds after Hornyak's accident the men are already
locked into the search for an explanation for the hole that Hornyak's absence has
punched into their lives. The dominant figure in this opening phase is McAlpine who
remains "not a little proud of the integrity and persistence of his inquest" (E 6) into
Hornyak's death. But as Guy quickly realises, it was Hornyak who "was there driving
them, insidiously" (E 16). McAlpine's psychological surrender to the dead man is
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conveyed in the ironic comment that he has become "a man of purpose; or a man of
Hornyak's purpose" (E 17). The destination of the Nahanni Jane upriver against the
flow of history towards an imagined reconciliation with an unapproachable past leads it
into a strange uncharted region where the co-ordinates of time and place become
indistinct. Even observers of the boat's progress from the shore fail to raise a hand in
greeting "as if to wave would be to confess a belief in the boat's presence that was not
warranted by common sense" (E 29).
The disorder produced by the crew's perverse refusal to find a reason for their
present dispossession in anything but the fall from an idealised past is repeated in the
natural world, where "[illusion and reality were confounded in a softly shining
landscape, the sky upset into its own reflection" (E 30). Their joy at finding
Hornyak's mangled corpse is unconfined: "An intense thrill of release was on them;
they had recovered the body" (E 87). But as Arnafson realises, the body by this stage
means nothing: the crew's struggle against time, change, and the process of decay has
become a value in its own right. "You want to run away," he tells them,
acknowledging their utterly ambiguous response to Hornyak's bodily presence, "but
you won't let go of that bloody damned ghost stretched out back there on the stem of
the boat" (E 89). In scenes that approach black comedy, the crew are both "deathly
afraid" (E 110) of the corpse and deathly afraid of letting it go. But the impossibility
of any escape from the dislocations of colonial history is grimly underlined when the
barge that bears Hornyak's body rears up before them on the troubled waters and then
splinters away, leaving the men to head alone into the storm towards an uncertain
destiny.
Guy's response to the misconceived nostalgia for an idealised past is altogether
different. Instead of discovering in Hornyak's recovered corpse a moment of reunion
with a lost history of meaning, he detects in Hornyak's absence an insight into the
history of Canadian alienation from origin. His experience of alienation and
concomitant loss of self-presence is not, he realises, a temporary consequence of
Hornyak's disappearance: it is the historical corollary of the Canadian's ambivalent
position between Old and New World discourses of the subject. In a key exchange
with Kettle during their brief interlude on Lobstick Island, Guy opposes his narcissistic
experience of alienation and division to her prelapsarian faith in a brand new world:
'But I'm leaving. I'm starting over brand new. My house is brand new. The
trees are brand new. The fence is brand new. Even the lawn - it arrived one
day while we were eating lunch.' Kettle gestured out at the stunted spruce and
the moss. 'You should drop by, Peter. Just to see my brand new world.
People come by to see it all the time.'
'But I'd track in the old world," Peter said. "I'd mess it up. I'd bring
in Yellowknife, and the Old Town part with its bums and the jumble of shacks
on the rock. Logs and tarpaper and false fronts and unpainted boards. And
water waiting. There you'd be, raising your kids to be civilized, and in I'd
come reeking of whisky or vanilla extract, and I'd say stake me one more time
and I'll make you a fortune. I know where there's gold.'
'And would you find me gold, Peter?'
'I'd find you tons of gold. No, I'd find you champagne. I'd go to the
bush and rocks and come back with champagne. Cases and cases. Just to
make you happy. And we'd sit on your new lawn under a new tree and we'd
drink champagne and be happy. If we had just one glass now we could start.
We could call one of these a new tree. We'd drink and be happy.'
Kettle raised in her hand an imaginary glass. 'To drink and be happy.'
To your new world.'
'To my new world, Peter.'
Peter started to drink. 'Don't spill it,' he said. 'Be careful.'
She turned and buried her face in his parka.
'You spilled it,' he said. 'It's all spilled.'
She lay on his parka. 'We'll have champagne,' she said. 'Won't we,
Peter? We'll have champagne.'
'It makes the old world new,' he said. 'We have to have champagne.'
He brushed imaginary drops of champagne off his parka and let his fingers
touch her hair.
She shook his hand away, crying. 'No, Peter. Break the mirror for
me. Break it, break it please, smash it, Peter. Listen to me, smash it.'
He put down his imaginary glass. He sat looking out beneath the trees
at the distant water. (E 123-24)
The importance of this scene is that it juxtaposes Kettle's edenic desire for a
return to the origin of man before the fall into language and difference with Guy's
melancholy acceptance that the "new world" is itself an effect of the historical rupture
from an "old world" that can never be completely erased. Indeed, Guy's remark that
his presence in Kettle's imaginary province would merely "track in the old world" with
its "bums and the jumble of shacks on the rock" recalls Prospero's resigned response to
Miranda's fantasy of a "brave new world" that "'[t]is new to thee."56 Kroetsch gently
deflates the edenic resonance of her remarks by making an ironic reference to the two
lovers as the first parents as they "joined hands and walked on and stopped again and
walked on" (E 121), which gains from comparison with the closing lines of Paradise
Lost:
The world was all before them, where to choose
Their place of rest, and providence their guide:
They hand in hand with wandering steps and slow,
Through Eden took their solitary way.57
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In contrast to Kettle's creation of a new Eden, Guy's remarks are informed by a refusal
to take the transcendent step outside the historical and subjective conditions of his
alienation. Writing on the Lobstick Island episode, Robert Lecker claims to discern
"those antimimetic motifs that prompt Peter to heed Kettle's suggestion to 'break the
mirror. . . . [bjreak it, break it please, smash it.' And the mirrors do break."58
However, close attention to the passage in question reveals that Guy resolutely refuses
to "smash the mirror" that reflects his historical status as the subject of difference. At
the end of his exchange with Kettle he "put[s] down his imaginary glass" and gazes out
beneath the trees "at the distant water." It is by virtue of this scrupulous refusal to
accept the false immediacy of identity as presence that he is able to avoid both the
lifeless unities of Kettle's paradise and McAlpine's ship of death.
Exiles returns at the end to the fundamental dialectic between identity and
difference with which it began. Alone on a windswept barge with Hornyak's corpse,
Guy confronts the rotting symbol of an impossible union with an idealised past:
And the strength born of his heard laughter: the body toppled stiff from the
canoe; hit the water; was lost in the snarl and riot of waves. He did not lock the
door, and wrapped in the quilt and tarpaulin he lay in the small canoe. Curled
in the quilt and tarpaulin he heard the slamming door, hour after hour. And as
the huge door opened he saw the grey light of the blizzard, saw the glare and
the snow and heard the plunge of wind and water, and as it closed he was
slammed back into darkness again, the silence again, and the soft delirium of
his impassioned motion. (E 145)
This scene has been interpreted as a description of an "overlap"59 between the
personalities of Guy and Hornyak and as a moment that reflects "a symbolic frozen
embrace of identity"60 between the two men. But as Guy's physical expulsion of
Hornyak's body makes clear, it represents the displacement of one discourse of history
and subjectivity by another. Hornyak's anarchic progress through the Canadian west
deliberately wipes out the question of alterity by resolutely turning the "other" into the
"same." He invests everything outside himself with a unitary phallic identity that he
then reinterprets as justification for his basic will-to-power. But as Kroetsch's
reference to Guy's "heard laughter" makes clear, Guy's acceptance of the irreducible
difference between subject and image allows him to resist Hornyak's deathly example
and the fate ofMcAlpine's crew, who are paralysed by their fascination with an image
of the past.
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As an allegorical exploration of the dialectic between place and displacement that
is such a major concern of post-colonial cultural discourse, Exiles offers several
interesting clues to the direction that Kroetsch's fiction subsequently takes. In
particular, its identification of an alienation within the mimetic experience of
verisimilitude provides an early indication of Kroetsch's desire to highlight the tension
that exists between the old language and the new place. Equally, his use of the image
of the split or divided subject to introduce the struggle in post-colonial culture between
the experiences of identity and alterity will later be developed into a semiotic analysis of
the binary contradictions that inhabit Canadian cultural discourse. Exiles
unquestionably exhibits some of the customary weaknesses of a first novel: it is flawed
by a certain over-fidelity to the Conradian motif of a journey into the heart of darkness,
and also by a slightly schematic use of conceptual dualisms. It was no doubt the
occasional crudity of Kroetsch's portrait of Guy as Narcissus that persuaded him to
expunge the epigraph from Ovid from later editions of the novel. More pressing,
perhaps, is the thought that Kroetsch's success in describing the deracination of the
Canadian Everyman leaves him with both a problem and a challenge. For if the
thematic resolution of Exiles turns upon the identification of an alienation within the
mimetic relation, how is Kroetsch to explore the issue of post-colonial alterity in a
realistic paradigm that, in MacCabe's terms, effaces the question of otherness itself?
And if his exploration of the tension between Old and New World discourse is
conducted successfully in allegorical terms, what relationship can his fiction forge with
the historical record of Canadian experience? In order to investigate more fully these
questions of textual form and historical context, we must turn to The Words ofMy
Roaring, Kroetsch's second novel, and attend to the voluminous voice of John Judas
Backstrom, candidate for public office in the election of 1935.
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Narrative and the Divided Subject in The Words of My Roaring
Our relations with each other are now only occasionally and fragmentarily based
upon global experience, the concrete "apprehension" of one person by another.
They are largely the result of a process of indirect reconstruction, through
written documents. We are no longer linked to our past by an oral tradition
which implies direct contact with others (storytellers, priests, wise men, or
elders), but by books amassed in libraries, books from which we endeavor -
with extreme difficulty - to form a picture of their authors. And we
communicate with the immense majority of our contemporaries by all kinds of
intermediaries - written documents or administrative machinery - which
undoubtedly vastly extend our contacts but at the same time make those contacts
somewhat "unauthentic." This has become typical of the relationship between
the citizen and the public authorities.1
With the publication of The Words ofMy Roaring in 1966 Kroetsch begins a
series of interrelated novels, continued in The StudhorseMan and culminating in Gone
Indian, which examine the discourses that constitute and delimit the modern Canadian
experience of cultural identity. The common emphasis of each of the novels that make
up Kroetsch's "Out West" triptych is upon the alienation of the post-colonial subject
from a narrative of Canadian history that purports to represent and give meaning to his
experience. In these texts, Kroetsch explores the tension between identity and
alienation by presenting the struggle between a pair of opposed characters for
hermeneutic control over the Canadian past. This basic structural pattern is clearly
evident in The Studhorse Man and Gone Indian where Hazard Lepage and Jeremy
Sadness are compelled to articulate their dissent from partisan and reductive
representations of their lives by their respective antagonists Demeter Proudfoot and
Mark Madham The fact that Demeter and Madham both present their contextualising
narratives as the embodiment of a discourse of cultural enlightenment enables us to
recognise in their words the implicit division between civilisation and barbarism that
underpins imperialist rhetoric. Meanwhile, the metafictional and self-reflexive nature of
both novels allows Kroetsch to consider the way in which history is produced by the
violent imposition of specific discourses of culture, knowledge, and power.
As the first panel of the triptych, Words differs from its successors in several
important respects. First, it records the story of a man involuntarily imprisoned in his
own rhetoric. Although Johnnie Backstrom is engaged, like Hazard and Sadness, in a
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bitter fight for control of his own destiny, he at least retains the power to marshall and
present the evidence of his own struggle. For it is Backstrom who bequeaths to us a
first-person account of his electoral battle with Doc Murdoch on the western Canadian
prairie during the starvation summer of 1935. Backstrom's independent history of his
own comic fall from grace isolates another difference between Words and the two
subsequent novels. If The Studhorse Man and Gone Indian are primarily concerned
with the ambivalent position of the Canadian subject between Old and New World
discourses of culture and history, Backstrom's schismatic and contradictory narrative
reveals the effect that this discursive ambivalence has had upon Canadian discourses of
self-identification. To illustrate this point properly, it will be necessary to interpret
Backstrom's narrative in the context of Kroetsch's semiotic analysis of Canadian
literature, which suggests that the contradictions of the post-colonial condition bring the
individual codes of Canadian cultural discourse into paralysing juxtaposition.
The concatenation of Backstrom, literature, and post-colonialism is significant
because the undertaker's difficulty in finding a name for his experience represents a
more general dilemma for the Canadian artist. The ostensible irony of Backstrom's
story is that a man obsessed with the idea of self-definition, and who envelops the
Albertan landscape in the resplendent sound of his own voice, comes ultimately to be
silenced by the contradictions that he embodies. But if Backstrom's strange reversal is
read as a comic illustration of Kroetsch's structural theory of the Canadian imagination,
his eclipse becomes a consequence of his search for a redemptive vision of self and
community uncontaminated by the tension between binary values that inhabits the
Canadian structure of vision. Backstrom's final silence therefore provides a stark
reminder of the difficulties facing the artist examining the question of identity within a
culture that has internalised the binomial logic of imperialist discourse. It also brings to
a conclusion Kroetsch's interest in a realist poetics: from this moment on, he begins to
explore how images of reality are constructed through the relationship between
systemic codes; and the way these codes are imposed by different discursive practices.
This modulation from the perception of post-colonial subjectivity as a residual effect of
difference to one that envisages it as a product of discourse is perhaps the single most
important development in Kroetsch's work; and it is consistent with his transition
towards a metafictional critique of Canadian history in The Studhorse Man.
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Kroetsch's use of the term "triptych" to describe the structural relation between
The Words ofMy Roaring, The Studhorse Man and Gone Indian requires comment.
In Chapter One I documented the correspondence in Kroetsch's work between a
distrust of hegemonic discourses of Canadian history and the deconstitution of 'closed'
or traditional textual forms. Similarly, he resists the classification of his novels as a
"trilogy" because this declares an overarching unity and internal integration within his
presentation of modern Canadian history where none in fact exists. Far more
appropriate to his purposes is the internal pattern of resemblance and difference implicit
in the structural organisation of a triptych:
You see I'm writing ... I really call it a triptych, though I find the word rather
pretentious. But I don't like to call it a trilogy because its connections are not
narrative ones, they are of another sort: juxtaposition, repetition, contrast. The
first volume is set in the '30's, the depression, the second volume is set at the
end of the war, and the third will be contemporary.2
The "OutWest" triptych re-interprets modern Canadian history while insistently
posing the question of representation itself. It insists upon a radical act of
defamiliarisation that reveals history to be a particular narrative event, complete with its
own syntax, principles of development, and rules of transformation. For Kroetsch,
history is not simply a nightmare from which he is trying to escape: it is rather a
supremely purposive structuring discourse that identifies beginnings, endings, and
phases of transition within the protean flux of human experience. Kroetsch's
abandonment of conventional narrative connections that presuppose a transparent "one-
to-one" relationship between language and a reality to which it refers, in favour of a
disjunctive approach defined by "juxtaposition, repetition, contrast" signals an
acknowledgement that "history" has no independent ontological existence outside the
textual work in which it is inscribed. By employing a series of extremely unreliable
narrators to impose order upon the changes of the last fifty years, Kroetsch
paradoxically asserts that the real drama of Canadian history is to be found in the
interstices of a totalising narrative. In this sense, Backstrom, Demeter Proudfoot, and
Mark Madham enact the imperial struggle for mastery within their own texts: their
attempt to confer privilege upon a single meta-narrative of history is at odds with the
post-colonial experience which celebrates the "abundance that is diversity and
difference"3 following the collapse of the homogenising discourse of Western imperial
expansion. Backstrom's chronic self-division, Demeter's insanity, and the
disintegration ofMadham's pose of studied neutrality are therefore the various indices
of Kroetsch's desire to foresake the unitary voice for a postmodern discursive
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heterogeneity that recovers "[t]he margin, the periphery, the edge"4 where the Canadian
experience is preserved.
Kroetsch's intention in the triptych to recover a stratum of Canadian experience
excluded from "traditional versions of history"5 also explains his preoccupation with
the landscape of his native Canadian west. Each of his seven novels is suffused with
the idiom, customs, and history of the the Albertan prairies. For Kroetsch, however,
the "west" functions as metaphor as well as geographical description of place. To
travel to Kroetsch's west is to enter an imaginative region where sound and silence
meet and familiar notions of identity dissolve into the endless play of language. In this
environment the closed structure of written form is supplanted by the open-ended
possibilities of oral culture: history is communicated down the generations not in text¬
books, but in the communal narratives of folk-lore, collective memory, and the tall-tale.
Throughout the nightly rituals of the beer-parlour, the bullshit artist is king. Yet as a
self-consciously post-colonial writer, Kroetsch's imagination is structured by the play
between oppositions in a state of constant and unremitting tension. The creative and
regenerative formlessness of the western landscape is therefore counter-balanced by the
political, commercial, and social power-structure of the Canadian east. In Kroetsch's
artistic vision, the "east" denotes a region dominated by stasis, order, and concluded
speech, where narrative is finished and history already written. This impression of
historical enclosure is reinforced by Kroetsch's identification of the east with the myths
of the Old World. For the westerner the east embodies a new Eden that seduces and
then repels him, throwing him back upon his uncreated history. As Kroetsch is aware,
the originary innocence of the prelapsarian state refuses to recognise the alterity of the
post-colonial condition. Stung by this rejection from the garden, the westerner
commits himself to uninvent established narratives of history by inscribing in the
written word the loneliness and the emptiness of the wide western spaces. Within this
new deconstructive stance the unitary narrative of the eastern establishment is exposed
to the polyphony and discordance of western oral culture. It is this incessant urge to
write the history of western alienation back into the documents of an east increasingly
associated by Kroetsch with the colonial presence that is indicated by the west's
"longing for a mythical resolution" to the problems of a divided culture:
The Canadian establishment has created, and is creating, our history. I think
that our history in the past has been created by the Eastern establishment. Even
the kind of religious activities in the West are symptomatic of a longing for a
mythic resolution rather than a historical resolution. Social Credit with its
quasi-religious basis was prophetic and did try to speakmythically. Curiously,
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even today with a fundamental reversal of economic power, the West refuses to
see itself in a dominant position. It maintains the fiction of its inferiority and
isolation and thus clings to its mythic view of itself.6
The relative freedom from definition that Kroetsch accords the west permits him
to create a mythological Albertan province, centred upon the town of Notikeewin,
where the principles of order and disorder come into creative conflict. The quasi-
mythological status of Notikeewin is important to Kroetsch because the entire notion of
the "mythic" allows him to highlight the distinction between lived experience and those
discourses that attempt to order our imaginative encounter with the world. Disclosing
that "myth has a couple of functions for me" insofar as it "orders exterior reality" and
"sometimes it orders interior reality," Kroetsch argues that "myth is related to the
problem of perception, to the way you perceive the landscape."7 The disjunction here
between imaginative order and lived experience that goes under the rubric of
"perception" creates a space that Kroetsch occupies to launch his assault upon
outmoded representations of post-colonial identity. He is assisted in this endeavour by
the move from the impersonal third-person narrative of Exiles to the exuberant comic
voice of Johnnie Backstrom. Comedy is a particularly suitable form in which to
explore the tension between identity and alienation because of its simultaneous
identification with and disengagement from existing social order. Responding to an
interviewer's enquiry whether Backstrom is a dualistic character, Kroetsch is drawn in
reply into a more general comment on the fundamental ambivalence of comedy as a
mode of address:
Sure. Because I think the processes of creation and destruction operate
simultaneously. I think that again is part of the comic vision, a recognition of
the totality of that relationship. You know there's that Indian deity Shiva, who
is both god of creation and of destruction. This too is very much part of the
comic vision.8
It may well appear in retrospect that the deconstructive irony of Kroetsch's later
fiction has its genesis in the comic ambivalence of Words. In the present context, the
significance of the irrepressible ambivalence of the comic voice arises from its secret
acknowledgement that it is necessary to destroy in order to create offers Kroetsch a way
out of the appalling stasis of Canadian cultural discourse. To appreciate more fully the
importance to Kroetsch's work of the juxtaposition of stasis and ambivalence, we must
turn our attention for a moment to his critical writing. In a series of major critical
utterances, Kroetsch has developed a theory of post-colonial cultural development that
is heavily indebted to the comparativist character of structuralist poetics. This mode of
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analysis has enabled him to differentiate at one level between the "Freudian" struggles
ofAmerican life and the "Jungian" balance of the Canadian cultural environment:
In the United States, the Freudian metaphor has swept the boards, the superego
versus the id kind of thing. The id is the good guy trying to free himself, and
the superego takes many forms, the government or the military-industrial
complex or, in recent history, the universities. The good guy is the youth or the
frontiersman, the man in the ten-gallon hat. I see in Canada much less
excitement about that particular Freudian metaphor. I suspect we're more
Jungian in some way. We see opposites in necessary balance all the time ... 9
Despite the residual feeling of security vouchsafed by the promise of less excitement,
Kroetsch proceeds to point out that the predilection of the Canadian imagination for the
resolution of opposing impulses threatens to erase the constitutive post-colonial
experience of difference:
The double hook. The total ambiguity that is so essentially Canadian: be it in
terms of the two solitudes, the bush garden, Jungian opposites, or the raw and
the cooked binary structures of Levi-Strauss. Behind the multiplying theories
of Canadian literature is always the pattern of equally matched opposites.
The balance, whatever the specifics, is always so equal that one wonders how
paradigm can possibly issue into story.10
In this semiotic grid Kroetsch provides a hermeneutic model for the essential
Canadian "ambiguity" that is indispensable to an understanding of his work. He begins
from his primary conviction that each attempt by the Canadian imagination to lend form
and structure to its cultural environment breaks down into the "pattern of equally
matched opposites" or individual binary structures that are inscribed within post-
colonial cultural discourse. Behind the creative vision of the individual imagination lies
a series of deep cultural divisions that resolutely resists totalisation. So entrenched
have these oppositions become that any effort to progress beyond this basic "paradigm"
into "story" or a new perception of self inevitably disintegrates into the series of
discrete tensions from which it arises. The interlinked structural terms "paradigm" and
"story" are elements of a theoretical vocabulary that allows Kroetsch "to say that in our
normal binaries the sides are so evenly drawn that there is a danger of stasis."11 In a
perceptive passage Rosemary Sullivan has written that the structure of vision that
perceives the world in terms of equally matched opposites "lays itself open to the ironic








or equally unfortunate, endless repetition."12 In his later fiction Kroetsch is able to
found a way beyond the paralysing stasis of binary oppositions by embracing the
separate but connected ideas of "contamination" and "deconstruction" which show that
relationships of power and domination are inscribed within the binary dyad itself.
Before this development, however, he constructs in Words a comic fable that records
precisely the dissolution of story into paradigm and the debilitating reassertion of the
stultifying "balance" of the Canadian imaginative matrix.
In Words Kroetsch devises an ironic fable of political emancipation that records
the subordination of heterogeneity to the latent dualities of Canadian cultural discourse.
He maps this triumph of structure over story through the ebullient first-person narrative
of Johnnie Backstrom, who provides an idiosyncratic account of his struggle for
election in the contest of 1935. At first glance, Backstrom's narrative might seem an
unlikely place in which to discover stasis, balance, and paradigm. After all, it is the
relentless energy of Backstrom's voice which propels his dissident campaign for a new
and independent cultural and political identity for the west during the grinding misery of
the Depression years. The words that he roars into the devastated western spaces
describe with intimate and loving detail a culture whose identity is created and
reaffirmed in the communal retreats of beer-parlours, sports halls, and Sunday morning
at-homes. He speaks, moreover, on behalf of a region deserted by providence and the
visible signs of divine justice; the psalmic cry of isolation that gives the novel its title
describes not only Backstrom's personal alienation but also the collective cultural
marginalisation of a people forgotten by the "grabbers from the East" and the "high-
muckie-muck gougers from Ontario."13 As his campaign proceeds, he makes himself
the hero of the unrepresented by promising his rural constituency the one thing - rain -
that can save them from financial ruin. Indeed, Backstrom's transformation into a
saviour and folk-hero shows, in Kenneth Graham's words, that his alienation "is the
people's alienation, an alienation that arises from the inexplicable workings of
economics and nature."14
However, if Backstrom is defined throughout the novel by voice, presence, and
energy, he is simultaneously driven in the opposite direction towards silence and
speechlessness. The more that his narrative tries to articulate the common agony of
dispossession, the more he is forced into a sullen and isolated wordlessness. Because
Backstrom's first-person point-of-view is "a subtle vehicle for revealing [his] divided
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self'15 we watch from a position of privileged proximity as his narrative collapses into
the set of contradictions at its core. Cast as a communal saviour who will establish a
new vision of the western self, he is at the same time the dynamic and self-interested
trickster of western mythology who subordinates the common good to the tug of his
own appetites. His capacious personality occupies, in other words, each of the
denotative positions that Kroetsch outlines in his semiotic analysis of the Canadian
imaginative landscape. Although he is committed to a new vision of Canadian origins,
Backstrom's voice is eventually submerged beneath the structure of oppositions that
order the ambivalent Canadian identificatory paradigm. To gain an understanding of
the rigour of Kroetsch's irony, and the wider implications of Backstrom's self-
division, we will be compelled to consider the meaning that Backstrom's mythic
projection of himself as rainmaker and redeemer has for a community suspended
between anonymity and complete obliteration.
It should be clear from this brief account of Words that the novel is enduringly
hostile to simplistic interpretations. Even heavily qualified pronouncements, such as
Graham's remark that Backstrom's story is "mysteriously providential"16 come to seem
problematic upon closer inspection. If Backstrom's injunction that he is "a great one
for paradox" (WMR 53) is kept firmly in mind, Lecker's observation that the
undertaker's struggle between words and wordlessness "describes a necessary tension
between creation and decreation and ... a necessary reluctance to embrace either
genesis or apocalypse, either sound or silence, either history or myth"17 seems more
responsive to the contours of Backstrom's narrative. Kroetsch's ironic vision demands
that we retain a powerful impression of the paradoxes that inhabit Backstrom's
discourse because he exploits Backstrom's testimony to illustrate the inevitable end that
awaits any attempt to transcend the dichotomous structure of Canadian perception
through the messianic assertion of self. His satiric intentions are apparent in the play
on "election" that runs throughout the novel, where it connotes both the political contest
between Backstrom and Murdoch and the narrator's latent desire for spiritual rebirth
with its escape from mortality and decay. The paradox of Backstrom's position is that
his urge to transcend the western experience ofmarginalisation and division through the
mythic projection of himself as the "One Honest Man" (WMR 180) who can restore
the original prelapsarian language of truth and justice denies the fact that the Canadian is
the quintessential subject of difference produced by the historic breach between
opposed discourses of culture and society. His transcendent leap beyond difference
into pure presence merely internalises this cultural division within the single space of
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his own personality without examining it as the specific entailment of contending
discourses of power. However, his own experience - particularly his Oedipal
relationship with Murdoch, his eastern surrogate father - demonstrates that post-
colonial subjectivity necessarily retains a core of ambivalence that can never be erased.
By reversing cause and effect and insisting that alienation is an existential fact rather
than the cultural consequence of a clash of discourses, Backstrom's self-conscious
mythologising of his own experience simply reinforces the culturally constructed
binaries that underlie his narrative. Paradoxically, however, it is because his narrative
is mythic, and therefore a field of discourse open to a range of different interpretations,
that we are able to read against the grain of his account and identify his self-division as
an individual manifestation of a collective cultural crisis.
The idea of myth as a structure that mediates or reconciles cultural
contradictions is clarified by momentary recourse to the work of Claude Levi-Strauss.
Levi-Strauss's anthropological research suggests that myth is a tool for the symbolic
resolution of unresolved oppositions in the cultural practices of a community. As he
writes, "mythical thought always progresses from the awareness of oppositions toward
their resolution."18 To grasp the direct relevance of Levi-Strauss's thought to
Kroetsch's work, we need to recall the concept of "structure" that underpins Kroetsch's
analysis of Canadian cultural discourse. Levi-Strauss's investigations demonstrate that
myths (and cultural systems generally) produce meaning through the differential tension
between their constituent elements. In this they are analogous to the phonemic structure
of a language. As Terence Hawkes explains, individual signifying systems such as
kinship, food, and marriage ritual form "a partial expression of the total culture,
conceived ultimately as a single gigantic language."19 If culture is a language that
incorporates a plethora of discrete semiotic systems, then myth is the mediating
structure that allows the mind to establish homologies between different conceptual
planes. Furthermore, because mythic thought permits migration across the structures
common to several spheres, an understanding of myth gives us "the right to conclude
that we have reached a significant knowledge of the unconscious attitude of the society
or societies under consideration."20
Levi-Strauss's identification of a connection between the phonemic structure of
mythic thought, the contrastive relationship between different semiotic systems, and the
unconscious beliefs of a particular culture offers a useful hermeneutic framework for
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Words. By considering Backstrom's narrative as an eccentric attempt to create a myth
of western unity out of the unresolved contradictions of prairie experience, we are able
to make the interpretative connection between Backstrom's parole (individual
utterance) and the langue (underlying system of codes) of the culture that he comes to
represent. Ironically, Backstrom is representative of the west not in his passage from
alienation to messianic self-presence, but because his vacillation and self-division
personify the internal tensions within the cultural body politic. There is thus a curious
sense in which, to adopt one of the key terms of Roland Barthes's work, Backstrom's
narrative is intransitive: it gestures towards the referent of the external world, but
always returns back to the collision of systemic codes within Backstrom's own
discourse.21 His roaring therefore reveals the pattern of equally matched opposites that
preoccupy Kroetsch in his critical writing. The intransitive nature of Backstrom's
narrative helps to explain the extreme repetitiousness of his mode of address; as Levi-
Strauss points out, "[t]he function of repetition is to render the structure of the myth
apparent."22 Despite his emotional isolation, Backstrom is engaged in a desperate
search for "the organizational categories and forms through which the mind is able to
experience the world, or to organize a meaning in what is essentially in itself
meaningless."23 His attempt to provide a narrative form in which to articulate the
fragmentation of Albertan society therefore lends considerable emotional power to
Kroetsch's exploration of the unconscious attitudes of western Canadian culture.
Kroetsch takes great care to emphasise the correspondence between
Backstrom's individual status as an alienated and bifurcated speaking subject and the
more general divisions of post-colonial culture. Consequently, the schism in
Backstrom between the need to roar his way to a new identity and his lack of a
language in which to describe his experience is replicated by splits and tensions in the
outside world. His narrative is set in the dreadful Depression years when the collapse
of world financial markets, loss of international business confidence, and the failure of
home crops left the west in a catastrophic condition. Added to this, the resentment felt
by the west at the perceived indifference of the relatively prosperous east gave rise to a
mood of helplessness tinged with sullen defiance. Words therefore presents a nation
in economic crisis engulfed by a manichaen politics. John A. Irving, whose magisterial
study The Social Credit Movement in Alberta has influenced Kroetsch's thought,24
describes rural Canada in the 1930's:
Social movements tend to appear during periods of widespread social unrest,
when profound dissatisfaction with the existing social order arises. No
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conditions could have been more favourable for the development of such unrest
than those which existed in Alberta in the autumn of 1932. The farmers of the
province had experienced every possible agricultural ordeal; they had been made
the playthings of the high tariffmanipulators; they had built up markets in the
United States only to have them ruthlessly cut off; they had suffered drought
and every agricultural pestilence from root-rot to grasshoppers; they had seen
prices drop to such incredibly low levels that sometimes it did not pay to haul
their produce to market. Under such circumstances, they found it well-nigh
impossible to keep up the payments on their heavily mortgaged farms. The
discouraged farmers, looking for some tangible cause for all their miseries,
focused their resentment and hate upon the banks and loan companies. In the
cities, towns, and villages the masses of the people were no better off.
Unemployment was general: thousands were living on relief; still other
thousands came close to lacking adequate food, clothing, and shelter.
Thousands of people were socially perplexed, frustrated, and angry. They
were caught in a steel web from which there seemed no escape. Their social
environment, their feeling for the process of life, their hope for the future, all
became meaningless.25
The vacuum produced by the absence of normal political and social order was
filled by the arrival of Social Credit. Social Credit embodies and reveals a crisis of
historical development; it represents an extreme response to the economic malaise
precipitated by the Great Crash of 1929. As an economic programme it is historically
associated with the name of C. H. Douglas. Douglas claimed to have identified a
fundamental disjunction between the forces of production and the demands of
consumption caused by the excessive cost of production in relation to the purchasing
power of the consumer. This observation is the basis of Douglas's famous "A plus B
Theorum."26 To rectify this lacuna within modern capitalist production Douglas's
mechanistic imagination proposed to stimulate economic demand by introducing,
among other measures, new forms of control over the monetary system, a national
dividend (the celebrated "social credit") payable to each citizen according to the real
wealth of the nation, and a "just price" for goods in order to combat monetary inflation.
The moral basis of this minor economic revolution was provided by Douglas's appeal
to the national cultural heritage since the application of his proposals would, he
believed, liberate the citizen from economic drudgery and facilitate his or her social and
cultural self-realisation.
In Alberta the unlikely figure ofWilliam Aberhart came to the fore, pioneering
an obscure hybrid form of Social Credit economics and biblical fundamentalism. As
Irving observes, "Social Credit ideas, Aberhart insisted from the beginning, offered a
fulfilment of fundamentalist and prophetic Christianity."27 In Aberhart's revisionary
schema the economic justification for Social Credit is based upon its appeal to moral
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health. Equally, its prophetic or mythic values demanded a communal return to the
unity of the organic whole:
With the exception of his addresses on basic dividends, no aspect of Aberhart's
exposition of Social Credit aroused more public interest than his definition of
the flow of credit as the bloodstream of the state. Just as the blood flows to
every part of the body, feeding, clothing, and sheltering every cell, so, he
argued, must credit flow to every individual and every productive enterprise of
the state for the same purpose. . . . Unless the amount of purchasing power
distributed during any period equates the total production available during that
period, a surplus of goods will pile up, production and purchasing power will
both be reduced, and pernicious anaemia of its bloodstream will make the state
sick unto death.28
Aberhart's adaptation of Douglas's theory transforms the latter's ideal correspondence
between production and consumption into an emotional appeal for economic, political,
and cultural holism. The consequences of such an exclusivist position are obvious:
Aberhart's programme bred isolationism and cultural separatism. On August 22, 1935,
to the astonishment of the watching world, Alberta elected the first Social Credit
government in history.
The rise of Aberhart and his Social Credit government forms the backdrop to
the opening pages ofWords. By recreating so faithfully the hopes and disappointments
of this crucial phase of western cultural development, Kroetsch provides a concrete
historical context for his allegorical vision of identity, alienation, and memory in Exiles.
Backstrom's narrative commences, appropriately enough, in a community hall where
he watches his rival Doc Murdoch make a campaign speech to an enthusiastic audience:
Old Murdoch was up on the fancy platform with all the flags and the bankers,
promising relief and better prices. Promising new markets. Up there looking
like a million dollars, showing his gold teeth and nodding his flat pink face as if
drought and hard times and mortgages were just something those three hundred
people had dreamt about last night. Promising we could all be as rosy and rich
as he was, if we'd just smile when he smiled - and make our X's on the
appropriate line.
Old Murdoch up there on the stage, he saw me sneak in and he bowed
and said, "My worthy opponent."
That brought the place down. By God, the Union Jacks stood straight
out in the gales of laughter. That old community hall just wheezed. The
windows rattled their putty loose. The streamers overhead, red, white and
blue, curled and uncurled in the raucous air.
Old Murdoch had packed them in and he was laying them out. "My
worthy opponent," he said, "has come to bury us not to praise us." (WMR 3-
4)
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At first glance, this scene appears merely to offer a conventional portrait of the
lone political outsider in hopeless opposition to the established hegemony of the local
party machine. But if we turn our attention from the transitive (what is narrated) to the
intransitive (the way in which it is narrated), we discover that Backstrom's opening
speech introduces a number of the binary oppositions that will later impel his story
towards silence. Thus Murdoch is depicted as an "old" and wealthy man, who looks
"like a million dollars" with his "gold teeth" because he is backed by "the plutocrat bank
managers" (WMR 5), and whose high public reputation is symbolised by his position
on the raised dais of the platform. Meanwhile, young Johnnie Backstrom is closely
identified with the drought, hard times, and crippling mortgages of which he speaks,
and symbolically associated by his occupation as an undertaker with the "low" and
unesteemed facts of dust, decay, and death. Murdoch's speech in this first scene neatly
marks this division between Backstrom and himself when he jokes that the undertaker
will be "buried ... in a landslide of votes" (WMR 4). Behind this series of
oppositions lies a further tension between authentic western experience and an east in
thrall to the "Union Jacks" of the former imperial presence that Backstrom will exploit
shamelessly as the election contest proceeds. In order to clarify the binary structure of
Backstrom's discourse, John Clement Ball has organised a number of these
oppositions into a compact tabular form:
The dichotomous structure of Backstrom's narrative therefore reveals his
internalisation of the binary divisions that afflict Canadian cultural discourse. To
illustrate this point, we might note that the separation Backstrom describes between
Murdoch's historical understanding of "the long and painful past" (WMR 5) and his
own intuitive and poetic response to western needs is present within his own
personality. Thus in a number of marvellous passages Backstrom gives expression to
the pervasive western experience of isolation within the unbounded prairie spaces in a
Johnnie Doc
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language careful, measured, and precise enough to satisfy even Murdoch's
verbal restraint:
I was born out here in a farmhouse, remember. The first thing you hear is the
wind. And going upstairs, at the turn of the stairs in that first house; a window
looked west; and westward in the summer you could see the green of a wind¬
break, elm and maple and Russian poplar and caragana. Things that don't grow
here by nature but have to be planted and tended. And then in the fall you could
see through the bare branches out across a mile of wheat stubble; a gradual rise
to the horizon, a clump of poplars, a line of telephone poles along a road a mile
away, and another farm finally, the closest neighbor. An old man whose wife
went out of her mind and had to be put away. (WMR 54)
Elsewhere, however, the connection between the sensitive mind and the west's wide
distances is broken by Backstrom's self-conscious projection of himself as a mythic
figure beyond the constraints of history and acculturation:
I could find absolutely no place to sit down. What empty seats there were were
smack up front. I didn't simply stand at the back of that hall, I loomed. My
name, let me say once and for all, is Johnnie Backstrom, and I am six-four in
my stocking feet, or nearly so, a man consumed by high ambitions, pretty well
hung, and famed as a heller with women. Or at least I was, until the eldest
unmarried daughter of the Burkhardt clan proved marvelously fertile on the
strength of an awkward and hurried trial. (WMR 4)
Here we find Backstrom insisting upon his status as a primal source of energy and a
totem of male virility. He does not simply stand, he "loom[s]"; he is "consumed" by
high ambitions; and he is, of course, "pretty well hung" and "famed as a heller with
women." The contradiction in Backstrom's idiom between a delicate individual
responsiveness to the western landscape and the exaggerated bombast of his
mythological song of himself pushes his narrative towards the mock-heroic: Elaine
becomes "the eldest unmarried daughter of the Burkhardt clan" and her pregnancy
proves her to be "marvellously fertile on the strength of one awkward and hurried
trial." Mock-heroic form is traditionally employed to introduce a discrepancy between a
language and the environment that it describes; in Backstrom's case, the discrepancy in
his position between the historical and mythopoeic imagination eventually calls into
question his ability to find any voice at all with which to articulate his vision.
The ambivalence that Backstrom manifests between existential fact and the
mythopoeic imagination characterises his response to the political crisis engendered by
the Depression. This first becomes evident in the opening scene where, pressed by
Murdoch's supporters for his own solution to what Kroetsch calls "the desperate
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situation of a people looking for an ideology and a politics that would help them out of
their wretchedness,"30 he makes the unfathomable gesture of promising rain to the
drought-stricken farmers. It is noticeable that Backstrom himself never wholly comes
to terms with his own action and spends the rest of the novel retreating from its
implications. Immediately after he introduces the idea of "rain" to the assembly he
begins to qualify the sense in which the noun should be understood. "No, sir . . .
[t]hat's not what I said" (WMR 8), he replies to a farmer who asks if the advent of rain
is contingent upon Backstrom's political victory; later he feels compelled to explain to
the reader "I was joking when I said that about the rain. I had to give old Murdoch a
smart answer. Why in hell couldn't people forget something?" (WMR 13). But if
Backstrom is unable to understand his own curious behaviour, the incident appears less
opaque to the reader familiar with Kroetsch's critical writing. For Kroetsch exploits
Backstrom's misadventure to point out the poverty of a politics that oscillates between
the nostalgic longing for a providential narrative that would identify subjectivity with
historical source and primal unity ("rain" operating here as both gift from heaven and
water of life) and the perverse luxury of absolute self-abandonment. The inadequacy of
Backstrom's solution emerges with the realisation that whether he follows Hornyak and
embarks upon a quest for the redemptive waters and absolute self-identity, or apes
Peter Guy's initial decision to safeguard himself from history and the terrors of human
relationships, he is unable to come to terms with the historical factors behind the
ambivalence of the post-colonial condition. Neither Holy Water nor the harsh politics
of exclusion are sufficient to explain Backstrom's unaccountable need to encounter the
east symbolised by his his ten years in Toronto, his relationship with Murdoch, and his
attraction to Murdoch's daughter Helen. Because the politics of redemption and
narcissism both actively refute the notion of 'difference,' it also becomes easier to
understand how a figure so prominently associated with voice is so frequently forced
into silence. "I was speechless" (WMR 50) he tells us after an encounter with Helen
Murdoch, and later he grants this personal experience almost metaphysical status:
"Speechless we come into this world; speechless we go out. What a hell of a state, to
be speechless in between" (WMR 56). But as Backstrom's story shows us, this
metaphysical loss of voice is in fact the historical consequence of his failure to escape
the "double hook" of the specifically Canadian dualities that underpin his entire
narrative.
Once the intuitive and paradoxical character of Backstrom's conduct has been
established, it becomes possible to discern a larger symbolic significance in his
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dramatic appeal for rain. For Backstrom's role as a collective focus for hope (a fertility
figure offering water to the parched land) identifies him as a modern shaman who
provides a vision of reconciliation and renewal to the stricken community. With the
eclectic impulse that informs his approach to narrative styles, literary genres, and
mythological patterns, Kroetsch in fact models Backstrom upon three independent but
interlinked cultural figures: the picaro, shaman, and trickster. The emphasis of
picaresque literature upon a society on the brink of collapse where structures of
identification and belief are in abeyance possesses an obvious relevance to Kroetsch's
description of the prairie crisis. Equally, the episodic and mock-autobiographical form
of picaresque fiction is evident both in the psalmic tone of Backstrom's confession, and
the inexorable passage of time shown by the division of his narrative into daily
segments, which increases dramatic tension and introduces a form of determinism that
his "roaring" attempts to escape. The association of Backstrom with the picaro also
suits Kroetsch's ironic intentions. As Alexander Blackburn has noted, the informing
idea of the myth of the picaro is "that it has the power to identify and to reverse modem
man's alienation from himself, from humanity, and from the universe."31 Backstrom's
ultimate achievement in supplying the Notikeewin people with an illusion that leads
them into a moral wilderness "reverses" modern alienation at a formidable cost to
reason and their collective sense of humanity.
Kroetsch's use of the picaro figure to refine and concentrate his ironic vision
also helps to account for his thematic use of the shamanistic process. In one sense the
structuring theme of shamanism, namely the symbolic death and resurrection of the
shaman who undergoes a mortal crisis and then is reborn as a consequence of the
vision that he offers to the community, is particularly apt for the story of an undertaker
who spends his working life presiding over the edge of man's mortal experience.
Also, the fact that shamanistic ritual insists upon a division between the priest, who is
the focal point of an established network of social and cultural relations, and the
shaman who, in Joseph Campbell's words, gains "a certain power of his own" as "a
consequence of a personal psychological crisis"32 sheds light upon the dichotomy
Backstrom creates between the "high" hieratic position of Murdoch and his own
dissident struggle. However, other aspects of Backstrom's narrative demonstrate
Kroetsch's ironic use of shamanistic transfiguration. To begin with, the importance to
shamanistic ritual of the individual fast becomes farcical in a land ravaged by hunger.
Furthermore, while a vision is disclosed to the shaman that is concealed from others,
Backstrom invents a premonition of rain for political gain. And although, as Levi-
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Strauss observes, the role of a shaman is to provide a language that makes it possible
for a community "to undergo in an ordered and intelligible form a real experience that
would otherwise be chaotic and inexpressible,"33 Backstrom's narrow appeal to a new,
exclusive conception of western identity mystifies the historical factors behind the
fragmentation of the prairie sense of self. The collective and cathartic shamanistic
function expresses the hope, suffering, and expectation of the tribe: the shaman has "an
occult power over nature, which he can use either to harm or to benefit his fellows."34
Conversely, Backstrom holds no power over nature and his comic ascension has grave
consequences for Murdoch, Jonah Bledd, and the community in general. In place of
the sanctity of shamanistic ritual, Backstrom offers the profane practices of the beer-
parlour, where drinking, gambling, and boasting establish a common bond. While
sickness, swelling of the body, and fainting fits may precede the shaman's rebirth, in
Backstrom's case these are the sure signs of a hangover. The comic diminution of his
occult power also emerges from the fact that while the shaman is made aware of his
holiness and his ability to protect the people from evil at an early age, Backstrom's
spiritual gift consists in the dubious knowledge that he was "sent for" as a baseball
pitcher where he performed the invaluable public service of "fannfing] twenty-seven
men in a row" (WMR 11).
A third cultural archetype that Kroetsch invokes is the trickster of north
American mythology.35 A degree of continuity between the shaman and trickster is
observed by Campbell who describes trickster as a "super-shaman."36 The advantage
to Kroetsch of employing themes and images from trickster mythology are manifold.
In general terms, the trickster tale acts as a prism through which a society comes to see
itself. The trickster erupts into a world that he is destined to redefine; through
trickster's exigencies, and the effect he has upon those around him, the storyteller is
able to construct a portrait of an individual society. Moreover, trickster is a
fundamentally ambivalent figure who oscillates between identification with and
disruption of the existing social and moral order. He is a fool, a lecher, and a cheat; but
he is also the bringer of culture and self-knowledge. Kroetsch inculcates trickster's
ambivalence in Backstrom, who brings the "equally matched opposites" of Canadian
cultural discourse into a single discursive space. The outward signs of this discursive
ambivalence are evident in Backstrom's chronic unreliability as a narrator. The
coexistence of opposing impulses appears in Backstrom's narrative often in a stark
form: "I cannot stand forgiveness" (WMR 61) he expostulates; "I wanted forgiveness"
(WMR 121) he admits of a conversation with the wall-eyed farmer. At other times
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Backstrom's sheer lack of insight into his own motives is breath-taking. "But I believe
to the best of my knowledge I recount events as they occurred" (WMR 134) the
unreliable narrator continues, pausing only to note in the middle of a farrago of
complaint that he is "not the sort of man who would let on that he is undergoing an
ordeal" (WMR 114). In words perfectly applicable to Backstrom's narrative Paul
Radin writes of the Winnebago Trickster:
Trickster is at one and the same time creator and destroyer, giver and negator,
he who dupes others and who is always duped himself. He wills nothing
consciously. At all times he is constrained to behave as he does from impulses
over which he has no control. He knows neither good or evil yet he is
responsible for both. He possesses no values, moral or social, is at the mercy
of his passions, yet through his actions all value comes into being.37
A number of correspondences between Backstrom and trickster may be
established at an individual and a thematic level. Backstrom, like trickster, is defined
by his "uninhibited sexuality"38 and his uncontrollable appetites. We have seen that he
introduces himself as a "heller with women" and his wife's pregnancy testifies to his
sexual potency. Adverting to his own voracious appetites he confides:
"I consume and I consume. Chapter and verse. Newspaper columns that bulge
with advice. The want ads. Food. Hats. Socks. Gasoline. Women. Beer.
Hardstuff. I have a large jaw and mouth, my appetite is healthy. My eyes are
twenty-twenty and so eager they hate to sleep. My ears are wax-free and larger
than normal. I consume and I consume ..." (WMR 95)
Like trickster, he is also initially defined by his unconsciousness, unpredictability,
destructiveness, and self-appointed suffering. Backstrom's unpredictability is signalled
ten years before the present crisis by his abrupt departure for the east on "some gigantic
roll of the dice" (WMR 24). His dislike of the process of socialisation and the
experience of community leads him to dream of "[tjhat old earth without form and full
of the void" as "that mysterious thing" seized him, "[t]hat longing for the old chaos"
(WMR 101). He retains a vestige of trickster-magic, which appears when he "dr[aws]
a circle" around the beer-parlour "with [his] old magic arm" (WMR 11). But
underneath his magic and his holy innocence lies the impulse of the "ravening lusting
beast" who must "corrupt and destroy" (WMR 63).
From these rather unpromising beginnings the trickster cycle presents the
gradual development of trickster's self-awareness: he evolves from a state of pure
animality to become the regenerate hero of the tribe. By the middle point of his
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wanderings, trickster is shown "emerging out of his complete isolation and lack of all
identity, and as becoming aware of himself and the world around him."39 During this
difficult passage through the trials of individual and social integration - for trickster's
escapades are concerned as much with the discovery of the nature and function of his
bodily parts as the quality of his natural environment - he becomes the collective focus
for a host of societal energies and tensions. As Jung remarks, "[a] collective
personification like the trickster is the product of a totality of individuals and is
welcomed by the individual as something known to him, which would not be the case
if it were just an individual outgrowth."40
However, Backstrom's role as trickster is deeply damaging to the Albertan
population. His unconsciousness, unpredictability, and latent destructiveness infect his
practical judgement. In Backstrom's hands, the politics of alienation become an
alienating politics. Kroetsch registers this disturbance by introducing a number of
incompatibilities between the development of the trickster cycle and Backstrom's
eccentric progress. Thus in the Winnebago trickster cycle, the Assiniboine trickster
myth, and the "Raven" trickster narrative of north-western Canada the world "is
represented as originally covered by water."41 In this environment, trickster only
begins his "mediating function" of resolving outstanding "polar terms"42 and creating
new stories after the water has subsided of itself or after he has caused it to subside. In
a variant on the Canadian Raven narrative "the world is represented as being in
complete darkness." Kroetsch inverts these narrative principles by showing
Backstrom's struggle to provide rain to a community afflicted not by darkness but by a
burning sun. In so doing, he problematises Backstrom's role as a "culture-hero."43
This aspect of trickster's character is clearly demonstrated at the end of the Winnebago
cycle, where he is pictured removing obstacles to the native Indians from the
Mississippi. As the storyteller reports, "[wjhatever he thought might be a hindrance to
the Indians he changed."44 In contrast, the paradoxical story of Johnnie Backstrom
ends with its narrator isolated from the community and curiously defeated by events,
aware that his own sympathetic identification with the natural world has been an
elaborate fraud.
Some of the unscrupulousness of a trickster denied his final vindication adheres
to Backstrom's political campaign. It is certainly possible to detect in his flirtation with
Social Credit the shallow self-interest of a man whose inability to understand that the
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political crisis of the 1930's is also a crisis of historical identity leads him to define
moral and cultural values in a vacuum. In order to underline this point, Kroetsch
deliberately exaggerates the ahistorical spiritual fervour of Aberhart's political platform,
and, by re-christening Aberhart as "Applecart," adds a touch of vaudeville comedy to
the proceedings. Kroetsch's purpose in making these changes is to emphasise that
Social Credit offers a mythological and dangerously exclusive vision of a new prairie
identity. Thus although Peter Thomas is correct to observe that through Applecart
Kroetsch expresses "that rhetorical compound of Biblical revelation and judgement
which serves as historical commentary in the oral tradition of the prairies," it is essential
that he adds the supplementary point that Applecart offers "the implicit model of the
times with its satisfactory wished-for closure in moral judgement."45 Backstrom's
gleeful acceptance of this moral "closure" is made plain when he attends to one of
Applecart's political sermons during an election meeting at his home:
Applecart was onto the dirty Easterners who were gouging the West. He had
built up to that and now he was onto them. He was talking about the Second
Coming and the Last Judgement, the final reckoning of the Fifty Big Shots.
Just wait, he said. And he gave them a blanket condemnation. "Just wait, and
in short order the wicked will be punished and the suffering good will be
rewarded." It was a great formula. People looked at me and nodded and
smiled. And I smiled and nodded. We were getting the hang of it fast. The
Fifty Thieves, Applecart said. You're damned tooting, I nodded. (WMR 35-
36)
Two features of Kroetsch's presentation of Social Credit demand attention.
First, Applecart's tendentious references to the "Second Coming" and the "Last
Judgement" discover a panacea for western cultural marginalisation in the resurrection
myth of the Old World. As Guy found on Lobstick Island, such a strategy is
problematic for the New World subject and this contradiction returns to haunt
Backstrom during his dalliance with Helen in Murdoch's edenic eastern garden.
Secondly, Applecart's dogmatic substitution of a temporally unspecific moral apoplexy
for a rational assessment of prevailing economic conditions creates the climate for the
naked opportunism that characterises a great deal of Backstrom's behaviour.
Applecart's use of an apocalyptic idiom to underpin a fascist rhetoric is genuinely
chilling; the substitution of "Jews" for "Easterners" in the above quotation provides an
unhappy reminder of other nationalist discourses of the decade. His rhetorical appeal to
fear and prejudice rather than reason provides the perfect opportunity for the
unscrupulous to exploit an uncertain situation for personal gain. For the estranged
figure of Backstrom, who lost his father at Ypres during a colonial war and who rebels
at the order and domesticity of family life (symbolised by his neglect of his pregnant
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wife), such an opportunity is too good to miss. He accepts Applecart's political
position, launches a series of scandalous personal attacks on the Ontario-born
Murdoch, and uses the resulting emotional hysteria dramatically to increase campaign
contributions from an outraged and bewildered public. Backstrom's ludicrous attempt
to disguise his random cupidity as political integrity is skilfully undermined by
Kroetsch, who juxtaposes his narrator's self-congratulatory participation in "a fine
discussion of cultural heritage and the flow of credit as the bloodstream of the nation"
with the more prosaic admission that he "took in over four dollars" (WMR 40).
Similarly, Backstrom's remarks that "[i]t was a great formula" and "[w]e were getting
the hang of it" betray the tone of an advertising-manager, further amplifying the
cynicism with which he records his motives for entering the political contest:
And I knew all the time that a single funeral, the cheapest kind of funeral, could
save me. Just a few dollars in the old tin cash box and I'd campaign Murdoch
right off the dirt roads. Out of the farmer towns and the skating arenas and the
country schoolhouses. Just one hundred dollars cash from one man who was
rich enough to die; I'd be a member of the Legislative Assembly come
September. You bet your sweet life. Let the snow fly and I'd be sitting up
there in the Parliament buildings, gawking out a window at the streetcars
crossing the High Level Bridge. The micks and bohunks be damned; let the
krauts and the crazy Swedes bury their own dead. Tough titty, boys. No more
digging the grave myself to make the extra two bucks. Not for John B., M. L.
A. Indemnity, they call it; nothing so crass as salary. Compensation for money
that was never yours to lose. Five solid years of good green indemnification.
(WMR 7)
In a judicious sentence Peter Thomas has argued that Backstrom "adopts the
tone of Applecart's voice, its hyperbole and metaphors of extremity, without its faith in
a final resolving order."46 For Backstrom, disorder is the only order because he
violently resists the authority words possess to frame individual action and solidify time
into history. Since Backstrom narrates the story of the Albertan election, with all the
scope for characterisation, opinion, and judgement that the act of storytelling entails,
his antipathy to narrative form is not the least of his paradoxes. However, his artistic
taste for "ordered chaos"47 poses a genuine threat to those who unashamedly live in
history and time. This is particularly true in the case of his longtime friend Jonah
Bledd. Unlike Backstrom, Bledd represents responsibility, fidelity, and a sense of
historical rootedness. As Backstrom recollects, Bledd was "so relaxed and contented
himself, sipping away at a beer in his wife's presence, a brood of kids climbing all over
him, while he pretended to read that rag of a local paper" (WMR 69). Backstrom's
ultraromantic credo "[l]ive, live. Roar, roar" (WMR 144) is the complete antithesis of
Bledd's example; his drunken irresponsibility, which leads him to crash his car thereby
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breaking Bledd's arm and rendering him unfit for work, is the direct cause of his
friend's suicide. Bledd's christian name thus becomes grimly appropriate: he is
swallowed up by Backstrom's need to "stride and thunder and roar" (WMR 162).
Backstrom's refusal to engage with those situations of brute fact that resist the
dynamic sweep of his personality is nowhere better illustrated than in his encounters
with the wall-eyed farmer. Betrayed by the collapse of agricultural markets, the farmer
auctions off his property to avoid its confiscation by the bank. Backstrom's
contribution to the farmer's relief-fund is the promise of one hundred and twenty-eight
dollars that he cannot possibly pay. The reason for his bid is simple: "Words were in
me, knocking to be let out. Pain was in me, and I let out the pain" (WMR 86).
Confronted by a predicament that eludes his personal control, his response is to set up a
private verbal world to rival the real. His seduction by the open-ended rhetoric of
redemption, beginnings, and endings explains why he can never finally break with
Applecart's apocalyptic vision. Although he rounds on Applecart, accusing him of
being a "flatulent windbag" who is hopelessly submissive to the "old dualities" (WMR
94), the charge is so close to a self-indictment that the exchange is best understood as a
conversation with his own conscience. His temperamental inability to engage with
history without recourse to Applecart's apocalyptic discourse becomes apparent during
his famous "hind tit" speech at the stampede, where the need for political agency forces
him to retreat into the scriptural idiom of revelation and renewal:
It was while I was mopping the sweat off my bare forehead that more of the
Bible came to my mind. Just like that. "And the fourth angel poured out his
vial upon the sun; and power was given unto him to scorch men with fire." I
shook my fists at that blazing hammering sky. And then I dropped my voice. I
let the hush fall. "We are afflicted," I said. "Afflicted and plagued, my friends.
But remember. Let me repeat: remember. If you feel - if you feel in your heart
and bowels that the heat can no longer be endured. If you know that the
burning must cease. If you agree that we must have back our self-respect, our
sense of decency, our hope, our pride - maybe then you should vote, my dear
friends - you should vote for the clown. (WMR 112)
But if Backstrom is the mythological trickster whose comic duplicities articulate
his "insatiable hunger not just for something but for everything" (WMR 146), he is
also a shaman who must offer a vision that puts into language the western experience of
exclusion and marginalisation. Because he personifies as shaman the divided narrative
of Canadian history, Backstrom is continually attracted to an east that he associates with
closure, stasis, and the privileged discourse of imperial order. No matter how great his
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aversion as trickster to established rhetorical and historical forces, his shamanistic
experience compels him to recognise the impossibility of understanding western
existence without recourse to the constant tensions between east and west, history and
mythology, form and flux. The inexorability of these cultural tensions is symbolised
by the Oedipal tension between Backstrom and his eastern 'father' Murdoch. Because
Backstrom's entire electoral campaign bespeaks his need to find an independent voice
beyond the limit ofMurdoch's rhetorical and political authority, it is difficult to interpret
the relationship between the two men as anything other than an allegorical exploration
of the tension between the imperial father (given Murdoch's willingness to identify
himself with the imperial image of the Union Jack) and his estranged colonial
offspring. The delicate political allegory implicit in this paternal relationship is
enhanced by the idea of surrogacy that Kroetsch introduces. Murdoch is not
Backstrom's natural father; he exercises a powerful but discrete influence upon his
surrogate son from a polite distance. As Helen reminds Backstrom, her father "almost
sees you as a son" (WMR 63). Backstrom is, in Murdoch's words, "the first child I
brought into this world" (WMR 6); and the undertaker always remains Murdoch's
"first-bom" (WMR 22). In return, Backstrom is drawn to the order and coherence of
Murdoch's eastern background. Travelling east on a "harvest excursion" (WMR 56),
he enters Murdoch's east to discover a vision of Eden that is the complete antithesis of
the west with "all those damned dirt roads running nowhere in straight lines" (WMR
59):
"Eden," I said. By God, I just burst out. "The green lush old Eden." For a
moment there I really felt good. I forgot the blinding sun outside, out there past
that rubber plant and the Venetian blinds; I forgot that vast empty glare of sky
that was waiting to humiliate me one more. Just for a minute I felt really on top
of the world. "That was A-l," I said. "Once I got a whiff of that country, I
had some idea of what heaven must be like. (WMR 58)
The tension between the closure of Old World myths of origin and the uncreated
history of the west is enacted during the lovemaking of Backstrom and Helen in
Murdoch's paradisial garden. Murdoch's garden is his "private domain" (WMR 160),
a "little bit of the East" (WMR 158) that he has brought back to the arid west. Its
order, lushness, and fecundity place it in stark contrast to the cracked and desolate land
tended by the bankrupt prairie farmers. Here, in the timeless space of "an artificially
sustained Eden cut off from change,"48 the dual halves of Backstrom's personality
undergo a radical separation. Alive to the transfigurative potential of Murdoch's lush
Eden, Backstrom joyfully accepts Kettle Hornyak's invitation to construct a New
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World mysteriously redeemed from the loneliness and self-division of the post-colonial
experience:
I stood naked before Helen. The branches of trees, the flower beds and the
bushes blossomed anew in sweat-stiffened clothes, in clothes that were much
the worse for wear. My shorts were nothing but holes. I stood naked and
proud in that garden, one sock on my left foot, my feet tender, nevertheless, my
hands raised up in stark humility to that hidden bird, the stars wheeling as they
pleased. "Helen," I said, it's all gone and a good riddance of bad rubbish. I'm
going to start over, from the ground up, from my birthday suit out." (WMR
166)
At the same time, however, Backstrom's phallic energy and exalted sense of his own
"mortality" (WMR 162) make a mockery of "Christian duty" (WMR 161) and the
adamic inheritance; his "seven nights in a row" (WMR 157) in Murdoch's garden enact
a "parodied creation-myth"49 that declines to exchange secular agony for the rhetoric of
redemption. The contradiction in his discourse between the desire for transcendence
and a rueful acknowledgement of mortal fallenness is captured perfectly in his self-
parodying remark that he has "less than twenty-four hours in which to lay on a
cloudburst" (WMR 172). Both creator of meaning and ironic commentator on
meaning's collapse, he occupies the space reserved for the Canadian artist between the
contending claims ofGod and Coyote:
the artist him / her self:
in the long run, given the choice of being God or Coyote, will,
most mornings, choose to be Coyote:
he lets in the irrational along with the rational, the pre-moral
along with the moral. He is a shape-shifter, at least in the lim¬
ited way of old lady Potter. He is the charlatan-healer, like
Felix Prosper, the low down Buddha-bellied fiddler midwife
(him / her) rather than Joyce's high priest of art.50
In retrospect, Backstrom's simultaneous identification with God and Coyote
marks the triumph of paradigm over story and deprives him of the power of
shamanistic vision. His reflex decision to unite these equally matched opposites in a
single discursive space, instead of examining them as the effect of a historical and
cultural schism, locks Kroetsch's semiotic grid into place and forecloses on narrative
itself. The failure of paradigm to issue into story is plain throughout Backstrom's
rhetorical attempt to present himself as the "One Honest Man" who could "sire a new
age" (WMR 180). The significance of this phase of his career is that the redemptive
unity symbolised by his new incarnation assimilates each of the dualisms outlined in
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Kroetsch's semiotic critique into a transcendent vision of self. As such, it develops the
messianic theme that runs throughout Backstrom's narrative: he is thirty-three years old
(Christ's age at his crucifixion); his life is a constant struggle against "temptation"
(WMR 102); and his predicament at the square-dance, where he is surrounded by a
howling mob of female claimants, parodies the fervour of Christ's petitioners.
Kroetsch points out the absurdity of Backstrom's redemptive rhetoric by bringing him
face-to-face with a number of his profane doppelg'angers. One of these doubles is the
rodeo clown who, like Backstrom, is "crowding six-three or six-four" (WMR 106)
and is "[m]aybe in his thirties" (WMR 122). The clown's fate suggests the awful
destiny awaiting those who mistake the true nature of their circumstances. Innocence is
not enough for the clown in the bull's den; he is ripped and gouged to pieces. Looking
down at the clown's broken body, Backstrom experiences a frisson of recognition.
"The spirit struck into frantic despair, I saw it all right. Without so much as peeking, I
saw and I saw" (WMR 106). Elsewhere, as Kenneth Graham notes, "[a]nother of
Johnnie's selves that he is fated to meet repeatedly is the filthy, old, itinerant prophet,
who promises audaciously that the world will end tomorrow and repeats the promise
unreservedly on the following day."51 Fittingly, it is in the company of the prophet
that Backstrom is forced to acknowledge the hollowness of his reputation as rain-
bringer and provincial messiah. It therefore seems quite appropriate that the prophet
climbs into Backstrom's hearse "as if he owned it" (WMR 187).
Each of Backstrom's comic doubles represents a symbolic warning to him to
foreswear Applecart's spiritual and cultural holism and to articulate the historical and
linguistic difference of the Canadian story. But by this stage of his narrative he is, like
the young rodeo-rider with whom he briefly empathises, set on a course of action that
he cannot check. Although the thought of conducting a dispassionate historical analysis
of the situation momentarily commends itself to him, it is swiftly superseded by the
resurgence of his projection of himself as the mythological redeemer of the prairies.
Ironically, though, his "One Honest Man" speech, which attempts to transcend
alienation through the redemptive rhetoric of eternal presence, disintegrates into the
verbal chaos that defines trickster's world of "beginnings and endings. The old
confusion" (WMR 125):
My dear friends, it has not rained and I'm sorry and I'd like to go up to the
Parliament buildings this fall and make amends. I'm in this with you. This
poverty is our poverty. This drought, my dear friends, is our drought. We
need new blood. We need action; enough of words and promises and filthy
lies. And the Lord said, If I find in Sodom fifty righteous within the city, I will
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spare all the place for their sakes. Or for twenty. Or for ten. Or- yes, my dear
friends, yes - One Honest Man can do what a gang of cutthroat schemers,
agents of the Fifty Big Shots, has never done. Has never been able to do.
Never will do. One Honest Man, my dear friends - (WMR 180)
In this passage, God and Coyote are locked in mortal combat. A speech which
promises an end to mere "words and promises and filthy lies" is turned into an empty
verbal pattern, ending as it began with the phrase "my dear friends." The circularity of
Backstrom's rhetoric is simply the manifestation in language of the binary paradigm
that he has internalised. All his visionary outburst achieves is to shift the site of cultural
conflict from the community at large to the schismatic body of his own narrative.
Simultaneously trickster and messiah, individualist and focus of communal longing,
dynamic "heller with women" and beaten icon, Backstrom is no longer able to put his
vision into words. As Kroetsch's semiotic paradigm reasserts itself, Backstrom is first
"undecided" (WMR 181), then "speechless" (WMR 202). In a remark that could
stand as his epitaph, he laments that "[wjords always fail me at the wrong time" (WMR
203). Ironically, he is granted an insight at the last into the manifest illusion of his
shamanistic power. Driving with the prophet towards an election rally at Coulee Hill,
he is caught in a downpour of rain. Taken by surprise, he is consumed by a "terrible
doubt." "The more I confronted the facts," he admits, "the more I was overwhelmed
by a terrible realization. I had nothing to do with the rain" (WMR 192). Denied access
to the universal rhetoric of redemption, Backstrom is left with the contradictions from
which he began. The bitter truth of Elaine's remark that he could "beat them without
rain" (WMR 174) by identifying western paralysis as a crisis of self-image as well as a
lack ofmaterial prosperity comes back to haunt him. But it is too late; his rhetoric has
outrun him. Bringing Murdoch home from his wasted labour at the Gunn farm,
Backstrom is exposed to the misplaced gratitude of a people who believe that they have
found their messiah. Here, at the climactic moment of his electoral campaign, he is
trapped within a narrative that he can no longer control:
A family met us with a warm drink, hot cocoa, teetotallers again, a couple with
two little kids who just wanted to see me. Little pale kids who looked thin and
sickly shivering down there beside the wagon wheel, their big eyes staring.
See me of all people, Johnnie Backstrom, a mere undertaker, sitting up there on
that springboard seat beside an M. D. The lantern just barely managed to light
up the streaking rain. If I'd been alone I think I would have cried. The father
picked up the little kids one at a time and raised them closer. But having the
Doc with me that way, I was embarrassed. (WMR 203-04)
The "terrifying irony"52 that increasingly comes to characterise Kroetsch's
writing pervades the final pages of the novel. Backstrom's primary impulse is to speak
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for a people stranded between history and mythology, who have, in Dennis Lee's fine
phrase, "made an alien inarticulacy their own."53 But by merely internalising this
opposition within his own discourse of western identity, Backstrom leaves himself
without a position from which to speak. In his final "speech" of the novel he provides
a poignant image of his own irremediable stasis:
One hour to meditate on the nature of raw ambition and man's ultimate end....
One hour in which to prepare a speech. They'd probably come out to meet me;
out into the rain, hundreds of people, running and waving and cheering in the
rain. Over and over I tried different approaches. "My dear friends," I said,
speaking directly to the horses, that coffin joggled along behind, "my dear
friends, I met tonight with Duncan Murdoch, the man who delivered ..."
Beginnings and endings. I had to make amends. By God, the world is a
wicked place. A man could get piles, sitting so long on a cold, wet board. "My
dear friends, the time is at hand. We've had enough suffering. Enough crying.
We've had enough pain. Enough dried codfish-" No, damnit, no. Explain,
explain. "We must forgive, my dear friends. We must forgive the selfish, the
proud of heart, the whoremongers; we must forgive the plutocrats on easy
street, the teetotallers, the pious-" No no no no. A man has to make amends. I
owed it to the old Doc. I'd fight my way tight-lipped into that hall. I'd be up
on that stage before I opened my mouth. We must make amends in this world.
"Rain," I would have to begin, the flags stilled about me; the crowd tense and
waiting. I'd be soaked to the skin. I let the binder canvas fall to the floor of the
wagon; hunched I sat, stubborn against the rain, soggy and alone as a creature
of the deep. It was blistering cold in the wet night, I have never been so alone.
But I had a duty and I couldn't stop; somehow I would have to begin, "My dear
friends, rain ..." (WMR 210-11)
In this last burst of frustrated eloquence, Backstrom's ability to convert
paradigm into story is irrevocably lost. His desperate attempt to give "a name to what
[he] knew" (WMR 150) ends in repetition, contradiction, and disjunction. This
rhetorical breakdown is signalled by his hapless use of anaphora. "One hour to
meditate," he reminds himself, only to run into the blank repetition of "[o]ne hour in
which to prepare a speech." He tries different approaches "[o]ver and over" but the
engine will not sputter into life. Sentences end in ellipses, lost in the maze of
"[b]eginnings and endings." "My dear friends," he tries again, unaware perhaps that
this phrase announced the premature end of his "One Honest Man" peroration and will
inevitably conclude this speech as well. "No, damnit, no," he castigates himself,
"[e]xplain, explain." He begins again with the phrase "my dear friends" only to end
with the injunction "[a] man has to make amends" which pops up again in almost
identical form a few sentences later. As he thrashes around for a way to begin,
sentences such as "[i]t was blistering cold in the wet night" appear to belong to a
different story altogether. His insistence that he "had a duty and [he] couldn't stop" is
ironic; the problem is that his narrative cannot start. He knows that somehow he will
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"have to begin," but the last phrase "[m]y dear friends, rain ..." takes him back to the
beginning and delivers him up to his own emptiness.
By the close of the novel, Backstrom is hopelessly lost in the "conundrum in
naming" (WMR 168) that all his speech has become. As Kroetsch concludes,
Backstrom "has this rage to tell a story and he can't tell his own story."54 Silence once
more becomes his business because, as Rosemary Sullivan points out
Backstrom's confessionalism, his continual self-rehearsals end by vitiating all
potential energy in the self. The problem we begin to recognize, is
egocentrism. Prophets go into the desert to lose the self. But Backstrom is no
prophet. All action is located in the self. The paradox of romantic egotism is
that it cannot put trust in the self by reference to something larger than the self,
be it Kroetsch's "community" or "God." Yet at the same time it demands for
the self, total control. And of course the quest for perfection, the impulse to
totality, is presumptive and destructive.55
The ultimate paradox of Backstrom's position is that his "impulse to totality" is by
definition unable to articulate the post-colonial experience ofmarginalisation, division,
and exclusion. His "presumptive and destructive" quest for perfection simply dissolves
into a series of unresolved oppositions. In this sense, John Clement Ball is correct to
argue that Words is about the "bringing together of normally separate things" but
wrong to say that this process leads to the "resolution of dichotomies."56 With
Backstrom's narrative, Kroetsch is not "writing against the prairie mythology (the
'systems') that he himself has identified"57; rather, he has discovered a vibrant
colloquial idiom in which to illustrate these systems in the most striking way possible.
Words brings the initial phase of Kroetsch's novelistic fiction to a conclusion.
In the unreliable and schismatic narrative of Johnnie Backstrom, he discovers the
perfect structural model with which to demonstrate the effect that the divisions and
exclusions of post-colonial experience have had upon native Canadian discourses of
self-identification. But having diagnosed the Canadian impulse toward paradigm and
stasis, Kroetsch must, as a chronicler of the post-colonial experience, find a way of
dealing with the paradoxes that leave Backstrom in a "terrifying and total solipsism."58
His solution to this connundrum is to undertake the journey described by Sullivan from
"the self to "something larger than the self by examining the dualisms of Canadian
experience as products of discourse rather than existential truth. His decision to
abandon mimesis for the fundamentally ironic framework of a deconstructive poetics
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enables him to examine the Canadian binary paradigm in terms of the relationship
between discourses of history and institutional sites of power. In this context, it
becomes possible to explore the construction of the history of the colonial subject
within an analysis of the textual production of meaning. The Canadian critic Dennis
Lee has hinted at just such a project:
Try to speak the words of your home and you will discover - if you are a
colonial - that you do not know them. ... To speak unreflectingly in a colony
then, is to use words that speak only alien space. To reflect is to fall silent,
discovering that your authentic space does not have words. And to reflect
further is to recognise that you and your people do not in fact have a privileged
authentic space just waiting for words; you are, among other things, the people
who have made an alien inarticulacy your own. You are left chafing at the
inarticulacy of a native space which may not exist....
But perhaps - and here was the breakthrough - perhaps our job was not
to fake a space of our own and write it up, but rather to find words for our
space-lessness. . . . Instead of pushing against the grain of an external,
uncharged language, perhaps we should finally come to writing with that
grain.59
To write the history of Canadian "space-lessness" is to embrace the deconstructive
insight that it is necessary to unname in order to name. It is Kroetsch's investigation of
the relationship between history, power, and unnaming, embodied in Demeter
Proudfoot's biography of Hazard Lepage, that this thesis will now address.
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Discursive practices are not purely and simply ways of producing discourse.
They are embodied in technical processes, in institutions, in patterns for general
behavior, in forms for transmission and diffusion, and in pedagogical forms
which, at once, impose and maintain them.1
No one wants to be part of a fiction, and even less so if that fiction is real.2
Both But We Are Exiles and The Words ofMy Roaring offer compelling
meditations upon the Canadian search for historical and cultural identity. By presenting
Peter Guy and Johnnie Backstrom as questing figures who symbolically represent the
aspirations and anxieties of an entire people, Kroetsch uses their adventures to make a
general comment about the character of post-colonial culture. The contradiction that
both characters perceive between the desire for an identity uncontaminated by difference
and the dislocation from historical origin that constitutes the post-colonial experience
becomes one of the primary themes of his work. The subtle negotiation between
individual and collective destiny in Kroetsch's early novels therefore lays lasting claim
to our critical attention.
These two early novels not only introduce the tension between identity and
difference into Kroetsch's prose fiction: they also provide an artistic reflection upon the
forms in which this theme should be narrated. Kroetsch's increasing emphasis upon
the act of narration is signalled by his shift from the third-person narrative of Exiles to
Backstrom's schismatic and contradictory first-person voice. I want to suggest that the
mutability in Kroetsch's approach to the question of narrative is produced by the
incompatibility that exists between realist aesthetics and the expression of cultural
alterity. In order to make this point clear, it is necessary to return momentarily to Colin
MacCabe's analysis of the classic realist text
In his remarks upon the nineteenth-century novel, MacCabe suggests that
classic realism is a form that produces meaning by enforcing a repressive hierarchy
between the various discourses that make up the literary text. This strict discursive
hierarchy is held in place by an unspoken authorial meta-narrative that provides the
reader with an interpretative apparatus with which to judge the relative merits of the
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individual discourses that he or she encounters. One of the great achievements of
Joycean poetics, in MacCabe's eyes, is that it compels the meta-narrative of realism to
acknowledge its "own status as writing - as marks of material difference distributed
through time and space"3 and thus liberated the individual object-discourses from a
position of subservience. One important consequence of this dissolution of a dominant
meta-narrative is that "[t]he claim of the narrative prose to grant direct access to a final
reality" and to "represent the invariable features of humanity"4 is challenged as a
number of different discourses struggle for hegemony across the space of the
typographic page.
I am placing considerable emphasis upon MacCabe's critique of the realist text
because it offers several clues to the development in Kroetsch's work from a mimetic to
a postmodern poetics. It is clear from the remarks of Homi Bhabha recorded in
Chapter Two that mimesis, which proclaims the transparency of the relationship
between word and world, is a problematic medium in which to explore the "alien
inauthenticity"5 of the post-colonial condition. In addition to Bhabha's assault upon the
political status of mimesis, MacCabe's analysis of realism asserts that the realist text
segregates individual discourses from each other and therefore makes an implicit
distinction between different orders of experience. The fact that realist meta-narrative
provides an hermeneutic code by which the reader discriminates between different
orders of discourse presents particular difficulties for Kroetsch because it assimilates
the marginal and the "other" into a uniform textual field. The translation and explication
of alterity within the discourse of the "same" therefore repeats at a textual level the
suppression and marginalisation of the radically "other" by an homogenising discourse
of identity and presence.
Realist fiction is, in other words, an unlikely form in which to consider the
question of cultural alterity because it enforces exacting limits upon the expression of
difference. Its authorial meta-narrative might itself be said to have a colonising function
since it remorselessly interprets the new within a preconceived system of values. The
connection that can be established between the colonising tendencies of certain forms of
political and literary discourse offers an intriguing perspective upon the direction taken
by Kroetsch's work after Words. For The Studhorse Man, his third novel, explicitly
links the operation of a literary meta-language to the imposition of a discourse of
cultural order. The ability of the discourse of colonialism to revisualise colonial space
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and incorporate the "other" into its own field of reference was central to its success. In
one of the most significant developments of his novelistic career, Kroetsch creates in
The Studhorse Man a resonant textual metaphor for this act of colonisation. At a
rudimentary level, the novel records Demeter Proudfoot's attempt to write a complete
biographical account of Hazard Lepage, studhorse man, and symbol of a vanishing
strand of western Canadian history. But Kroetsch uses this deceptively simple
narrative to forge an allegorical link between Demeter's biographical appropriation of
Hazard's history andWestern representations of colonial identity. The act of biography
therefore functions in the text as a metaphor for the discourse of colonialism; it
represents a vision of history that must be displaced before the indigenous Canadian
voice can properly be heard.
By focusing so insistently in The Studhorse Man upon the relationship of
power between biographer and biographical subject, Kroetsch signals his desire to
examine the material production of discourses of colonial history. In fact, both The
Studhorse Man and Gone Indian mark a shift in Kroetsch's approach away from the
interior history of the Canadian subject's division toward an examination of the political
discourses that circumscribe post-colonial experience. The development in these novels
from a passive representation of cultural alienation to a transformative reading of
cultural discourse is shown by the increasingly contestatory character of the struggle
they depict between individuals for a position of discursive hegemony. In both novels
the act of biography is introduced as a metaphor for the influence of colonialist
discourse upon the narrative of Canadian history; it is also used to detail the
individual's struggle for autonomy within a discourse that it cannot control. Neither
Hazard Lepage nor Jeremy Sadness (the postgraduate student who tries to discover his
identity in the northwestern Canadian interior) exist outside the contextualising
discourses of Demeter Proudfoot and Mark Madham which appropriate and interpret
their experience. By charting the failure of Lepage and Sadness to attain an enunciative
position from which to articulate their own story, Kroetsch bears eloquent witness to
the discursive constraints placed upon the independent expression of Canadian
experience.
The Studhorse Man and Gone Indian are not, however, unidirectional
narratives of domination and exploitation. Lepage and Sadness both make a number of
attempts to contest the sequestration of their own history. Their dissent is crucial to the
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meaning of both texts: the refusal of these characters to occupy the positions allotted to
them within the totalising discourses that claim to represent their lives demonstrates that
post-colonial identity is not a 'natural' condition anterior to discourse but an ideological
construction formed by the interchange of discursive rules and prohibitions. The
textual antagonism between 'author' and subject in these novels therefore allows
Kroetsch to expose the assumptions and exclusions that characterise Demeter and
Madham's colonising narratives. By creating an allegorical relationship between the act
of biography and the dynamics of colonialist appropriation Kroetsch is thus able to
denaturalise politically coded images of post-colonial culture. He also manages to
effect the transition from the private space of character to that radical discursive
exteriority where different versions of post-colonial history come into open conflict.
As these remarks suggest, the appearance of The Studhorse Man in 1969
constitutes a major turning point in Kroetsch's artistic career. In this chapter I want to
consider four developments in his work that fundamentally alter his approach to the
discursive colonisation of Canada. The first, which illustrates the broadly Foucauldian
character of Kroetsch's prose fiction, concerns Kroetsch's exploration of cultural and
historical discourses as discourses of exclusion. If Kroetsch's first two novels
consider the relationship between dominant cultural discourse and the self-divided
Canadian subject, his subsequent fiction examines the way discursive formations form
the subjects they represent. Who, these works ask, are granted access to discourse, in
what circumstances, and under what prohibitions? Secondly, the period following the
publication of The Words of My Roaring charts Kroetsch's transition from a
synchronic or 'structuralist' investigation of opposed cultural codes to a post-
structuralist examination of the hierarchies of power inscribed within the binary stasis
of Canadian cultural discourse. Next, Kroetsch develops in this period a series of
trenchant political allegories of colonial cultural dispossession which operate
dialectically upon dominant cultural discourse to expose the illusion of its political
neutrality and resituate its synchronic or unitary readings of Canadian difference within
the diachronic process. The gradual fragmentation of hegemonic cultural discourses in
each of Kroetsch's five most recent novels is therefore directly attributable to the
formation of counter-discourses of modern Canadian history. And finally The
Studhorse Man announces Kroetsch's first sustained experimentation with an open
postmodern form which foregrounds the processes by which post-colonial subjectivity
is constructed.
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Although these four themes are interlinked it is useful to consider them in
temporary isolation from each other. The Foucauldian strain of Kroetsch's thought
becomes most evident when his work is considered together with Foucault's theoretical
analysis of the genesis and structure of discursive formations. In a group of texts
comprising The Archaeology ofKnowledge, "The Discourse on Language," and the
first volume of The History of Sexuality Foucault depicts a series of discursive
formations "characterized by the delimitation of a field of objects, the definition of a
legitimate perspective for the agent of knowledge, and the fixing of norms for the
elaboration of concepts and theories."6 Discourse demarcates, orders, and regulates the
field of truth for hegemonic social groups; and it does this by establishing relationships
ofpower. Discourse, Foucault famously asserts, must be conceived as "a violence that
we do to things, or, at all events, as a practice we impose upon them."7 In Richard
Terdiman's words, discourses become "the complexes of signs and practices which
organize social existence and social reproduction" and, through their material
persistence, "give differential substance to membership in a social group or class or
formation" by mediating both an "internal sense of belonging" and an "outward sense
of otherness."8 By applying the Foucauldian analysis of the establishment of
discursive formations to the discourse of colonialism it becomes possible to envisage
the latter as the name "for that system of signifying practices whose work it is to
produce and naturalise the hierarchical power structures of the imperial enterprise and
to mobilise those power structures in the management of both colonial and neo-colonial
cross-cultural relationships."9
The notion of discursive formations as violent and repressive structures that
naturalise the power relationships they instantiate is crucial to readings of both The
Studhorse Man and Gone Indian. These texts problematise the process of
naturalisation by which Demeter Proudfoot and Mark Madham construct images of
Hazard Lepage and Jeremy Sadness. In both novels Kroetsch deconstructs established
images of Canadian history to expose the influence of the discourse of colonialism
upon the representation of colonial space. Kroetsch's identification of a violent
hierarchy within the field of discourse is one important consequence of his passage
from a structuralist to a post-structuralist poetics. As I suggested in Chapter Three,
Kroetsch's early fiction partakes of the comparativist character of structuralist poetics;
his influential analysis of Canadian cultural discourse in terms of the static binary
opposition produced by a collision of unresolvable cultural codes reproduces the
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intrinsic binarism of the Saussurean linguistic paradigm. However, a structuralist
reading of cultural history in keeping with the Saussurean critique of language is
problematic for Kroetsch since Saussure's analysis produces a theory of differences
without positive terms.10 Far more pertinent to Kroetsch's concerns is the Derridean
notion of differance, which, by an infintesimal and radical displacement of the classical
oppositions ofWestern ontology, identifies a hierarchical relation of domination within
the neutral couplings of the Saussurean dyad.11 One of the most striking features of
differance as the enabling condition of conceptuality is that its emphasis upon the
historical primacy of one term within a classical opposition reintroduces diachrony into
Saussure's synchronic paradigm. Derrida's emphasis on the historical constitution of
binary structures enables Kroetsch to see within the binary stasis of Canadian discourse
the continual effacement of certain forms of experience before others. His progressive
elaboration of a deconstructive mode of fiction from the end of the 1960's therefore
allows him to develop from "paradigm" into a version of the Canadian "story" that
examines cultural discourse as a contestatory form in which opposed interests, values,
and histories struggle for pre-eminence.12
The admission of diachrony into a synchronic paradigm is also the most salient
feature of Kroetsch's use of allegory as a counter-discourse to the rhetoric of
colonialism. As he shows in The Studhorse Man and Gone Indian, one of the
primary discursive strategies of colonialism is the projection of its own system of
values and beliefs onto the uninscribed space of the colonial "other." This tactical
transposition of cultural codes has a dual motivation: the "other" culture becomes
rapidly assimilable within a colonialist frame of reference, while the disquieting
irruption of manifest cultural difference is translated into a deficiency within colonial
culture that can only be remedied by the renewed application of external control. The
helpless imprisonment of the colonial subject within a European matrix of cultural
reference is demonstrated in both novels by the indebtedness of Kroetsch's surrogate
narrators' to the narrative of The Tempest, which enforces a moral and political
distinction between the untutored and bestial native subject and those who aspire to
mastery of the Book. In Kroetsch's allegories of power and dispossession access to
the order of discourse is conferred only by mastery of the traditional values of
European civilisation; while those marginalised by the narrative of enlightenment
progress must encounter their own history in the guise of a foreign language.
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The trope of allegory (which comes from the Greek alios or "other" and
agorevein which means to speak publicly or openly) is particularly well suited to
contest the seamless transposition of different cultural typologies. Indeed, as Paul de
Man has shown, the structural dependence of allegory upon the temporal repetition of
an anterior sign with which it can never coincide insists upon the irreducible fact of
difference. Writing on the relationship between the allegorical sign and its meaning he
comments:
We have ... a relationship between signs in which the reference to their
respective meanings has become of secondary importance. But this relationship
between signs necessarily contains a constitutive temporal element; it remains
necessary, if there is to be allegory, that the allegorical sign refers to another
sign that precedes it. The meaning constituted by the allegorical sign can then
consist only in the repetition (in the Kierkegaardian sense of the term) of a
previous sign with which it can never coincide, since it is of the essence of this
previous sign to be mere anteriority. . . . Whereas the symbol postulates the
possibility of an identity or identification, allegory designates primarily a
distance in relation to its own origin, and, renouncing the nostalgia and the
desire to coincide, it establishes its language in the void of this temporal
difference.13
By designating primarily "a distance in relation to its own origin" allegory is
hostile to the enforcement of universalising European values onto the colonial
landscape. Instead, the schism between history and origin constitutive of allegorical
meaning encourages the recognition of cultural pluralities, heterogeneities, and
differences. The Studhorse Man and Gone Indian continue the transformation of
synchrony into diachrony by employing allegorical references to the European and
American imaginative traditions (Augustine, Bunyan, and Frederick Jackson Turner for
example) to institute counter-discourses of post-colonial history. These counter-
discourses have a potent subversive effect because they establish "an oppositional,
disidentificatory voice within the sovereign domain of the discourse of colonialism"14
and thereby expose the historically constituted character of colonialist discourse.
Kroetsch's attention in his use of the allegorical sign to the historicity of
discursive formations clears the way for a discussion of his development of a
postmodern poetics. This concern with the locus of history and textuality introduces a
problem that haunts his early postmodern fiction and which allows us to identify a
relation of compensation between The Studhorse Man and Gone Indian that is of
signal importance for his later work. Before we turn to this issue, it is necessary to
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consider the possible significance of 'postmodernism' as a generic label for the
expression of identity and difference. The term 'postmodern' is problematic since it
describes simultaneously an artistic, philosophical, and historical category. Such a
migration across conceptual boundaries is typical of a movement of thought that has
been variously described as paralogical, anti-totalising, parodical, acutely self-
conscious, ahistorical, pluralistic, ludic, and neo-conservative. On one hand
postmodern culture has been celebrated for its removal of the boundaries between
popular and elite culture, commended for its inclusion of a range of different cultural
registers within political discourse, and applauded for its deconstruction of totalising
historical narratives that embody the masculine and Western values of the
Enlightenment project. Conversely, however, it has been condemned for its naive
valorisation of semantic indeterminacy and identified pejoratively as a mere extension of
the commodified social sphere of late monopoly capitalism. But whether
postmodernism is identified by its foregrounding of ontological rather than
epistemological issues,15 lambasted for its "depthless, styleless, dehistoricized,
decathected surfaces,"16 or congratulated for its progressive "critical reworking"17 of
hegemonic cultural values, postmodern thought persistently invades the interpretative
space between "same" and "other" enforced by colonialist discourse.
Within the more general movement of postmodern thought there exists,
however, a bifurcation that assumes considerable importance for an analysis of the
novels of Kroetsch's middle period. I refer to the schism detectable in theories of
postmodernism between those who assert the subversive potential of semantic
indeterminacy and others who turn their attention to the political and historical forces
that underpin specific discourses of cultural identity. The first position is synonymous
with the work of Jean-Francois Lyotard. Lyotard's influential treatise The Postmodern
Condition, with its emphasis upon the postmodern "incredulity towards
metanarratives"18 and valorisation of "the heterogeneity of language games"19 over the
coercive unity of Enlightenment grand narratives, has a seductive appeal for a writer
striving to redefine post-colonial subjectivity. Lyotard's commitment to the disordering
effect of paralogy and contradiction has had a sustained influence upon Kroetsch's
work; it is therefore unsurprising that Lyotard's name should figure so prominently in
such a recent statement of Kroetsch's cultural politics as "Disunity as Unity."
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The second position meanwhile is represented by those who, like Fredric
Jameson, are concerned to establish a connection between decentred subjectivity and
the displacements of the signifier on one hand and the "great global multinational and
decentred communicational network in which we find ourselves caught as individual
subjects"20 on the other. Although Jameson's Hegelian heritage impels him toward a
Marxist critique of modern cultural production that Kroetsch does not necessarily
endorse, his strictures upon the political consequences of a fall back into "a view of
present history as sheer heterogeneity, random difference, a coexistence of a host of
distinct forces whose effectivity is undecideable"21 refocuses attention upon the crucial
relationship in Kroetsch's work between history and textuality. Certainly, Jameson's
insistence upon a political critique of the notion of "play" in order to prevent an
awareness of "the alienation of the subject" being replaced by "the fragmentation of the
subject"22 has a particular relevance to The Studhorse Man. Moreover, his conception
of postmodernism as a "cultural dominant" which "allows for the presence and
coexistence of a range of very different, yet subordinate features"23 enables us to
thematise the postmodern as the reciprocal exchange of identity and difference.
Jameson's intervention is calculated, at one level, to make precisely this point: to
characterise "the postmodernist experience of form" in terms of the paradoxical
proposition "difference relates," which repudiates theories of difference that "stress
disjunction to the point at which the materials of the text . . . tend to fall apart into
random and inert passivity" and to develop a "more positive conception of relationship
which restores its proper tension to the notion of differences itself."24
In both the remainder of this chapter and my reading of Gone Indian in
Chapter Five I wish to contend that the development of Kroetsch's postmodern poetics
pivots upon his transition from the first to the second of these critical positions. In The
Studhorse Man his allegorical exploration of the cultural dispossession of the post-
colonial subject makes repeated strategic use of semantic dubiety to undermine Demeter
Proudfoot's history of the Canadian west. As my reading of the novel will
demonstrate, Demeter, in a duplicitous move that replicates the logic of colonialist
discourse, simultaneously employs the fundamental division between nature and culture
enforced by Western metaphysics to situate Hazard as "other" to enlightenment
discourse while attempting to portray Hazard's anarchic condition as prior to the act of
representation. To expose this willful duplicity Kroetsch deconstructs Demeter's
binary logic by showing how the dichotomy between nature and culture rests upon a
further opposition between presence and non-presence that is constitutive of all
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signification. For, as Derrida remarks, "the signification 'sign' has always been
understood and determined, in its meaning, as sign-of, a signifier referring to a
signified, a signifier different from its signified."25 In a development fatal to Demeter's
dream of a complete and self-enclosed biographical record, the act of biography, by
converting the 'presence' of its human subject to the status of a sign within a literary
text, inscribes identity within an infinite chain of substitutions. Consequently, Hazard
is transformed by the very act of biographical representation from a "form of present-
being" whose itinerant, bestial nature is simply reflected by Demeter's text into "a sort
of nonlocus in which an infinite number of sign-substitutions c[o]me into play."26
The gulf that Demeter perceives between signifier and signified challenges the
mimetic assumptions of his own biographical discourse and creates a space in which
the alterity of post-colonial history can be articulated. The ambiguity of the freedom
granted to the post-colonial subject in The Studhorse Man. becomes clear, however, if
we acknowledge that the collapse of Demeter's position at the end of the novel is
caused by Hazard's unrepresentability within a discourse that ignores the ruptures of
colonial history and posits an unbroken immediacy between language and experience.
Despite this ambiguity, Kroetsch suggests that the post-colonial subject can force a
breach in the repressive discursive formations of colonialist historiography by
highlighting the semantic slippage between word and world. His faith in the
subversive political potential of linguistic play is evidenced by the name Hazard
Lepage, which draws attention to the ludic possibilities offered by the printed page of
the literary text.
The political consequences of the dissolution of historical discourse into the
endless configurations of the text should give us pause for two reasons. First, the
specificity of the colonial experience of effacement and marginalisation is menaced by
an aesthetics that privileges semantic indeterminacy over the claims of historical
reference. Without some conception of the force that underpins certain discourses of
history, Kroetsch's ludic strategies threaten to slip over into historical relativism.27
Secondly, the assumption that by deconstructing colonialist discourses of history a
space opens of itself in which post-colonial identity can be articulated is deeply flawed.
In particular, it ignores the question of "explicitly and systematically posing the
problem of the status of a discourse which borrows from a heritage the resources
necessary for the deconstruction of that heritage itself."28 It negates, in other words,
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the complex relationship between coloniser and colonised created by their possession of
a common language.
All of Kroetsch's prose fiction dating from The Studhorse Man insistently
poses the question Derrida introduces concerning tradition, deconstruction, and
counter-discourse. I want briefly to outline a method of reading Kroetsch's
postmodern fiction that accounts for both the problematic status of The Studhorse Man
and the greater success of Gone Indian in examining the formation of discourses of
historical and cultural identity. Accordingly I believe that the second and third panels in
the "Out West" triptych are most usefully considered in the context of Fredric
Jameson's distinction between pastiche and parody in postmodern textual practice. For
Jameson, this distinction is based upon a notion of relative linguistic normality:
Pastiche is, like parody, the imitation of a peculiar mask, speech in a dead
language: but it is a neutral practice of such mimicry, without any of parody's
ulterior motives, amputated of the satiric impulse, devoid of laughter and of any
conviction that alongside the abnormal tongue that you have momentarily
borrowed, some healthy linguistic normality still exists.29
In the light of this distinction it would seem that The Studhorse Man, with its
promiscuous interchange of different literary genres (biography, the quest novel, satire,
mock-epic, trickster-tale and so on) resembles postmodern pastiche since it places in
parenthesis the historical world behind the linguistic patterns of its various discourses.
In contrast Gone Indian approximates more closely to the "satiric impulse" of
postmodern parody. The chief difference between these two modes is that postmodern
parody establishes a connection between text and world that examines this loss of
historicity as a consequence of a disordered political reality. Chapter Five will
therefore investigate Kroetsch's attempt in Gone Indian to expose the institutional sites
that order, regulate, and legitimate cultural discourse. The focus of his interest
therefore shifts from the troubled sensibility of the individual biographer to the
influence of the institution of the university where texts, identities, and cultural values
are created and examined.
The Studhorse Man presents one version of the life and death of Hazard
Lepage, rural trickster and studhorse man, who travelled the length and breadth of the
Canadian west in the First half of this century to breed his horse Poseidon and
perpetuate the line of Lepage blue roan stallions. Hazard's story is narrated by Demeter
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Proudfoot who recounts, from his current confinement in a lunatic asylum, his failed
attempt to apply conventional standards of narrative continuity to the chaotic life of his
biographical subject. In fact, Demeter's biography of Hazard tells of his initial
enchantment with Hazard as an embodiment of the traditional values of rural Canadian
society, his subsequent despair at Hazard's reckless abandonment of the sacred duties
with which he is entrusted, and his own eventual usurpation of the role of studhorse
man. Curiously, then, Demeter converts biography into autobiography and becomes
the hero of his own narrative. Yet far from appearing abashed by this unusual
transposition of roles, Demeter defends his actions as the only possible means of
safeguarding his history of the west from the wilful disruptiveness of Hazard's
behaviour. He is thus able to assert his own importance as a tragic figure whose dream
of giving historical legitimacy to an unrepresented strand of western experience was
frustrated by the anarchism and cultural primitivism of the subject of his attentions.
Accepted on its own terms, Demeter's text portrays the biographer as the
innocent victim of his principled effort to bring historical rigour and objectivity to bear
upon the mythological landscape of the Canadian west. Yet if we respond to
Kroetsch's invitation to treat Demeter's claim sceptically - an invitation made more
seductive by the fact of Demeter's mental breakdown and his implication in Hazard's
death - the novel stands revealed as a comic allegory of the relationship between
coloniser and colonised. For it is possible to show that Demeter's deceptively simple
outline of comic antagonisms, duplicities, and reversals is designed to conceal his
considerable indebtedness to the rhetoric of imperialism. This sceptical reading of The
Studhorse Man therefore seeks to highlight the similarity between Hazard's
helplessness within Demeter's narrative and the historical position of the Canadian
subject whose experience is mediated and circumscribed by the discourse of
colonialism. It would focus, in particular, on Demeter's treatment of Hazard's life as a
mobile configuration of meanings that must be deciphered and assimilated within a
prior system of identification that dissimulates the "awesome materiality"30 of its own
status as discourse. Such an approach allows us to investigate the process by which
Hazard is constructed as an object of knowledge by a colonising discourse that situates
him as an "other" in a cultural matrix designed primarily, in Stephen Slemon's words,
to "interpellate a subjectivity"31 for the coloniser himself.
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Interestingly, Kroetsch promotes an allegorical identification of Demeter as an
agent of the colonialist enterprise by means of the biographer's attitude to history and
narrative. Like Mark Madham in Gone Indian, Demeter's obsession with reason and
order is presented as a perversion of the ideals of European Enlightenment discourse.
Both men attempt to impose extreme narrative coherence upon the scattered fragments
of the Canadian story. In each case, the urge to confer unity and closure upon a heap
of textual fragments is seen to be antithetical to the reality of the Canadian experience,
where questions of authenticity and belonging are informed by Canada's ambivalent
position between different discourses of historical and cultural identity.
The struggle in both novels between the homogenising impulses of an
'omniscient' first-person narrator and a character who insists upon his difference from
the narrative that envelops him may be interpreted as a fictional prototype of the
dialectical cultural vision that Kroetsch outlines in "Disunity as Unity." The
relationship between the private desires of an authoritarian narrator and the predicament
of an individual lost in the labyrinth of an obscurely plotted world becomes one of the
basic paradigms of Kroetsch's fiction; and it is calculatedly used to introduce the theme
of cultural appropriation. Demeter Proudfoot, Mark Madham, William Dawe, and Jack
Deemer each dream of eliminating difference by alighting upon the one true narrative of
history; each, in his own way, is symbolically associated with the cultural
presuppositions of the OldWorld. Fittingly, perhaps, this dream of transplanting the
established structures of imperial identity to the NewWorld receives its most elaborate
parody in Alibi, Kroetsch's most recent novel, where Dorf traces Deemer's vision of
history to the ruins of Roman civilisation at Bath.
The desperate search for a moment of absolute self-identity is recurrently linked
in Kroetsch's work with the ruthless suppression of alterity. More importantly, those
characters who embark upon such a quest are symbolically associated with European
cultural values and the coherent narratives of imperial history. This pattern is repeated
in The Studhorse Man, since Demeter's biographical method reflects the naive
positivistic assumptions of nineteenth-century historiography Hayden White has
pointed out that this period gave birth to
the dream of a historical discourse that would consist of nothing but factually
accurate statements about a realm of events which were (or had been)
observable in principle, the arrangement of which in the order of their original
occurrence would permit them to figure forth their true meaning or
significance.32
Kroetsch exploits Demeter's attraction to the hypothesised neutrality of
historical positivism to make a specific political point. For he detects in this simple and
objective interest in the "arrangement" of "factually accurate statements" a parallel
between positivist historiography and the ethnological discourses used by the coloniser
to justify the act of appropriation. In each case, a calculated appeal to conventional
standards of evidence conceals the fact that such standards only have meaning from the
perspective of the colonisers themselves. It is difficult, for instance, for the victims of
colonialism to accept the proposition that "historical discourse" consists of "nothing but
factually accurate statements" when their own experience of marginalisation and
effacement so often failed to be recorded in the documents of history.
The Studhorse Man depicts the encounter between the representative of the
positivist "dream" of European historiography and a character whose experience of
history is mediated by the mythopoeic imagination of western Canadian oral culture.
The scholarly ethos of European historiography, with its corollary desire to forego
"what were regarded as the intuitive procedures of the makers of fictions"33 in its
apprehension of reality, is central to Demeter's project because it enables him to deny
that his selection and arrangement of the 'facts' of Hazard's life is in itself an act of
interpretation. He therefore supports his blithe assertion that his biography is an
"extremely objective account of the life of one good man"34 with some bizarre displays
of scholarly rectitude. In two particularly memorable incidents we find Demeter
examining railway timetables to "get some sense of the response our hero must have
known" when he encountered the "sudden and alien world" (SM 24) of a country
railway station, and claiming personally to have used the fork that Hazard employed to
remove his stallion's excrement. Demeter explains his compulsion to attain the
objective rigour of European historiography by insisting that this approach is consistent
with "the interest of logic, of continuity, [and] the need to instruct and direct future
generations" (SM 99). But as early as the second page of the novel, Kroetsch
undermines his surrogate's belief that language presents a simple window on reality by
revealing Demeter's biographical discourse to be a comic travesty of Zola's
encyclopaedic method:
Thus it was that on Thursday, March eighth, Hazard Lepage got out of bed
three hours earlier than usual - he was sleeping in his fifth bed, the significance
of which I shall explore later - made his porridge and tea, combed his hair and
beard, put on his overshoes and mackinaw and fur cap, and precisely at 8: 15 ne
went outside to dig a hole in the snowbank covering his recently accumulated
pile of bones.
By 10:10 he was kicking around in the powdered snow, hitting almost
nothing. He found a horse's skull, knocked it clean on the sleigh's bolster,
tossed it onto the pile that now humped out of the sleigh's weathered green box.
He gave one last kick, found a jawbone, and then, knocking the snow off his
wet leather mitts, out of his beard, he crawled up from the hole he had by this
time dug to a depth of nearly six feet. He cursed rather freely the pain in his
back. (SM 8)
Towards the end of The Studhorse Man Demeter is forced to acknowledge that
facts do not speak for themselves independently of interpretation but that the historian,
in White's words, "speaks on their behalf, and fashions the fragments of the past into a
whole whose integrity is - in its re presentation - a purely discursive one."35 Yet
Demeter repeatedly insists upon the innocence of the division between statement and
interpretation - "[tjhere is no need for interpretation" he reassures us at one point (SM
21) - in order to obscure his discursive control over readings of Hazard's life. In this
progressive naturalisation of a meta-discursive function we not only recognise one of
the governing devices of the classic realist text; but we also encounter the technique by
which the coloniser denies responsibility for the ideological distinctions that it enforces
between different orders of subject To appreciate the extent of Demeter's indebtedness
to the binary logic of colonialist rhetoric, we need only compare and contrast his
jaundiced vision of Hazard with this image of his own rectitude. His own actions are
invariably represented to us in the language of enlightenment benevolence. As one of
the "seekers after truth" (SM 34) he insistently underlines the moral responsibility of
the biographer's historic mission:
The biographer is a person afflicted with sanity. He is a man who must first of
all be sound of mind, and in the clarity of his own vision he must ride out the
dark night, ride on while all about him falls into chaos. The man of the cold eye
and the steady hand, he faces for all of humanity the ravishments and the terrors
of existence. (SM 152)
The fact that Demeter writes these words from an asylum alerts us to the
duplicity of his appeal to "the clarity of his own vision." Indeed, his assertion of a
spurious distinction between his own "sanity" and the "chaos" of the world that he
must order reproduces the rationale for imperialist intervention noted by Marlow in
Heart ofDarkness. Demeter extends this rhetorical division between enlightenment and
anarchy by assiduously associating Hazard with bestial, irrational, and uncivilised
attitudes. To this end, he repeatedly conflates Hazard's role with that of the stallion he
accompanies. We can detect this gradual erosion of the boundary between man and
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beast in Demeter's ironic use of Hazard's term "Old Blue" for Poseidon to refer to
Hazard's own "shrivelled" penis (SM 21), his insistence that Hazard "whinnied" (SM
133) while making love to Marie Espheter, and his reference to Hazard's unaccountable
"horse-man cry of pain or delight" (SM 169) at the scene of his death. As Demeter's
text emphatically reminds us, Hazard's "only means of livelihood was the white and
black dink of that stallion" (SM 60). Who, his narrative asks us, would listen to the
ravings of a man who is merely the appendage of an appendage if it were not for the
interpolations of a more reasoned observer?
Throughout his biography Demeter introduces selective criteria of competence
and knowledge to justify the discursive prohibitions that define and regulate Hazard's
existence. For the colonising tendency of Demeter's discourse is reinforced by his
implicit assumption that the studhorse man is incapable of representing himself. By
presenting Hazard as a "dear ninny" who happens simply to be "terrified of history"
(SM 33) he attempts to conceal an act of cultural appropriation in the language of moral
beneficence. Demeter perpetuates the illusion that by speaking for Hazard he is merely
making Hazard's voice heard by his antiseptic technique of quoting Hazard's own
idiom and then translating it into civilised speech. Confessing that he must "control a
certain penchant for gentleness and beauty" Demeter admits that Hazard did not use the
expression "the high raw odour ofmares and spring" but preferred the more colloquial
"raw bitch of a wind was full of crocuses and snatch" (SM 12). By means of this
artful form of semantic imperialism Demeter simultaneously suggests Hazard's
primitive crudity and his own reserves of tact and discretion. However, if the date of
the events described by Demeter's biography is taken into account, the discursive
constraints under which Hazard labours are seen to have not merely a social but also a
political significance.
The Studhorse Man is set in 1945, at the end of a conflict that confirmed the
pre-eminence of American power and hastened the collapse of the last remnants of
direct European colonial influence. This transference of authority and shifting of
allegiances is reflected in Hazard's private world by the supersession of the horse by
the automobile. The proliferation of the automobile in rural Canada in the middle
decades of this century has serious implications for Hazard whose studhorse trade is
based, of course, upon the continuing viability of the horse as a cheap source of
transport and labour. Demeter draws the appropriate conclusion from the facts of social
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and cultural transition in his remark that "Hazard knew his arbitrary and high-handed
rule was being challenged, his era might draw to a close" (SM 88). But the appearance
of the automobile, with the foreshortening of distances and the redefinition of
community boundaries that it brought in train, also threatens Demeter's unitary
narrative of Canadian history since the car, as Kroetsch remarks in an interview with
Rudy Wiebe and Shirley Neuman, is linked to the evolution of new and plural
narratives of cultural identity:
Kroetsch: I think you're on to something because another thing that changed
things was the car. The minute everybody had a car you joined other
communities.
Wiebe: Yes, we literally never had a car in Saskatchewan. The car was the
great vehicle for spreading you all over the place and immediately the
boundaries of the community disappeared.
Neuman: And that creates its own tradition of tall tales.
Kroetsch: Exactly, it changes the story completely.36
To preserve the hegemonic status of his own version of history Demeter must
resist the profusion of new indigenous narratives of cultural experience through what
Neuman terms the west's "old tradition of tall tales." His response to the threat posed
by the eruption of heterogeneity reveals a great deal about his political and cultural
attitudes. In the same reactionary spirit as T. S. Eliot, Demeter transposes the structure
of classical myth onto chaotic modem experience in order to draw a number of specific
ideological conclusions from the "immense panorama of futility and anarchy which is
contemporary history."37 In The Studhorse Man Demeter effects this strategy of
containment by mapping the narrative of the Odyssey onto his story of Hazard's
peripatetic adventures. One added advantage of this manoeuvre is that it enables him to
imply that his self-privileging representation of post-colonial history is simply one
example of a universal mythic pattern that underlies Western narratives of self-
registration.
The conservative impulse behind Demeter's valorisation of synchrony over
diachrony in fact resembles the strange but necessary paradox by which the discourse
of colonialism asserts its historical mission to civilise the colonial nations while
insisting upon the immutability of the structure of power between imperial and colonial
culture. Demeter's transposition of the framework of Greek epic narrative onto the tale
of a rural trickster converts Hazard into an amoral Odysseus whose passage upon
181
Poseidon (the ocean) through an assortment of trials is merely an excuse to avoid a
return to domestic responsibilities. Similarly Martha, the fiancee who for thirteen years
patiently awaits his homecoming despite the presence of "ardent suitors" (SM 165),
becomes, like Penelope, a symbol of constancy in an inconstant world. Demeter,
meanwhile, covets the role of loyal Telemachus for himself. The disingenuousness of
Demeter's scorn for the "violent yokings of greek wisdom" (SM 81) becomes apparent
when we consider how his mock-epic description of Hazard "slugg[ing] away at his
terrible task" (SM 83) during the studhorse man's involuntary union with Widow Lank
and his characterisation ofMarie Espheter as a contemporary Circe who "cast a spell"
(SM 124) on Hazard to detain him at the Espheter ranch impose the idiom of classical
mythological discourse upon the native contours of Canadian experience.
Demeter's appeal to European narrative conventions to order the chaos of
Canadian history is symbolised by his name, which recalls the Greek goddess of the
mysteries. However, Kroetsch has written of his need to "tell [his] way out"
of Canada's "entrap[ment]" within the "mythic stories"38 of the Old World. His work
repeatedly ironises the imperialist pretensions of those characters who attempt to tailor
New World history to fit the paradigms of Old World cultural discourse. Kroetsch
draws attention in The Studhorse Man to the incommensurability between Demeter's
frame of cultural reference and the eclipse of a phase of western history by detailing his
narrator's commitment to the principle of mimetic 'reflection' shown in But We Are
Exiles to be problematic for the representation of post-colonial identity:
If you look at a map of Alberta you will recognise that, traveling from Mrs.
Lank's stump ranch eastward into the parklands, Hazard must inevitably have
driven along the road that is visible from my bathroom window.
By a fortunate combination of light and reflection, I am able to see out
of my window without leaving my bathtub. A mirror is so placed above my
sink that I have been able to sit for hours, attempting to imagine what in fact did
happen (allowing for the reversal of the image) exactly where I imagine it. It is
then time that I must reconstruct, not space. Further, I am able to see far
distant; it is what is nearest that I cannot always make out from my high
window. (SM 85)
In this passage we confront not only Demeter's admitted inability to make sense of the
evidence nearest his "high window" (which we may take in this context as an oblique
reference to the details of Hazard's existence), but also the inevitability, given his
longing for a "whole image of the vanished past" (SM 34), of his eventual decision to
"revers[e]" the projected image in the mirror and usurp the role of studhorse man.
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Kroetsch's parody of Demeter's dependence upon mimesis is one feature of a
more general assault upon the biographer's use of European cultural discourse to situate
the post-colonial subject outside the sphere of civilised Western values. If one aspect
of this discursive inheritance is identified as Homer's Odyssey, Demeter also makes
use of the configuration of political and moral judgements that constitute Shakespeare's
Tempest. The political allegory of The Tempest assists Demeter's enterprise in two
areas: it offers, in the figure of Prospero, a potential moral justification for the
hegemonic position accorded to those who possess the Book; while it provides, in the
figure of Caliban, a prototype of the bestial colonial subject "on whose nature / Nurture
can never stick."39 However, Kroetsch counters Demeter's emphasis upon the
structural relationship between different narrative codes by introducing diachrony into
Demeter's synchronic system. In the same spirit as De Man's characterisation of
allegory as a semantic complex that distributes signs through time in search of a
moment of historical origin with which they can never coincide, he exposes Demeter's
political allegory of colonial history as a semantic process dependent upon a series of
exclusions, omissions, and prohibitions to hold its meanings in place. By highlighting
both the temporal nature of language as a signifying process and the ambivalence of the
colonial subject's relationship to indigenous and external discourses of identity,
Kroetsch shows Demeter's biography to be an ideological reconstruction of post-
colonial reality. The incompatibility ofHazard's actions and Demeter's interpretation of
them therefore opens up a way of reading against the grain of Demeter's text to
establish the fact of cultural heterogeneity and difference and to identify what Slemon
calls "the investments of allegory in the semiotics of imperialism."40
One way for Kroetsch to denaturalise Demeter's steady colonisation of the
western experience and form a dialectical intervention in the production of cultural
meaning is through Hazard's frequent transgression of Demeter's binomial categories.
For Demeter's effort to confine Hazard's rebellion against order, categorisation, and
closure to the single stereotype of the trickster enjoys only limited success. To be sure,
his description of Hazard's various sexual encounters (those involving P. Cockburn,
Widow Lank, Marie Espheter and Mrs Laporte for example) and release of 800 horses
into the centre of Edmonton succeeds in depicting Hazard as an elemental force devoid
of historical or social consciousness. Other aspects of Demeter's biography, though,
are more problematic. It is noticeable, for example, that the staunchly realist biographer
completely fails to register the subversive potential ofHazard's association with Eugene
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Utter. As his name implies, Utter personifies the transfiguring power of the word. His
unconstrained behaviour and his refusal to accept established ideas of individual and
social identity - illustrated most graphically by his incineration of a public schoolhouse -
offer an anarchic insight into the possible redefinition of the self suggested by the oral
narratives of western Canadian culture. Demeter also passes quickly over Hazard's
preference for the genealogies of The General Stud Book rather than the narrative
continuities of his own biography, even though Hazard's attention to the generational
rhythm of equine ancestry, with its repetition of the biblical term "begat," bespeaks a
desire for a new creation myth sensitive to the needs of the post-colonial experience.
But before following Robert Lecker in describing Hazard as "[d]efiant of
history, order, and closure"41 in general terms, we should note that Hazard is often
strategically positioned by Kroetsch to contest highly specific symbols of historical
domination. Thus in a number of incidents Hazard subverts established images of
Canada's colonial history. This subversive process is sometimes suggested in single
incidents such as Hazard's occupation of an Englishman's isolated mansion which was
completed "on the day Queen Victoria died" (SM 52). At other times Hazard's refusal
to be coerced into Demeter's unitary narrative brings together a complex of allusions.
An example is the important scene in which Hazard is carried unconscious into the
bedroom of P. Cockburn, curator of the provincial museum. The allegorical resonance
of this occasion is deepened by the fact that Cockburn's bedroom doubles as a replica
of the bedchamber of the chief factor of the Hudson's Bay Company. Here Hazard
defines himself by his resistance to Cockburn's attempt to transform him into a waxen
image of a studhorse man; he then wakes the next day to find himself confronted by a
gallery of symbols depicting the history of Canada as a settler colony:
Along either side of the high bed were three life-sized figures: on one side the
resplendent figure of an Indian chief, the buckskin of an early explorer, the red
coat of a Northwest Mounted Police constable; on the other the black robe of a
missionary, the coat and tails of an early premier, the black gown of a
university president. (SM 33)
Hazard's response to his unwilling incorporation within the narrative of a
history that has excluded him is instructive. By proceeding "to dress as one of Queen
Victoria's admirable redcoats" (SM 37) he not only makes good his escape, but also
registers his dissent from the institution of government whose "door in closing had
locked behind him, had locked him out" (SM 38). As John Thieme remarks:
The museum episode ends with Hazard escaping, wearing a redcoat taken from
the wax figure of a mountie - later he dons the garb of a clergyman - and this
disguise typifies his trickster-like subversion of the symbols of Western
Canadian authority, as well as his repudiation of official versions of history.42
Although Demeter continues to insist that he is devoting his life "to the making of
[Hazard's] present into history" (SM 10), his willful neglect of the political specificity
of Hazard's protest shows that he is unable to register the meaning of Hazard's
continual displacement of hegemonic images of western Canadian history. For
Hazard's repeated transgression of "official versions of history," his violation of
communal forums such as schoolhouses and wedding ceremonies, and his constant
interchange of identities dramatises the sense of exclusion from dominant cultural
discourse felt by the post-colonial subject. But Demeter, who refuses to acknowledge
the pressure that discursive formations exert upon the worlds they construct, can only
engage with a history of exclusion by recreating it as an exclusion of history. Hazard's
deeply political dissent from the discourse of colonialism is therefore sidestepped by his
biographer, who explains away his subject's truculence as the result of his "peculiar
little aversion to history" (SM 32).
The scene in the Legislative Building makes a concrete connection between the
meta-discourse of Demeter's biography and the political control exercised by dominant
cultural discourse. The discrepancy that Kroetsch creates between Hazard's actions
and Demeter's biographical explanation of them provides a space in which a counter-
discourse of western Canadian history can function. As the novel proceeds, Demeter's
anguished realisation that an alternative version of Hazard's biography can be glimpsed
through the gaps and omissions that his text cannot conceal forces him to confront the
ideological character of the act of representation. But before Demeter undergoes the
textual crisis recorded in the second half of the novel, Kroetsch continues to alert us to
Demeter's continuing failure to explore the real political significance of the events he
describes. A particularly good example of Demeter's abrogation of historical
responsibility occurs in an important early episode, where Poseidon is pictured
challenging a "bronze replication" of a horse supporting a regal lady:
There is - or at least until this happened there used to be - a statue of a royal lady
on a horse on the lawn in front of the beautifully domed Legislative Building.
Now a simple cairn has been put up by the Historic Sites and Monuments
people, and on it the inscription "To this land of prairie, foothill, mountain and
river, where the Indian roamed ..." A group of legislators and a number of
women, coming out from an evening session, had surprised Poseidon in the act
of confronting his bronze replication.
Hazard, hearing laughter, sought out its source and found his stallion.
He must have at that moment known premonitions of a competition that was to
enter into his own life. Poseidon snorted in wonder and fear at the poised and
perfect bronze beast, approached, turned to lash out viciously with his heels,
reared up himself just as the tall bronze stallion reared.
Two strong males contending for one mare could not have been locked
into a more desperate equilibrium. Hazard climbed at once onto the ice-
sheathed granite base of the work of art, intending to put a halter to Poseidon's
head and lead him away in defeat. Instead he found himself booed and mocked
for not letting the battle be resolved.
A man of ministerial voice announced the bronze horse to be superior:
"The artist has done it. In bronze. Forever."
The man's colleagues repeated these words and nodded. "Forever. In
bronze." They applauded briefly.
One lady alone was so reckless as to defend the mortal blue stallion
against his critics. She praised loudly the fullness of Poseidon's natural
endowment, pointing out that the artist, in casting his bronze model somewhat
larger than life, had in fact erred in making its parts ridiculously small. (SM
29-30)
Demeter's description of this highly political struggle between an image of
imperial domination and a representative of the dissident Canadian west strips the
confrontation of any semblance of historical context. Blithely ignoring the fact that a
representative of an effaced historical experience is challenging the authority of Queen
Victoria, matriarch of colonialism, to impose herself upon the Canadian landscape,
Demeter, in a gesture both venal and typical, chooses to focus upon the phallic imagery
on display. His closing remark that "my story is of Hazard, not of the sordid
behaviour of politicians" (SM 30) is disingenuous, since Hazard's story explores the
consequences of a life without political control over the discourses that disseminate
social and political power.
Demeter's attempt to naturalise his appropriation and reconstruction of Hazard's
history depends upon the elimination of the ontological divide between life and
representation: only by establishing his biography as a complete, contemporaneous and
disinterested account of Hazard's career can Demeter hope to disguise his own role as a
producer and distributor of discourses of place, history and identity. Paradoxically
then, Demeter, the realist par excellence, is involved in a postmodern search for the
death of the author. His solitary achievement, though, is to be the death of his
historical subject Taking as his representational model the "old Chinese artists" who
"drew their horses true to life" (SM 134), Demeter tries to obstruct our view of his
creative role by arguing that "[tjhere is no need for interpretation" within the
biographical process. Unfortunately for him, the biography that he actually writes
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demands a series of staged withdrawals from this uncompromising position. As soon
as he begins to develop his portrait of Hazard, Demeter's need to establish a suitable
social distance between his discourse and the crudities of the studhorse man leads him
to admit that "[a]lready I find myself straying from the mere facts. I distort" (SM 12).
Eventually the tension that exists between his air of scholarly detachment and the
obvious signs of his manipulation of Hazard's position compels him to adumbrate an
ungainly compromise proposal: "While a biographer must naturally record, he must
also, of necessity, be interpretive upon occasion" (SM 18). But by yoking together the
ideas of "natural" and "interpretative" documentation in this formulation Demeter
simply re-opens the hermeneutic gap between experience and representation that he
elsewhere tries to deny.
Demeter's stance is complicated further by his recognition of a fundamental
instability within the linguistic sign. Clearly the identification of an area of semantic
indeterminacy between sign and referent poses a direct challenge to the synchronic and
taxonomic closure of Demeter's rhetoric. I will argue at the end of this chapter that the
use of the free play of the signifier to disorder the culturally constructed oppositions of
colonialist discourse is in itself of dubious value for a radical post-colonial politics.
What is not in doubt is that Demeter's insistence upon the ideological neutrality of
biographical representation requires him to repress his understanding of language as a
signifying system in which meaning is created from the patterns of linguistic exchange.
Kroetsch in turn lampoons Demeter's unyielding linguistic positivism by crediting him
with a text that depends for its meaning upon the exaggerated linguistic play between
the signifiers "mare," "mer" and "Marie" (the christian name of Hazard's lover Marie
Espheter). These three nouns are internally related in the novel because they symbolise
Hazard's comportment towards death. The first reminds us that Hazard is driven to
disaster by his search for a mare to breed with Poseidon; the second that he is warned
of a death by water in the prophecy of the old woman at Paaschendale Ridge who tells
him "'La mer sera votre meurtriere.' The sea shall be your murderess" (SM 12); and
the third that he is persuaded by Marie's Circe-like charms to exchange the security of
home for the erotic promise of the Espheter Ranch. The rudimentary consistency of
this thematic development not only exposes the impoverished imagination of a second-
rate writer; but it demonstrates once again that Demeter's biography is a textual
construct that imposes form and meaning upon the contentious evidence of post-
colonial history.
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By the second half of the novel, the constant tension between Demeter's
calculated exploitation of a retrogressive image of Canadian history in order to
interpellate a subjectivity for himself and his diehard belief in language as a natural
reflection of a pre-given and self-identical reality fractures the representational surface
of his text. This schism is most clearly marked at that moment when the mounting
evidence of his selection and reconstruction of historical data forces him to
acknowledge in the process of representation the diachronic displacement of a static
structure:
The very process of recurrence is what enables us to learn, to improve, to
correct past errors, to understand the present, to guide the generations that are to
come. Yet it is precisely this same characteristic of life that makes life
unendurable. Men of more experience than I have lamented at the repetitious
nature of the ultimate creative act itself. It is only by a mastery of the process of
repetition (you will note the repeated "e," and "t" and the "i," and the "tit"
standing out boldly in the middle) that we can learn to endure; yet we can only
master the process by a lifetime of repetition. (SM 127-128)
Demeter's reflection upon the "repetitious nature of the ultimate creative act"
acknowledges language to be a sgnifying system that produces meaning by the
temporal play of differences between its various terms. This inscription of diachrony
within the synchronic has two devastating entailments for Demeter's theory of
language. First, the notion of language as a temporal play of differences is, in
Derrida's words, "incompatible with the static, synchronic, taxonomic, ahistoric motifs
in the concept of structure." 43 Secondly, because the play of difference supposes that
meaning is produced through the interweaving of a series of decentred signs, a text may
be produced "only in the transformation of another text."44 Demeter's insistence upon
a set of binomial categories operating within a closed field ofmeaning prior to the act of
representation therefore becomes completely untenable. With fine comic irony,
Kroetsch illustrates Demeter's inability to police the borders of his text by
superimposing the Oedipal narrative onto Demeter's borrowings from Homer. As
Russell M. Brown has pointed out, Demeter Proudfoot is "a name which joins the
Greek goddess of marriage to an English equivalent of the name Oedipus."45
Demeter's Oedipal character is bleakly borne out by his role in the events that precipitate
Hazard's death: not only is he antagonistic to Hazard, whose role he later reproduces;
but his entry into Hazard's story is prompted by his incestuous desire for Martha, his
own "first cousin" (SM 18). Meanwhile the implication of the signifier in a potentially
endless chain of substitutions ushers in a range of intertextual references that Demeter is
unable to control. In one of these, Demeter's portrait of Hazard as a priapic itinerant
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mutates into an image of the forsaken Redeemer "turned and mocked away from where
he would once have been more than welcome" (SM 85).
Demeter's predictable response to the growing threat of Hazard's instability
within the text is to eradicate the space between sign and referent and reconstitute the
binary oppositions on which his biography is based. In an act of considerable naivety
he attempts to guarantee the passage from signifier to signified by becoming the subject
of his own discourse. The end of the novel describes exactly this transition from
biography to autobiography as Demeter picks up his saddle and declares "[t]hat
morning I was D. Proudfoot, Studhorse Man" (SM 156). Ironically, though,
Demeter's violent elimination of the play of differences between signs inevitably leads
to his predecessor's demise since Hazard's ludic appellation and chronic over-
determination as a rhetorical figure mark him out as a personification of the play of the
signifier. Post-structuralist theory displaces the static structures of colonialist rhetoric
as the novel culminates in a scene in which the biographer is implicated in the death of
the native Canadian subject:
The stallion, with a slight touch of a shod hoof, rolled Hazard's figure about
like a rag doll. I saw for the first time the bloodied face, and the gun of itself
came up; terror raised my gun.
And over the sight I saw the last and only surviving stallion of the
Lepage breed of horse.
I looked away and Hazard's eyes were open and looking nowhere and
yet watching the horse's head.
"Kill him," Martha whispered. "Kill him".
"No," I answered.
"Kill him now. Hazard is still breathing."
"He's all that Hazard lived for," I said.
"No," Martha said.
And I thought of firing the gun; in my mind's eye the neck twisted and
the head went sideways and up. The stallion fell and rolled over, kicking at the
air. A grotesque dance of love, as if the world had turned, not the stallion. The
great penis shrank back into the body of the dying horse. The calks of the
horseshoes, bright, flashed with the kicking at the lions and the fleur-de-lis.
"No," I said. Martha-"
And Hazard stirred then, trying once more to move across the floor. I
swear he shook his head at the raised gun.
And then it was to late for me to fire; the two heads were together, the
man's, the stallion's. The stallion's yellow teeth closed on the arm of the man.
(SM 171)
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Demeter's desire to reconstitute a number of fixed binary oppositions is evident
at several points in this passage. His description of Hazard's need to break into the
civilised domestic space of the house and effect a perilous reunion with his studhorse is
intended to re-emphasise the basic animality of Hazard's character. As such, it makes
subtle ideological use of the dichotomy of "horse" and "house" that Kroetsch identifies
as a stock concern of prairie fiction:
The basic grammatical pair in the story-line (the energy-line) of prairie fiction is
house: horse. To be on a horse is to move: motion into distance. To be in a
house is to be fixed: a centring unto stasis. Horse is masculine. House is
feminine. Horse: house. Masculine: feminine. On: in. Motion: stasis.46
Equally the deft symbolic touch of the conjoined "lions and the fleur-de-lis" enables
Demeter to reinscribe both the English and the French strains of the Canadian colonial
inheritance at the scene of Hazard's death. And Demeter eventually closes his text with
the composite figure of Demeter Lepage, daughter of Hazard and Martha, whose
lineage reflects the oscillation between energy and stasis that Kroetsch defines as one of
the "ambiguous"47 legacies of Canada's ambivalent colonial status.
But Demeter's attempt to explain Hazard's death as the predictable consequence
of his unnatural consanguinity with his studhorse is mere posthumous clamour.
Whether Demeter usurps the role of historical subject by expelling Hazard from the text
that was to bear his name, or insists, against all the evidence, that his own discourse
exerts no leverage on the historical world, his identification of a continual diachronic
displacement of the synchronic structures of language opens a space in the surface of
representation that can never be closed. No matter what form of coercion he brings to
bear, Demeter's experience of the mutability of the sign confirms to him that history is a
text that can never be totalised. As his meta-narrative of western history collapses in
the last pages of the novel, the contamination of each term of a binary dyad with its
opposite is underlined as Demeter, personification of the enlightenment project, submits
to the pressure of madness. So complete is his disintegration that his history of Hazard
Lepage ends by celebrating an eschatological vision in which "barbarous, stinking man
would soon be able, in the sterility of his own lust, to screw himself into oblivion, to
erase himself like a rotting pestilence from the face of God's creation" (SM 174).
Kroetsch, however, reserves the last laugh for himself, since Martha, the object of all
Demeter's crazed attentions, is eventually bequeathed to Utter, whose polyphonic
vitality leaves Demeter's narrow empire of discourse in ruins.
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The end of The Studhorse Man, with its comic deconstitution of a totalising
meta-narrative of western Canadian history, might appear to offer a momentary
liberation from imposed paradigms of cultural value. However, in these concluding
remarks on Kroetsch's novel I want to suggest that the allegory of colonisation and
cultural dispossession that it contains is deeply problematic for an emancipatory post-
colonial cultural politics. The chief difficulty with Kroetsch's approach is that by
predicating Hazard's liberation from the armature of Demeter's narrative upon the
collapse of Demeter's biography into a configuration of textual indeterminacies, he
threatens to create an ontological wasteland between sign and referent that degrades
history to the status of a gratuitous fiction. By placing such emphasis upon the damage
done to the monolithic constructions of dominant cultural discourse by the radical
contingency of language, Kroetsch envisages post-colonial identity simply as an effect
of the semantic surplus of language. Because of this rather curious tendency of his
work, his rejection of a meta-discursive standpoint is accompanied here by an
unwillingness to consider what the relative status of various discourses should be.
Discourses of knowledge, power and identity are therefore perceived simply as a
collection of texts that interact with each other through the ceaseless circulation of
signs. But such semantic relativism ignores the fundamental lesson of his novel,
which is that certain discourses do achieve sufficient authority to hierarchise and
subordinate other idioms and languages. Ironically, then, Kroetsch's highly political
interest in the diacritical character of language leaves him in position from which to
address those specific discursive practices that structure knowledge, regulate cultural
production, and legitimate binary systems of knowledge and power.
This reflection on Kroetsch's handling of language and binary structures allows
us to identify one troubling aspect of the terms in which his work has been received. It
is noticeable that those critics who have endorsed the textual politics of The Studhorse
Man frequently link Kroetsch's exposure of the textual character of historicity to a
more general dissolution of binary structures by the self-differing discourses of post-
structuralism. Hence Susan Rudy Dorscht, in a "post-feminist" reading of Kroetsch's
fiction, commends The Studhorse Man for its exemplary articulation of textual and
historical "difference" and its deconstraction of the binary structures of knowledge.
She then goes on to claim that the straggle in Kroetsch's texts is always "a straggle to
break down these oppositions between masculinity and femininity, indeed, the
opposition between self and other, and so to engage in a post-feminist manoeuvre
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which questions the notion of identity itself."48 However, this implicit acceptance of
the deconstitution of the opposition between "self and "other" ignores the fact that this
manoeuvre is problematic for a culture whose identity is based upon its historical
difference from its colonial past
This problem emerges most fully in the tension that exists between the textual
strategies of postmodern pastiche, which gleefully subvert the binary structures by
which dominant cultural discourse articulates historical and cultural identity, and the
recognition that one of the primary needs of emergent post-colonial cultures is an
"other" against which they can define their newly-discovered cultural freedom. The
New Zealand critic Simon During has described the potential difficulties inherent in the
contradiction between those strains of postmodern thought which testify to the loss of
critical distance between "same" and "other," and the structure of post-colonial identity,
which insists upon this distance in order to exist. As During remarks
the concept postmodemity has been constructed in terms which more or less
intentionally wipe out the possibility of post-colonial identity. Indeed, intention
aside, the conceptual annihilation of the post-colonial condition is actually
necessary to any argument which attempts to show that "we" now live in
postmodernity.49
Yet it remains possible to envisage a form of representation that might avoid the peril of
semantic relativism without reinserting the meta-narrative of realist discourse: the
genre of postmodern parody.
The advantage of postmodern parody is that it offers a textual form that permits
us to contest some of the more depoliticised and dehistoricised developments of
postmodern culture. One of the classic problem of postmodern ontology has been that
the character of its mode of enquiry has contributed to the loss of the object under
investigation. On one hand its hypersensitivity to the codes and conventions of the
textual process has sharpened the reader's interpretative skills, assisting him or her to
decode the informational overload of the modern world; on the other it has placed in
ontological brackets the historical world to which the reader might apply these newly
acquired techniques. This problem might be circumvented, though, by a form of
parody which contains a postmodern reading of history as part of its basic structure of
meaning. The epistemological, ontological and intersubjective questions that
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postmodern thought has highlighted could then be linked to broader movements in
modem political and cultural practices.
A practical example of postmodern parody at work sheds light on these issues.
David Bennett, in his reading of The Crying of Lot 49 argues that the crisis of
verification experienced by Oedipa Maas is a microcosmic version of a larger crisis of
identity foisted upon America by Macarthyite revisions of political and cultural history.
Bennett shows that Pynchon manages to parody this crisis of historicity, without
abandoning the material context of Oedipa's position, by the subversive manoeuvre of
locating characters and incidents that are "historically, socially and ideologically
determinate"50 within the plural worlds of postmodern ontology. A connection can
therefore be made between the textual interpretation of historical representations and the
historical scene of textual interpretation. The use of postmodern discourse to analyse
the historical development of our social and cultural practices opens up a rich seam of
artistic enquiry in which the transformation of political discourse and cultural
production carried out by media and communications technology can be assessed.
It is within the terms of this development from pastiche to parody that the
middle stage of Kroetsch's artistic career is most usefully considered. If The Studhorse
Man ultimately falls short of Kroetsch's ambition, it is surely because his refusal to
accept any notion of discursive hierarchy fails to engage with the political reality of
contemporary social and cultural practice. Given a political environment in which a
handful of discourses - discourses of nationalism, unfettered individualism and
technological 'progress' for example - are valorised at the expense of many others,
Kroetsch's identification of an unbridgeable ontological gap between word and world
leaves has no explanation for the relative success of individual narratives and bodies of
belief.
This weakness in Kroetsch's analysis of the semiotics of imperialism is, as I
have argued here, primarily a consequence of the textual pastiche of The Studhorse
Man, which privileges semantic dubiety over an examination of the historical
conditions of textual production. While it is true that by the end of the novel Demeter's
constricting hold on the life of Hazard Lepage is over, Hazard is dead, Demeter is
insane, and Martha Proudfoot and Marie Espheter have no voice of their own. Because
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the text leaves no impression of what Jameson terms "linguistic normality" it is difficult
for us to gain a position from which to interpret events beyond Demeter's calculated
self-deprecation. The novel therefore becomes a comedy of hollow laughs and nervous
side-glances in which the freedom of the subject from discursive enclosure
paradoxically denies the specific character of post-colonial identity.
In conclusion, The Studhorse Man demonstrates the dangers implicit in the
deconstitution of meta-narratives of colonial history if no recognition of the ideological
power of certain master narratives is retained in the interim. Gone Indian, I believe,
offers a way out of this abyss by operating in the manner of postmodern parody both
inside and outside the discursive world of the text itself. The deconstitution of Mark
Madham's taxonomical cultural order is therefore transformed into an assault upon an
hegemonic discourse produced from a specific cultural site within a particular set of
social and discursive practices. It is to this postmodern review of Canada's position as
the "other" of Western enlightenment discourse that we now turn.
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Chapter Five
Empires of the Mind:
Parody and Counter-Discourse in Gone Indian
The north is not a typical American frontier, a natural world to be
conquered and exploited. Rather, in spite of inroads, it remains a true
wilderness, a continuing presence. We don't want to conquer it. Sometimes
we want it to conquer us. And we don't have to go there literally in order to
draw sustenance from it, any more than the American had to go literally to the
west. It presses southwards into the Canadian consciousness.
TTie settled part of Canada becomes a borderland then, and a borderland
is a place of interaction. This is, characteristically, a good place to look for
poets, painters - the individual as artist.
The city of Edmonton for me is a place - and a metaphor - that enables
me to talk about the confrontation of north and south. Conveniently, we have
in Edmonton a technological centre that bills itself as The Gateway to the North.
I am fascinated by characters who approach the city, resist it, leave it, enter it.1
This passage, taken from Kroetsch's essay, "The Canadian Writer and the
American Literary Tradition," offers a succinct introduction to the multiple borders that
structure Gone Indian, the final text in his "Out West" triptych. In his fourth novel
Kroetsch explores the tropological nexus represented by the terms "wilderness,"
"frontier," and "borderland" in order to examine the way in which aWestern discourse
of enlightenment is used to identify and appropriate of the cultural "other." These three
terms are significant because they demarcate simultaneously the geographical area in
which the action of the novel takes place and the principal rhetorical figures by which
an image of northern Canada as an inchoate cultural environment is contrasted with the
established epistemological paradigms of European enlightenment discourse. Gone
Indian retains the bifocal character of Kroetsch's approach to the representation of
Canada as a cultural "wilderness" by revealing a fundamental division between the
story of a quest into the Canadian interior and a parodical investigation of the way meta-
discourses of history are employed to circumscribe and delimit the expression of post-
colonial experience. The importance to Gone Indian of the basic quest narrative,
which records the disorientating encounter with alterity that prefigures every struggle in
Kroetsch's fiction for a new and lasting vision of the self, becomes apparent from a
brief summary of its plot.
Jeremy Sadness, a graduate student of literature at the University of
Binghampton, is sent by his doctoral supervisor Mark Madham from New York to
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attend a job interview in the Canadian northwest. While in Canada, Sadness is
introduced to a repressed, atavistic side of his personality which undermines his rigid
adherence to the sterile taxonomies of Madham's epistemology and alerts him to the
existence of a Canadian historical experience commonly excluded by Old World
discourse. Sadness's gradual disavowal of the restrictive rhetoric of the academy is
comically suggested by his reincarnation as King of the Notikeewin winter festival, his
sexual relationships with those agents of dislocation Jill and Bea Sunderman, and by
his acceptance of the historically constituted character of discourses of culture and
identity. Meanwhile, Kroetsch's emphasis on the restrictions placed upon indigenous
narratives of post-colonial experience by the imposition of meta-discursive constraints
is dramatised by the struggle for discursive hegemony between Sadness and Madham.
Thus Sadness sends back to Madham a series of taped statements that record the details
of his emotional and intellectual metamorphosis while Madham exploits this material to
construct an alternative history of Sadness's quest that reinforces the set of distinctions
upon which his vision of NewWorld culture and society is grounded.
Certain similarities with The Studhorse Man will be evident from this synopsis
of the plot of Gone Indian. In particular, the idea that the act of writing presupposes
the existence of a "difference" that in turn enforces relations of power between subjects
as they are admitted to or excluded from the order of discourse is common to both
texts. This relationship between writing, difference, and power can be illustrated with
reference to the field of anthropology. In the famous chapter from his autobiographical
volume Tristes Tropiques entitled "The Writing Lesson" Levi-Strauss provides a
fascinating account of the impact that the introduction ofwritten script into the illiterate
community of the Brazilian Nambikwara Indians had upon the structure of recognition
underpinning its collective existence. Arriving among the Nambikwara, Levi-Strauss
distributed pens and sheets of paper as a propitiatory gift. Because of their absolute
unfamiliarity with written language, the Nambikwara amused themselves with the
execution of a few desultory squiggles. However, the chief of the group, associating
the anthropologist and the act of inscription with the possession of authority, insisted
on conversing with Levi-Strauss by sketching nonsensical lines onto a writing pad.
The illusion of communication deceived neither the anthropologist nor the chief; the
point of the exercise was for the chief to "astonish his companions, to convince them
that he was acting as an intermediary agent for the exchange of the goods, that he was
in alliance with the white man and shared his secrets"2 - in short, to invest in the system
of differentiation that writing disseminates. Acknowledging the peculiar resonance of
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this incident as a lesson on the coincidence of writing and power, Levi-Strauss is
impelled toward a more general conclusion:
The only phenomenon with which writing has always been concomitant is the
creation of cities and empires, that is the integration of large numbers of
individuals into a political system, and their grading into castes or classes.
Such, at any rate, is the typical pattern of development to be observed from
Egypt to China, at the time when writing first emerged: it seems to have
favoured the exploitation of human beings rather than their enlightenment....
My hypothesis, if correct, would oblige us to recognize the fact that the primary
function of written communication is to facilitate slavery. The use of writing
for disinterested purposes, and as a source of intellectual and aesthetic pleasure,
is a secondary result, and more often than not it may even be turned into a
means of strengthening, justifying or concealing the other.3
Two implications of this conclusion should be carefully noted. The first, which
may be identified in Levi-Strauss's emphasis on the interestedness of writing, is of
signal importance to the plot of Gone Indian. Writing, in Levi-Strauss's view, can
never claim to be simply an objective documentation of an independent reality; the
opportunities it introduces for the preservation and classification of knowledge, the
organisation and division of labour, and the distinction it enforces between different
orders of subject (those who do and those who do not have access to the systemic
codes of writing) shows it to have a directly sociological, and not merely an
interpretative, function. The division that writing produces between illiterate and
literate subjects is shown in the response of the Nambikwara, who "withdrew their
allegiance to their chief after he had tried to exploit a feature of civilisation" because
they "felt in some way that writing and deceit had penetrated simultaneously into their
midst."4 We should note, with reference to Gone Indian, that Madham's version of
Sadness's quest insists upon this division between the Professor's written script and
Sadness's oral narrative to support a distinction between his own rationality and his
student's anarchic irrationalism. However, Madham's smug claim to intellectual
objectivity is remorselessly parodied by Kroetsch who, in the two major judgement
scenes that Sadness is forced to undergo, steadily deconstructs the opposition between
action and interpretation in order to expose Madham's narrative as an ideologically
motivated appropriation of Sadness's experience.
The second feature of Levi-Strauss's work relevant to our concerns is his
radical contention that the idea of enlightenment in general (and ofwriting in particular)
conceals the effect of slavery within its emancipatory gestures. Kroetsch develops this
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idea by showing, in the character and the textual practice of Madham, how a discourse
of enlightenment rationalism exploits the universalising impulse ofWestern reason to
establish a relationship of political and cultural dependence between subjects. More
specifically, Kroetsch shows how Madham's borrowings from, and perversion of,
enlightenment thought underpin his appropriation and displacement of Sadness's
history. The German philosopher Ernst Cassirer has described how the emphasis of
the Enlightenment upon the mind alighting on the rules and systems of the universe
contributed to a "belief in the unity and immutability of reason" and to the assumption
that "[rjeason is the same for all thinking subjects, all nations, all epochs, and all
cultures."5 To express these beliefs, enlightenment thinkers developed taxonomic
systems to facilitate the classification of knowledge, expounded empirically verified
laws to assist the correlation of empirical data, and conceived of an idea of process by
which intellectual enlightenment is accompanied by moral progress. Madham accepts
all of these tenets: he rigourously polices the boundaries of different discourses to show
that it is only the retention of empirical laws and rules of evidence that prevent "our"
culture from succumbing to the chaos represented by the northwestern Canadian spaces
beyond Edmonton, the "last city on the far, last edge of our civilisation."6 But
Madham perverts enlightenment thought by refusing to look for the character of
phenomena in the evidence before him; rather, he imposes a rhetoric of judgement and
value prior to a textual examination of Sadness's quest. Put simply, the spirit of
enlightenment reason is inclusive: it casts its light equally over all orders of phenomena,
experience, and knowledge. Conversely, the enlightenment projects of Demeter and
Madham are exclusive: their rhetoric introduces a series of antitheses that reciprocally
guarantee the 'reason' and 'order' of their own systems of belief. The ability of
Demeter and Madham to impose their own epistemology upon the material they seek to
elucidate is directly linked in each text to the narrator's power to control the
dissemination of writing. Equally, their projection of Lepage and Sadness as cultural
"others" on the brink of barbarism underpins their strategies of domination and offers
eloquent testimony to the many enslavements that are concealed within their unitary
drive to an enlightened conception ofman.
The Studhorse Man and Gone Indian therefore share a common emphasis
upon the relationship between representation and violence, the positions from which
discourse is produced, organised, and distributed, and the designation of a cultural
"other" to reciprocally define the identity of the writers of history. However, there are
also significant differences between the two texts that allow us to establish Gone Indian
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as a much more successful exploration of the constraints placed upon the expression of
post-colonial experience. One of these differences is Kroetsch's progression from
literary pastiche to the mode of postmodern parody. As I argued in Chapter Four, the
axiomatic insight of postmodern parody that "[t]o say that the meaning of a text is
indeterminate ... is not to say that it signifies indeterminacy"7 enables Kroetsch to
make a connection between the institutional sites which order representations of
"Canada" and the subsequent ambivalence and over-determination of images of
Canadian cultural life. Kroetsch inspects the relationship between representation and
power by forging a link between the taxonomic procedures of Madham's academic
discourse, which groups, classifies, and evaluates phenomena according to the
requirements of predetermined areas of research, and the projection of Madham's
discourse of history onto the 'uninscribed' spaces of the Canadian northwest. As
Stanley Fogel observes, "[i]n much of the novel Kroetsch indulges in something
seldom seen in his other works, a caricature of the university ambit that he knows so
well."8
Another innovative feature of Gone Indian, which owes much to the parodic
impulses at work in the novel, is Kroetsch's subversive reappropriation of themes and
motifs from the European and American imaginative traditions. In particular, Gone
Indian makes telling use of the European tradition of spiritual autobiography and the
American topos of frontier fiction. By introducing these genres into a Canadian text
investigating the discursive construction of Canadian cultural history, Kroetsch effects
a parodic inversion of the ways in which "Canada" has been constructed as an "other"
by the discourse of colonialism. In the concluding portion of this chapter I will
therefore examine the use Kroetsch makes of the work of figures as diverse as
Augustine, Bunyan, and Frederick Jackson Turner in his quest for a new vision of
Canadian identity.
Madham's narrative commences, appropriately enough, with an undisguised
attempt to impose the systemic codes of his own discourse onto the random details of
Sadness's history. In response to a plea from Jill Sunderman for assistance in
deciphering the evidence of Sadness's ambiguous disappearance with her mother Bea,
Madham produces an exhaustive inventory of the discursive strategies of colonialism.
He begins by exculpating himself from any responsibility for the events under
discussion; Sunderman must understand, his letter begins, that he feels "under no
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obligation to explain anything" (GI 1). But having thus distanced himself from
Sadness's narrative, Madham immediately introduces a distinction that governs his
entire presentation of his student's story. Sadness, like Hazard Lepage, is identified
chiefly by "his inability to get anything down on paper" (GI 1); denied access to the
order of civilised discourse, he uses his tape-recorder "to insult everything the
university must stand for" (GI 1). Madham's move into the imperative mode is
revealing: it betrays an anxiety about the status, integrity, and application of knowledge
that will become deeply significant as the novel proceeds. Here, the contrast between
his own rectitude and the intellectual incoherence of a man who outlines three
contradictory methods of interpreting his recorded messages forms the basis for a more
general comment on the internal chaos of Sadness's mind:
I am transcribing a few passages from those same tapes, simply that you might
better appreciate the kind of rascal you found yourself involved with. It is my
own opinion that everything he says can be taken at face value. He was as
surprised as are we by the course of events, failing to understand, as he did, the
nature of freedom. His wife, however - and I suspect he did not tell you he
was married - Carol insists that he was faking everything from the moment he
spoke the first sentence into the recorder. The hard academic truth was never
adequate to Jeremy Sadness. Therefore she would have us distrust his original
promise to "hurry back," and even the evidence of his "tragic" end. (GI 1-2)
This passage, with its scornful characterisation of Sadness as a "rascal" blind to
the "hard academic truth" and therefore unable to understand the true "nature of
freedom," offers an excellent insight into the way Madham presents Sadness as a figure
inexplicable within rational boundaries of behaviour and expectation. Our subsequent
discovery that Sadness's quest is actually a complex meditation on the way such
boundaries curtail freedom renders these prefatory remarks grimly ironic. In fact, the
contents of Madham's letter, especially the section that records the Professor's
usurpation of Sadness's position in Carol Sadness's affections, is best understood as a
sustained example of what Edward Said has termed the "substitution and
displacement"9 of indigenous narratives of history by the external codes of colonialist
rhetoric. Several aspects of Madham's letter testify to the implicit imperialism of his
textual appropriation of Sadness's experience. Foucault, for example, has noted the
tendency of scholarly commentary to displace and re-order the material that it claims to
elucidate. With regard to the "rules concerned with the principles of classification,
ordering and distribution" commentary is always, in his words, "involved in the
mastery of another dimension of discourse: that of events and chance."10 Certainly in
Madham's account of Sadness's adventures we encounter textual commentary not as a
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scholarly means of clarification, but as a practice that systematically forms the objects
of which it speaks. In a spirit similar to Foucault, Edward Said's influential treatise
Orientalism, which examines Western ideological reconstructions of the Near and Far
East, emphasises the Orientalist's use of the conceptual framework of academic
discourse to give ideologically conditioned judgements the character of universal truths:
To the extent that Western scholars were aware of contemporary Orientals or
Oriental movements of thought and culture, these were perceived either as silent
shadows to be animated by the Orientalist, brought into reality by him, or as a
kind of cultural and intellectual proletariat useful for the Orientalist's grander
interpretative activity, necessary for his performance as superior judge, learned
man, powerful cultural will.11
If Madham employs the "the rhetoric of high cultural humanism"12 to underpin
a rigidly binomial opposition between civilisation and barbarism, his use of scriptural
rhetoric also reveals his indebtedness to the thematics of imperialism. In his study of
the evolution and development of the idea of "Europe" Denys Hay has shown that a
primary factor behind the nascent "cultural unity"13 of the European people in the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries was the implicit ideological division between the
superior intellectual, moral, and economic capacity of the European and the perceived
inferiority of other races. Quoting Samuel Purchas, Hay demonstrates that the unity of
the European sensibility was produced by the conflation of European imperial
expansion and the "ennunciation of Christ's European mission":
But what speke I of men, Arts, Armes? Nature hath yeelded her selfe to
Europaean Industry. Who ever found out that Loadstone and Compasse, that
findes out and compasseth the world?Who ever tooke possession of the Ocean,
and made procession round about the vast Earth? Who ever discovered new
Constellations, saluted the Frozen Poles, subjected the Burning Zones. And
who else by the Art of Navigation have seemed to imitate Him, which laies the
beames of his Chambers in the Waters, and walketh on the wings of the
Wind?14
The interdependence Hay adduces between scriptural and imperialist rhetoric offers a
compelling insight into Madham's strange remark at the end of his letter that the
"necessary documents" of Sadness's history will show him to be "so to speak,
unfallen" (GI 3). Indeed, if this enigmatic formulation is read alongside Madham's
subsequent characterisation of the "professor's domain" as "[t]he word made human"
(GI 13) it becomes clear that Madham's own discourse of self-identification is imbued
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with the desire for a redemptive which negates difference and denies Sadness's
insistence upon the historical specificity of all cultural values.
The bluff confidence of Madham's tone, mixing effortless superiority with
dismissiveness in equal measures, is therefore intended to underline the assured
individualism of a character who is unreservedly his "own man" (GI 3). Even at this
early stage, however, Kroetsch invites scepticism concerning the absolute security of
Madham's act of self-recognition. Thus Madham's answer of "Never" to Carol's
assertion that "Professor Madham ... is being Professor Madham" (GI 3) and his
graphic transcription, in his letter to Sunderman, of his forename "Mark" (with its
overtone of 'making your mark') focuses attention on the ambiguity of identificatory
motifs. Meanwhile, Madham's erotic metamorphosis into a bull that catches up Carol's
underwear "as if with great bruising horns" (GI 3) prefigures Sadness's later
transformation into a buffalo and introduces a degree of consanguinity between the two
characters that I shall explore later in this chapter. But the most striking feature of
Madham's approach remains his reliance upon a pre-given system of value to explain
Sadness's behaviour. This desire to compel unfamiliar data to conform to the
epistemological borders of known experience recalls Anthony Pagden's remarks upon
the doomed effort of the coloniser to sustain an absolute distinction between the act of
seeing and the process by which what is seen is classified as knowledge:
But observers in America, like observers of anything culturally unfamiliar for
which there exist few readily available antecedents, had to be able to classify
before they could properly see; and in order to classify in any meaningful sense
they had no alternative but to appeal to a system which was already in use. It
was indeed that system, not the innate structure of the world, that determined
both what they actually believed to be the objective reality before them and the
areas of it they selected for description.15
The chronic tension between Madham's taxonomical imagination and the
deconstructive logic of Sadness's journey into the Canadian interior emerges in
Sadness's account of the emotional and psychological damage he sustained attempting
to conform to Madham's insistence on the rational priority of the act of classification
before independent action within history. In a series of flash-backs to his time at
Binghampton, Sadness shows that his unhappiness there was provoked by his decision
to follow Madham and substitute the refinement of an individual sensibility for active
engagement with the outside world. In thrall to Madham's belief in the epistemological
privilege due to "the world of reflection, of understanding" and the "insight born of
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leisurely and loving meditation" (GI 13) Sadness develops an inability to engage with
experience outside the classificatory structure of literary analysis - a malady he
attributes directly to the "PhD syndrome" (GI 35). Sadness's constant confusion of
"appearances" and "joy" during this period is a staple ingredient of his encounter with
Miss Cohen, one of his students:
Carol, I'm sorry. No. Professor. Listen. Me with my genuine nose for
calamity, I keep mistaking appearances for joy. This Miss Cohen. It started
quite by accident. Let's make love up against the bookcase, I suggested. Are
you kidding? she said. So I slipped it into her right there, Lit and Comp 1,
Section 13, tits on her like snowcapped volcanoes: we were in my office in the
Library Tower. She wanted to know about passion. What is a destructive
passion, Mr Sadness? she inquired. My office looked like a barbershop after,
there were pubic hairs scattered from my Norton Anthology through Anatomy
of Criticism to my notes on Bishop Berkeley (thus I refute the Bishop). (GI
45-6)
Sadness's insatiable need to reassimilate social and sexual experience within the
evaluative paradigm of academic critique is not simply a hindrance to his casual erotic
encounters. His desire to substitute detached analysis for the demands of emotional
intimacy is also the reason behind the disintegration of his marriage:
But we'd had a bad scene before I left. Carol and I. The last night, the tender
moment before I ventured into the world to seek my fortune. We were in the
sack. "Read," I said. She pulled a book off an unpainted plank, dusted it; she
began to read: Gibbon, The Rise and the Fall. No, The Decline and Fall...
history of same. "I don't like it," she said. "No," I said, "read. Read on."
Maybe, I was thinking, maybe I'm so programmed that I have to be in a
learning situation. She read another page. "Just what in hell are you doing? "
she burst out. I was frantic. "Just read," I shouted. We got into a wild
argument about the length of Gibbon's sentences. (GI 55)
His increasingly terse references to women, notably his rueful admission that "I've
done some graduate work in that area of specialisation" (GI 65), subtly embody the
system of values implicit in the division of intellectual labour within academic
institutions. Ultimately Sadness's acknowledgement of the incommensurability
between the development of his interpretative skills and the social practices that should
accommodate them precipitates a complete breakdown in his relationship with others:
Then I'm grading everything in my whole life: lunch at McDonald's, C-minus;
my wife's spaghetti, F; Miss Cohen's swollen nipples, A-plus; The Defecation
in Swift Man lecturing on sin, C over D; the cheeks of Miss Cohen's perfect
ass, A-plus; a memo from the Acting President on turning out lights, A-minus;
my brilliant little lecture on Hamlet, F; Miss Cohen slipping her panties into my
desk drawer lest we be surprised of a sudden, A; my xeroxed letter applying
around the nation and into foreign lands for gainful employment, F-minus; Miss
Cohen straddling my lap on my broken office chair (yes, I could and probably
still can make it sitting even if not lying), A-plus; my three job interviews at
MLA, F-minus: my friendly explanation to my professor, my wife, my father-
in-law, my dissertation committee, my dead mother, my draft board, my
unremembered father, my bank, my mother-in -law, my anti-scientific aunt,
Matthew Arnold, Grey Owl, Our Dean who art on the fifteenth floor hallowed
A failure. An F-minus-minus-minus fucking failure. (GI 47-48)
Barbara Johnson has pointed out that the decision to privilege the interpretation
of cultural phenomena over independent action within history is not ideologically
innocent "Just as the attempt to know without doing can itself function as a deed," she
writes, "the fact that judgement is always explicitly an act adds a further insoluble
problem to its cognitive predicament."16 Against the taxonomic closure of Madham's
discourse Kroetsch strives to resituate the interpretative act within the social exchange
of knowledge and power. Contrary to Madham's expectations, Sadness's journey to
the Canadian northwest demonstrates that the act of interpretation always exerts
leverage upon the historical world and that the reinterpretation of cultural history marks
a conscious ideological intervention. By dramatising Sadness's gradual realisation of
the isolation of his hermeneutic stance from the social and cultural practices that it helps
to define, Kroetsch is therefore able to expose the gap that exists between
representations of Canadian cultural identity and the reality of post-colonial Canadian
experience.
Uncomfortably aware that Madham's valorisation of the intellectual over the
material renders him a "transcendent man" and a "MIND-FUCKER" (GI 49), Sadness
searches for a way of reconciling critical thought and social engagement. Interestingly,
his first impulse is to develop a deconstructive discourse that examines the effect modes
of representation have upon the experiences they describe. This commitment to explore
the semantic tensions that inhabit language, which reaches its apotheosis in the
hypothetical titles of his academic dissertation "The Plot Against Plot" and "The Quest
Unquestioned" (GI 149), characterises the opening of his idiosyncratic discussion of
the discovery of America: "Christopher Columbus, not knowing that he had not come
to the Indies, named the inhabitants of that new world - " (GI 21). This curious
sentence, which reverses its movement in mid-stream and instils a crisis of identity in
the formative gesture of New World history, suggests that Madham's diffuse
positivism is an inappropriate response to the post-colonial experience of alterity. The
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process of defamiliarisation that this acknowledgement of cultural difference begins
continues with Sadness's arrival at Edmonton International Airport, where, stripped of
the obvious trappings of his American identity, his first words in response to the
Customs Official's challenge are "Hey ... This isn't mine" (GI 6).
The scene depicting Sadness's arrival at Edmonton airport offers the reader a
first opportunity to consider the appropriateness of Madham's critical commentary to
the text of Sadness's quest. Sadness's crisis of identity is obvious from the very first
words that he utters. Entering Canada with nothing to declare, the contents of his past
can only be recovered by means of "a veritable jailor's ring of keys" (GI 6).
However, Sadness provides an important insight into the reason for his curious
placelessness when he states that the purpose of his trip is for him to "become" Grey
Owl. Seizing upon this admission, Madham provides an instant interpretation of his
student's unusual ambition:
Jeremy Sadness might have chosen no end of frontiersmen to embody his
dream of westward flight. Curiously, he chose a model from the utmost
cultivated shores of the civilized world. Given as he was to self-deceiving self-
analysis, he believed that his life's predicament found its type in Grey Owl. He
was almost anally fascinated by that quick-tempered English lad who left
Victorian England, disappeared into the Canadian bush, and emerged years later
as Wa-Sha-Quon-Asin.
He-Who-Travels-By-Night. (GI 6-7)
Madham's sneering reference to Sadness's penchant for "self-deceiving self-
analysis" coupled with his assertion that the "possibility of transformation . . . played
no little part in Jeremy's abiding fantasy of fulfilment" (GI 7) deliberately replaces the
wider cultural implications of Sadness's fascination with Grey Owl with a problem of
personal psychology. Yet a radically different reading of Sadness's desire for
metamorphosis is available which examines his interest in the story of Archie Belaney,
the "quick tempered English lad" who threw off the cultural presuppositions of
Victorian England and re-emerged as the Indian warrior Grey Owl, as a way of
challenging the meta-discourse of colonialist history through a direct encounter with the
Canadian interior. In this regard, Belaney stands in the same relation to Sadness as
Kroetsch to Felix Paul Greve, the German who reinvented himself in Canada as
Frederick Philip Grove to become "perhaps the most complex and most instructive
ethnic writer yet to appear on the Canadian literary scene."17 Grove's importance to
Kroetsch is that his life and work show that "[t]he unnaming allows the naming."18 At
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once symbol and explorer of the post-colonial experience he strives, in "a situation
where signified and signifier do not cohere,"19 to rewrite the myths of the Old World in
terms of the silence of a nation without its own myths of origin. Kroetsch discusses
the dynamic of Grove's art in terms strikingly reminiscent of The Studhorse Man and
Gone Indian:
If there is a gap between word and object, the final question is language itself,
and the question of naming. Perhaps the completion of the narrative is made
possible, not primarily by the surface story, but rather by a narrative movement
that entails a changed sense of language, a movement from the old language,
through silence (a silence that might be imagined even as a death) into a new
language.20
Sadness's experiences repeat the narrative movement of Grove's work:
liberated from the confines of the academy, he progresses beyond the "old language"
toward a final "silence" that suggests the possible "death" of colonialist rhetoric and the
emergence of new forms of cultural identity. For Sadness's story to achieve its widest
allegorical significance, it is important that Kroetsch establishes him as a cultural site
upon which the struggle between colonialist and post-colonial discourse can be enacted.
Kroetsch suggests the duplicity of Sadness's function as both 'character' and metaphor
for an evolving cultural consciousness by presenting him as the personification of a
psychological and cultural borderline between two states of being.21 Madham
identifies Sadness's interstertial position between American and Canadian codes of
recognition in his remark that "[o]nce you are through the Catskills you are free of the
east, and the east will never hold you again. But you are not yet west" (GI 94). The
ambiguity of Sadness's role is again emphasised when he replaces two symbols of
transgression within the novel: he substitutes for Dorck, who went "across the line"
(GI 12) between life and death, as Winter King; and then duplicates Robert
Sunderman's place in Bea Sunderman's bed following her husband's unaccountable
exit from prairie life.
Arrested in a curious interzone between different cultural borders, Sadness's
quest to find the nature of freedom implicates him in a continual uninvention of
representations of Canadian cultural history. His need to question received narratives
of identity and place is given comic expression by his loss of his suitcase upon his
arrival in Canada (he is, in fact, handed an identical suitcase that belongs to the
mysterious Roger Dorck), and his discovery that his best chance of escaping further
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confinement by the Mounties is to escape from the airport "DISGUISED AS MYSELF"
(GI 11). Thus transformed, he enters the Canadian "labyrinth" (GI 11) to feel the first
stirrings of a buried life within himself "like a large, heavy animal pawing its way
through a crust of snow" (GI 12). Sadness's journey to Notikeewin, which he
undertakes in order to return Dorck's possessions and recover the suitcase that
guarantees his connection with his American past, merely increases his distance from
his former life. Riding through the immense northwestern prairies, Sadness
experiences "a kind of still but endless motion" (GI 16) that defies Madham's
insistence upon causality and closure and confronts him with the prospect of "space
itself, undreamed, silence undreamed" (GI 19). "When will you begin?" (GI 21)
asks Madham, seeking form and pattern in his students life; to which Sadness bluntly
replies "Endings be Damned" (GI 24).
The contrast between the Professor's passion for verisimilitude and orderly
progression and Sadness's need to reinvent himself outside the constraints of
Madham's narrative is evident in Madham's complaint that Sadness's recordings do not
"give us adequate motivation, adequate allowance, for what happens" (GI 30). But
mimesis, as Sadness quickly discovers, is a problematic mode in which to record the
deconstruction and reconstitution of the self implicit in the bivalent example of Dorck,
his elusive doppelganger, who lies suspended "alive and dead" (GI 29) between two
opposed conditions of being, and Archie Belaney, the Englishman who "died into a
new life" (GI 62). Instead, the plural ontologies of Canadian reality, dramatically
encapsulated in the multiple universe of Bea Sunderman's home WORLDS END,
demand a form of representation that challenges the univocity of Madham's cultural
critique. One of Sadness's first acts in Jill Sunderman's apartment is therefore to "tr[y]
to reach through the glass and touch my own skin" (GI 19), a gesture which reveals,
in Lecker's words, that Sadness is "trying to penetrate the mimetic barrier that confines
him in a world of duplicated, rather than invented, meaning."22 Far from being
"trapped in the blank indifference of space and timelessness" (GI 124), Sadness's
rebirth in the uninventing spaces of the Canadian prairies is threatened only by the
image of his "decapitated body" that he glimpses "hung in suspension" (GI 53) in a
wilderness of mirrors.
Edward Said has suggested that the problem with the border that divides "same"
from "other" is that it can be traversed in both directions.23 Unhappily aware that
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Sadness's assault on mimesis threatens his construction of Canada as an unconditional
ontological category, Madham makes a concerted bid to undermine his student's
testimony. An early example of Madham's strategy can be seen in the scene that
describes Sadness's first meeting with Jill Sunderman. This episode begins with
Madham's insinuation that Sadness's taped record of this encounter is so shocking that,
in the name of Jill's "feminine reticence," it is necessary for Madham to interpret
Sadness's version of events "in my own words" (GI 20). Having neatly displaced
Sadness from his own narrative, Madham then introduces the urbane brutalities of
pornographic discourse to demonstrate the inherent baseness of Sadness's imagination.
His textual ventriloquism presents Sadness watching Jill who is "cocked forward over
a desk" touching the "bone handle" of Sadness's "hunting knife." Despite being "in a
way that is vaguely sexual, immobilized," Madham recollects, Sadness projects an
image of Sunderman as "a woman desiring her isolation to be violated." However, a
suspicion lingers throughout this scene that Madham is guilty of overplaying his hand:
his gloating remark that Jill is "creating" Sadness out of the "immense joke that is the
life on exhibit in that suitcase" into her private "version of a savage" only reinforces our
sense of Sadness's helplessness within a discourse that circumscribes his every action.
As if sensing the implausibility of this portrait of Sadness as an intellectually confused
Caliban, Madham suggests that his student's crisis of cultural identity was in fact
prompted by his inability to project his own image onto the seductive blankness of the
Canadian landscape. Accordingly, he superimposes Marlow's imperialist dream of
appropriation in Heart of Darkness, where he is pictured as a "little chap" with a
"passion for maps" that were subsequently filled with "rivers and lakes and names,"
onto Sadness's vision of the northwest:
He went to the iron rail. He looked over the rail, down into the falling snow,
trying to see the North Saskatchewan River. He let his mind dream the name.
The name that had been so long in his dreaming. All those hours spent over a
school atlas, studying maps. Finding blank spaces. Finding that thin blue line
of river that melted out of the Rocky Mountains and fell across the northwest,
into other thin blue lines, into Hudson Bay. (GI 59)
The mutability of Madham's approach reflects a tension within the needs of
dominant cultural discourse outlined by Richard Terdiman:
When a particular social practice emerges as hegemonic, its relation to other
competing and contesting practices is subtly altered. By virtue of its status as
dominant, it becomes the target for "vampirization," for colonization, for
subversion by its rivals. It begins to be the inevitable referent of their counter-
assertions. And, as in the parable about the jailer and the jailed, those seeking
to undo it necessarily spend more time and energy toward this end than the
dominant can spend countering such efforts.24
The corollary of this paradox in Gone Indian is that Madham's attempt to establish
Sadness as an "alien strain" and give him "an analytical, visible, and permanent reality"
as a "natural order of disorder"25 depends upon the illusion of Sadness's freedom. Yet
this illusion can be sustained only by the provision of a discursive space that Sadness
exploits to undermine Madham's narrative. Sadness underlines his difference from
Madham by developing an ironic counter-discourse which, in Terdiman's words,
"materialises the counter-term which any dominant usage seeks to suppress" by
projecting an alternative "through which any element of the here-and-now may be
shown as contingent, and thereby to subject the whole configuration of power within
which it took its adversative meaning to the erosive, dialectical power of alterity."26 In
the limited space that Madham's narrative allows him, Sadness is able to develop a
powerful critique of Madham's motivation for sending him to Canada:
The whole idea sets me to thinking about you. As I reconstruct the impulse
now, it was at your suggestion that I applied for a job out here. I begin to
suspect your motive. I know you have a professorial desire to exercise your
impotence on my gullible wife, Professor Madham. Your lassitude appeals to
her. Not to mention your huge head with its greying wavy hair, your squash-
player's perfect figure, your Zapata mustache smelling, as Carol once idly
remarked, of meerschaum pipes and rum and honey. I know you would add
her upstate innocence to your collection of beautiful objects, use her to stimulate
your failing appetites. And that is why you sent me out here into the eternal
goddamned temptations of the wilderness. Into what you, in your appalling
ignorance, like to think is the wilderness - (GI 60)
Sadness's ironic identification of the link between Madham's "appetites," his
colonisation of Sadness's private life, and his expulsion of Sadness from New York
successfully contests the privilege Madham accords to his own actions. But if Sadness
manages to impose the dialectical power of alterity upon Madham's frame narrative, his
own life is gradually transformed by the pressure of Canadian history upon his exposed
sensibility. Kroetsch underlines the fluid, metamorphic quality of the experiences that
Sadness is to undergo by substituting him for Roger Dorck as King of the Notikeewin
Winter Festival. The Winter Festival is the first example in Kroetsch's fiction of the
influence upon him of the Bakhtinian notion of "carnival" which I will examine at some
length in my discussion of What the Crow Said in Chapter Seven. Briefly, the term
"carnival" denotes a period of social and cultural upheaval when hierarchies are
suspended and normal relations of order and causality are reversed. The inversion and
parody of empirical codes of classification intrinsic to carnival play poses an explicit
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challenge to Madham's epistemology. "Perched as it is on the edge of carnival
celebration, Notikeewin is decreating itself'27 writes Lecker, and the possibilities for
transformation that this process introduces change Sadness irrevocably. The distance
that he has travelled from Madham's closed world becomes apparent during his
participation in a snowshoe race, where he crosses the frontier between Madham's
repressive "innocence" and the postlapsarian paradise of northwestern Canada:
The snow was a garden. Flowers of light and shadow bloomed out of the
banks of the frozen river, out of the mouth of a cave, the curve of what must be
stone, under the blue snow. A broken crow's nest in a crooked poplar had
sprouted petals of light. A fallen tree had raised up the blown snow into a
mound beneath its fall, and the mound splintered the fall of the sun's rays. A
patch of fractured and reset ice was an alpine meadow of varied white, and
where a spring had cracked loose from the winter itself the bent grasses were
fixed in blossoms of translucent glass. (GI 84)
Sadness's epiphany challenges Madham's "unfallen" vision by introducing time
and process into the edenic "garden." The regeneration that this passage describes,
where light blooms and grass blossoms out of the frozen landscape, duly takes place
around the spectral presence of the "fallen tree." Against Madham's transcendent
dream of the "highest paddock" (GI 2), Sadness envisages the promise of mankind
"beneath its fall" where the "diffusion of personality into a complex of possibilities
rather than a concluded self (GI 152) becomes an inescapable fact of human
existence. The fall into contingency that accompanies Sadness's vision of a
"splintered" paradise reveals Madham's image of himself as a new Adam innocently
reading the experience of the New World to be a fiction designed to conceal his
narrative control over discourses of Canadian history.
By enforcing a distinction between different orders of cultural experience the
motion of writing, in Levi-Strauss's terms, merely reworks the imperialist strategies of
colonisation at another level. Consequently, Madham can only establish the innocence
of his adamic acts of identification by excluding from his gaze those forms of New
World experience erased by the European process of colonisation. Conversely,
Sadness's ironic counter-discourse, which lampoons Madham as the "old mad Adam of
the original day" (GI 91), powerfully dramatises the Amerindian heritage marginalised
by European enlightenment discourse. It achieves this primarily by recording
Sadness's growing conviction that his own identity as a post-colonial subject depends
upon a rapprochement with the original forms of New World experience. Following
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his unlikely victory in the snowshoe race, Sadness 'goes Indian' by admitting to the
existence of an 'Indian' side to his own personality. His transformation begins with an
overpowering sense of alienation from his surroundings. His companions, a sullen
and resentful group of beaten runners, metamorphose before his eyes into "muskrats"
(GI 89), while the fracture of Sadness's personality is evident in his remark "I found
my own right hand, under the table, one of two matching hands" (GI 89). The reflex
response of the local men to inexplicable difference, which is to identify the newcomer
as a "part Indian" (GI 91) interloper from the Hobbema Reserve, is accepted by
Sadness, who sees "the potential truth of the observation" and refuses to point out their
mistake since any explanation would force him to speak in "a tongue [he] did not
understand" (GI 93). Instead, his transformation is given symbolic expression by his
encounter with the Cree Daniel Beaver, who rescues him from the snow after he
undergoes a vicious physical assault. In the quiet privacy of an Esso station washroom
Beaver dresses Sadness in the jacket and moccasins of a plains Indian; bereft of the
"ring of keys" (GI 98) that open the way back to his old life, and encircled by the
"engulfing wave" (GI 99) of Beaver's huskies, Sadness's incorporation of two distinct
phases of New World history into his own life is complete.
Sadness's deconstruction of the "sterile, named East characterized by
concluded speech and written form"28 represented by Madham is symbolised by his
reincarnation as the Indian warrior Has-Two-Chances. Asleep in the back of Beaver's
truck, Sadness experiences a dream-vision that challenges Madham's use of the
Canadian interior as "other" to enlightenment discourse. In the professor's sardonic
paraphrase, "[i]t was Jeremy's notion that two great waves of culture have washed out
from Europe, one to the east, one to the west. On the Great Central Plains of America
they had met again. Bloodily" (GI 103). However, this "notion" of New World
history as the consequence of a struggle between "two great waves of culture" allows
Sadness to envisage an alternative scenario in which the moral claims of enlightenment
discourse are tested against the practices that gave them hegemonic status.
Accordingly, his dream of the "scalping of Edmonton" inverts the logic of genocide
against the indigenous population and exposes the role of the guardians of order
(educators, policemen, missionaries) in the history of barbarism:
Hardly had the sun found the sky when the earth was red with fire and blood.
Department stores gave up their treasures to crackling flame: banks bubbled and
burst like cauldrons of molten money. High-rise apartments and their
occupants fused at last into a community of soul, smoked like wildcat gushers
into the darkening sky. Lovers ran arm in arm from their cheap motels,
perishing together in speaking tongues of fire. Businessmen at a conference,
hand in hand, leaped together from a balcony of a large hotel, fell like a strand
of dark pearls onto the indifferent cement. Drivers of automobiles, seeing the
end so near, smashed their cars into poles, into trees, into plate-glass windows,
into fleeing pedestrians, into each other. Rape was the order of the day for
those, men and women alike, who escaped from their flaming beds. Trial by
torture was the rule for those who survived the eloquent rape. Big Bear, with a
handful of warriors helping, filled the local jail with uniformed policeman, then
touched fire to the powder magazine; the smoking air rained badges and boots,
rained ears and legs. Looking Glass found four professors and cut from each
the thumb and first finger of the right hand, then asked them to lecture on truth
while they bled. Crowfoot, remembering indignities of the past, captured six
legislators, then forced them to scalp each other alive. A little fellow named
Wolf Head cut off the testicles from a missionary and gently stuffed them into
the good missionary's own mouth. (GI 104-05)
Sadness's reincarnation as Has-Two-Chances permits him to recover a stratum
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of Canadian experience preserved by the collective memory western oral culture. His
vision of the scalping of Edmonton employs the transgressive logic of dream-narrative
to dramatise the way in which Madham's enlightenment rationalism represses native
discourses of Canadian history. Stung by the irruption of repressed historical material
into his narrative of Sadness's decline, Madham lambasts his student's "perverse
dreaming" and re-emphasises the difference between their respective methodologies:
I must break my silence, Miss Sunderman. Your idiot lascivious student knew
nothing: and yet he would dare to dream my northwest If you understand his
perverse dreaming, then you might understand my careful accounting for his
end. It was earned and willed and deserved. (GI 101)
However, Sadness's experiences in the carnivalesque environment of
Notikeewin question the value of the distinction Madham makes between his own
"careful accounting" and Sadness's response to marginalised narratives of western
experience. The unreliability of Madham's faith in pure causal relations in a world
where, he admits, explanations are assigned "almost at random" (GI 51), is made clear
to Sadness when he is arrested by the Festival Redcoats, whose behaviour parodies
normal rules of detection and evidence. Disoriented by his predicament in a situation
where all charges "had changed since the time of arrest" (GI 70), Sadness is brought to
be judged by the White Bear (Bea Sunderman). Her cross-examination of him
demonstrates the relative and culturally specific nature of judgements of historical
value, and ridicules his residual belief in the universal applicability of Madham's naive
empiricism:
"Then tell us," the bear said, "is it better to be beautiful or to be happy?"
She riddled me a tough one. I was close to a cold sweat, wishing I
could get hold of that microphone. Ask Jill, I thought to myself: ask your
daughter. She drove over icy roads and knocked on the door of her own
apartment, a terrified stranger.
I said nothing.
"Fine," the bear said. "Exactly."
The crowd laughed.
"Then tell us further," the bear said, is it better to seek beauty or to seek
truth?"
Again I had nothing to say. You should meet our poor dear Madham, I
thought. He would stumble between a woman's legs while staring into her
eyes. The crowd surged into a closing circle, threatened me with a chorus of
boos. I was ready and willing to run for it. Make a break. But where would I
go?
"Exactly," the bear said. "And now, Mr Judge, please, tell us one last
thing?"
Last thing all right. And last things. My speciality since the beginning.
Bringing up the rear.
I nodded.
She either nodded in reply, or bent her head and licked at her fur.
"Tell these three waiting princesses. Is it better to be beautiful, or is it
better to be free?"
Excellent question, I decided. Excellent. Consult Mr Dorck for details.
He kicked himself loose from gravity itself. (GI 72-73)
Bea Sunderman's final injunction to Sadness to "[g]o free yourself (GI 74)
underlines his imprisonment within a sterile hermeneutics. The force of her judgement
unsettles him, prompting him to locate the cause of his social isolation in his adherence
to Madham's rhetoric:
I know what you will say, Madham, even before you say it. The mark of the
well-trained professor. Separate and alone, Sadness, my boy. Separate and
alone, the tragic figure of our unhappy days, embracing the shadow of his
imagined self. Dreaming his universe in his own little skull. Lost in his own
conniving. (GI 108)
Sadness's disorientation continues in his own judgement scene - the election of the
Winter Queen. In this episode Sadness is asked to fulfil his obligations as Dorck's
surrogate by choosing the most beautiful woman from three candidates so similar they
"might have been Xeroxed copies of some lost original" (GI 112):
The three young ladies had commenced the ritual. They had performed it so
often in the past they had no need to be told now what to do. And why should I
know what they were doing?
I was the only goddamned stranger within 500 miles of that stage.
Trust my luck.
These three mysteries were carrying roses that were peculiarly orange
and purple in the blazing lights, the bright blossoms themselves almost lost in
green leaves. Quickly I scratched on my pad: RED YELLOW BLUE.
Miss Red stood up from her chair and arranged her hands under her
bosom. Her bosoms. Which is it? She smiled, walked along the apron of the
stage directly at me, smiled again, turned around, eased her hips into motion,
walked along the apron of the stage, sat down again.
The thunder of applause. Goddamn. Whoopee. Look at that.
Miss Yellow arose and did likewise. The crowd loved it. My despair
grew. Hooray. Thunder of applause.
It was a problem in the angle of perception. The audience had a view
of each candidate in profile, ofmotion across the field of vision; a horizon and a
foreground united by a common pursuit. But the candidates were coming
straight at me, then moving straight away. I was getting no depth into the
picture. I was trapped into my own tight focus on that which zoomed in,
retreated. Under the heading of Dissertation Number Eight I wrote: The
Forgery of Distance: Ritual for a Long Night. (GI 113)
The pivotal importance of Sadness's judgement of the Winter Queen to a
reading of Gone Indian is that this scene presents the collapse of politically
disinterested discourses of cultural order. Through Sadness's crisis of judgement
Kroetsch satirises the claim of empiricism to objective status outside the social practices
and institutional centres that identify, structure, and legitimate knowledge. He achieves
this by systematically subverting the epistemological dichotomy of action and
interpretation, showing interpretation to be, in the words of David Bennett, "always
already infected with action, the interpretative act as ineluctably a social act."29
Although Sadness is introduced as an "objective," "disinterested," and "final" (GI 112)
arbiter of aesthetic value, he discovers that the absolute identity of the three women
before him forces him to counter the "problem in the angle of perception" by openly
projecting his own personality into his evaluative paradigm. Trapped within his own
"tight focus," Sadness's reaction to the extremity of his situation is to replicate
Madham's behaviour and use the 'neutral' epistemological strategies of academic
analysis to conceal his own crisis of identity:
Not once did any one of the candidates speak a word. Not a human word. To
me, a man forever attracted to the maelstrom. Something in me wanted to write
in the margins of those lives: Awk. Frag. Emph. Cap. Fig. Instead: I was
offered silence. What In heaven was I supposed to judge? (GI 114)
But, as Barbara Johnson has shown, "[wjhat every act of judgement manifests
is not the value of the object but the position of the judge within a structure of
exchange. There is, in other words, no position from which to judge that would be
outside the lines of force involved in the object judged."30 Sadness's enthronement of
Jill Sunderman (a non-contestant) as Winter Queen is an appropriate response to the
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"lines of force" involved in the object judged. Daughter of Robert Sunderman and
colleague of Roger Dorck, she occupies a pivotal role in Notikeewin's carnivalesque
celebration of temporary freedom from the "concluded self of fixed identity. By
identifying Jill as Queen of the Festival, Sadness acknowledges that to interpret may be
to name, but to name is also to interpret. Only at this point is he able to break out of the
hermeneutic circle that imprisons him, and signal his ultimate disavowal of Madham's
coercive rationalism:
I was staring at Jill where she sat on the throne. But looking at her, at the
beautiful blonde crowned queen of winter - God forgive me, I thought of
Jeremy Bentham. Jeremy Bentham. The ultimate professor. It was too much
altogether. That ultimate crowned head of professorhood. He who would give
a grade to justice, pleasure, law, luxury, will, duty, ambition, honor, pain,
belief, fiction, chaos . ..
I knew I had to get out of there.
Jill had flicked on the microphone. "My dearest subjects," she was
saying, regal and sure, "let us now clear the chairs and benches from the floor.
Tell the players to bring up their instruments. We will dance until dawn."
I wanted to dance, let me tell you. Just once in my goddamned fucked-
up book-spent life, I wanted to dance clean through the night: damn the
unwritten papers. Damn the forthcoming exam.
I left through a fire exit (GI 123)
The final line of this passage suggests, however, that the liberation of the post-
colonial subject from imposed discourses of cultural order is not easily achieved.
Madham's textual mediation of Sadness's personality is demonstrated once again
when, immediately after the election of the Winter Queen, he introduces a number of
distinct discourses (anthropology, ethnology, literary criticism) to 'explain' Sadness's
testimony as a symptom of delusional behaviour:
Miss Sunderman: The sort of emotional anxiety your hero was experiencing,
we are led to understand, is not uncommon in frigid climates. The phenomenon
sometimes described as arctic hysteria has been examined by a number of
Russian authorities, especially Krivoshapkin and Vitashevsky - though in all
fairness I should add that a Mr. Elaide disputes their conclusions. The extreme
cold, the long nights, the solitude of unbounded space: these are the enemies
that induce that northern ecstasy. I had hoped to send you a copy of Ohlmarks,
Studien zum Problem des Schamanismus - but I cannot find an adequate
translation. At any rate, the afflicted person, quite commonly, senses the
presence of another who is not in fact there. Mr. T. S. Eliot, to take a literary
example, attributes the experience to the members of Shackleton's Antarctic
Expedition: those explorers, at the edge of exhaustion, were deluded into
believing there was amongst them one more member than could actually be
counted. (GI 123-24)
218
In the concluding chapters of the novel Sadness's efforts to come to terms with
his "otherness" within Madham's totalising narrative system reach fever-pitch. Driven
through the streets of Notikeewin by his "loneliness and isolation" (GI 124), he
undergoes a symbolic resurrection at a party in Johnnie Backstrom's funeral parlour,
where, after dozing in a coffin provided for his temporary support, he awakes from a
dream of his own epitaphs to concede that the "jest and mockery" his life has become is
"too much" (GI 133). But in order to divine his real identity, it is essential that
Sadness's confronts his doppelganger Dorck. Alone in a hospital room with Dorck's
prone body, Sadness condemns the "fucking old king of the winter" (GI 141) as a
fraud whose comatose tranquillity mocks the helpless confusion of his festival subjects.
As Peter Thomas points out, Sadness's anger arises because of his conviction that
Dorck's leap into vacancy grants him "a dubious freedom from the female claim in
time"31 represented in the novel by Carol Sadness and Jill and Bea Sunderman.
However, Thomas is quite wrong to suggest that Sadness's "function" is "to survive
Carol, Jill and Bea by trickster cunning and the escape into ficticity and story."32 In
fact, Sadness's complaint is that Dorck's escape into stasis denies the process of
historical change through which Sadness can challenge the absolute determinism of
Madham's "codified worldview."33 It is therefore the irruption of diachrony into a
closed system of meaning that Sadness desires so vehemently in the form of a
"message" detailing Dorck's death:
Are you listening, Dorck? I want you to do me a favour. I want you to die.
Just goddamned die and get it over with. I can't stand this. We go around day
and night waiting for one little message. He's alive. He's dead. It doesn't
matter where we go, what we do. Always the question. When will the
message arrive? (GI 141)
Sadness's need to break out of an atemporal "endless circle" within which he is
"always the lost man circling blindly, come back upon himself (GI 144) is explored
most extensively atWORLDS END, the house to which he flees after his confrontation
with Dorck. During Sadness's first visit toWORLDS END, shortly after his entry into
the northwest, Madham describes Bea Sunderman's home as an "imprisoned garden"
(GI 31) full of timepieces in which "[n]ot one clock was ticking" (GI 32). In contrast
to the arrested temporality of Sunderman's dwelling, however, Sadness's quest
redefines post-colonial identity by materialising the "invisible world" (GI 97) of
Canadian history and opposing it to the hegemonic structures of American cultural
discourse. The diacritical impulse behind Sadness's intervention becomes clear when
his reappearance at WORLDS END introduces the process of mutability into
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Sunderman's petrified garden. As he enters the house a number of clocks begin to tick;
then he hears footsteps "like the tickings of a clock" (GI 145). The identification of
Sadness as an agent of temporal process continues with his observation that
"[s]omewhere, now, I could hear my own heart. Or was it a clock I heard?" (GI 146).
And, in a moment of signal importance, Sadness contrasts the plural and interdependent
discursive worlds of the New World experience with the "embalmed" (GI 146) and
self-enclosed figure of his namesake Jeremy Bentham, that "hero of our reasonable
world" (GI 51). "I have done a quick review of logic, called upon the paradigms of
literature and history," Sadness explains, in an intellectual adventure that has "put to the
test the whole theory of a liberal education" (GI 148). But after twenty-five years of
study, and nine years of instruction in the violent displacements of Madham's cultural
rhetoric, all he can be sure of is that "for a long, long time I had not heard the ticking
clocks" (GI 148).
Sadness's ultimate understanding of the historically constituted character of
cultural meaning, which leads him to describe his experiences in Canada as the
"Columbus quest for the oldest New World" (GI 147), is a disaster for Madham. Said
has noted that the synchronic vision of colonialist rhetoric, which erects a vision of the
world upon a series of absolute cultural distinctions, crumbles if "diachrony is
introduced into the system."34 To ward off this threat Madham assumes executive
control and banishes Sadness from the text. By expelling the sign of alterity in this
way, Madham hopes to restore the status of his narrative as a discourse outside a
system of differences. He therefore concludes Gone Indian with a little detective
mystery, in which Sadness and Bea Sunderman flee into a prairie blizzard and are killed
when their snowmobile is hit by a train. In order to account for the lacunae in this
version of events (particularly the lack of bodies and the absence of any motive for the
lovers' presence in the blizzard in the first place) Madham insists that since the couple
were prey to the "kind of silliness that intrudes upon reason" (GI 153) their behaviour
is best examined within the register of nihilism. Consequently they "rode away seeking
NOTHING" because "THEY DID NOT KNOW WHERE THEY WERE GOING" (GI
156). Not surprisingly, Madham recognises the "benevolence of a generous Creator"
(GI 156) in this final disposition of circumstances . But so abrupt is Madham's
assumption of control for Sadness's narrative, and so unhesitating his expulsion of
Sadness from the field of meaning, that his student's very absence guarantees the
professor's sober explanations an ironic reception. Given Madham's manifest
exploitation of the lovers' disappearance to illustrate the peril of departure from his own
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discourse of enlightenment - Sadness and Sunderman, we recall, are said to follow
"their own little light" (GI 156) to their death - we accept his statement "[t]hat the
bodies were not to be found is no mystery to me I assure you" (GI 150) for reasons
rather different to his own. Meanwhile, his insistence that he has "abjure[d] the
apostrophe" (GI 154) in his presentation of WORLDS END is bleakly comic if the
term "apostrophe" is understood as a speech given on behalf of one who is no longer
present. Indeed, the sheer incommensurability between Madham's exaggerated respect
for the integrity of Sadness's recordings and his imposition of a wholly alien
framework of interpretation upon his student's story eventually forces him to admit of
his own narrative that "[t]he rest is fiction" (GI 157).
Madham's admission that his objective representation of Sadness's last days is,
to some degree, a fictional re-creation of his student's encounter with the northwest
exposes the way he has constructed and positioned Sadness as an object of discourse.
In this regard, Sadness is revealed to be not an autonomous and unified subject but "a
space of exteriority in which a network of distinct sites is deployed."35 The narrative in
which this network of codes and images is articulated should not therefore be perceived
as "the majestically unfolding manifestation of a thinking, knowing, speaking subject"
but rather as a medium "in which the dispersion of the subject and his discontinuity
with himself may be determined."36 The notion of discourse as a material practice
through which the "discontinuity" of the subject with itself can be assessed is best
explored by means of the series of references that connect the lives of Madham,
Sadness, and Robert Sunderman. For a counter-discursive reading of Madham's
narrative extends the tantalising suggestion that Madham is in fact none other than
Robert Sunderman, the "boy-husband" with a "child-bride" who escaped the Canadian
prairie because he could not stop "regretting the boyhood that he could not quite
surrender" (GI 155). In this revised reading of Gone Indian, the character of Sadness
becomes merely an "other" which Madham projects onto the Canadian landscape in
order to exorcise his own guilt and emphasise the necessity of escape from the
carnivalesque chaos of the northwest. Ultimately, then, Kroetsch's novel considers
simultaneously the way in which the identification of cultural difference is used to
justify the imposition of a hegemonic discourse of cultural order, and the crippling
contradictions that beset the post-colonial subject (Madham) who internalises the meta-
narrative of enlightenment discourse in order to come to terms with his own
"discontinuous" experience.
221
As Arnold E. Davidson has pointed out, Kroetsch teases the reader with
"various hints that the drowned Robert Sunderman has resurfaced as R. Mark
Madham."37 Not only are the men of the same generation (Madham, at forty-seven, is
approximately the same age as Sunderman would now be) but they were born in the
same place. "The truth is," Madham confides, at the beginning of the novel, "I was
myself born out there on those wind-torn prairies, on the ripped edges of that northern
forest - the details are unimportant" (GI 13). On the contrary, the details ofMadham's
past become more important as links between him and Sunderman are established. One
connection is their shared love of ice-hockey. As Robert Sunderman's father
remembers, Sunderman was the "best damned hockey prospect this country ever
produced" with the "perfect physique for hockey" (GI 131). Much earlier in the novel
Madham admits to Jill Sunderman that "I played a bit of hockey out there myself.
When I was a boy. Didn't we all?" (GI 37). The general inclusiveness of this remark
is meant to deflect attention from the specific quality of Madham's memory, but when
this statement is added to Sadness's remark concerning his supervisor's "squash-
player's perfect figure" (GI 60) a comparison with Sunderman becomes irresistible.
Certainly the lingering attention the text pays to those who attempt to transcend the
confines of their daily lives - and here we must number not just Sadness, but also the
cowboy with his "desperate passion to fly" (GI 76), and Dorck, who leaps into free
space "like a dream of himself (GI 26) - might be thought to rehearse the guilt of the
man who left without leaving any explanation. If so, Madham's strange statement that
it "grieves" him to see WORLDS END deserted, and his equally unlikely admission
that in ordering the fragments of Sadness's tapes he has "come to love that old house as
well as if it were my own" (GI 154), offer poignant testimony to the ties with the past
that can never be dissolved.
Once the detailed similarities between Madham and Robert Sunderman have
been established, we can consider the ways in which the professor exploits his
student's narrative to reconcile himself to his own split identity. Madham's significant
personal investment in Sadness's adventures emerges in his admission that he sent
Sadness to the northwest "as on a mission, as on a veritable quest for something
forever lost to me and yet recoverable to the world" (GI 14). Kroetsch has playfully
suggested that "the question of symbiosis" between Madham and Sadness is
"complicated."38 However, we can gauge the extent to which Sadness is a mere
creation of Madham's melancholy genius by simply exchanging the two men's names
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in certain situations. Thus it is Madham, not Sadness, who "believed that his whole
life was shaped and governed by some deep American need to seek out the frontier"
(GI 5); and it is the professor of whom it is "undeniable" that he "dreamed northwest"
(GI 6). It is equally clear that Madham's withering comment on Sadness's "self-
deceiving self-analysis" (GI 7) may be more fairly applied to a man who unearths
details of his own past to serve as clues in an elaborate literary puzzle, while his scorn
for Sadness's "voyeuristic fantasy" (GI 27) sits ill with his own initial description of
Jill Sunderman.
Madham's cavalier disregard for the integrity of Sadness's story emerges
particularly forcefully when he continues to attribute a narrative to Sadness even at
those moments when it could not have been recorded. For over one-third of the novel
(from Chapter twenty-five to Chapter thirty-eight) Sadness loses his microphone - Jill
Sunderman leaves with it at the pancake breakfast at the First Presbyterian Church and
Sadness only recovers it in Dorck's office after his judgement of the Winter Queen.
Yet for the intervening period, Madham continues to supply us with a present-tense
narrative that purports to originate from Sadness. With manipulation of this magnitude,
it is altogether unsurprising that Madham decides to "destroy" Sadness's tapes for the
inadequate reason that they were "cluttering up" (GI 154) his office. Madham's
inexorable need for his cultural "other" is made plain, however, when Sadness reminds
him during a conversation about Archie Belaney's passage between two versions of the
self that "[o]ne false move, Professor, and instead of addressing you, I'll be you.
That's serious" (GI 62). In a rare moment of candour, Madham reflects that "[t]he
forest of my own intent is inhabited with strange creatures, surely" (GI 51). Not the
least of these strange figures is his lonely graduate student, whose presence in the
northwest is supposed to underpin Madham's timeless vision of Canada, and whose
disappearance reintroduces history into the professor's abandoned home.
Sadness's diachronic intervention into the synchronic structure of Madham's
narrative therefore embodies the need of post-colonial culture to achieve an identity
unconstrained by universalist or Eurocentric concepts and images. This imperative is
supplemented in the text by Kroetsch's appropriation of themes and motifs from the
European and American cultural traditions. By incorporating dominant images from the
Western imaginative tradition into a Canadian discourse of self-identification, Kroetsch
reverses the relationship between the imperial "same" and the colonial "other." This
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subversive act of semantic colonisation enables him to ironise those discourses - such
as the notion of the "spiritual mission" of colonialism or the implicit division between
civilisation and chaos represented by the idea of the frontier - that have traditionally
circumscribed discussions of colonial identity and provides a critical space for an
exploration of alterity itself.
There is an important moment in each encounter with an entirely new cultural
environment in which the individual must choose between loyalty to established ideas
and attitudes or the leap into a new constellation of imaginative possibilities. We can
recognise this point of transition in Susanna Moodie's Roughing It In The Bush where
the English lady is confronted with the reality of the Canadian experience.
"You have much to learn, ma'am, if you are going to the woods," said Mrs. J -
"To unlearn, you mean," said Mr. D - . "To tell you the truth, Mrs. Moodie,
ladies and gentlemen have no business in the woods. Eddication spoils man or
woman for thai location.39
In Gone Indian Kroetsch seizes upon this fracture within the individual sensibility and
transforms it into a metaphor for the ambivalence of the post-colonial position between
the Old and New World. Like Susanna Moodie, Kroetsch's novel argues, Canadians
must come to terms with the accumulated burden of the American and European cultural
inheritance. This historical legacy receives particularly powerful expression in the
frontier mythology of American culture. In one of its most basic emancipatory
gestures, Gone Indian parodies the imaginative forms of American frontier fiction,
appropriating for its own purposes that genre's brooding emphasis upon the
demarcation and transgression of boundaries, its prevailing sense of personality in
crisis, and its wariness of the malevolent "otherness" of the unhuman world.
Several aspects of the American frontier experience emphasise its suitability for
Kroetsch's parodic intentions. To begin with, the ambiguous status of the notion of the
'frontier' produced by the tension the term embodies between the opposed poles of
'civilisation' and 'savagery' is an extension of the contradictory concept of the 'New
World.' Thus the appellation 'New World' simultaneously suggests a form of original
experience free from the restrictions of OldWorld history and social traditions, while
accepting, by its designation as New World, its allotted position within the ideological
framework of European colonialism. This fundamental contradiction helps to explain
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the tension in American cultural discourse between the desire to establish the myth of
the American as a 'new Adam' redefining human experience in a New World garden
and the more pragmatic need to locate the New World experience within its European
historical context. The sweep of Sadness's quest incorporates both extremes of this
cultural divide: he is drawn to Edmonton by Madham's seductive vision of the
blankness of Canadian cultural history, but he is ultimately transformed by the impact
that the repressed narratives of Canadian history have upon his solitary consciousness.
Kroetsch initially demonstrates the effect that discourses of the American
frontier have had upon the definition of Canadian identity by affixing one such
discourse as an epigraph to Gone Indian. Thus the epigraph to his novel is taken from
Frederick Jackson Turner's paper "The Significance of the Frontier in American
Flistory." Kroetsch fastens upon the closing moments of Turner's paper, where he
moves into the declarative mode: "For a moment, at the frontier, the bonds of custom
are broken and unrestraint is triumphant." By quoting Turner in this way, Kroetsch
substitutes the Canadian prairie for Turner's vision of the great western American
spaces in which ideas of social development, political philosophy, and cultural
nationalism were developed, and which subsequendy became the crucible of the North
American imagination. Within this transposition, Canada becomes the first term in that
symbolic "meeting point between savagery and civilisation"40 that for Jackson Turner
defines the American character. By superimposing Jackson Turner's frontier onto the
northwestern landscape, Kroetsch suggests that the distinction within frontier rhetoric
between civilisation and barbarism is reproduced in the dialectic between imperial and
colonial culture. It is this dichotomy that Sadness deconstructs in his vision of the
bloody meeting of the "two great waves of culture" (GI 103) on the Great Central
Plains of America. Through this cataclysmic collision of the different cultural traditions
that have "washed out from Europe" a space opens in which post-colonial identity can
be articulated. Sadness's subversion of colonialist discourse eventually disorders even
Jackson Turner's epigraph: despite the fact that Sadness's progress into the northwest
slips the "bonds of custom" it is Madham, and not Sadness, whose "unrestraint"
becomes "triumphant."
Another strategic borrowing from American cultural discourse of great
significance to Gone Indian is Kroetsch's use of the doctrine oifelix culpa, or the
'fortunate fall.' In the writings of the elder Henry James, the myth of the fortunate fall
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acted as a corrective to the notion of the American as an unfallen Adam transplanted to a
new Eden. Against this desire for historical innocence, James emphasised the
importance of the lessons of the past to a full development of the personality. James's
signal contribution to New World thought was thus to resituate the image of the
American Adam within a larger historical cycle of loss and regeneration. R. W. B.
Lewis has shrewdly identified the importance of the doctrine of the fortunate fall in
James's thought and its implications for the self-declared innocence of the adamic
personality:
The Christian suggestion teeters on the verge of heresy, and, for all its
cheerfulness, it has always made its proponents uneasy. But as a metaphor in
the area of human psychology, the notion of the fortunate fall has an immense
potential. It points to the necessary transforming shocks and sufferings, the
experiments and errors - in short, the experience - through which maturity and
identity may be arrived at. This was just the perception needed in a generation
that projected as one of its major ideals the image of man as a fair unfallen
Adam. The claims of newborn innocence for the individual in America
inevitably elicited the response that innocence is inadequate for the full reach of
human personality; that life, in James's words, "flowers and fructifies . . . out
of the profoundest tragic depths."41
In Gone Indian Kroetsch evokes the myth of the fortunate fall to show that a
discourse of history that aims to reflect the "claims of new-born innocence for the
individual in America" is quite inadequate to the task of portraying post-colonial
experience. In the character of Madham he therefore parodies the Adamic strain of
American transcendentalism associated pre-eminently with the poetry ofWalt Whitman.
Accordingly, Madham's robust belief in his own unfallen nature recalls Whitman's
desire "to re-establish the natural unfallen man in the living hour."42 Moreover, his
description of his naked frolic with Carol Sadness in his letter to Jill Sunderman echoes
Whitman's Romantic return to the state of first things:
As Adam, early in the morning,
Walking forth from the bower refresh'd with sleep,
Behold me where I pass, hear my voice, approach,
Touch me, touch the palm of your hand to my body
as I pass,
Be not afraid ofmy body.43
Madham's attempt to repudiate the vision of his own history represented to him
by Sadness's narrative embodies the Whitmanesque imperative to slough off the
influences of the past and begin the world again in a present made permanent. "Apart
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from the pulling and hauling stands what I am, / Stands amused, complacent,
compassionating, idle, unitary"44 Whitman declares in Leaves of Grass; but it is as
well to remember Lewis's remark that in Whitman's view "the poet projects a world of
order and meaning and identity into either a chaos or a sheer vacuum; he does not
discover it."45 In contrast to Madham's fidelity to the adamic ideal, Sadness's
experiences show that the doctrine of New World man as an unfallen Adam fails to
account for the separation from origin enforced by the need to name the New World in
the language of the world it left behind. Behind discussions of Canadian identity lie, as
Sadness's narrative explains, the great waves of European culture. Kroetsch repeatedly
employs the trope of the "fall" to dramatise Sadness's awareness that history is not a
random or contingent context for human experience, but a discourse of power that
constructs subjectivities for the objects it describes. By falling from innocence into
history Sadness therefore discovers a means of comprehending his own "otherness"
within the discourse that envelops him. Initially unnerved by Notikeewin's
carnivalesque dislocation of his cultural expectations, he is only too glad to to be
"saved" from "falling" (GI 40). But his time in the northwest slowly alerts him to the
implicit violence ofMadham's representation of Canada as a place of darkness in which
order, meaning, and identity are threatened. Sadness eventually signals this discovery
in his remark that the "trick" or secret ofNew World existence is "knowing how to fall"
(GI 78) from Madham's idea of absolute selfhood (the "old mad Adam of the original
day") and to acknowledge the mediation of New World identity by colonialist
discourses of history.
Kroetsch's parodic appropriation of themes and motifs from American cultural
discourse is supplemented by a series of intertextual references that connect his novel
with the discursive forms of European culture. In particular, the story of Sadness's
flight from inauthenticity towards a new vision of the self parodies the genre of spiritual
autobiography which finds famous expression in Augustine's Confessions and the
writing of John Bunyan. The narrative form of spiritual autobiography assists the
thematic development of Gone Indian for three reasons. First, the historical discourse
surrounding the genre of spiritual autobiography is one of chaos and fragmentation:
both Augustine, witnessing the collapse of the Roman Empire, and Bunyan,
imprisoned following the turmoil of the English civil war, write at a time when social
authority is in abeyance and cultural identity in question. By reworking the textual
motifs of spiritual autobiography into Sadness's quest-narrative, Kroetsch is therefore
able to emphasise the moment of delegitimation that occurs at every frontier between
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different paradigms of historical experience. Secondly, the tendency of the work of
Augustine and Bunyan to use the experience of physical displacement intrinsic to the
quest-narrative as a metaphor for an emotional and spiritual rebirth is replicated in the
connection Kroetsch makes between Sadness's transplantation to the Canadian
northwest and his attempt to escape the closed forms of Old World discourse. And,
third, the dependence of the idiom of spiritual autobiography on the "old dualities" of
scriptural rhetoric offers an excellent imaginative focus for Kroetsch's account of the
paradoxical nature of the post-colonial search for new forms of identity within the
discursive constraint of a mandarin language
Several connections between the Confessions and Gone Indian can usefully be
established. The first correspondence between them is implicit in the title of
Augustine's autobiography, because the confessional mode that he employs influences
the form of Sadness's taped messages. Similarly, the textual structure of Augustine's
"quest"46 for redemption enforces a division between the modes of spiritual consolation
and philosophical speculation that Kroetsch exploits in Gone Indian, where he
allocates the former to Madham and the latter to Sadness. Furthermore, Augustine's
anguished recognition that his exile from divine grace compels him to see himself as "a
confused reflection in a mirror" 47 articulates the emphasis of both texts upon the link
between the revaluation of the past and the development of new codes of recognition.
Finally, Augustine's quest for self-knowledge is rooted in the experience of oral
culture. The polyphonic discourse of oral culture is important to Kroetsch because the
flexibility that its collective exchange of personality permits challenges received
representations of historical and cultural identity. Commenting on Gone Indian,
Kroetsch has acknowledged the appositeness of the unbounded inventiveness of oral
discourse to a post-colonial situation "where we are literally in a new world telling
ourselves about it, making each other up, inventing each other in this new world."48
Themes and images from the work of John Bunyan also reverberate throughout
Gone Indian. Thus Bunyan's repeated use of the "maze"49 as a figure for the soul's
tortuous journey towards God and his characterisation of paradise as a "new world"50
are parodied by Kroetsch in Sadness's passage through the Canadian "labyrinth"
towards the "oldest new world." By debunking Bunyan's theological discourse in this
way, Kroetsch rejects the transcendent leap outside representation towards originary
plenitude in favour of a deconstruction of the narrative frames that order Canadian
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experience. In the same spirit, Sadness's journey from alienation to self-knowledge
makes profane use of the tropes of trial and "judgement"51 that underpin Bunyan's
Christian morality tales. However, Kroetsch's borrowings from Bunyan are not
simply confined to the topological level. Instead, Bunyan's writing extends to
Kroetsch the possibility of further levels of meaning implicit in the epistemological
strategies of Christian allegory. Accordingly, the curious names of Kroetsch's two
narrators accrue meaning from their relocation within the allegorical nominative
tradition apotheosised in The Pilgrim's Progress. By combining within itself a
multiplicity of reference, the name "Madham" may be read as a parody of the
professor's adamic desire to establish an unmediated relationship between sign and
referent. Three possible connotations of his name should be noted: the ideas of
theatrical insincerity ("mad-ham"), sexual insecurity ("madam") and the urge for
transcendence ("the old mad Adam of the original day"). Meanwhile, the novel gains
its internal dynamic from the attempt to discern a context for, and a solution to, the
question of Jeremy's sadness. By establishing The Pilgrims Progress as an intertext
for Gone Indian we can also appreciate Kroetsch's exquisite parody of Christian's
status as the lonely wayfaring man who carries the world's sin upon his shoulders. In
Kroetsch's revision of this story, Christian's burden is transformed into Sadness's
back-pack and microphone. Consequently, the expulsion from origin signified by
Christian's fallen wandering becomes a legacy of the proliferation of discourses
produced by contemporary mass-media reality.
Before leaving this area, it should be noted that the themes and preoccupations
of spiritual autobiography have been developed and modified in our own century in
ways that anticipate Kroetsch's practice in Gone Indian and establish his novel within a
continually evolving representational tradition. Thus Joyce Cary's picaresque novel
The Horse's Mouth, which shares Kroetsch's concern with the discovery of new
modes of fiction, pictures its hero Gully Jimson working on a canvas entitled "the Fall
into Freedom." Completing "the Fall," Jimson is fascinated by the bifurcation between
redeemed and unregenerate man symbolised by "[t]he old Adam."52 The schism within
Jimson's creative sensibility between the rival attractions of innocence and experience
leads him to identify what he takes to be the fundamental insight of Blake's work that
"HIS OUTSIDE IS ON THE INSIDE."53 In this paradoxical statement we recognise
the outline of Jeremy Sadness, who enters Canada "DISGUISED AS MYSELF" to
discover a hidden dimension of the NewWorld experience.
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These themes are developed in a fiction by a Canadian writer which
incorporates both the image of the frontier and the motifs of spiritual autobiography into
the quest for a new vision of the self: Malcolm Lowry's Under The Volcano. Lowry's
novel rehearses many of the central issues of Gone Indian, and, in the character of the
vice-consul Geoffrey Firmin, reveals a prototype for the figure of Sadness. Like
Sadness, Firmin's life is presented as a "quixotic oral fiction."54 Meanwhile, the
despair he feels after his divorce - an act we are told that means "to sever" and "to
sunder"55 - foreshadows Sadness's divorce from his former life following his
adventures with the significantly named Jill and Bea Sunderman. Interestingly, Firmin
also shares Sadness's consciousness of the need to renounce the panaceas of the past in
order to achieve a measure of self-knowledge. His awareness of this painful truth is
conveyed in the haunting phrase that "sooner or later, I shall fall."56 But before he
goes to meet his private calvary, Firmin, seeking the meaning of his present agony
within older forms of cultural expression, transforms himself into William Blackstone,
"[t]he man who went to live among the Indians."57 In his doomed attempt to reach "the
final frontier of consciousness"58 Firmin prefigures Sadness's transmutation into Grey
Owl and his reappropriation of the Canadian cultural past
In conclusion, it is appropriate to advance some more general remarks
concerning the comparative textual politics of The Studhorse Man and Gone Indian.
The obvious point of similarity between the novels is that they both describe the
process by which the binary presuppositions of an hegemonic historical discourse are
responsible for the effacement of the historical subject under discussion. Confronted
with the obvious discrepancy between the designation of Hazard and Sadness as
unreasoned and atemporal mavericks and the evidence of these character's struggle
against a discourse that fails to represent their experience, both Demeter and Madham
are forced to expel their protagonists from their texts. Yet behind this basic
consanguinity of interest lies a fundamental difference in emphasis. Thus in The
Studhorse Man Demeter's failure to preserve the neutrality of his biographical
appropriation of Hazard's life is presented as an inevitable consequence of the
resistance of language to fixed binomial categories. But as I pointed out in Chapter
Four, the problem with predicating the recovery of colonial history upon the resistance
of language to closure in general is that this approach disqualifies Kroetsch from
contesting the relative and disproportionate influence enjoyed by certain discourses of
historical and cultural order.
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Two developments in Kroetsch's textual practice reflected in Gone Indian
render such contestation possible. First, by identifying a node of what Jameson terms
"linguistic normality" in an eastern American university, Kroetsch is able to show how
an image of colonial culture as "other" has accompanied the unitary drive of Western
enlightenment discourse. Secondly, by providing a space in the text for Sadness's
ironic counter-discourse Kroetsch manages to expose the historical contingency of this
view of Canada as "other" to the Western search for self-identity. Sadness's
ambiguous position both within and without the ambit of enlightenment discourse
enables Kroetsch to dramatise the full implications of Canada's situation as a cultural
construction of European colonialism. In the same way that Canada's language and
history ties it to those Western discourses that name it as "other," Sadness's ambivalent
position in Madham's text demonstrates that there is no discourse uncontaminated by
colonialism in which the post-colonial subject can articulate its experience. No matter
how successful Sadness is in denaturalising the ideological assumptions of Madham's
discourse, the professor always has the last word. In an appropriately ironic tone,
Kroetsch has remarked that "falling out of cosmologies is at least an illusion of
freedom."59 The fate reserved for Sadness in Madham's narrative shows how
dangerous such illusions can be.
But at the termination of the "Out West" triptych one difficulty remains. When
Sadness's disappearance at the end of Gone Indian is added to the images of Hazard's
death and Backstrom's final wordlessness, it becomes difficult to ignore the presence in
Kroetsch's texts of the "peculiar will towards silence"60 that he detects in other
Canadian fiction. Despite Kroetsch's rigourous insistence upon the contamination of
images of Canadian subjectivity by Old World discourse, his protagonists sometimes
seem to tread a rather predictable path towards silence and erasure. In his essay "The
Grammar of Silence" Kroetsch meditates upon this situation at some length:
How do these patterns of binary opposition get turned into narrative? How do
we avoid a paralysis with characters caught between two worlds - caught, if
you will, in silence? If we take departure and return as the basic or archetypal
design of the journey, then the ethnic story immediately becomes problematic in
that the traveller buys a one-way ticket
If the elements in the binaries are the nouns in the grammatical set, what
are the verbs that set things in motion? How do we articulate the silence?61
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Badlands, Kroetsch's fifth novel, offers an ingenious solution to the problem
of articulating the silence brought on by Canada's position "between two worlds."
This solution consists in inverting the logic of his previous fiction and allowing the
marginalised post-colonial subject to construct a meta-narrative for Canadian history.
Accordingly, Anna Dawe retells the story of her father William Dawe's expedition into
the Alberta badlands. Anna's narratorial intervention therefore appears to be the "verb"
that "sets things in motion" beyond binary stasis. Given the masculine environment in
which Dawe's quest for a perfect archaeological specimen is enacted, and his
phallocentric exclusion of the female voice, Anna's disdain for his mission offers a
welcome alternative perspective on the thematics of male imperialism. But, as Kroetsch
has shown, the contamination of Canadian cultural discourse cannot be expunged by an
unproblematic assertion of individual freedom. So, in a brilliant move, he uses Anna's
revision of her father's history to pass beyond "paradigm" into "story" while showing,
in Anna's complete capitulation to her father's exclusivist rhetoric, the contamination of
her discourse by the patriarchal values she blithely dismisses. In a neat twist on the
incipient paradigm of his male questers journey into silence, Anna Dawe is allowed to
imprison herself in her own rhetoric. Badlands therefore defines a pivotal moment in
Kroetsch's fiction: it extends the possibility of progress beyond the silence that
reasserts itself when "the old story forms are no longer adequate to the new
experience"62; but it also exposes the unhappy consequences of a rhetoric of self-
identification negatively defined against the exclusivity of dominant cultural discourse.
To fully understand the necessity of Kroetsch's most bitter attack upon the grammar of
silence we must consequently turn to the strange case of Anna Dawe's 'liberation' from
the masculine discourse of history.
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Chapter Six
Badlands: From a Counter-Discursive to a Deconstructive Poetics
How can I say, I say, that these are not the eyes of the law that stare from
behind my eyes, or that the mind of the law does not occupy my skull, leaving
me only enough intellection to utter these doubting words, if it is I uttering
them, and see their fallaciousness.1
Wherever he goes he leaves absence behind him.2
In In the Heart of the Country, the first novel of the white South African writer
J. M. Coetzee, Magda, a lonely frustrated middle-aged spinster, tries to come to terms
with both the pressure exerted upon her by a domineering father and the hierarchical
vision of society that he represents. Her father's violent imposition of power upon the
disenfranchised black majority is symbolised by his sexual coercion of Klein-Anna, the
defenceless wife of his herdsman Hendrik. Appalled by this flagrant violation of the
master/servant relationship, Magda shoots her father and attempts to create a new
environment in his absence based upon social and economic co-operation with her
servants. But given the chance to define herself outside the history of white
imperialism, she is unable to escape the "language of hierarchy, of distance and
perspective"3 which separates her, in turn, from Hendrik and Anna. Terrified by the
collapse of social distance between herself and her servants, she eventually succumbs
to the "frantic spurious babble"4 of a life lived by the arbitrary authority of the gun.
Eventually all three antagonists enter into a curious sexual triangle where identities are
exchanged, power transferred, but the underlying culture of violence and exploitation
remains. Despite her idealistic vision of becoming "[njeither master nor slave, neither
parent nor child, but the bridge between, so that in me the contraries should be
reconciled"5 Magda is unable to deny the cultural heritage of South African racial
history. In Helen Tiffin's words, her "ability to function in a relationship with 'others'
is circumscribed by the inherited codes which subvert attempts to escape its hierarchical
binary structurations."6 The tenacity of her father's influence upon her social attitudes
is poignantly expressed in the last scenes of the novel where he reappears from beyond
the grave, determined to outlive her, demanding his broth and weak tea without respite
into a nameless future.
When Coetzee's scabrous vision of the inescapable violence of the
master/servant relationship is restored to its proper context within the history of
apartheid politics, it presents a compelling meditation upon the problematic relationship
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between dominant cultural discourse and counterhegemonic discourses of political
emancipation. Richard Terdiman has noted the political vulnerability of counter-
discourses that "implicitly evoke a principle of order just as systematic as that which
sustains the discourse they seek to subvert" by arguing that "in the image of the
counterhegemonic ... the counter-discourse always projects, just over its own
horizon, the dream of victoriously replacing its antagonist."7 The existence of this
unacknowledged dream of mastery is attested to by Coetzee himself, when, in a
passage quoted by Tiffin, he speaks of a counter-discourse "which, subverting the
dominant, is in peril, like all triumphant subversion, of becoming the dominant in
turn."8 This peril can only be gainsaid by a strategy of subversion that meditates upon
its own operation, examines its own implication within a wider field of social and
cultural relations, and asserts its own provisionality in the face of the binary structures
inscribed within post-colonial discourse. By a mode of contestation, in short, that
makes the radical transition from a counter-discursive to a deconstructive poetics.
In Badlands, Kroetsch effects this transition from a counter-discursive to a
deconstructive reading of history. Coetzee's artistic and critical reflections on the
nature of counter-discursive strategies have an abiding relevance to a discussion of this
development in Kroetsch's work. By using Magda's first-person narrative to
emphasise the impossibility of simply rejecting dominant (in this case patriarchal and
racial) discourse, Coetzee insists that counter-discourse must simultaneously rework
and displace hegemonic discourses of identity and place. His decision to make it the
victim's task to recreate through language the scene of her oppression shows that the
counterhegemonic impulse has no choice but to engage with the historical discourses of
order that govern its existence. Only when the counter-discursive has to some degree
internalised the principle of order that it contests can it achieve that momentary
assumption of hegemony from which it parodies the operations and motives of
dominant discourse. It is at precisely this moment of subversive triumph, when the
inexorable progress of the dominant has been retarded, that the counter-discourse must
admit its own provisionality and examine the structural codes that underpin its own
emancipatory gestures. Magda's fault may therefore be seen to seen to lie in her refusal
to make the progression from a counter-discursive to a deconstructive stance. Instead,
she exploits her position of power to establish a new vision of order which
reconstitutes her father's law through the sound of her own voice.
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It will be clear by this stage that Coetzee's novelistic emphasis upon the
inextricability of the relationship between the reconstitution and displacement of
imperial order makes inevitable an analogy between post-colonial counter-discourse and
deconstructive poetics. The necessity of this relationship between the
counterhegemonic and the deconstructive becomes more pressing as a reading of
Badlands proceeds. Initially, however, the most obvious point of comparison between
Coetzee and Kroetsch is in their allegorical use of the struggle between father and
daughter. Badlands meditates upon the tension between hegemonic and marginalised
narratives of Canadian history by offering two narratorial responses toWilliam Dawe's
archaeological expedition into the dinosaur bone beds of the Albertan badlands in the
summer of 1916. Thus the story of Dawe's expedition is recounted in a third-person
present-tense narrative which charts his entry into the Red Deer River, his discovery of
the dinosaur bones that are to immortalise his name, and his return to the border of
modem Canadian history. Woven into Dawe's story is the narrative of his daughter,
Anna Dawe, a forty-five year old semi-recluse, who retraces the path of Dawe's
expedition fifty-six years later in order to settle accounts with her father's memory.
Anna's narrative acts as a second reader within the text, offering contexts, restoring
elisions, and providing a mythological and psychological interpretation of her father's
quest. Her historical revision of her father's story is therefore presented
simultaneously as a discursive and psychological liberation: her ironic commentary
frames the narrative of her father's triumph and re-examines its cultural assumptions,
while her physical return to the scene of his apotheosis culminates in her rejection of his
field-notes, his history, and the shadow of his influence.
This reading of the narrative structure (and hence the meaning) of Badlands has
the virtue of clarity and has been adopted by most commentators on Kroetsch's work.
Its primary attraction is that it provides an excellent example of the counter-discursive
displacement of hegemonic cultural formations which is such a recurrent theme of post-
colonial literatures. By parodying the implicit imperialism of the male quest, Anna's
narrative displaces phallocentric discourse and provides a critical space for a feminist
reading of history and national identity. However, if we return briefly to the
relationship between reconstitution and displacement that I outlined above, it is apparent
that the relatively linear conception of a feminist displacement of phallocentric discourse
fails to do justice to the complexity of the relationship between dominant discourse and
counter-discursive strategies. In particular, Anna's ironic aloofness from the site of the
male discourse of history conveys neither the intense pressure put upon dissident
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expression in a hostile cultural environment, nor the hubristic temptation to internalise
the despised principle of authority once a position of hegemony has been achieved.
Consequently, an interpretation of Badlands that accepts the basic substitutive logic of
Anna's feminist revision of Dawe's story accords her discursive intervention a degree
of benevolence and a level of political success that modern cultural history simply
denies.
In my discussion of Badlands I will seek to demonstrate that Kroetsch
singularly fails to confer the degree of benevolence upon Anna's project that the
conventional reading of the novel demands. His scepticism is clearly detectable from
the evidence that the text offers for a quite different interpretation of Anna's intentions.
This alternative reading begins from the radical premise that Anna is in fact responsible
for both of the narratives presented within the novel. In this new disposition of
circumstances, the omniscient third-person narrative is exposed as Anna's imaginative
reconstruction of Dawe's motives, dreams, and secret fears, while her signed segments
of text constitute an editorial comment on the experiences she has just described. By
ascribing both narratives to Anna, Kroetsch is able to dramatise with great economy the
danger to marginalised groups of victoriously replacing their antagonists only to
become dominant in their turn. For Anna's novelistic representation of her father's
experience replicates the imperialism of his behaviour by hypothesising the masculine
as an embodied dream of conquest and appropriation that is in complete antithesis to the
feminist vision of renewal and change. Her valorisation of the feminine simply inverts
the binary logic of Dawe's quest to confer privilege upon the values that he denies. In
an irony neither would recognise, both father and daughter mine the past for the image
of sexual difference that their discourse requires without pausing to consider the
culturally constructed meaning of 'difference' or its implication within social and
political strategies of domination.
It should be emphasised that this deconstructive reading ofBadlands does not
completely foreclose upon the conventionally revisionist identification with Anna's
first-person narrative. Indeed, it is not until we have travelled some distance through
the text that inconsistencies and logical flaws in Anna's account force us to reconsider
the whole question of narrative voice. By insisting upon this gradual process of
revelation, Kroetsch encourages us to invest emotionally in Anna's counter-discourse
in order to heighten our sense of shock when her absolute textual control becomes
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apparent. Alerted in the last pages of the novel to the trick that Anna has played, we
can only make sense of the text by re-reading it and holding the two narratives together
in ironic tension. Because this process demands that we deconstruct both of Anna's
narratives, we are compelled to move beyond the merely counter-discursive in order to
examine the binary structure of her cultural vision. Meanwhile Kroetsch, by bringing
the two narratives together in a way that forces them to revise each other, establishes a
deconstructive space beyond the binary assumptions of patriarchal and counter-
patriarchal thought. Sherrill E. Grace acknowledges that Kroetsch produces meaning
by juxtaposing the two narratives to create a third realm of signification when she
writes that "the two voices interact to create a third ironic point of view because the
reader is given both fictions, and is forced to weigh and balance many opposites."9 In
order to respect the properly dialectical shape of Kroetsch's text, which disillusions us
only by involving us in Anna's many authorial illusions, I intend to begin with an
analysis of her 'revision' of Dawe's story before commencing the deconstructive
reading that calls her own version into disrepute. By undermining in this way the
theoretical predicates of a counter-discourse negatively defined against the order that it
challenges, it becomes possible for us to progress beyond the binary constrictions of
Gone Indian and to identify a space within hegemonic discourse where the
marginalised histories of post-colonial experience will eventually be written.
The counter-discursive impulse that contests hierarchical structures ofmeaning
and resists narrative closure is present from the novel's opening pages. Badlands
begins with a brief introduction from Anna Dawe. This simple fact is of the utmost
significance, because Anna's introductory remarks are intended to reinscribe the sign of
the feminine within a masculine discourse of history that has steadfastly excluded it.
She searches for voice, name, and identity in an environment where the "male story"10
relegates the feminine to the margins ofDawe's fading field-notes. Years after Dawe's
expedition has been converted into a footnote in archaeological history, his wife can
decipher "her own boredom and possibly her loneliness, if not his outrageous joy"
from the "blurred letters" and "hasty, intense scrawl"11 that he has bequeathed her.
The marginality of her textual presence is an ironic reminder of female dispossession in
a world where they are expected to "sit at home" and are "not supposed to have stories"
(B 3). Women, in this reading of the past, are "Penelopes to their [men's] wars and
their sex" (B 3), the silenced and policed audience whose helpless admiration confers
value upon the trophies that the men bring home from the tilled field of history:
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I don't know that I ever received a letter from my absent father. He sent us
instead, left us, deposited for me to find, his field notes; God help us we are a
people raised not on love letters or lyric poems or even cries of rebellion or
ecstasy or pain or regret, but rather old hoards of field notes. Those cryptic
notations made by men who held the words themselves in contempt but who
needed them nevertheless in order to carry home, or back if not home, the only
memories they would ever cherish: the recollections of their male courage and
their male solitude. (B 2)
From these beginnings, the novel explores two sharply contrasted responses to
the "old hoards of field notes" that denote the scattered fragments of Canadian history.
In order to salvage for herself "a past, an ancestor, a legend, a vision, a fate" (B 3)
from the totalising narrative of masculine history, Anna deliberately emphasises the
provisionally of the male story, resisting its tendency to disguise its political interests,
and working to resituate it within a wider field of social and cultural meaning. She
therefore punctuates the story of Dawe's expedition with her judgements and opinions,
interpolating facts, decoding symbols, and commenting on matters of narrative form.
Like a contemporary literary critic, she inspects the surface of the narrative that
surrounds her, searching it for those moments of contradiction and ellipsis where a
breach may be made in the unilinear text of Canadian history. The discursivity of
history, its narrative status as a culturally constructed field of meanings, is of
paramount importance to Anna because it leaves the present open to revision and
change. Conversely her father, William Dawe, seeks to impose his own name upon the
Canadian past and thereby grant himself the absolute historical privilege of immortality.
Far from acknowledging the status of history as a semantic field written into coherence
by the creative readings of its interpreters, Dawe searches for a level of meaning prior
to discourse itself. For Dawe, the act of entering the ground and exposing the stratified
levels of its archaeological formation establishes a direct connection between history
and place free from the obfuscations of language. By moving beyond language into the
site of the land itself, he contradicts Anna's basic premise that there can be no access to
history outside its textualised remains. In a paradox that takes us to the core of the
novel's ambivalence over the question of history, the male story exists for Dawe
precisely because it is not a story but a record of domination, exploitation and erasure
reflected by the bones of time themselves.
Dawe's paradoxical dream of a passage through time that mocks time out of
meaning is a contradiction that attracts the attention of Anna's revisionist intelligence.
As John Moss points out, Dawe's journey down the Red Deer River into the badlands
"in search of immortality, the quest to defeat time, to become a word, is linear, a river
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journey."12 The narrative form of Dawe's quest towards the site of ultimate historical
origins in fact emphasises the textual mediation of history since, in Dorothy Seaton's
words,
[t]he notion of the river trip as a journey of discovery is a familiar mythological
construction in Canadian self-definition: as told in the proto-texts of Canadian
history and identity, the exploration and fur trade narratives, it is largely
through river journeys, of course, that Canada was explored, named, and
defined.13
In contrast to this sense of a return to a moment of collective self-definition offered by
the journey back down the river of time, Dawe assembles his archaeological fragments
in order to construct an exclusive individual vision of self. The closure of his stance is
suggested by the fact that he is raiding the western Canadian bone beds in order to
deposit the remains (and guarantee his reputation) in a museum in the east. Turning his
back upon the narrative possibilities - and the potential for story - opened by the
juxtaposition of archaeological fragments, he subordinates the uncreated history of the
west to traditional eastern discourses of history and nationhood. In this sense he is,
like Mark Madham, an enlightenment figure who would make the world "clear" to
"these poor souls, the uninitiated, the ignorant, the vulgar" (B 7). Like Madham, too,
he is driven on "by some absence he would escape" (B 230). Despite his inclusive
gestures towards men severed from their historical inheritance, he seeks to establish an
inviolable core of self safe from history and change. He is therefore described as a
figure enclosed within his own hard little body: he is "hunchbacked," "small," and
moves "stiffly" (B 6) through the landscape. In the physical act of creating the history
of the west he renounces his contact with humanity, guided only by his "maniacal
obsession" to discover "the one gigantic and perfect skeleton" that "would insinuate to
him, however grotesquely, the whole truth" (B 8).
Dawe's "quest for self-definition, through the search for origins in the bones of
dead dinosaurs"14 becomes the explicit theme of his inmost reveries. "Looking and
looking . .. Daweosaurus magnicristatus ... the lost bones ... the dead creatures
immortalizing the mortal man" (B 36) he muses to himself. His need for an absolute
identification with a site of prehistory uncontaminated by language is ironically
underlined by his physical resemblance to the landscape he examines. Throughout the
novel our attention is drawn to "the mountain on his back" (B 174). He is, in essence,
"sculptured down to naked clay, a landscape unto himself (B 56). However, Dawe's
strangely ahistorical quest for a point in time before history began, which sends him "in
search of Eden, the lost perfect world of humanity's origins,"15 receives its first
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challenge from his encounter with the squaw Anna Yellowbird at the very start of the
novel. The significance of Dawe's meeting with Yellowbird is that her story insists that
history is not a discontinuous collection of relics awaiting the presence of an ordering
hand, but a discourse that disseminates power through an inscrutable system of
privileges, checks, and prohibitions. Instead of offering "the formless unity of some
great evolutionary process,"16 history, for Yellowbird, is the record of the
displacement and division of her community by white society. A widow at fifteen,
having been told that her husband "was vanished and gone, with an iron ship bound for
something called England, for something called the World War, she had wandered
blindly towards the east, knowing that England lay to the east, the war raged to the
east." It was, as Anna reminds us, "another of the ironies of that season that the wars
of Europe had sent the Indian girl into the canyon ofmy father's dreams" (B 148).
The conflict between Dawe and Yellowbird first becomes evident over their
different interpretation of the phrase "the place of the dead" (B 8). In Dawe's eyes,
Yellowbird's intuitive native response to the land promises a secret knowledge of the
archaeological treasures that he seeks. His request for assistance in locating "the bones
of the dead" is merely the next stage of his quest for immortality. But for Yellowbird
the "place of the dead" is a phrase that suggests a link between the the traditions of the
past and the present. This link, which is a part of the shamanistic experience of death,
revelation, and renewal, provides an important clue to Dawe's identity that undermines
his narrow interest in a moment of personal male redefinition. For from the beginning,
as Peter Thomas observes, "Dawe is cast for the shaman's role."17 His hunchback is a
"magical hump" that stands out "like some talisman of splendid good fortune" (B 7).
Alert to the shamanistic resonance of the journey into the Land of the Dead, Yellowbird
is quick to identify the meaning ofDawe's role:
[A]nd vaguely, desperately, despite the Anglican if not Christian missionaries
who taught her husband submission and love, she recalled a shaman whose
whereabouts she did not know but whose sacred and recollected words she
knew she must heed. And she found, was found by, three strange white men
and a chinaman. And she knew, had known ... it was the hunchbacked man,
not the others, who could find the way to the place of the dead. Even as she
vaguely knew, vaguely and yet vividly remembered, what the shaman had said:
do not eat, lie in your grave, wait for the guide. (B 148)
If the shamanistic character of Dawe's interest in dinosaur bones is understood,
more general conclusions about his behaviour may be drawn. An excellent starting
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point for such a discussion is Mircea Eliade's description of shamanistic ritual,
particularly the pivotal moment when the shaman contemplates his own skeleton:
Such a spiritual exercise implies the "exit from time," for not only is the
shaman, by means of an interior vision, anticipating his physical death, but he
is finding again what one might call the non-temporal source of Life, the bone.
Indeed, for the hunting peoples the bone symbolizes the ultimate root of animal
Life, the matrix from which the flesh is continually renewed.18
It is clear from this description that the shamanistic "exit from time" is a preliminary
stage in a larger cycle of resurrection and renewal. Eliade is quite unequivocal on this
point: he writes that the contemplation of the skeleton is a "symbolico-ritual complex
centred in the notion of life as perpetual renewal."19 The skeleton represents the
"essence" of life from which life "will be born anew according to an uninterrupted cycle
that constitutes an eternal return."20
Eliade's elucidations help to explain the meaning of Dawe's mission and the
ironic nature of his success. Once Dawe's identity as shaman has been established, it
becomes easier to understand the contradictory nature of his journey into the prehistoric
for a place in history, and the paradox of his search through the bones of the dead to
find a meaning in life. However, Dawe perverts the meaning of the shamanistic vision:
his search through levels of prehistory for the "non-temporal source of Life" is not an
attempt to renew the spirit and the flesh, but a quest for an immortal name that will
remove the self from time altogether. The consequences of this betrayal of the
shamanistic ideal are particularly noticeable in Dawe's struggles with language. The
energy of language plays a vital part in the shamanistic process of transfiguration and
renewal; as the shaman divests his body of flesh and blood, he names his body parts in
"the special and sacred language of the shamans."21 In contrast, Dawe battles against
the "enlarging sentence" that might seduce him into "his own unscientific noting of the
world" (B 11). "I despise words, he wrote; he stared at the sentence, enjoying it.
Writing it down had freed him, in some way he did not fully comprehend" (B 34).
Later, his greed for the "originating specimen" is accompanied by an image of him
"staving off the words that swarmed into his mind" (B 37). Ironically, it is to be Web,
his comic antagonist, who will assume the mantle of the shaman and release the bones
from their hidden grave. We can observe this ironic transference of responsibility in
the scene where Dawe and his crew encounter the snake man, who doubles as the
shaman of the badlands:
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A peal of laughter came out from behind one of the hoodoos. Then a coyote
appeared from behind the sandstone pillar that was the hoodoo's base. Then,
as if being led by the young coyote on a leash, a man appeared: a tall, thin, wiry
man. And Web noticed immediately, the band on the cowboy hat was the skin
of a garter snake, his belt a bullsnake's skin ... (B 152-53)
The snake, as Dawe recognises, is the sign of "death" and of a descent into the
"cave's dark mouth" (B 149). But it is Web who receives the shamanistic call. On the
morning of the crew's encounter with the snake man he finds "a horned lizard in his left
boot" (B 151); later that night he defeats the snake man in a bout of squaw wrestling.
In return, the crew are granted a vision of their first specimen after a suitably shambolic
parody of shamanistic rite is observed:
Then all six of them bent away from the fire, crawled out of the cave, slid out
into the night They carried with them pails and small bones, and they pounded
now, on the pails, the drunken band, Tune trying to get the other men to sing.
They staggered out into the badlands, into the moonlit and cooling night, the
snake man with his coyote taking the lead, Dawe humped and walking fast,
following, stumbling at his side, the others straggling in two pairs as if they
must, all together, lift and carry some invisible burden. They pounded their
makeshift drums; they hopped and jigged as they went, through the rocks, the
sagebrush, the cacti; they came to a spike of clay, as high as a tipi, white in the
light of the orange moon; they danced once around it, twice, again, the snake
man passing back a jug of moonshine. (B 157)
It is, as Peter Thomas remarks, shortly after this moment that Web unburdens himself
of his "shamanistic 'song,' his tale of the Twister"22 which confirms Dawe's
everlasting reputation at the same time as it destroys the closed frame of his historical
perspective.
Web, Dawe's anarchic sternsman, is a central figure in Badlands because his
adventures parody Dawe's search for ultimate historical origins. In his first
appearance, his discovery of Yellowbird in a shallow grave marks him out as a
burlesque Adam encountering death in the garden for the first time. Later he, not
Dawe, is granted a dream of an "upriver trip" to the "hidden and pristine lakes that are
the river's source, the sky-high and dazzling glaciers that feed the originating lakes" (B
13). While Yellowbird's vestigial presence continually reminds us of the exclusiveness
of Dawe's masculine version of history, with its bluff assertion that there is "no place
for women" (B 9) on the journey into the Canadian past, Web's irremediable
mythologisation of his own experience exposes the male quest as a story men tell each
other to conceal their own loneliness. His phallocentric discourse of male sexual power
is his way of coming to terms with "[a] lifetime of trying to grow free on those open
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prairies" (B 66). Whereas Dawe deliberately "enforcjes] the silence" (B 10), Web's
exuberant vitality resists all forms of enclosure, even death. He parodies Dawe's
obsessional interest in bones with his own phallocentric interest in "bone-ons."
Reflecting upon Yellowbird's premature burial, he tells the crew that they "[w]on't
catch me there before I'm hog-tied and hammered in. . . . [b]one-on I'm developing
now, it'll take them a week to get the lid down" (B 16). By re-creating the journey
downriver towards source in what Anna calls the "western yarn" (B 45) of male sexual
prowess, Web challenges Dawe's monological reading of history and opens the past up
to the plural interpretations of story. The transgressive logic of Web's relentless verbal
myth-making undermines established constructions of self and nation, as Dorothy
Seaton acknowledges when she comments that his stories "invariably suggest a barely
contained chaos of radical, directionless energy, far from the value-laden order and
encompassing system which usually characterise national myths."23
The real difference between Dawe and Web, as Anna's frame narrative points
out, is that the former immerses himself in prehistory for immortality and a "handsome
profit" (B 4), while the latter hates the river because it carries the alluvia of history and
connects the men with a past whose confinements he rejects. Anna offers a fine image
forWeb's denial of history when she recounts his response to his familial ties:
[A]nd Web saying he left that day and went back that night, put a match to the
shack and left again before he found out if his old man got out dead or alive,
and then, his way lighted by the burning shack, headed down the road and kept
going. "There is no such thing as a past," Web, his father forgotten, said to
mine.
There is nothing else, Web. That you should misunderstand is
unfortunate; on that one issue, on that issue only, my father perceived correctly.
(B 4)
It is Web's rootlessness, encapsulated in his persistent refusal to address the
ambivalence of his identity in historical terms, that attracts Anna's censure. In an
important passage later in the novel, she describes how Web's defensive need to
obliterate the past and spend himself in the present compels him to reinscribe the
dichotomies of patriarchal politics into his own discourse of history:
Web would divide his women into virgins and whores. And yet it was the
virgin who seduced him into his fine mockery of virtue; and I suspect he never
went to bed with his whore at all.
Total and absurd male that he was, he assumed, like a male author, an
omniscience that was not ever his, a scheme that was not ever there. Holding
the past in contempt, he dared foretell for himself not so much a future as an
orgasm.
But we women take our time. (B 76)
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Anna's sardonic analysis of both Web's repression of history and Dawe's
desire to establish history as an unconditional ontological category is reinforced by the
presence of the photographer Michael Sinnott. As the crew inch their way perilously
towards the major bone beds of Deadlodge Canyon they come across Sinnott, his
Model-T partly submerged in the river, preparing a photograph of their moment of
destiny. Dawe is immediately hostile to Sinnott because the photographer reminds him
that history is a discourse: a collection of images, stories, and commentaries that situate
the individual moment within a prior history of representation. For Sinnott, 'history' is
the history of memory's mediation by narrative. By the simple action of framing a
picture, Sinnott hauls the men "through the vanished world of his, of their, creation,
the emporium of their sought descent" (B 125). His calculatedly ironic framing actions
mock Dawe's voluntarist intentions, expressed in the archaeologist's need to live "by
an act of pure will" (B 150). Indeed, Sinnott's theatrical arrangement of images brings
out the irony of the earlier picture of Dawe's barge as a "badly managed stage" (B 10).
Dawe has no option but to resist Sinnott's aesthetic stance because it threatens to
displace his quest into a series of fractured images over which he has no control. The
fundamental difference between the two men over the discursive status of history is
captured in a key exchange:
Sinnott brushed at his own white beard, adjusted the black patch over his right
eye; as if he must now save himself from vanishing. He had already, using
Web as his model, adjusted the square bellows camera, set the flap shutter,
Taking the rubber bulb in his right hand, he determined that his subject would
not only pose but would smile as well. Sinnott announcing: "We are two of a
kind, Mr Dawe, you and I. Birds of a feather. You with your bones that are
sometimes only mineral replacements of what the living bones were. Me,
rescuing positive prints out of the smell of the darkroom.
"I recover the past," Dawe said. Unsmiling. Adjusting his grip on the
sweep. "You reduce it."
"I know," Sinnott said. "And yet we are both peddlers."
"You make the world stand still," Dawe said. "I try to make it live
again."
"Then let me save you from your inevitable failure," Sinnott said. "Tell
me where you might possibly be reached and I'll send you the consolation of
my masterpiece: The Charlatan Being Himself." (B 128)
Appropriately, Sinnott is waiting at the scene of Dawe's triumphant return out of the
badlands: he photographs Dawe's momentous victory, frames it as a snapshot, and
reproduces it as an image among others. His disinclination to award Dawes's story the
privilege it demands is expressed in a marvellous comic moment, in which he
assimilates Dawe's imperious seizure of the past into the larger narrative of American
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frontier expansion: '"Yes, folks. See him in person. Champion Bone Hunter of the
Wild West. Hero of a Thousand Close Calls. The Winner.' Sinnott laughed hugely"
(B 246).
Dawe's insistence upon creating his own myth of the land's history from the
signatures of the past that he recognises in abandoned fragments of bone is undermined
by the descent through time that the crew undertakes. His dream of lifting an
archaeological matrix out of time and consecrating it with his own name is shattered by
the forceful intrusion of time into his own re-construction of self. As the men progress
down the Red Deer River, their journey between different levels of history compels
them to slip back down the evolutionary ladder. The simple binary between the
temporal and the timeless that obsesses Dawe is unworked as the men concentrate the
experiences of prehistory and history into the space of their own lives. McBride is the
first to experience this metamorphosis, as he emerges from the river after his encounter
with a skunk:
He was a farmer, and maybe didn't think of the mud on his body any more than
he thought of his skin and considered it something other than himself. But the
lone woman, facing the three odd men, saw the man behind her, the man caked
in mud from his feet into his hair, his body like an alligator's; she saw him step
from his trough and into the willows. And it was not the smell that came with
him that made her hesitate.... It was the man himself, coming formless out of
the mud. Onto the land. The mud, the grey mud, cold, reptilian, come sliding
into the yellow-green flame of the shore's willows. (B 42-43)
This one transfiguring experience is enough for McBride: he abandons the
expedition, after transforming the barge into an "ark" (B 50) appropriate to Dawe's
attempt to transcend time. Dependent as a farmer upon an intuitive sympathy with the
local rhythms of the seasons, he is too much time's creature to embrace immortality. In
Anna's summation, McBride is "the only one with the ability to become a hero, the
wisdom not to" (B 45). The remainder of the crew continue undeterred their passage
towards their evolutionary origins. By the end of the journey they "had become
reptilian, had become the creatures of which they would possess the dead bones" (B
240). For Dawe, the penetration into the present of different strata of geological time
retains a particularly ironic resonance. Thus his discovery of an outcrop of bone on an
exposed butte leads him to overreach himself, fall from the cliff-face, and sustain a near
fatal injury. Immortality and temporality are ironically juxtaposed as he slips away
from his potentially perfect specimen down through the compressed layers of time:
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Dawe felt himself going, had time to reach for the pick, had time to free it, to try
to drive it again into the hard, wet clay. But the pick did not penetrate. Tune
was shouting; Dawe was sliding, the colours of the layered ridge unravelling
under his open eyes; the yellow-grey gravels and silts, the brown of ironstone,
the black and grey and white of slate, the ash-grey of bentonite rain-washed into
purple and green; and he was falling, down past, down into Cretaceous times;
down he fell with the rain, tumbled; a creeping juniper caught his face, twisted
him upright: except there was nothing beneath his boots. (B 173)
Dawe's spectacular fall incapacitates him and temporarily removes him from
active participation in the expedition. Because his injuries force him to rely upon Web
to excavate the remains of the specimen, the dichotomy between the intelligence and the
physical body that Dawe has so laboriously constructed disintegrates. Another
consequence of his immobility is the burgeoning of his relationship with Yellowbird.
Trusting to the perception of Dawe as a shaman in the twilight lands, the Indian girl
follows the men into the badlands where, unknown to Dawe, she is sustained by food
and bedding provided by his crew. Now, in the shaman's time of emotional crisis, she
comes to minister to his wounds, and savant and novitiate enter into a sexual
relationship. By involving Dawe in an emotional bond with another, Yellowbird
interrupts his private confrontation with the land and "ma[kes] him lose the past" (B
196). Their love-making exposes the insecurity in Dawe that drives him to rigourously
control his environment: "[T]he silence that he could not break with words he broke
with a long and whimpering whipped-dog, whipped-little-boy groan of exquisite pain
and welcome relief' (B 192). Bewitched by Yellowbird's attentions, Dawe yields "to
her passion, her violence, her tenderness; his male sense of surrender surprised and
violated and fulfilled" (B 196).
Just as Yellowbird's tipi of dinosaur bones suggests that we live in the spaces
history leaves us, her seduction of Dawe symbolises the fact that personal and national
identity is constructed in part from a negotiation with cultural alterity. Dawe's inability
to understand this lesson, reflected in his compulsion to plunder the land in "an act of
male heroic self-construction,"24 reaches its tragic conclusion in the death of Tune.
With the introduction of Tune, the Orphic metaphor that lies at the heart of Badlands
receives full expression. Plucked from the coal mines ofDrumheller, Tune is inducted
by Dawe into his male myth of self-definition. Trapped between the unappealing
alternatives of the mines, the whorehouse where he plays rudimentary piano, Dawe's
expedition, and the Canadian Army, Tune's options are gravely limited from the
beginning. As he works on the site under the burning sun, his adolescent fat is
removed to reveal a hard core of maleness. "Young Tune" is replaced by "the grown
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boy if not the young man, muscular now, his aims hardened, his hands hard" (B 214).
Although Tune has discovered "his male muscles" he has not, as Anna acknowledges,
"found the male instinct that would fling him against my father's possessive will" (B
162). Already a martyr to the men's "fervid need of abasement" (B 226) Tune "would
follow Dawe to the ends of the earth, off the map, assisting, uncovering" (B 214).
But like Cronos, Dawe's myth of male heroism feeds upon its young. Crouching to
prepare an explosive charge, Tune is buried beneath an avalanche of clay. The tune,
the magic of Orpheus, is obliterated, leaving Dawe without the renewing "language of
love and loss."25 Bereft of voice and the privileged passage from the underworld,
Dawe becomes a mute witness as power is transferred to Web, the master of verbal
transfigurations.
It is thematically appropriate that Dawe's exclusion of the feminine and Web's
hypertrophic celebration of the masculine should bring them into conflict over the site
of Yellowbird's body. Following his discovery of Yellowbird's presence, Dawe
peremptorily forbids his crew from contact with her. Noting the paradox that men
"avoid violent relations with each other by violence," Anna reminds us that since
women have the "instinct of community, will share or be shared ... the avoidance of
Anna [Yellowbird] was no idea of Anna's" (B 162). But, in truth, the restrictions that
Dawe places around Yellowbird are an attempt to bring his obdurate antagonism toWeb
to a crisis. Dawe's transgression of his own moral boundaries in his affair with
Yellowbird demands recognition: he must "tempt Web into a loss of [his] supreme
indifference" (B 198). Yellowbird recognises, however, that "Web's inviolable
resistance to Dawe's dream was the inviolable and necessarily violated secret that
enabled him, Web, to go each morning unwary and unafraid up the bare butte to the
high, open pit" (B 193). Web's dissent from Dawe's story bespeaks the western
Canadian's refusal to submit to imposed frameworks of perception. Instead, he
appropriates both Yellowbird and the language by which the western experience of
history is conveyed. Sent out by Dawe to rescue Yellowbird from the tornado that
threatens the landscape, Web returns with his tale of the Twister. Taken up by the
tornado, as Web tells it, he is given a momentary glimpse of the source of time. "The
air was so cool and thin you could hardly get enough to breathe," he remembers, "and I
thought of the mountains: we're up in the mountains I thought to myself, we've come
to the headwaters; this is the source . . . " (B 205). This return to temporal origin
prepares Web for the shamanistic experience that he is about to undergo. While
copulating with Yellowbird in the grave of Gorgosaurus, the Orphic and the
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shamanistic come together as he uninvents time and redeems the bones of the dead
through the visionary powers of story:
"And then the bolt came streaking straight at us, the ball of fire came WHAM -
and sweet mother of Christ the blue flames shot out of our ears, off our
fingertips, our glowing hair stood on end, my prick was like an exploding
torpedo, we glowed and blossomed and bloomed like a flare, like a burning
house. Like a house. Burning. We smelled the burning fish in the blue-green
flame of the night. My old pecker was like a rock spigot pouring out molten
lead, my balls glowed like furnace doors. I could see Anna under me, on top of
me: that ball or bolt or bomb of lightning had entered through my asshole, I
could tell by God I was scroched [sic] and burned, savaged, a flaming pitchfork
rammed out of the luminour air - " Web trying to capture his spouting words.
"And the crack of thunder deafened us. The inverted universe and undescended
testicles of the divine, the refucking-union with the dead - " (B 206-07)
Set down by the twister on a "white butte," Web realises that he has ripped the
bones of Dawe's "perfect specimen" from time itself. In contrast to Tune's uneducated
disbelief, Dawe recognises the meaning of Web's riotous parody of shamanistic magic.
His curt command "[g]et my axe, Tune" signals his acknowledgement that "[e]nds and
beginnings, the source and conclusion of the quest, are contained only in story, which
releases, in the language of flight, the experience of descent and return."26 Dawe's
quest forDaweosaurus ends on this ironic note, as the name he sought to redeem from
time is conferred upon him in the parodic language of his rival. In the final and most
unwarrantable paradox of his story, his monologic search for origin leads him to
contemplate "the single preposterous unnatural white butte of Web's impossible and
uncontradictable and total victory (B 209).
The circumscription of Dawe's story by a quite other discourse of history and
identity is repeated at the end of Badlands in the epilogue that Anna appends to the
novel. Fifty-six years after her father's return with Daweosaurus, Anna retraces his
footsteps in order to come to terms with his memory and the silence left after his
suicide. More than this, however, her pilgrimage to the badlands symbolises her need
to retell the story of the west outside the "curious little narrative tricks of a male
adventure" (B 27) where every man is "symbolic of another" (B 63) and to resituate
the meaning of Dawe's quest in the female medium of "time" (B 256). Her accomplice
in this revisionary exercise is Yellowbird, whom she discovers in Gleichen, "that
fading and sun-smashed and awful town on the edge of the Blackfoot Reserve" (B
25). Yellowbird has already commenced her own quiet subversion of Dawe's
monolithic dream by naming each of her children Billy Crowchild. Her refusal to
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distinguish between her sons mocks Dawe's urge to know, name, and conquer. With
Yellowbird alongside her, Anna is gradually able to unlock the door to memory and
articulate her sense of loss and dispossession. Just as Yellowbird felt most secure with
Grizzly, the silent chinaman, so Anna finds in Yellowbird's deliberate incomprehension
of her guilt and sense of responsibility the key to her own voice:
And so we drove and talked and sometimes laughed outrageously, that Anna so
unthinkingly and absolutely obscene that I could only stop the car and laugh
until the tears ran down my cheeks; and then I dared it too, tried those words on
my mouth: and glanced at her face and saw she was letting me try in the same
way that my father had stopped me - (B 259)
Anna's emancipatory journey from silence to voice is complemented by the
women's decision to foresake the trip west to "look for the river's source" (B 257) for
the route east to the edge of the badlands. Anna parodies Dawe's obsession with "the
still and unmoving source" when she weeps at the sight of the "high peak of a
mountain" merely because her "feet were bleeding" (B 266). The absurdity of the male
quest is expressed in the image of the air-borne Grizzly, whose struggles in the
helicopter's net are "so comically human and male" as "his hind legs swung free in the
air, galloped straight at us in the empty air, his sharp claws scratching for the gone
earth, his testicles following crazily after" (B 268). It is at this moment, when male
hubris is undercut by the technological power that it fails so woefully to control, that
Anna is able to reject her father's field-notes. Where Dawe came at last to "the end of
words" (B 269), Anna has finally mastered the bitter language of renunciation:
And I took that last field book with the last pompous sentence he ever wrote,
the only poem he ever wrote, a love poem, to me, his only daughter, and I
threw it into the lake where it too might drown.
And I turned around on my blistered, bloody feet, and I walked out of
that place, as I had walked in. Anna and I walked out of there together. We
walked through the night, stumbling our way by the light of the stars; we
looked at those billion years of light, and Anna looked at the stars and then at
me, and she did not mention dinosaurs or men or their discipline or their
courage or their goddamned fucking fame or their goddamned fucking death-
fucking death. (B 269-270)
Liberated at last from the myth ofmale heroism that had consigned her to grim years of
silence, Anna is able to utter the first words of her own story. Badlands ends upon
this note of counter-discursive triumph as the women link arms and abandon the site of
the masculine adventure. "We walked out of there hand in hand, arm in arm, holding
each other" Anna concludes. "We walked all the way out. And we did not once look
back, not once, ever."
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The final pages of Badlands, with their neat inversion of the dominant images
of the preceding sections of the novel, provide a paradigmatic example of post-colonial
counter-discourse at work. The hegemony of male quest narrative is subverted and
female experience is recovered from the margins of Dawe's page. For a moment
Penelope slips her bonds and enters into a full share of the Canadian story of self-
definition. Recent criticism of Badlands has generally commended Anna's dissident
reading of Dawe's quest, and the novel has been roundly celebrated as an important
'feminist' critique of the male quest for hierarchical systems of knowledge.27 Such
readings of the novel have therefore tended to accommodate the series of distinctions
upon which Anna bases her interpretation of the male story: the distinction between the
masculine mythos of individual destiny and the feminine consciousness of history; the
tension between the urge for personal definition and the claims of communal
responsibility; and the struggle between the male need for source and origin and the
female acceptance of discourse, mediation, and displacement. Consequently Anna's
relationship with Yellowbird, her narratorial revision of her father's story, and her
escape from his version of the past have been taken to signify a development beyond
imperialist and patriarchal representations of gender and history and a rediscovery of
the full significance of the Canadian cultural inheritance.
However, accounts of Badlands that celebrate Anna's counter-discursive
revision of Dawe's story have come to seem simplistic given the problematic status of
narrative voice in the novel. Put briefly, for Anna's critique of the male quest to be
accepted as a rejection of patriarchy, a degree of interpretative distance must be
established between the novel's primary narrative and Anna's ironic interpolations. In
the classic counter-discursive reading ofBadlands this effect is achieved by attributing
the central narrative to an omniscient narrator possessing all the qualities of a neutral
and ungendered voice. This unattributed third-person discourse is then juxtaposed with
Anna's narrative which announces itself as gendered and issuing from a particular point
in time and space. In this way a tension is created between the two narratives which
Anna exploits to question the relationship between gender, history, and discourse.
The problem with this basic counter-discursive reading is that it takes no
account of the various signs present within the novel which indicate that both
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narratives are in fact the work of Anna Dawe. For in fact there is little evidence within
Badlands beyond the merely formal division between first and third-person narrative to
sustain a distinction between the two discourses on matters either of gender or style.
Consequently, modern criticism of Badlands rests upon a number of questionable
assumptions which, I would argue, are parodied by Kroetsch within the text itself. If
the conclusion of Gone Indian and Coetzee's strictures upon counter-discourse are
kept in mind, the plausibility of Anna's simple dismissal of patriarchy must be placed in
doubt. Conversely, a deconstructive reading of Badlands can be advanced that
identifies both narratives as Anna's, holds them together in ironic tension, and
demonstrates how her rewriting of her father's history is in fee to the culturally
constructed dichotomies of patriarchal politics. By showing how thoroughly Anna has
internalised Dawe's authoritarian stance, a deconstructive reading of her narratives
suggests that Badlands is an elaborate hoax upon the reader who wishes merely to
exchange one closed reading of history for another one cloaked in the rhetoric of
political emancipation. The wider political resonance for post-colonial cultures of
Kroetsch's subversion of counter-discourses negatively defined against the order they
contest is that Anna's unacknowledged capitulation to the routine exclusions of
patriarchal discourse dramatises the predicament of any oppressed group which,
seeking to overthrow authoritarian power, eventually appropriate that power, and the
structure of feeling germane to it, to itself.28
Anna's authorial responsibility for both of the narratives ofBadlands becomes
apparent if the structural relationship and the stylistic similarities between the main body
of the novel and her textual commentaries are considered. To begin with matters of
structure, scepticism concerning the provenance of the narrative discourse ofBadlands
is increased by the presence of a logical aporia within Anna's first person account. As
Robert Lecker has demonstrated, Anna's narrative relies upon a crucial falsification.29
In the final sentence of the novel she claims that having thrown Dawe's field notes into
the Red Deer River she and Yellowbird walked out of the valley, "[a]nd we did not
once look back, not once, ever" (B 270). Clearly a problem arises here: if Anna's
statement is true the text of Badlands would not exist, since Dawe's notes could not be
reproduced within either narrative (there being no suggestion that Anna wrote her
account contemporaneously with her journey); conversely, if Anna's statement is
untrue and Dawe's notes were preserved, it seems overwhelmingly probable that
Dawe's narrative actually represents Anna's reconstruction of her father's history, an
impression strengthened by the stylistic similarities between the two narratives.
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The contradictions that blight Anna's first-person narrative and open it up to a
deconstructive reading emerge unequivocally from those six words "we did not once
look back." Because her account of her adventure with Yellowbird is manifesdy a
recollection of a journey into freedom, it is quite clear that Anna did look back in order
to tell her story. Everything that issues from her pen, beginning with her nominative
declaration "I am Anna Dawe" (B 2) on the novel's opening page, is written after she
discovers her voice in the final pages of the text. The realisation that Anna's personal
moment of truth in the badlands is predicated upon a deliberate deception precipitates a
"grand inversion process"30 in which both of the histories that Badlands incorporates
are read against each other. By asking us to commence a second reading of the novel at
the climactic moment when Anna's discourse violates its own logical principles,
Kroetsch ensures that we begin to identify the resemblances between the two
narratives. An interpretation of Badlands that begins at the novel's conclusion and
then returns to its beginning to watch Anna's recollections unfold notes immediately
how the central narrative is soaked in Anna's personal style. To take merely one
example of this stylistic contamination, the main text describes Dawe's emotional
condition following Tune's death in the following terms:
Dawe, furiously, in the outrageous silence of his writing trying to cite or
fashion or penetrate or plumb or receive or accomplish or postulate or pretend
the absolute truth that would give him his necessary lie ... (B 239)
However, exactly the same tentative discourse of self-identification, with its numbing
catalogue of adjectives, is present in Anna's own initial account of post-colonial
alienation from established narratives of history. "God help us," she expostulates,
"we are a people raised not on love letters or lyric poems or even cries of rebellion or
ecstasy or pain or regret, but rather old hoards of field-notes" (B 2). The two voices
are identical; the two narratives are unmistakeably Anna's. The irony of the
dispossessed daughter's complete discursive control over her father's fragmentary field
notes is now inescapable.
The impossibility of positing a lasting distinction between the novel's two
discourses is amply demonstrated by recent commentaries upon Badlands. In an effort
to sustain the classic counter-discursive reading, Connie Harvey argues that Anna's
interpolations are "distinctly separated spatially, typographically and stylistically"31
from the main narrative. But as the rest of Harvey's reading makes clear, the
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distinctions upon which this separation is based continually collapse. Thus she is
forced to admit that in Anna's narrative, as well as the the central text, "the desire to
describe completely manifests itself in the use of adjectives, particularly gerunds and
participles, and clauses, adjectival and adverbial, to qualify the statement." In both
narratives, once again, "syntactically incomplete or grammatically incorrect phrases are
common." Although Harvey tries to explain Anna's textual ventriloquism as a
deliberate parody of the male adventure, it is evident that her counter-discursive
approach is unable to account for the interpretative difficulties created by Anna's alleged
renunciation of Dawe's field notes.
Once Anna's authorial responsibility has been established, the fraught issue of
her mediation of Dawe's story can be resolved. In the opening pages of the novel,
Anna comments upon her role as Dawe's archivist and interpreter:
Why it was left to me to mediate the story I don't know: women are not
supposed to ha^e stories. We are supposed to sit at home, Penelopes to their
wars and their sex. As my mother did. As I was doing. (B 3)
The ambiguity of Anna's "mediation" of her father's life has led to an uncertain critical
response. Thus John Moss, attempting to enforce a distinction between the two
narratives ofBadlands, writes:
In the structure of Badlands, wherein Dawe makes field notes which through
his daughter blossom into narrative, while Anna tells a story of herself, with
another Anna, in which her father's notes are something of a talisman and
ultimately as ephemeral, two distinctly separate versions of reality are held
simultaneously present.32
Leaving aside the question of how far Moss's reading, by reinscribing woman as the
principle of passivity and regeneration through which the male story "blossoms" into
narrative, is complicit with the patriarchal order that Kroetsch subverts, this formulation
is clearly unsatisfactory because it makes no effort to address the issue of narrative
voice. What is interesting about Moss's analysis, though, is its implicit acceptance of
Anna's premise that two "separate versions of reality" co-exist in the novel. But if we
discount this distinction between narratives as Anna's novelistic illusion, and approach
Badlands as a unified counter-discourse that creates its own version of the male quest
and then pulls it open for critical examination, we find that Anna's text reproduces the
hierarchical structure of meaning that she identifies in masculine discourse. In short,
Anna's counter-discourse, for all its rhetoric of emancipation, is still a discourse of
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exclusion that perpetuates itself by inverting and reinserting the hierarchised binary
dualisms of patriarchal culture.
The importance of hierarchised binary dualisms to patriarchal discourse can be
established by brief reference to contemporary French feminist thought. In her
influential article "Sorties" Helene Cixous argues that logocentric and patriarchal
thought work by means of a system of hierarchised oppositions. Thus a binary
relationship is set up in which one term is valorised over the other (the valorised terms
being those of "masculinity" and of "activity") and where the principle of
hierarchisation "subjects the entire conceptual organization to man."33 Having made











Form, convex, step, advance, seed, progress.
Matter, concave, ground - which supports the step, receptacle.
Man
Woman34
The idea of Anna's indebtedness to the hierarchised oppositions of patriarchal
thought may seem strange considering her frequent criticisms of the culturally
constructed dualisms of masculine discourse. After all, she has sharp words for the
form, as well as the content, of the "male adventure," with its patchwork of illusion and
contrivance that generates plots of romance, combat, and suspense:
And I assumed the occasion would demand of her a formal telling, would
sponsor the curious little narrative tricks of a male adventure: the lies that enable
the lovers to meet, the mystery of who did the killing, the suspense before
victory. As if we didn't know all the answers long before they asked their
absurd questions ... (B 27)
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Yet the noticeable feature of this condemnation ofmale quest narrative is that it depends
upon the same narrow binary logic as the form she criticises. In this case, Anna
introduces a distinction between the spatial and the temporal imagination that governs
the rest of the text. Thus men seek, by their very nature, "open spaces" that they
"translate" into a "fabled hunting," whereas women, with "only time to survive in .. .
live and then die in time." Her critique, which ties men inexorably by gender to male
"mythologies of the flesh" (B 94), depends upon an essentialist division between
masculinity and femininity which holds that there is a female 'essence' prior to social
inscription waiting to be redeemed.35 She has no interest in deconstructing
conventional representations of masculinity and femininity or examining gender not
simply as an effect of biology but as a consequence of the subject's position within the
power structure of society.36 The complete reliance of her counter-patriarchal discourse
upon the gender divisions that she inverts inevitably leads her to reinscribe their force.
A particularly notorious example is her remark that Grizzly's quiet sexual confidence
confirms him as "too much the male my father wanted to be" (B 162). Elsewhere, the
crudity of her analysis of patriarchal thought serves merely to focus attention upon her
absolute textual control over the characters in the novel. While it may be true that Web
"divide[d] his women into virgins and whores," it is Anna, not the sternsman, who has
the "omniscience" of a "male author" (B 76) and who orders the representations of
gender that we receive.
Anna's enforced distinction between the spatial and temporal imagination has
serious consequences for her analysis of Dawe's quest. In particular, it seduces her
into a complete misreading of Dawe's motives and experiences. Half-way through the
novel, Anna offers the following extended meditation upon the meaning of her father's
journey into the crucible of history:
But I was left always with the mystery of his own first season. For in the
summer of 1916, in the Badlands of the Red Deer river, discovering the
Mesozoic era, with all of Europe filling the earth with the bones of its own
young - he removed himself from time.
Whatever the desperate reason that had taken him into that far place, he
came back delivered of most of the impulses we like to think of as human. He
could survive any weather, any diet, any deprivation. And that was necessary
to a man whose back bore on it a hump larger than any of us could see. But
somewhere in the course of that first journey that was his own - somewhere,
somehow, he shook himself free of any need to share even his sufferings with
another human being. His field notes, after that summer, were less and less
concerned with his crew, his dangers, his days of futile prospecting, his
moments of discovery, his weariness, his ambitions, his frustrations. They
258
became scientific descriptions of the size and location of bones, of the
composition of the matrix, of the methods of extraction and preservation...
And I had to visit those badlands where his success began. Because,
there, in that beautiful and nightmare season - he ceased to dare to love. (B
139)
This passage makes three main charges: Dawe's search for historical origin
removes him from time; it forces upon him an impersonal and dehumanised language of
scientific objectivity; and it immures him from the terror of human relationships. But if
we step for a moment outside Anna's schematic presentation of the evidence and attend
to the story that she actually tells, a radically different interpretation of Dawe's quest
becomes available that questions her confident assumptions about the relationship
between language, history, and gender. This subaltern reading of Badlands suggests
that the "strange" disconnection between "[ajction and voice" (B 45) that so perplexes
her in Dawe's field notes is precisely what his story is about. Far from recording the
signs of his deliberate and stubborn silence, Dawe's notes testify to the impossibility of
preserving the absolute limits of the individual self within the collective exchange of
language. His encounters with Web, Yellowbird, and Sinnott do not signify the
construction of a myth of male heroism; they precipitate the deconstruction of the
totalising myth of male identity. Indeed the tautologies, elisions, and paradoxes of
Dawe's journal entries represent the private, scripted agony of a man forced to reconcile
himself to the discursive status of history, compelled to acknowledge the irreducibility
of the relationship with the desired "other," and resigned to the impossibility of closing
identity in upon itself.
The effect upon Dawe of his recognition of the implicit textuality of the male
story is shown after Web's unlikely discovery of Daweosaurus. Web is, as I have
noted, the archetypal product of discourse: a character who continually constructs
himself in words. He is a 'web' of different discursive effects: a compendium of
jokes, tall-tales, and failed one-liners. In Tune's words, Web is "a natural-born
bullshit artist" (B 137). His fascination with the polymorphous possibilities of
language increases after the departure ofMcBride, the symbol of domestic order, when
he is pictured "elaborating his lie, delighting in the ambiguity of his discovery" (B 56).
The ambiguity of Web's comic language is important because it underlines the
carnivalesque nature of his role. Far from coveting the "omniscience" of a "male
author," Web's egalitarian outpourings incorporate a space for dissent and disbelief in
their basic narrative structure. Equally, his playful parodic inversion of Dawe's
enlightenment discourse exposes the archaeologist's imperialistic appropriation of
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history. In Web's "inverted universe" where "the divine, the refucking-union with the
dead" is an imaginative possibility, the "upright bone" of Dawe's specimen is liberated
by the shaman's "aching balls" (B 207). Alienated by Web's comic narrative from the
object of his own desire, Dawe is forced to look away from the headwaters "far
downriver" (B 209) to the site of Web's triumph. Web's insistence upon telling the
undisclosed story of the badlands in western oral narrative receives its due reward
when Daweosaurus becomes, for a moment, his "conquest, his mistress, his love" (B
248). Meanwhile, the central narrative moves to its conclusion with Web's marvellous
parody of the phallic imperatives of Dawe's quest. Here, in an idiom stuffed full of
puns, obscenities, and sexual braggadocio, Web breaks down Dawe's distinction
between the mental and the corporeal and reconciles the discourse of history to the
needs of the sensual body:
The ferryman puffing, shouting, explaining, directing: he'd never found a
rattler this far upriver. Unbelievable. Fantastic. Unique in the history of the
place. He needed the trophy, just to prove it: the rattles, the skin. Do or die.
And Web, then, following, staying close to the invisible snake, staying
out of its way, too, had visions of a whole new splendid costume. For the
snake man. No, for Dawe himself. Raiments never before imagined. Send old
Dawe back east with his hump covered in tanned snakehide. Must be as old as
dinosaurs, those snakes. Hundreds of years. Here in this muck and mud,
looking for skin for his bones, old Dawe. Hump on his back celebrating its
millionth birthday. Need some gladrags myself, vest made of the skins of
sixteen gigantic rattlesnakes, all of them captured, strangled and skinned with
my bare hands. Row of fangs worn round my neck: had to bite them out of
those skulls with my own teeth. A brave man and true, yes, by God, a
jockstrap made out of the whitest bellies of nine deadly females, the rattles of
four males tied to my prick when I get into town. Bone-on I had last night,
didn't have enough skin left over to close my eyes ... (B 253)
The shock inflicted upon Dawe by Web's oral reclamation of western history is
reflected in his field notes. His entries following Web's shamanistic apotheosis show
him searching for a way of expressing his sense of displacement in language. At first,
this leads him to develop an equivocal idiom of counterpoise and reversals in which
two directly opposed meanings come together in a single statement. In this spirit he
writes "quietly and almost daintily what he had been thinking to and of himself: Dawe,
cured of nothing but death, of everything but death" (B 211). Soon, however, he
begins to disorder his notes by repeating the same sentence with "careful randomness"
(B 212). He is "puzzled apparently by his own repetition of these simple and obvious
remarks" (B 213) because the disconnected words on his page describe a world which
he cannot control by entering, appropriating, and naming its contents. Dawe's helpless
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awareness of his position in a world where experience is defined and mediated by
language is expressed most forcefully by his attempt to record the fact of Tune's death:
Dawe, unmoving, unmoved, on the box amidships writing: It was an
unfortunate accident. Dawe crossing out the word, unfortunate. Starting again:
No doubt the boy was. Careless. Didn't follow. He, Dawe, smashing the
period down onto the page as if he would pierce it, penetrate, nail the book to
the box. (B 241)
It is somehow moving that the final sentence of Dawe's life "I have come to the end of
words" is as deceptive as Anna's claim to have discarded his field notes. For Dawe's
silence, his brooding unhappiness, and his eventual suicide all speak of his unwilling
position at the beginning of words, a place in which 'history' is the history of our
discursive engagement with the world, and where it is no longer possible to salvage
identity by personalfiat or the recuperative rhetoric of a nameless and wordless origin.
Dawe's enforced silence is therefore the consequence of his inability to
reconcile his voluntarist demand for source with his experience of the duplicities of
language. His field notes do not disengage themselves from his "moments of
discovery"; the alterity of language is what he discovers. Neither does he remove
himself from time. As Anna very well knows, the significance of her father's
relationship with Yellowbird is that it brings him into contact with someone for whom
'history' is not a neutral empirical category but a material process of marginalisation
and erasure. The only way that Anna can escape contradiction by her own narrative is
to interpret her own writing for us so that we do not fail to read Dawe's encounter with
Yellowbird as a physical expression of his desire to colonise the past:
It was the moment of descent that came to obsess him. The hot, cascading
instant when, in which, she eased her body down onto his. The secret
opening, the perfect mass of her cunthair yielding its secret gate, forcing his
entrance; at that split second of penetration he must, he would, raise up with
him into that underworld of his rampaging need the knowledge of all his life;
into that sought darkness, that exquisite inundation, he would carry in his mind,
in his head, the memory of wife and home, his driving ambitions that had swept
him into this canyon, the furious desire and dream that had brought him here to
these badlands, to these burnt prairies and scalded buttes; conquer, he told
himself, conquer, and out of that blasting sun, into the darkness of her body he
must, rising, plunge ... (B 194-5)
This florid, overwritten passage bears all the hallmarks of the apprentice novelist.37
Anna's defensive need to impose the absurd overstatement "conquer, he told himself,
conquer" and the remarkable contention that "all the fury of [Dawe's] body needed,
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spent, to swim him back, down, to the memory of the civilised east, his home and his
wife" (BL 195) upon this scene make a mockery of her famous relativising statement
that "[t]here are no truths, only correspondences" (B 45). As Lecker comments, "[a]re
these the thoughts of a man who has any memories, or are they the product of a
narrator who would provide her absent father with memory at any cost, any contra¬
diction?"38
Ironically, the limits of Anna's counter-discursive approach become most
obvious in the brief coda she appends to Dawe's story, the section of text most
commonly hailed as the scene of her ultimate liberation. By dismissing Dawe from the
text and returning with Yellowbird to the site of his ambiguous victory, Anna clearly
intends to substitute a feminine discourse of self-registration for the hubristic
assumptions of the male story. But the unintended irony of her position is that her
account of her journey west to the Rocky Mountains reveals her enthusiastic acceptance
of the conventions of male quest fiction. Consequently, her entry into her own road-
movie, as she drinks, drives, and lusts her way through the badlands, rests uneasily
alongside her strictures against the "fabled hunting" of the men with their need for
"open spaces." It also becomes difficult to reconcile her contempt for the crew's "little
ceremony of success" (B 256) at the Loveland ferry with her own ceremonial
'abandonment' of Dawe's notebooks in the novel's closing scene. The thematic
difficulties engendered by the narrowing of identificatory space between male and
female quest narrative are intensified in the case of Sinnott. Sinnott is, as we have
seen, the character employed by Anna to underscore the textual context of all historical
knowledge. But if Sinnott's narrative frames insist upon the historicity of historical
discourse, what becomes of Anna's binomial distinction between female temporality
and the male mythos of presence? Anna has no solution to this dilemma; her
compromise proposal, which converts the photographer into a pornographer, has the
whiff of panic about it All she can do is restate the binary structure of her vision in the
grotesque image of the defecating Grizzly, "his prick and testicles hung over us like a
handful of dead-ripe berries." The casual way in which Anna writes the male
experience off the map of Canadian history suggests that she has indeed taken "the
wrong turn into Deception Pass" (B 266) and reproduced in her own narrative the
exclusivist presuppositions of the male story. In the most withering irony of the novel,
the voice that she eventually discovers is the voice she heard at her father's knee.
Living proof of Kroetsch's "insistence upon the tyranny of narrative models,"39
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Anna's destiny is to transform the male story into the "other" of the female quest for
self-definition, and therefore repeat male history a second time as farce.
In Badlands, Kroetsch presents his most potent vision of the limitations of a
counter-discourse negatively defined against hegemonic narratives of history and
identity. Peter Thomas has claimed that Badlands is "arguably the most perfectly
conceived novel Kroetsch has written"40; a statement that commands assent if the
faultless inverse symmetry of the novel's structure is taken into account. Some
measure of Kroetsch's skill in mapping his narratives against each other may be gained
by the fact that Badlands can perfectly easily be interpreted as the counter-discursive
parody that Anna claims it to be. It is only at the very end, when we are confronted by
the contradictions that her curiously timeless myth of female historicism imposes upon
her story, that we are offered the chance to begin a deconstructive reading of Canadian
history in the space opened by the disjunction between her two narratives. Contrary to
Anna's intentions, as she marches out of the badlands with the undeclared aim of
obliterating her father's memory, this deconstructive reading would begin with Dawe,
the man broken by language and compelled at the last to search for a way of contriving
authentic origins in an alien language. It would therefore accept as its point of
departure the double strategy of unnaming and uninventing historical constructions of
identity and place outlined in Kroetsch's essay "The Fear ofWomen in Prairie Fiction":
This is a new country. Here on the plains we confront the hopeless and
necessary hope of originality: constantly we experience the need to begin. And
we do - by initiating beginnings. We contrive authentic origins. From the
denied Indians. From the false fronts of the little towns. From the diaries and
the reminiscences and the travel accounts. From our displaced ancestors.
Here the bride, so often, without being wife, turns into mother. The
male cannot enter into what is traditionally thought of as marriage - and possibly
nor can the female. The male, certainly, to make his radical beginning, takes on
the role of orphan or cowboy or outlaw. He approaches the female. He
approaches the garden. He approaches the house ...
And only then does he realize he has defined himself out of all entering.
If he enters into this marriage - and into this place - it will be he - contrary to the
tradition of the past - who must make the radical change. It will be he - already
self-christened - and not the woman this time - who must give up the precious
and treacherous name.41
Kroetsch's fiction after Badlands continues to search for a mode of inscribing
the paradoxical identity of a post-colonial people that accepts its conclusions as
provisional, possibly paradoxical in form, certainly open to change. Interviewed in
1981, he gave a tantalising glimpse into this area of his thought. Commenting upon his
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own interpretation of the notion of "quest" he suggests that quest is really "sexual, it's
looking for that fulfilment; so I made it comic quite often.... I think carnival is a way
to let the secret slip out."42 This coupling of carnival and quest fiction is particularly
revealing. Carnivalesque thought is attractive to Kroetsch because its subversion of
hierarchical attitudes and discourses of historical order is enacted in a controlled space;
it therefore retains an awareness of the borders, divisions, and frontiers that exist
elsewhere beyond its improvised parameters. The narrative strategies of carnival
therefore provide exactly the provisional, metafictional approach to the disunited
narratives of Canadian self-registration that is so sorely lacking in Anna's alternative
history of the west. In order to gauge the potential of this development in Kroetsch's
work, we must, in Anna's words, make ourselves "ready for real laughter" (B 264)
and enter the camivalesque world of What the Crow Said.
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Chapter Seven
The Word Turned Upside-Down:
Carnivalesque Subversion in What the Crow Said
By introducing the status of the word as a minimal structural unit, Bakhtin
situates the text within history and society, which are then seen as texts read by
the writer, and into which he inserts himself by rewriting them. Diachrony is
transformed into synchrony, and in light of this transformation, linear history
appears as abstraction. The only way a writer can participate in history is by
transgressing this abstraction through a process of reading-writing; that is,
through the practice of a signifying structure in relation or opposition to another
structure. History and morality are written and read within the infrastructure of
texts. The poetic word, polyvalent and multi-determined, adheres to a logic
exceeding that of codified discourse and fully comes into being only in the
margins of recognised culture. Bakhtin was the first to study this logic, and he
looked for its roots in carnival. Carnivalesque discourse breaks through the
laws of a language censored by grammar and semantics and, at the same time,
is a social and political protest. There is no equivalence, but rather, identity
between challenging official linguistic codes and challenging official law. 1
With the publication of What the Crow Said in 1978 Kroetsch's exploration of
a culture divorced from a coherent sense of historical origin and divided between Old
and New World discourse takes a fresh turn. In each of his five previous novels, the
perilous negotiation between the constrictions of a history that denies the ambivalence
of post-colonial experience and a naive identification with the rhetoric of totalising
narrative systems has impelled Kroetsch's characters toward silence, erasure, and
death: Hazard's dismemberment, Sadness's ambiguous disappearance, and the memory
of Backstrom's private Calvary bear eloquent testimony to the toll exacted by the binary
schisms of Canadian life. By the final pages of Badlands, Peter Guy's liberating
alienation from source has been transformed into Anna Dawe's grotesque replication of
colonialist cultural discourse. Collectively, these texts constitute a tragicomic allegory
of the constraints placed upon the Canadian subject by his or her ambiguous position
within an alien language and an alien history. The subtle inverse logic of Badlands,
which unexpectedly reveals the circumscription of the male quest within a female
discourse of enlightenment, justice, and freedom brings this process full circle. In the
bleak light of Kroetsch's ironic vision coloniser exchanges places with colonised in a
transaction that mutates history into farce and leaves the rhetoric of colonialism
undisturbed.
The success of Gone Indian and Badlands in portraying the limitations placed
upon Canadian discourses of self-identification by the opposed codes of post-colonial
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discourse is not unproblematic. One difficulty with these novels is that by moving so
concertedly toward a system of dual narratives Kroetsch unwittingly reinforces the
binary tensions that he seeks to expose. By developing in Badlands what I have
referred to as a third hermeneutic space exterior to the dialectic between "same" and
"other" he signals his desire to find new ways of exploring the "binary opposition
within language that has its roots in the process of either transporting a language to a
new land or imposing a foreign language on an indigenous population."2 At the same
time an increasing discrepancy becomes evident between Kroetsch's novelistic irony
and the tenor of his cultural criticism; it is difficult to reconcile the renewing vision of
"Unhiding the Hidden" and "The Canadian Writer and the American Literary Tradition"
with the bitter comedy of Madham's delusions or the circular logic of Anna Dawe's
hubris. In this chapter I will argue that Kroetsch's response to these two related
problems was to develop a discursive mode, heavily indebted to the genre of "Magic
Realism" and the subversive cultural logic of the "Carnivalesque," which foregrounds
the tension between opposed cultural, historical and cognitive codes within the space of
a single narrative. The decision to make the transition from the critical stance of
postmodern parody to a hybrid form that enacts, as well as describes, a
"metamorphosis in perception and in things perceived,"3 enables Kroetsch to present a
Canadian landscape caught in the flux of becoming, where the interplay of gender,
idiom and culture undermines fixed borders between different forms of experience and
ascribes a positive value to the post-colonial position between different versions of
linguistic, cultural and historical identity.
Although Kroetsch had been excited by the possibilities of South American
fabular fiction since the late 1960's, Crow is the first of his novels to demonstrate a
sustained engagement with magic realism.4 In an acute comment on this topos Stephen
Slemon has written:
The term "Magic Realism" is an oxymoron, one that suggests a binary
opposition between the representational code of realism and that, roughly, of
fantasy. In the language of narration in a magic realist text, a battle between
two oppositional systems takes place, each working toward the creation of a
different kind of fictional world from the other. Since the ground rules of these
two worlds are incompatible, neither one can fully come into being, and each
remains suspended, locked in a continuous dialectic with the "other," a situation
which creates disjunction within each of the separate discursive systems,
rending them with gaps, absences, and silences.5
The seductive appeal of magic realism for Kroetsch emerges forcefully from Slemon's
description. In particular, the promise of a narrative mode that enforces a "continuous
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dialectic" between "incompatible" narrative worlds is clear given Kroetsch's
commitment to highlighting the divisions and exclusions imposed upon a people denied
an independent signifying relationship between language and place. Equally, a method
of narrative "disjunction" that rends each discursive system with "gaps, absences and
silences" helps Kroetsch to recuperate the lost and marginalised voices of Canadian
history occluded by the narrow denominative positions offered by the rhetoric of
colonialism.
The emphasis of magic realism upon disjunction, bivalency, and narrative
contraries is also a staple feature of carnivalesque discourse. Julia Kristeva, in words
that serve as epigraph to this chapter, identifies a moment in literary and cultural
development when the revision and destabilisation of hegemonic political discourse was
pursued through ritual and textual disruption of representations of historical order.
She attributes this insight to the Russian formalist critic Mikhail Bakhtin, and follows
him in naming this process "carnivalesque." Her description of carnival's
transgression of socially "codified discourse" and its renewal of "the margins of
recognised culture" holds a peculiar resonance for the subjects of a marginalised
culture; it is as if Bakhtin's theoretical writings and Kroetsch's fiction had travelled
parallel paths without finding a moment of common expression. In order to underline
the importance to Crow of carnivalesque discourse I intend to dwell briefly on three
aspects of the carnivalesque that find expressive form in Kroetsch's text: the interactive
and participatory principle of "dialogism"; the pervasive importance to carnival of
ambivalence, undefined forms, and the suspension of hierarchies; and the carnivalesque
use of the cosmic or universal body to symbolise both the natural rhythm of decay and
transfiguration and the potential for collective social and cultural renewal.
Bakhtin's term "dialogism" retains a range of applications: it denotes a principle
of philosophical anthropology; refers to the social conventions that precede and
determine the meaning of particular historical situations; and describes a relationship
between individual utterances that reflects the linguistic stratification of society.
Perhaps the best summation of dialogism as an epistemological mode is provided by
Michael Holquist, who writes:
Dialogism is the characteristic epistemological mode of a world dominated by
heteroglossia. Everything means, is understood, as part of a greater whole -
there is a constant interaction between meanings, all of which have the potential
of conditioning others. Which will affect the other, how it will do so and in
what degree is actually settled at the moment of utterance. This dialogic
imperative, mandated by the pre-existence of the language world relative to any
of its current inhabitants, insures there can be no actual monologue. One may,
like a primitive tribe, be deluded into thinking there is one language, or one
may, as grammarians, certain political figures and normative ffamers of "literary
language" do, seek in a sophisticated way to achieve a unitary language. In
both cases the unitariness is relative to the overpowering force of heteroglossia,
and thus dialogism.6
I want to focus here on two particular aspects of the dialogical: Bakhtin's
insight that, in Todorov's words, the most important feature of the individual utterance
is its "intertextual dimension" which insists that "all discourse is in dialogue with prior
discourse on the same subject" and which defines culture in terms of "the discourses
retained by collective memory"7; and his belief that individual and collective cultural
identity was based not on "decadent and idealist (individualistic) culture" but on a
reciprocal relation with alterity through which "the role of the other person was
revealed, in whose sole light could any word about oneself be constructed."8 If these
two features of the dialogical principle are assessed in the context of Holquist's remarks
concerning "a world dominated by heteroglossia" which is hostile to the construction of
a "unitary language," striking parallels emerge between dialogism and Kroetsch's
critical thought. Clearly, the dialogical emphasis upon "the overpowering force of
heteroglossia" offers a sophisticated interpretative model for a nation divided by
language and cultural tradition, while its hostility to monologic individualism and its
recuperation of the "other" is pertinent to a country historically defined as "other" to the
imperial imagination. Kroetsch employs the dialogical principle to good effect in Crow
by using the inherent heteroglossia of western Canadian oral culture to bring a range of
cultural oppositions together within a common linguistic space. By working in a
decentred form outside the normative frame of realist meta-narrative, he is able to
present the multiple borders of Canadian culture as evidence of a renewing clash of
"codes of recognition"9 that prevents Canada's reassimilation into American and
European discursive stratagems. Kroetsch similarly emphasises Canada's borderline
status by showing in the figure of Gus Liebhaber, the typesetter who can "remember
the future" but struggles to retain details of the past and present, that the collective
memory that defines the Canadian cultural heritage is irremediably split between the
country's oral and graphic traditions.
The dialogical promotion of polyvalency and contraries at the expense of
monologism and the claims of a unitary language takes on concrete form in the
hierarchically inverted world of carnival. Bakhtin has written of the "undestroyable
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nonofficial nature" of carnival images, which are "opposed to all that is finished and
polished, to all pomposity, to every ready-made solution in the sphere of thought and
world outlook."10 Instead carnival exists alongside "official" ceremonies, thereby
creating a "two world condition," a "second life outside officialdom" in which "all
medieval people participated more or less."11 Three characteristics of this second
world on the margins of official cultural discourse are particularly notable. In contrast
to the delimitations of rank during an official feast, carnival "celebrated temporary
liberation from the prevailing truth and from the established order; it marked the
suspension of all hierarchical rank, privileges, norms, and prohibitions."12 Hostile to
all that was "immortalized and completed" carnival became "the feast of becoming,
change, and renewal."13 Secondly, the suspension of hierarchical precedence during
carnival time "led to the creation of special forms of marketplace speech and gesture"
which permitted "no distance between those who came in contact with each other" and
liberated participants "from norms of etiquette and decency imposed at other times."14
Finally, the dialectical tension between the "official" world and its carnivalesque double
is encapsulated in a spirit of ambivalence that relativises the established order and
questions religious, moral, and political values. In a famous passage, Bakhtin
expresses this ambivalence in the form of carnival laughter:
Carnival laughter is the laughter of all the people. Second, it is universal in
scope; it is directed at all and everyone, including the carnival's participants.
The entire world is seen in its droll aspect, in its gay relativity. Third, this
laughter is amibivalent: it is gay, triumphant, and at the same time mocking,
deriding. It asserts and denies, it buries and revives. Such is the laughter of
carnival.15
Each of these features of the unofficial world of carnival recurs in Crow.
Bakhtin's emphasis upon the suspension and reversal of hierarchies is particularly
relevant to a discussion of the Lang farm, which provides a microcosmic inversion of
hegemonic social and gender relations. Equally Vera Lang, Liebhaber, and the
eponymous Crow all employ a variant of marketplace speech to disturb the familiar
rhythms of provincial life. Meanwhile, Kroetsch exploits the ambivalence of
carnivalesque discourse to bring into juxtaposition oral and print culture and re-examine
the relationship between language, desire, and subjectivity. In Crow, however,
discursive ambivalence is also linked to the transfiguring qualities of the carnivalesque
body.
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Within the signifying system of carnival the bodily element is epitomised "by
events and activities in which boundaries between bodies, and between bodies and the
world, are at their most obscured and eroded."16 Consequently, carnivalesque
discourse gives prominence to acts of birth, death, eating, copulation and defecation.
The significance of these acts is that they show the body in a state ofmetamorphosis: it
becomes a living symbol for the transit between conditions of being. Given that the
metamorphic carnival body is not private or individualised but "universal, representing
all the people"17 its potential as a symbol for the transgression of established codes of
recognition becomes obvious. Bakhtin captures the body's simultaneous process of
death-and-renewal in the image of "senile pregnant hags" who symbolise "pregnant
death, a death that gives birth."18 In a somewhat different spirit Vera Lang's
transfiguration in the opening scene of Crow suggests not simply individual
metamorphosis but dramatises rather a mutation in "the collective ancestral body of all
the people."19
As Peter Stallybrass and Allon White have shown, the radical ambivalence of
carnivalesque discourse survives the recent political attack on carnival as a licensed
safety-valve which is complicit with social order.20 These assaults, as Stallybrass and
White remark, tend to essentialise carnival; if the 'doubled' and relational side of
Bakhtin's analysis is preserved, carnival "may often act as catalyst and site ofactual
and symbolic struggle""21 in which political action is coupled with the legitimisation of
desire as a force disruptive of established categories of social and cultural behaviour.
The ambivalence of carnival may therefore be seen to retain a potential political force.
Kroetsch has not remained oblivious to the imaginative possibilities suggested
by Bakhtin's work on carnival. In a paper entitled "Carnival and Violence: A
Meditation" he examines the opportunity for a renaissance in Canadian cultural
autonomy afforded by the carnivalesque subversion of discourses of social order.
Having reflected upon carnival's ambivalence and suspension of hierarchies he
postulates that "carnivalistic challenges" to "the official codes, the official laws" mean
that "[fjolk speech itself becomes a form of violence."22 This recognition prompts him
to consider the political potential of a confrontation between post-colonial culture and
the discourse of colonialism in terms of North America's subversion of imperialist
historiography:
The promise of the carnivalesque is a promise of renewal by destruction. (Jne
of the forces that accounts for the radical development of literature in nineteenth-
century North America is the encounter with the renewing energies of the
carnivalesque. I am here looking at prose; I could as well look at the poetry of
Whitman against that of Longfellow and Isabella Crawford. The writers in
North America confronted a carnivalesque world in which hierarchies were
collapsing, boundaries disappearing or shifting, opposites uniting or dissolving
or changing face. Actor and audience were no longer separate. Everything was
in a state of becoming, not of being. Violence was at once metaphor and reality;
that distinction, too, collapsed. Violence was no longer a page-turner, a
novelist's trick, a philosophic proposition. Perhaps North American culture
itself became a kind of carnivalesque response to the 'authority' of European
cultures and European versions of history.23
In Crow, Kroetsch creates "a carnivalesque world in which hierarchies [a]re
collapsing, boundaries disappearing or shifting, opposites uniting or dissolving or
changing face." The importance to the novel of the metamorphic movement between
contraries is evident from its opening scene, where Vera Lang is seduced and
impregnated by a swarm of bees:
Vera, alone at the edge of the valley, lifted her body against the pressing bees.
Her not daring to resist became the excuse, the cause of her slow yielding. She
lifted her hips against the pressing, her long pale legs spreading to the weight of
the bees, the slow surging of the bees. Her body joined their urgency. The
drones, bigger, slower, moving with a hot deliberation, seeking always the
hiving queen. Vera herself, swarmed into a new being. Her body singing like
a telephone wire. Her nipples swelling and throbbing to the kiss of wing and
leg, her belly tightening to the push and rub of her myriad unthinking lovers.
She was enveloped. Her eyelids wore each a bee. Her armpits opened to the
nuzzling bees. They found the spaces between her fingers, between her toes.
Her body was not hers now, it moved with the surge of grass in the wind, a
field of green oats, a flowering of clover. Her moving crushed the blue-purple
petals of the crocus bed, broke the hairy stalks, the blossoms, into the dizzying
sweetness of her own desire. The hum of wings melded earth and sky into the
thickness of her skin. She had no mind left for thinking, no fear, no dream, no
memory. The bees had closed her mouth, her ears. The bees found the
swollen lips between her thighs; she felt their intrusive weight and spread
farther her legs.24
Motifs from both carnivalesque discourse and magic realism characterise this
passage. Kroetsch's portrayal of Vera's "swelling and throbbing" nipples, the
"swollen lips between her thighs," and her admission into "the dizzying sweetness of
her own desire" introduce the leading themes of carnivalesque images of bodily life,
which Bakhtin notes as "fertility, growth, and a brimming-over abundance"25; similarly
her loss of "memory" and her entry into "a new being" symbolise the birth of a new
identity from the ashes of the old self. Kroetsch underlines the significance of the
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transition between states of existence by using the pathetic fallacy to describe the bees
"hot deliberation" while Vera is pictured "swarm[ing] into a new being." Enveloped
within the discursive paradoxes of carnival, Vera now inhabits her "world-old virgin
body" (C 12) while her "cry" (C 11), which hangs over the community like the
annunciation of a new beginning, is "lament and song in one" (C 12). In keeping with
the tradition of carnival imagery, Vera's rebirth is symbolised by her pregnancy: her
son, raised by coyotes and known simply as Vera's boy, later becomes an emblem of
the difficult passage between two opposed worlds.
The influence ofmagic realism on this scene is no less profound. In particular,
magic realism's yoking and juxtaposition of opposites, which repeats in its own
narrative movement the struggle between different idioms, cultures, and perceptions of
the world, informs Kroetsch's startling interpenetration of mythic and natural imagery.
Equally he adopts the refrain "years later" (C 7) from Gabriel Garcia Marquez's One
Hundred Years of Solitude and uses it as a structuring device for his own novel.
These two words mediate between narrative and event by opening a space through
which the secret histories of communal life recorded in gossip, folklore, and the rituals
of popular belief and aspiration can be reincorporated into Canadian cultural discourse.
Referring back to a period that evaded contemporary documentation, Marquez's refrain
wryly notes the varieties of human experience neglected by the narrow generic
boundaries of realism. In The Crow Journals, Kroetsch's self-reflexive account of the
artistic process that yielded Crow, he declares that Marquez has "cracked the problem
of how to tell a story in third person again." For the magic realist "[vjoice" entails a
"calm distancing" which, with its conflation of different discursive worlds, "enables
him to forget the conventions of realism."26
If we return for a moment to the interpenetration of natural and mythic imagery
with which Crow commences, we can gain an important clue to the novel's formal
structure. Kroetsch's description of Vera's bestial seduction is startling because it
superimposes the ontological rules of mythic discourse onto a lush evocation of a
prairie valley; in fact, the story of Vera's transfiguration is a contemporary re-creation
of Jove's conquest of Danae. Indeed, Kroetsch makes a semantic link between the two
narratives by transposing the burnish of Jove's appearance in a "gold shower"27 onto
the swarming presence of the "gold" (C 9) bees. Robert Wilson has noted that
Kroetsch's juxtaposition of narrative codes from different discursive worlds creates the
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effect of "spatial folding" where "one world, bearing with it its own distinct laws,
appears or erupts into [an] other world."28 The collision of the "two systems of
possibility"29 represented here by human and apiarian life provokes a series of
incompatibilities simply ignored by the narrator's neutral tone. Why the bees choose
Vera as their target; where they come from; how it is possible for a woman to conceive
from such a union - no response to these questions can be provided without violating
the laws of cause and effect intrinsic to one or other of the opposed fictional worlds.
Consequently, we are continually unsure about which set of discursive conventions to
use to assimilate the text's information. Kroetsch compounds our interpretative
difficulties by structuring his story around the quick-fire division and multiplication of
narrative units. Thus the first three chapters, which rapidly intercut Vera's seduction, a
visit to the Lang farm, and our introduction to Liebhaber in his newspaper office, yoke
together three environments that must be read in three different ways. Kroetsch has
remarked upon the initial resistance he experienced from readers wrong-footed by the
novel's disjunctive narrative grammar:
When What the Crow Said first came out, two very good readers told me, the
book's way too short. They wanted the elaboration visible in front of their
eyes; whereas I knew after a quarter of a page that they really knew the story,
you see? And why tell it all? What are the pleasures in reading a long novel
that just lays everything out?30
Kroetsch's uneasiness at calls for his novel to include more visible
"elaboration" is best understood as an attempt to frustrate the logic of realist
epistemology. Conversely, his elliptical and fragmentary style reincorporates into a
portrait of a provincial Canadian community the gaps and absences that characterise the
post-colonial narrative of history. A comparison may fairly be drawn between the
reader's embattled search for meaning amid the welter of correspondences Kroetsch
institutes between Crow and the texts of several literary cultures and the Canadian
quest for self-recognition outside a unitary narrative of cultural identity. Interestingly,
given the provenance of the story of Jove's seduction of Danae, Kroetsch has linked
his attention to the "surfaces" and "edges"31 of each narrative unit with the metonymic
strategies of Ovidian poetics:
Ovid is much more metonymic and much more inclined to let myths be, to let
them do their own thing, than the highly interpretive psychoanalytic schools.
Most of us have been trained to do something else. We have been trained to
coerce the material, and it's very hard not to do that32
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Comparing the Metamorphoses and the Aeneid E. J. Kenney identifies the structural
significance of elision and discontinuity in Ovid's work, which resists an internal
hierarchy of narratives and lends itself to the transgression of discourses of social and
cultural order:
The essential difference from the Aeneid is that the structure of the
Metamorphoses is serial, cutting right across the divisions between the books.
These are indeed ingeniously exploited by the poet - for Ovid never misses a
technical trick - but in a purely 'local' way, to provide immediate surprise or
drama, and to whet the readers expectations.33
It is along this ambiguous border between different imaginative geographies that
Kroetsch develops his "mythic/epic/comic/telltale of the family/town/west of this
version of man."34 In the period that follows Vera's admission that she "just now
walked over from the other side" (C 30), Big Indian is not so much a "world without
order"35 as an environment in which rules of natural and cultural behaviour have been
reversed. Changes in the natural world are particularly noticeable: the common belief
that "[s]omething had gone awry in the district since the afternoon of the bee swarm"
(C 15) receives support from the return of cold weather in April and the onset of a year
long winter. Meanwhile, the retardation of the laws of seasonal progression leads
Tiddy Lang to transgress the mores of provincial society by interrupting her husband's
carousing despite the fact that is was "against the laws of the municipality for a woman
to enter the beer parlour" (C 18). The dramatic consequence of the remorseless winter
and Tiddy's unsanctioned invasion of a private male space arrives when Martin Lang
freezes to death on his drunken return from town, adrift between his instinctive need of
masculine society and his responsibility to his wife and daughters.
The death of Martin Lang is a pivotal moment in the novel. His disappearance
punches a hole in the community's ordered expectations and compels the townspeople
to confront a world in which unpredictable and inexplicable events utterly transform the
local landscape. The distinction between the male and female response to Lang's
demise also introduces one of the key binary conflicts of the novel. For the men
Lang's death imposes an "absence" (C 34) in their daily lives; when the snow
continues to fall in August they turn their thoughts regretfully to the loss of his body.
But for the Lang women his absence enables them to take control of their own existence
without the restraint of patriarchal supervision. With the cessation of Lang's paternal
role, the Lang household becomes a carnivalesque second world where women take
control of land management and men are introduced for momentary use during the
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process of conception. In contrast to the masculine imperative to impose an external
order on the world, the women's cthonic life puts faith in the transfiguring power of
seasonal renewal:
Sometimes the cows mooed. Sometimes they didn't. Sometimes the chickens
laid. Sometimes they needed oyster shells. Sometimes the thistles or the
pigweeds grew faster than the wheat. Sometimes hail fell instead of rain.
Sometimes the dust blew through closed windows. Tiddy, with her
hardheaded radiance, held together die past and the future. Her daughters went
on maturing. Her mother grew older, more wrinkled, forever clutching her ball
of sorrow in a pocket of her apron. JG was more work than all the others, all
the other connundrums of the world, put together. He grew larger. He said
nothing. Tiddy accepted his existence as she accepted the stinkweeds, the
grasshoppers, the green grass in spring, the sun. (C 68-69)
The schism between the men's search for the lost male body and the women's
acceptance of change, growth and renewal is personified in the figure of Gus
Liebhaber. Liebhaber, the typesetter for the Big Indian Signal, oscillates between
identification with the masculine search for redemption from the chaos of mundane
existence and involvement in the Lang women's persistent effort to redefine their social
and cultural position. His ambivalence is remarked by Kathleen Wall, who suggests
that Liebhaber "doesn't quite fit in the male category, largely I suspect because his
relationship to language and order ... is more problematic."36 The complexity of
Liebhaber's relationship to language is confirmed by his occupation - for a typesetter
the connection between the lexical shape of words and the textual production of
meaning is a matter of habitual concern. Isolated by his activity in the print room,
Liebhaber is trapped between the belief that his physical manipulation of words enables
him to create a stable linguistic order and the lingering suspicion that his own identity is
merely an effect of the general movement of language. This hermeneutic dilemma
forces him to question the transcendent dream of the male quest and alerts him to the
possibility that the printed word might transform, as well as consolidate, conventional
representations of gender, culture, and society.
Writing on Crow, Linda Hutcheon has noted the gender implications of
Liebhaber's obsession with the typographic process. It is, she argues, Kroetsch's
"men who are print-oriented, who are therefore maimed and destroyed by their need to
imprint themselves in a visual manner on their place and time," while his female
characters, "earthy and fecund, exist in another world, one closer to the natural yet
ritualized continuity of folk traditions."37 Liebhaber's experiences bring him to the
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interface of these two modes of perceiving the world. His initial appearance "playing
pocket pool" (C 15) suggests that he, unlike Vera, represents the private self-enclosed
body of modern individualism. Kroetsch's most recent fiction insistently links sexual
desire with the transgression of outworn modes of perception: Liebhaber's onanistic
dependence upon his own body therefore bespeaks a refusal to make that empathetic
connection between self and world which is reflected in his fear of language.38
Stephen Slemon has pointed out that "[p]rint, in obliterating the need for
memory, inevitably contains and fixes the past as dead record of the monuments of
achievement, but it also creates marginal spaces in which the silenced voices of
totalizing systems can speak."39 Liebhaber's discomfiture, which begins immediately
after Vera's transfiguration, gradually reveals to him that the emphasis of Gutenberg's
innovation on visual and linear modes of perception excludes what Marshall McLuhan
calls the "audile-tactile"40 experience of a predominantly oral culture. Consequently,
Liebhaber's attempt t<~> discover a way of representing Big Indian that reincorporates the
narrative forms of oral popular culture may be seen as symbolic of Kroetsch's more
widespread effort to recuperate the marginalised "other" of totalising cultural discourse.
For the typesetter to bridge the gap between oral and graphic culture he must develop a
mode ofwriting that reflects and repeats the transgressive logic of desire. Accordingly,
the connection between language and the body is made early in the novel. Here we find
Liebhaber striving to "lock up the form" (C 16); in this instance, as elsewhere,
Liebhaber's involvement in the physical act of typesetting becomes symbolic of his
general disposition to narrative closure. Yet his sudden realisation that he cannot
"finish the story" (C 16) makes him focus on the realm of tactile life excluded by the
mechanical reproduction of experience: "Liebhaber watched his fingers as if, abruptly,
they were not his own" (C 15-16). It is at this moment, when the illusion of the
autonomous individual self is momentarily suspended, that he "remember[s] the future"
(C 15) and makes his first break with the linear trajectory of typographic culture.
Liebhaber's apprehension of the "marginal spaces" through which folk memory
and oral popular culture intrude upon the typographic world is formed by his
experiences at the Lang farm following Martin Lang's death. The name "Lang," with
its phonic proximity to "langue" (the index of linguistic possibilities which, In
Saussure's theory of language, forms the pre-condition for individual acts of
communication), is significant because it suggests that the reintegration of Liebhaber's
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personality hinges upon his recognition that meaning and identity are dependent upon
the structural space between different nominative codes. It is through this differential
space, comically illustrated by Vera's effort to make Liebhaber include the dissonant
phrase "[m]en are a bunch of useless bastards" (C 19) in the public text of the Big
Indian Signal, that oral modes and sensibilities gradually modify his exclusivist print
consciousness. Kroetsch repeatedly puns upon character names to portray Liebhaber's
encounter with oral narrative forms such as the "extended anecdote"41 of Big Indian's
beer-parlour mythologisers: Eli Wurtz (words), John Skandl (scandal), and the
undertaker Aardt (art) show this process at work. At the Lang farm the distinction
between typographic and oral culture is made by the juxtaposition of Liebhaber
(symbolic representative of the printed body), the blank erasure of snow, and the white
margin of the printed page. Lying by Martin Lang's corpse, Liebhaber discovers that
"[ejverything was erased, blanked into nothing by snow" (C 28). As Tiddy rubs
Liebhaber with snow to revive his frozen body we are reminded of her staring at the
"blank space, the absence of words" (C 27) at the margin of Liebhaber's type-set page.
This attention to the margins of recorded social experience is extended when Liebhaber,
in an image that recalls Vera's encounter with the renewing and energising force of
desire, sees "the bee-like swarming of the flakes of snow" covering his "parted legs"
(C 28). The white blanket of snow and the typographic margin unsettle Liebhaber's
post-Gutenberg sensibility because they register the fact of difference and spacing by
which language is able to produce meaning. Similarly, women are endlessly attracted
to the albino skin of Zike, Liebhaber's pressman, because his white body offers an
unwritten space that resists the linear logic of print culture:
Women went to bed easily with Zike. It didn't count, they said; he was an
albino. It didn't count with Zike, who lived in the basement under the
newspaper office, while Liebhaber lived in the flat above. It didn't count with
Zike, his bed there close to the furnace, the crumbling cement walls hung with
calendars, with every type and year of calendar he had ever printed, the
basement divided into rooms by boxes of calendars that hadn't sold. He never
tore the month of January off a calendar pad. (C 21)
Kroetsch has observed that the inhabitants of the Canadian west had to "invent a
new concept of self and a new concept of society" for a culture wiped "down to zero"
by the Depression.42 Liebhaber's task is no less radical: he must choose between his
hitherto passive role in the production of meaning, which leads him to identify with
Fust, Gutenberg's coadjutor, who was "condemned merely to fulfil what Gutenberg
had ordained" (C 197), or active participation in the process of oral culture where "we
are literally in a new world telling ourselves about it, making each other up, inventing
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each other in this new world."43 In Crow this bifurcation is presented in stark terms:
Liebhaber "must see for himself, either the snow or the beacon" (C 40). As we have
seen, "snow" is associated in the novel with the cleansing and renewing female space
of the Lang farm; the "beacon" meanwhile offers an appropriately thrusting symbol for
the phallocentric self and its spokesman, John Skandl.
Skandl's decision to build a lighthouse "out of blocks of perfect ice" (C 45)
may be seen as an extreme masculine response to the carnivalesque disruption of
traditional rural experience. His project embodies an "erotic dream" (C 46) of male
transcendence in which the phallus represents a masculine order prior to language and
history. The exclusiveness of his vision, which deliberately marginalises "those
muttering few, wives and mothers, who saw the tower as a kind of tomb or
monument" (C 47), foreshadows the narrow cultural nationalism that characterises his
subsequent political career. In his search for the "fixed point" (C 33) of pure phallic
identity, Skandl is transformed into the "giver of light" (C 49); his actions, meanwhile,
have all the men in the "snow-buried town" dreaming of "[a] center. A beacon. A
guide" (C 41). In his climatic speech before his "rising creation" Skandl gives full
vent to his idiosyncratic phallic narcissism:
Some days he spoke of the Bishop Rock Lighthouse, occupying the most
exposed situation in all the oceans of the world; he praised the Skerryvore
Lighthouse, its profile a hyperbolic curve from the hard rock to the lantern base.
He reminded his men of the hazards of building a lighthouse on the dangerous
shores of Britanny, on the Fastnet Rock off the Irish coast. He told them of the
Rothersand Lighthouse and the difficulties of its erection. He spoke confusedly
of the lights of Ravenna and Messina, of the ancient tower that was the Pillar of
Hercules. And all the while he ordered the blocks of ice hoisted higher,
stacked, positioned. He had them sprayed with water that froze and welded
them together. He surveyed his rising creation and ordered another round of
blocks, another layer, another reaching at the rim. (C 46-47)
If Skandl espouses nothing more than a narrow discourse of male self-
definition, his rhetoric is nevertheless embraced by his followers as evidence of a
transcendent release from the experience of cultural marginalisation. By "building their
tower of ice to heaven"44 the men demonstrate their need for a definitive creation myth
that will assert the primacy of male reason before the fact of linguistic and cultural
difference. Yet Crow, like all Kroetsch's previous fiction, rigourously contests the
attempt to substitute a transcendent myth of origin for the experience of social and
linguistic alienation. It does so chiefly by employing the myth of Daedalus and Icarus
to show the penalty reserved for those who dismiss this world for the redemptive
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promise of another. Consequently Crow bulges with stories of failed flights and
inexplicable falls from grace. Thus Joe Lightning is killed by his fall from the beak of
an eagle; one of the husbands of the Lang sisters' is killed by slipping into a bag of
drilling mud, another falls into a threshing machine while "raging at the sky" (C 140),
and a third hooks himself to a windmill and dies "spinning and spinning" (C 177);
Jerry Lepanne, a convict who repeatedly escapes prison to express in person his
response to Rita Lang's erotic letters, crashes into the CN bridge in a doomed attempt
to save Vera's life; while JG, the silent child whose "pre-cultural muteness"45 is a
visible rebuke to the various discourses that enclose him, falls to his death from a tree,
thereby demonstrating the perils awaiting those "free of language" who try "to enter
heaven."46 Equally, Skandl's premature death on a return aeroplane journey from the
outside world shows that, in contrast to his plan for an independent and segregated
Alberta, it is as impossible to secede from history as it is from language. Instead it is
left to Tiddy, a woman whose stance is "always in the world,"47 to recognise that "in
their desperate confusion" (C 50) the men have reconstructed the tower of Babel. The
significance of the myth of Babel in Kroetsch's work is that its assertion of the
polymorphous possibilities of story accords with Canada's position between different
narratives of cultural identity. Not suprisingly, this postlapsarian emphasis upon
linguistic difference primarily affects Tiddy, excluded by gender from Skandl's
monolithic phallic creation myth, and Liebhaber, whose suspension between the
masculine and feminine worlds increasingly subverts his faith in the natural order of
language.
After the inevitable collapse of Skandl's lighthouse, Liebhaber is left to come to
terms with the legacy of Babel: the narrative disunity that characterises modern
Canadian identity. Initially his linguistic positivism leads him to construct a "single
copy" (C 68) of the world in print. But his disorientating experience of remembering
the future alerts him to the inadequacy of recording the inverse world of Big Indian in
the linear mode of narrative realism. Alive to the rhythms of folk memory and popular
mythology, Liebhaber realises that "it was Gutenberg," with his printed representations
of the past, "who'd made all memory of the past irrelevant" (C 68). In order to
articulate his own position on the border between oral and print culture, he needs to
escape "Gutenberg's curse" (C 163) - to retreat, in Lecker's words, "from any form of
syntax that concludes."48 His increasing powerlessness within a discursive order that
does not represent his own schismatic experience is shown by his awareness that at the
end of a night's work "he was himself hardly more than a mere tray of alphabet,
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awaiting the insistence of an ordering hand" (C 68). Consequently, Liebhaber
attempts to free himself from the "tyranny of rote" by rejecting the "recited order" of the
typographic alphabet:
All the capital letters in his collection of wood type were set in neat rows,
arranged alphabetically. He couldn't bear that either. In terror at the
domestication of those free, beautiful letters - no, it was the absurdity of their
recited order that afflicted him: ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ - he
opened a twenty-six of rye and, with immense effort, tried to disentangle
himself from the tyranny of rote. The U, he argued aloud to himself, in the
Middle Ages, was the final letter, held by the wisest of men to be only a
rounded version of V. He tried to resay the alphabet and failed. I and J, he
remembered, were once deemed the same: he tried to disregard one in his
recitation and lost both. He tried again, the simplest changing of the alphabet -
and found himselfmaking sounds for which he had no signs at all. (C 69)
Liebhaber's response to the discrepancy he observes between the "chaos" (C
50) outside and the artificial order of his own print script is to develop a carnivalesque
discourse capable of expressing the metamorphic principle of oral culture. The first
signs of his new discursive strategy appears during Skandl's speech at the lighthouse:
In the babble and chaos of voices, Liebhaber, wildly, tried to undercut Skandl
by arguing perversely in his favour. He pictured the tall lighthouse white
against a black sky, its finger of light touching out, beckoning the very birds
that no longer came to the municipality, bringing down from the high night the
geese, the ducks, the robins, the crows, the meadowlarks, the orioles.
Liebhaber, recklessly, in the endless winter, invented a spring. (C 49)
Next, he resolves to uninvent outworn narrative structures by constructing "a sequence
of illogical sentences" (C 55) that play with the phonic shape of language. Here we
might make a connection between Crow and Alibi because Liebhaber, in his attention
to the restrictions placed on the subject by the historical sedimentation of language,
reveals himself to be, like Dorf, a type of the Barthesian subject. Significantly the
Barthesian subject is threatened not, as in Sartrean ontology, by the monitoring and
annihilating gaze of the "other" but rather by its entrapment within a discourse or doxa
that precedes it. As Barthes is aware, the subject cannot resist its prior situation within
closed discursive formations simply by developing a personal code of identification.
Instead it seeks to open up conventional forms of representation by developing a
linguistic stance that Barthes calls writing "through the body."49 Ann Jefferson has
described this practice:
In this practice the body's relation to language is altered from being the object of
its representation to becoming the support and condition of a certain linguistic
activity.... When the body sides with the subject, then it becomes possible to
counter the finished and static representations of the doxa, a discourse which
Barthes describes as being without a body, even if it takes the body as its
object. A doxa is no longer a doxa if it is no longer finished and complete, if
its structures are opened up.50
Liebhaber's first sustained effort to define himself outside the doxa is the game
of schmier which lasts for 151 days and represents the male response to "the
inadequacy of truth" (C 76). The card game constitutes an alternative order with its
own conventions of behaviour: the players create, in Kathleen Wall's words, "a
culture, an organization of human beings governed by shared values and established
rules."51 Kroetsch has spoken of the tension in games between free play and rule-
bound discourse. In an important remark he extends this insight by linking "game,"
"language," and the redefinition of the self in a manner that sheds light on Liebhaber's
predicament:
I play on the edge of convention; I suppose that's one place where I bend the
rules. I think I also take the risk of falling right into language: the danger of
language taking over. There is an anxiety about language being separate from
reality or being its own reality. I think a kind of erasure of self goes in fiction-
making. Its interesting that we play the game, isn't it? There's a double thing
that goes on even in the statement which is very fascinating to me. The two
words contradict each other in a signifying way. Play resists the necessary
rules of the game.51
The ambivalence in games between order and redefinition is reminiscent of the second-
world environment of carnivalesque play. Interestingly, the conjunction of the sacred
and the profane worlds in the game of schmier played in the Church of the Final Virgin,
and the introduction into the church basement of the grotesque figure of Marvin Straw,
the prison hangman, incorporate key motifs of carnivalesque discourse. Following the
discovery of Martin Lang's body in the church basement the latent spirit of
carnivalesque disorder bursts forth from the schmier players to engulf the whole
community:
The dispossessed men, drunk, shouting, farting, whining, hollering, cursing,
belching, swearing, puking, spitting, were forced out of the beer parlor, into
the street. Some of them collapsed into the arms of waiting wives. Some of
them crawled into cars and immediately fell asleep. Some of them, their joy
turned to rage, began to fight in the streets, smashing senselessly at each other's
bodies while still others cheered them on. There were thirteen minor car
accidents in the vicinity of Big Indian in less than twenty-four minutes. One
driver drove through his own garage wall and into the potato patch behind it.
Another, unable to change gears, tried to back all the way home, and two miles
south of town hit a dugout; fortunately the car was waterproof and floated until
next morning. Another, mistaking the railway for a hayrack, turned to avoid it
and drove into the Bigknife River. (C 115)
However, Liebhaber's escape into the closed world of the schmier game proves
ultimately unsatisfactory because it embodies an exclusively masculine practice that
denies the metamoiphic promise of the feminine. Tiddy is accordingly "content to let
them go on with their game of schmier" confident that "the women were running the
world better than had the men" (C 85). When she eventually comes to rescue the
starved men, whose obsession with the ordered ritual of schmier has prevented them
finding food, she discovers Liebhaber "ahead in the game, about to win a few nails and
some pieces of broken glass and a pile of round stones they'd dug up from the frozen
riverbed with their bare hands" (C 126). Unable to bring order to bear at a time when
"there was no meaning anywhere in the world" (C 94) the men embark upon their
absurdWar Against the Sky. Only two individuals stand out against the general chaos.
One is Joe Lightning, whose Indian background teaches him the futility of the men's
search for absolute control over the elements. Significantly, Lightning is cast as an
initiate in the ways of carnival: his death, which comes when he is dropped to earth
from an eagle's beak, transforms the male dream of transcendence into the redefining
ambivalence of carnival laughter. His "holy laugh" is therefore "a simple laugh of
pleasure and yet it was a kind of scream too, a scream of release" (C 159). The other
dissident is Liebhaber, who sees in the war a way of contesting the "death of the
world" (C 182) imposed by the closed narrative structures that he labours to
deconstitute. His action in firing Vera's bees from a cannon into the sky may therefore
be seen as an act of reconciliation that unites the earthly and the supramundane through
the agency of desire. Liebhaber's success, moreover, in overcoming conventional
gender divisions by shooting the bees into "the one androgynous moment of heaven
and earth" (C 216) is crowned by the coming of rain to the parched land.
Liebhaber's final warning of the dangers inherent in the male vision of
transcendence occurs when, in bewilderment at the onslaught of rain his action has
unleashed, he begins to build an ark. Like Noah, he "worked quickly, angrily, almost
in despair at the folly of his fellow citizens" (C 197). But Liebhaber never completes
the symbolic journey back to origin and source suggested by the image of Noah's ark.
Indeed, his failure to resolve his sense of social and cultural alienation in the
epistemological security of providential narrative is symptomatic of Kroetsch's more
general dislocation and juxtaposition of discrete narrative units. In order to illustrate
this point we might note that Crow is littered with spiritual motifs that Kroetsch refuses
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to order into one coherent narrative. Any analysis of Kroetsch's decentred narrative
structure must consider the meaning of Rose's repeated religious ceremonies of burial;
the symbolic significance of the birth of Vera's boy in December beneath the "strange
beacon" (C 50) in the sky; the collocation of the "white and lifted host in the priest's
right hand" and the "absolute of Tiddy's breasts" (C 74); Kroetsch's juxtaposition of
an allusion to the wolves "final feast" (C 112) with a parodic image of the last supper
as thirteen men play schmier in the basement of the Church of the Final Virgin; the
revelatory violence of the "everlasting wind" (C 148); and the confusion of Liebhaber
with Christ in the phrases "the first and final male, horny to die" and "the having lover,
thirty-three minutes in one best trial" (C 216).
By aligning language and meaning in a series of rural epiphanies, this chain of
imagery attempts to transcend the social and cultural fragmentation of Big Indian
society. But Crow's radical narrative displacements ceaselessly juxtapose individual
mythemes to create an over-determined semantic field that frustrates a unitary reading of
the text's multiple stories. Consequently the reader is never in a position to choose
between the myths of Eden, Babel, or Daedalus and Icarus; instead they impinge upon
each other to develop the indeterminate imaginative landscape of magic realism.
Kroetsch's emphasis in Crow is therefore upon the possibility of a continual act of
becoming, which receives symbolic expression in the founding mythology of Romulus
and Remus introduced by the story of the rearing of Vera's boy by a band of coyotes.
In The Crow Journals Kroetsch links his interest in the "myth of the founding of the
city" with the tension between "origins" and "[d]e/construction."53 Liebhaber's
captivity within this unresolvable dialectic is comically revealed when he is imprisoned
under his capsized ark. Trapped beneath the boat's hull, in absolute isolation from the
typographic world, he is finally able to enter into an intuitive and sensual relationship
with language:
Liebhaber, trapped in the absolute darkness under the boat, trapped into death,
hit on the realization that he had escaped. He hung onto a rib, in the cold water,
trying to remember a life he hadn't lived. Without Gutenberg's curse; yes, that
was it; without Gutenberg and moveable type, he would have lived another life.
And finally he was free of Gutenberg. / perish, he imagined, but only in a
dream. No, that wouldn't do for an opening. Yes, he was writing his own
story, at last. He tried again, working with furious intent: Enough would be
enough. He liked that. He could account for events, announce the presence of
design, under the apparent chaos. Enough. That one, sufficient word, so
neatly balanced against itself. He had no idea how long he'd been under the
hull. Perhaps it was night now. Surely someone would miss him. All night he
would set type; everything set, everything forgotten. But now he had escaped;
he had recovered the night, and dream, and memory. He would compose a
novel one sentence long, a novel that anyone could memorize. You in my
arms. Yes, that would do it. He tested for revision, recited the four words ...
(C 163-64)
Kroetsch's remark that Crow " is full of balances and halves which we have to
put together"54 provides a clue to the central image of the novel's final pages. At the
end of their protracted period of estrangement, Kroetsch pictures Tiddy and Liebhaber
together at last in the mutual space of the bedroom:
And Tiddy, asleep. She, with no imagination at all, dreaming the world.
Liebhaber, finally, understands. She only dreams what she has dreamed. But
she is dreaming. He knows now. Gutenberg, too, was only a scribe.
Liebhaber, turned end for end in the old bed, his head to the foot, like printers
of old, always, reading backwards, reading upside down. They lay, he and
Tiddy, together, in the naked circle of everything. His tongue finds the
warmth, the heat of her skin, the first small hairs. He sees now the bees. The
bees come in at the torn screen. The ball hits the wall. It must be morning.
Young Theodora is out in the rain. The bees touch the dreaming woman, touch
gold and black her closed thighs. Rita is writing. She flings the words across
the page: he is dying, she writes. He is dying in the next room. He is always
dying in the next room. She, bent to her tablet, her fingers tight on the ball¬
point pen; alone. Alone. All one. Alone... (C 216)
This scene, with its image of Liebhaber "turned end for end in the old bed,"
illustrates perfectly the inverse logic of carnival. Here in the "naked circle of
everything" male and female come together as the sensibilities of oral and typographic
culture enter into productive dialogue. Liebhaber's progression beyond emotional and
social isolation is shown as "alone" modulates gently into "[a]ll one" and the lovers
slowly blur into one another. Able at last to "break his self-inflicted definition of
maleness"55 Liebhaber, the "having lover," embraces the marginalised cultural
experience of the oral community "where the story in the act of retelling is always
responsive to individuals, to the place, to invention."56 His rebirth is reflected in
Kroetsch's prose, which develops from a distanced third-person commentary to an
immediate present tense third-person voice. Appropriately Kroetsch, at the very last,
liberates his characters into their own story as they begin to construct their new world
fresh from the mutual interaction of opposites.
In conclusion, I want to suggest that the creative interaction between oral and
typographic culture symbolised by the reconciliation of Tiddy and Liebhaber has a
broader thematic significance for Kroetsch's work. To demonstrate this proposition, I
intend to draw upon a series of remarks Kroetsch makes in his essay "The Moment of
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the Discovery of America Continues" concerning his early life on the Albertan prairies.
Here he speaks of prairie society as historically without representation. "My sense of
the gap between me and history was growing," he remarks of his early years "History
as I knew it did not account for the world I lived in. Present here in this landscape, I
was taking my first lesson in the idea of absence."57 Aware that "authorized history,
the given definition of history, was betraying us on those prairies," Kroetsch was "on
[his] way to embracing the model of archaeology, against that of history."58 Because
Canada's "inherited literature, the literature of our European past and of eastern North
America, is emphatically the literature of a people who have not lived on prairies"59 he
turned to the continually evolving narratives of Alberta's oral storytelling tradition to
document the "beer-talk of our daily lives, the shape of our living."60 But by
repeatedly dissolving western experience into the exuberant presence of voice, oral
history "is not likely to go back more than two generations . . . with huge
consequences for our sense of history."61 Kroetsch therefore arrives at the strange
paradox by which the oral tradition simultaneously inscribes and erases the
unrepresented prairie experience from the Canadian historical record.
The solution to this paradox arrives for Kroetsch when the "oral tradition"
recognises itself as a "literary tradition" which "points us back to our own landscape,
our recent ancestors, and the characteristic expressions and modes of our own
speech."62 It is only after western oral culture engages fully with the referential status
of its own discourse - conceives itself, that is, as a carnivalesque second world that
transgresses the boundaries of official cultural discourse - that it can properly articulate
its challenge to the linguistic codes of European and American imperialism.
Commenting on Canada's curious position between different narratives of self-
identification, Kroetsch detects this culture of opposition in the "pattern of contraries"
that inform western discourse:
The effect of perceptual models on what we see is now the concern of social
and literary critics.... I was living outside of Alberta (and outside of Canada)
while writing most of my fiction and poetry. Perhaps for that reason I was
constantly aware that we both, and at once, record and invent these new places
called Alberta and Saskatchewan. That pattern of contraries, all the possibilities
implied in record and event, for me finds its focus in the model suggested by
the phrase: a local pride.63
If we consider this remark within the context of Tiddy and Liebhaber's reconciliation,
we recognise that the rapprochment of the newspaperman (record) and the rural
matriarch (who symbolises the metamorphic event of oral performance) revises
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traditional narratives of western Canadian cultural identity. By deliberately violating the
borders of each other's world the lovers "uncreate themselves into existence"64 in a
carnivalesque space that renews itself through "the inevitable splits and tensions"65 of
post-colonial discourse.
In a general comment upon the politics of post-colonial writing, Kroetsch
argues that Canadians must "resist endings, violently" by doing "violence" to traditional
forms that force "resolution" upon their unresolved and hybridized narratives of self.66
With Crow he not only conducts his own "personal struggle with the temptation of
meaning"67 but comes to a "Bakhtinian version of the dialogic, in which the possibility
of a single or privileged voice announcing the right version of the narrative is talked
away."68 The decentred form and shifting narrative surfaces of his novel therefore
reflect the multiple borders of post-colonial cultural discourse where national unity is
created "by the very debate that seems to threaten the unity."69 Consequently, the
polyphonic world of Big Indian is best understood if, in John Thieme's phrase, we put
"the emphasis on process rather than a concept of achieved national identity".70
Kroetsch has spoken of the way the "postmodern impulse in its radical resistance to a
governing narrative" might allow him to "politicize the aesthetic question."71 In Crow,
where the nostalgic desire for a single or privileged voice is answered only by the
crow's babble, he has politicised the border between oral and graphic culture to develop
a fictive model of a community that celebrates its postmodern difference from a
unifying narrative of national cultural identity.
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Chapter Eight
A Life Without Alibis:
Narrative and the Erotic Body in Alibi
Texts ofpleasure. Pleasure in pieces; language in pieces; culture in pieces.
Such texts are perverse in that they are outside any imaginable finality.... No
alibi stands up, nothing is reconstituted, nothing recuperated.1
Is it that the human being is secretly nothing without the others?2
What the Crow Said closes a chapter of Kroetsch's fiction. It marks that rare
point of confluence where a postmodern theory of discourse and a fictive investigation
of place combine to produce a new version of cultural history and identity.
Paradoxically, the success of What the Crow Said in forging an artistic vision of the
postmodern narratives of Canadian life has proved problematic for Kroetsch's writing
since it apparently exhausted the reserves of his artistic and critical ambition.
Everything else in the two decades of Kroetsch's career seems to lead up to What the
Crow Said: the scope of its achievement threatened to leave him without voice,
purpose or direction.
Alibi, Kroetsch's latest novel, can be read as an attempt to move beyond this
exhaustion of theory and practice. As such, it occupies a curious place in the Kroetsch
canon; the dearth of critical attention paid to the novel in the eight years since its
publication testifies to the unease it generates. Yet much of this unease is dissipated if
we resituate the text's technical virtuosity within the developmental progression of
Kroetsch's previous work. I have argued that Kroetsch's fiction is most profitably
read as a sustained attempt to re-examine the interdicted and marginalised narrative of
post-colonial Canadian experience: the series of transitions he has made between anti-
mimesis, pastiche, parody, and the carnivalesque reveal a growing awareness that
Canadian cultural identity cannot be redefined in a neutral political space; it must
acknowledge the ineradicable distance between being and meaning opened by the
inscription of "Canada" within foreign discourses of historical and cultural value. The
carnivalesque world of What the Crow Said, with its suspension and reversal of
hierarchised oppositions, brings this novelistic quest to fulfilment by rehabilitating
occluded narratives of Canadian history within a discourse self-consciously aware of its
implication within the representational tradition ofWestern culture.
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Kroetsch returns, in Alibi, to the carnivalesque ambivalence of What the Crow
Said and transforms it into an elaborate meditation on the textual production of
meaning. Indeed Kroetsch's text, with its doublings, scattered clues, and teasing
omissions, offers a narrative about the nature of narrative. By developing an erotic
grammar of delay, in which the reader's desire for resolution, closure, and meaning is
frustrated by the writer's insistence upon story, polyphony, and difference, Kroetsch
focuses attention upon the process by which narratives of personal and cultural identity
are constructed. Alibi flirts with the reader: it reveals and deceives, multiplying
narrative codes in an exhilarating passage through the semiotic labyrinth of Dorf s
world. In a transaction crucial to Kroetsch's purposes, our desire to assimilate the
signs Alibi disseminates is exacerbated by the knowledge that no sign will ever be
enough to unravel the textual maze that encloses us. The desire for meaning imposes a
"state of loss"3 that can only be assuaged by the intermittent fulfilment of narrative.
Kroetsch has linked the interplay of presence, absence, and desire fundamental to any
system of signification with the ambiguous position of the Canadian displaced from
cultural and linguistic origin:
There is a labyrinth of love. Desire itself is desiring a way through the
labyrinth, out of entrapment. And into entrapment. Canadians are so
goddamned frightened of the labyrinth they have created out of the need to have
a labyrinth. The immensity of love's entrapment is replaced by familial
bickering and bourgeois rivalries. I agree that culture itself is a kind of
labyrinthine godgame; we have come to a potential and a mystery so huge that it
makes us hesitate.4
The progressive importance to Kroetsch's work in the last decade of the critical
nexus represented by the terms presence, absence, and desire is testimony to the
influence upon his writing of the textual erotics of Roland Barthes. Amid the welter of
intertexts that impinge upon Kroetsch's words in Labyrinths Of Voice the work of
Barthes is a persistent presence. Certainly Barthes's conception of the text as a
"sanctioned babel" where "the subject gains access to bliss by the cohabitation of
languages working side by side,"5 his celebration of the text's transference of value to
the "sumptuous rank of the signifier,"6 and his vision of culture as an "edge" produced
by different "seam[s]"7 of discourse possess an indisputable relevance for Kroetsch's
later fiction. However, the real significance of Barthes's thought for an understanding
of Kroetsch's work lies in the connection Barthes makes between the constitution of the
subject and the literary text, and the distinction he discerns between texts of pleasure
and texts of bliss.
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In The Pleasure of the Text Barthes names this correspondence between subject
and text hyphology:
Text means Tissue; but whereas hitherto we have always taken this tissue as a
product, a ready-made veil, behind which lies, more or less hidden, meaning
(truth), we are now emphasising, in the tissue, the generative idea that the text
is made, is worked out in a perpetual interweaving; lost in this tissue - this
texture - the subject unmakes himself, like a spider dissolving in the
constructive secretions of its web. Were we fond of neologisms, we might
define the theory of the text as an hyphology (hyphos is the tissue and the
spider's web).8
The unmaking of the subject is therefore a consequence of the reader's exposure to the
different discursive registers that constitute his or her experience of the world.
Significantly, Barthes suggests that a counterpart to the dissolution of the organic text
is, in human terms, the recovery of the "erotic body"
obscured by our daily accretion of habit and convention. He carries over the tension
between convention and revaluation into his division between texts of pleasure and
bliss:
Text of pleasure: the text that contents, fills, grants euphoria; the text that comes
from culture and does not break with it, is linked to a comfortable practice of
reading. Text of bliss: the text that imposes a state of loss, the text that
discomforts (perhaps to the point of a certain boredom), unsettles the reader's
historical, cultural, psychological assumptions, the consistency of his tastes,
values, memories, brings to a crisis his relation with language.9
I am suggesting that by the logic of Barthes's analysis Alibi is a text of bliss.
Or, more accurately, it resides, like the Barthesian subject, in that incommunicable
space between satiation and disintegration that marks the fault-line between pleasure
and bliss. By personifying this intermittence in the form of the "split subject, who
simultaneously enjoys, through the text, the consistency of his selfhood and its
collapse, its fall"10 Barthes gives a plausible sketch of Dorf, the registering
consciousness of Alibi, whose career we shall follow in some detail. Dorfs quest,
which takes him to Britain, Portugal, Greece, and across the Canadian west in search
of the perfect spa deemed by his employer, the millionaire oil baron and collector Jack
Deemer, can be understood as a comic parable about the Canadian subject's necessary
acceptance of its ambivalent position between Old and New world narratives of
historical identity. Yet although Dorfs journey towards self-revelation repeats in
several details Peter Guy's experience of alienation and division, Alibi advances far
beyond Kroetsch's realist fiction in its analysis of narrative, desire, and alterity.
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Indeed, Dorfs gradual realisation that the ambiguities andmultiplicities of language and
sexual desire offer him an escape from Deemer's authoritarian narrative of cultural
order suggests that the erotic intermittence of the postmodern text subverts those meta-
narratives that have appropriated and codified post-colonial experience. In Alibi
Kroetsch consequently develops an aesthetics of desire in which the radical
incompletion of the text attempts to dispel the "illusion of a unity" promulgated by
classical realism and replace it with "the theater of society in which we stage our
plural."11 Concomitantly, Dorfs relationship with Dr. Medeiros, his metamorphosis
into an agent of Julie Magnuson's "total desire,"12 and his instruction in the textuality
of historical discourse at the hands of Karen Strike express his ex-centricity from
traditional narratives of selfhood and confirm him as a protagonist in the radical
disunities of the Canadian story.
These introductory remarks concerning Dorfs dispersal within the flux of
language and desire can be developed by momentary recourse to Lacanian
psychoanalytic theory. In Chapter Two it was seen that the emphasis of Lacan's work
is upon the ineluctability of the intersubjective relation: the subject is driven continually
towards the "other" in a futile attempt to retrieve the security of primordial unity
shattered by the alienating division enforced between the subject and the ego by the
acquisition of language, and by the damage done to infantile self-identity by the spectral
doublings of the mirror stage. Here the latinate root of the title Alibi becomes
significant: it comes from alius, or the sense of displacement implicit in the idea of the
"elsewhere." Dorfs entanglements with Julie, Karen, and Medeiros, which provoke
him to meditate upon the nature of desire, language, and historical representation,
comes to symbolise the engagement with alterity characteristic of alienated humanity.
However, his self-conscious recognition that intersubjective 'Teachings to each other"
(A 153) are all that constitute the subject frees him from the grip of Deemer's paranoid
subordination of world to self. After this revelatory moment Dorf begins to explore the
contours of desire outside the "space of alibis (reality, morality, likelihood, readability,
truth, etc)"13 imposed by Deemer's imperialist reading of history.
Another aspect of Lacan's teaching pertinent to a reading of Alibi is the
importance it attaches to the act of naming. In Lacan's schema, the pivotal moment at
which the illusion of unity is transformed into an experience of otherness occurs when
the act of naming propels the subject into the symbolic order of language. With the
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accession to the symbolic order the subject apprehends its identity to be a consequence
of its position within a network of signs. At this point it first begins to grasp its
decentred status within the movement of the signifying chain. Anika Lemaire has
highlighted this aspect of the symbolic order:
In general terms, the symbolic order establishes mediate relationships between
things; the relationship between man and man, between self and other is
mediated, that is, by a symbol. It is not immediate, direct and without an
intermediary.
It is the existence of the mediator which allows everyone to register
himself in his distinct subjectivity. In an immediate relationship, on the other
hand, the distinction between self and other is not clear.14
Alibi attaches great importance to the act of naming. Dorf, Kroetsch's
protagonist, is a man with a name twice doubled: Billy Billy Dorfendorf. As he
explains:
I'd had two grandfathers by the first name of William, both with the same first
name, and my parents, farming people northeast of Calgary in the Battle River
country, in a futile hope that I might receive at least one inheritance, named me
after both of them. Billy Billy Dorfen. And all I got from my ancestors, it
turned out, was the conviction that I needed two of everything: two cars, two
university degrees, two bank accounts, two addresses, two mailboxes. For
sure, two kicks at the cat. Two lives, possibly. (A 13)
This early sign of Dorf s double nature is the first indication that the novel will be
concerned with the disorientations that attend his implication within a system of
difference. Indeed, the tension between the terms 'system' and 'difference' is
fundamental to the plot ofAlibi, which pivots around the confrontation between Dorf,
figure of the desiring self, who crosses the Atlantic to discover the real meaning of his
own divided personality, and Jack Deemer, his employer, who silently orders the
world into a private collection that he alone can control. Dorf considers the relationship
between his own "discontinuity" and Deemer's inhuman "coherence" when he speaks
of his role within his employer's "silent manipulation" of the world:
The story had no doubt been dictated by Jack Deemer himself. I was beginning
to understand the plot that connives the world into visible being; the necessary
plot that makes us seek each other, if only to do violence to the meeting.
Deemer thinks he can take the law into his own hands, and that just because
he's managed to collect a trace of the discarded world into his warehouses; he
thinks it's his money and his silent manipulation that makes the collection. Too
bad for him is all I can say; it's my scrounging and my snooping and my
talking, talking, talking that make his famous collection. Money is cheap. I'm
the poor fool who must go out and dicker and plead and lie and cheat and
swindle and count and pack and ship. The collection itself only confirms the
discontinuity of this scattered world; it's my talk that puts it together. I rave the
world into coherence for Deemer; he sits there on his little hill called a
mountain, Mount Royal; he sits there, silent, and now by God he wants to
collect the law too. (A 195)
The antagonism between Dorf and Deemer is most usefully understood as the
struggle between unitary and plural narratives of cultural identity. Deemer is the
archetypal representative of the autonomous self; he deems the world around him into
an ordered copy of his private fantasies and desires. By dedicating his life to the
establishment of a limitless collection of global cultural artefacts he constructs a meta-
narrative of individual and cultural history that effaces everything beyond the
boundaries of the taxonomical imagination. He is reportedly "[cjollecting the world"
(A 25); this verb characterises all his dealings with external reality. As Dorf remarks,
Deemer "simply collects" (A 13). Significantly, Deemer's difference from Dorf is
brought out by the act of naming. While Dorf s ambiguous identity is conveyed by the
fact that he is "a man given two names, but both of them exactly the same" (A 70),
Deemer's rigid authoritarian attitude is suggested by his uncompromising univocity: he
is "simply a name" (A 13).
Dorfs quest in Alibi is to overcome his helplessness within Deemer's arcane
narrative system in order to give expression to the dislocation he feels from any
coherent sense of historical origins. His impression of his own powerlessness within
Deemer's sphere of influence is established at the outset:
I might explain that I have never once met Jack Deemer, at least not face to face;
he's a great one for sending messages. His minions live in a kind of dread of
memos or post cards or, for that matter, scraps of toilet paper scrawled with
instructions for which there is no explanation, no place to seek clarification.
My calamity differed only in arriving as a yellow, pasted-up CNCP telegram,
waiting like a bomb in my mailbox when I flew in from Sicily with a collection
of twenty-eight sets of dominoes. (A 7)
The conflict between Deemer's hubristic desire to assimilate the diversity of a myriad
different cultures into his own private myth and Dorfs need to come to terms with the
self-estrangement brought on by his double naming is dramatised by Deemer's
instruction that Dorf should acquire the perfect spa for his collection. For Deemer, the
spa functions as a transcendental signified: it is a source of value that will order all other
values. Because of its symbolic properties as a centre of recuperation and renewal, the
spa offers Deemer respite from time, the one force that escapes his repressive
regulation. As Fish, one of Dorfs itinerant companions, remarks, "[t]he only solution
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for Deemer ... is to go on living forever" (A 57). In an important insight Dorf
recognises that even more than his battle with time, Deemer "wants to collect, possess,
some special and immovable part of the earth itself to offset the sheer "randomness"
(A 58) of creation.
But as Kroetsch has made plain elsewhere, "[difference might be the basis of
erotics, sameness a version of death."15 In accordance with this distinction, Dorfs
search for Deemer's perfect spa leads him not to a transcendent sense of origin but
rather to an awareness of the imbrication of the question of identity in the reciprocal
relation with the "other." His formative encounter with alterity occurs in the spa at
Sulphur Mountain, where, surrounded by the disembodied heads of other bathers, he
experiences a sudden crisis of self-recognition:
Just heads, just floating. Like that. Motionless. Heads and more heads,
planted there, and growing. They weren't the least bit troubled at not having
bodies, there in that yellowish light, under the lid of fog. Nobody seemed
worried. Shit, I thought, this is okay. I wanted to tell Karen, wanted to say,
you've got to use this in your documentary, get a camera in here, and only then
did I realise I couldn't see her anywhere. And I'd loafed on purpose in the
change-room, waiting for her to get to the pool ahead of me; I panicked a little.
I don't mean I panicked, I just felt strange. Because I knew, looking at
all those heads, floating there, on the water, under the fog, that I'd never be
quite the same again. One has those occasions, those recognitions. Just as I
knew I had changed slightly, forever, when I levelled a gun at my wife's
frightened, absurd, scrawny lover and realised I could pull the trigger. (A 10)
Immersed in the spa-waters where "heaven and earth had got themselves upset"
(A 10) Dorf is gradually introduced to the transgressive logic of desire. His aquatic
sexual encounter with Julie Magnuson, which leaves him disorientated and "crying a
little" (A 15), is of primary importance because she is the spectral "other" woman who
leads him into the "secret connivance of figure and letter and sign" (A 15). Her threat
to kill Dorf if he discovers Deemer's spa underlines the danger to his newly awakened
self of Deemer's passion for source, origin, and "sameness." Instead Dorf, with the
key to his former life tied "around [his] slightly aroused member" (A 12), is to be
prepared for the erotic revelation of his emotional and cultural alienation.
Following his unsettling experience with Julie, which tips him "over the edge
into a slow, long, delicate flooding" that leaves him "aware of everything, and nothing
too" (A 15), Dorf begins to recognise that only the death of his garrisoned self can
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provide a cure for his lonely disengagement from the world around him. Against
Deemer's voluntarist progression beyond the "merely human" (A 25), Dorf realises
that his own sense of self is based on a "dream" of the "other" (A 28). His gesture
beyond the unitary confines of the self is also accompanied by a disturbance of ascribed
pronoun positions: "I cross out I am and write in He is ... He ... I... What does it
matter?" (A 51) he muses, suspended between two different experiences of being.
Stirred subsequently by a glimpse of Estuary's underwear he acknowledges that to find
"the woman I was looking for with a dream of being healed" (A 35) he must accept the
loss of self demanded by the engagement with alterity. His admission that "[w]e
cannot have what we want and we hurt" (A 35) testifies to the dangerous fragmentation
of personality that precedes his vision of self-renewal.
The brief scene between Dorf and Karen Strike in The Banff Springs Hotel
highlights the perilous route that awaits the collector's agent on his journey to a new
identity. Enmeshed by Karen ever more tightly in "desire and guilt and the old hunger
to connect" (A 23) Dorf is given a comic warning about the duplicity of desire and
language:
I was taking off my clothes as she spoke. I quite simply undressed. Said
nothing. Karen was holding a boot in her hands. I undressed right down to
my skin.
The words HOT and COLD, it turned out, were on the wrong taps over
the deep white tub. I gave a cry, leapt from behind the curtain, slipped on the
floor, caught myself.
Karen burst in at the bathroom door, I already, trying to touch myself
with both large hands, and I do have large, awkward hands, trying to touch my
burn.
"Kiss it better," I said, almost shouting. (A 21)
Scalded by his desire for Karen and unable to consummate their physical union,
Dorf discovers in the process of storytelling another way to re-invent the self. "We
talked that night," Dorf confides, "[w]e told each other stories. Perhaps that is what
changed our relationship" (A 22). If Julie's role in Alibi is to persuade Dorf of the
futility of the effort to get "free of the everlastingly nagging sexual needs of one's
body" into a "religious concept" of "potential escape" (A 56), Karen, with her hunger
for facts and her delight in the mechanics of film-making, provides him with a valuable
lesson in the radical ambiguity of historical reconstructions of the self. Indeed, the
power of Karen's impact upon Dorf is due, in large measure, to her contradictory
attitude to representation, form, and historical experience. Introduced as "a lunatic on
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the subject of history" (A 8) who spends her time "making notes on the goddamned
world" (A 16), Karen's naive belief in the historian's ability to create "the perfect
replica of a dismissed life" (A 17) resembles Deemer's piecemeal construction of his
own myth. Yet if in the early part of the novel Karen is depicted as the daunting
"keeper" of those "human rules" (A 24) from which Dorfmust seek his alibi, it is only
through her continual emphasis on the process of historical representation that Dorf
accepts the impossibility of recreating a version of the self outside historical and social
inscription. "No man can live in a paradise," he admits at the close of the novel,
because "[t]he world will not allow it" (A 236). In return for his instruction in the
historically conditioned character of cultural experience, Dorf offers Karen some advice
of his own. Thus his injunction to her to "[fjorget history," "[sjpeak our language"
and "[mjake do" (A 102) entreats her to abandon her residual positivism and compose
the record of those figures marginalised by the grand narratives of contemporary
history.
Karen's influence on Dorf with "her cameras, with her notebooks" (A 102) is
revealed by his decision to transfer to her structural responsibility for his story. In a
terse note in his diary "Dorfendorfs Journal," Dorf declares that he has entrusted
Karen with the duty of inserting "some chapter titles to trap the unwary eye and lure the
customer; she with her gift for compromise" (A 231). As Robert Lecker has pointed
out, Dorfs revelation that his story will only be published after Karen has provided it
with a suitable narrative order divides Alibi into three sections: Dorfs reconstructed
journal, which constitutes the main body of the novel; Karen's playful chapter-
headings, which provide ludic introductions to the central narrative; and the novel's
final segment, "Dorfendorfs Journal," which offers itself as the last word on Dorfs
adventures.16 The tension between the first two categories spills over to destabilise the
third since Karen's titles, by setting up what Lecker calls "their own interplay . . .
between expectation and disappointment"17 ironise and deconstruct Dorfs quest.
Titles such as "Notes Toward A Transitional Chapter" (A 104) and "The Archaeology
OfHope: And These The Shards From A Journal ThatWilliam William Dorfen Kept
But Did Not Keep" (A 168) highlight the uncertain location of Dorfs account between
different discursive registers. Similarly, Karen's repeated use of the term "negative" to
circumscribe Dorfs text suggests that it may be read backwards as well as forwards (a
"negative" being the mirror-image of a photographic representation).
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To come to terms with his dislocation within Deemer's secretly plotted world,
then, Dorf must uphold Karen's insistence upon the textuality of historical discourse
while exposing the implausibility of her claim to align being and meaning in a moment
of supreme narrative co-incidence. Accordingly, most of the central narrative presents
Dorfs gradual attunement to the narrative construction of reality. His instruction to
Karen to "[fjake the real" (A 52) shows him beginning the hyphological process of
rediscovering self through the dissolutions and reconstitutions of narrative. Watching
Dorf complete an entry in his journal Karen remarks, "[y]ou invent yourself, each time
you sit down to make an entry, and I feel envy" (A 61). Later she pictures him
composing "these real 'takes' on this Dorf guy that you're trying to put together" (A
62). Lying buried in a cocoon of snow following his unwitting appearance before an
avalanche (possibly begun by the mysterious Julie Magnuson) Dorf reflects upon the
"abrupt and unexpected changes of role" that have befallen him:
Strangely enough, dead as I was, and I believed for certain I was a dead duck, I
found some small comfort in the recognition that I, the hunter, had become the
hunted, the collector's agent made part of a collection. I was big enough to
admit that in some small way I deserved my fate. We live and die by such
distinctions, such abrupt and unexpected changes of role. I had been bundled
up and carted off. In a fashion. I was into the old alabaster after all, and this a
translucent white that allowed me to recognise my losses and my gains. I was
gone from the mere world. (A 68)
The crucial word in this quotation is the adjective "mere." By this stage in the
text, Dorf has begun to make a connection between his own alienation from "the source
itself (A 52) and his position within Deemer's private collection of cultural
phenomena. Like Oedipa Maas, that other representative of displacement within the
narrative network of an absent storyteller, Dorf cannot begin to understand his
predicament until he traces the outline of the "plotted world" (A 97) that encompasses
him. Significantly, his attempt to unravel the meaning of Deemer's closed cultural
order takes him on a chaotic journey back to the heart of Europe, source and interpreter
of the post-colonial condition. On a plane above the Atlantic Dorf sees that Deemer's
calculated assimilation of the heterogeneity of world culture to construct a single
assertion of self marks him out as an atavar of the imperial imagination:
Europe is a dream too. But not of silk and spice. Maybe, I thought, maybe
Deemer's mad collecting is just that, and that only a calling up of ghosts from a
million ancestral pasts. It is only that, a hailing and a hollering too, a head in
the rain barrel listening to its own echo, a lost voice hearing a voice from the far
cliff. The cry that comes banging back from the barn wall. The creaking sound
from the attic. (A 74)
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Dorf s journey through Britain in the company of his sister Sylvia Thorn is a
brief interlude before the major disorientations visited upon him by his experiences in
Portugal and Greece. But his return to the historical site of imperial ambition alerts him
once more to the moral corruption of Deemer's cultural colonialism. Kroetsch finds a
fine ironic image for the moral darkness of the colonial enterprise in Dorfs visit to the
healing spa at Bath, where the illusion of national vigour is replaced by the language of
desuetude and decay:
We had found and we had entered the sacred place of healing. And all I could
see, anywhere and everywhere, was evidence of ruin. The Roman Empire
itself turned into a collection of broken stones and a warming system, a
hypocaust system that doesn't any longer work. (A 87-88)
Gazing at the Royal Crescent, that "architectural triumph of aristocratic lunacy based on
the bleeding of an entire empire," Dorf remarks drily that "even Jack Deemer, with all
his money, would have to settle for something less" (A 85). His estrangement from
Deemer's dream of empire is also symbolised by his aversion to European narrative
conventions. In contrast to his sister, who unproblematically "regard[s] herself as the
guardian of truth and language, as if there was, somehow, a connection between the
two" (A 86) and accepts worldly benevolence as "the glass she holds to her eyes" (A
81), Dorf abandons mimesis for that "deliberate tilting of the mirror" (A 86) that
characterises the deconstructive activity of Hazard Lepage and Jeremy Sadness.
Dorfs similarity to Sadness, in particular, becomes evident in his dream of
uninvention that follows the telephone call he receives from Julie Magnuson at
Llandrindod Wells.18 In a passage that recalls Sadness's vision of the cataclysmic
meeting of east and west on the Great Central Plains of North America, Dorf imagines a
silence that redefines the horizon of past and present:
And I remember, indeed: out ofmy dream of trains that meet and blur together
and separate, came the voice of Julie Magnuson. She was in London, on her
way to Portugal. Because she was going there, to a spa.
She invited me to join her.
My dream. Two trains, one east-bound, one west-bound; they are
about to meet; I can't look away; they meet, they blur together. They separate
again. They open a wide, blank space. A silent space on the horizon. Good
God, the silence. The silence of horizons. (A 100)
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The drama of decreation symbolised by Dorfs dream is acted out during his
sojourn in Luso, a place-name that suggestively combines connotations of the loss of
self, the ludic, and the illusory or fantastic through which desire speaks. Here Dorf is
purged of his residual belief in a wholly autonomous self by Julie and the mysterious
Dr. Manuel de Medeiros whose surname anagramatically 'contains' desire itself. In his
newly discovered role as "the comic imitator of what [Deemer] proposes in earnest" (A
108) Dorf has to learn that the self can only be understood in its reciprocal relation with
others. Thus the story of Deemer's relationship with Julie, which consolidated his
financial success and led him to refuse any emotional relationship with the outside
world, is undercut by Dorf, whose affair with the same woman initiates him into the
displacements of desire:
We were lying together on her bed, all three of us, in such a tangle of arms and
legs that I could not recognize my own limbs let alone identify the this of her
this. Manny had, in his passion, bit her [Julie] violently on her right thigh, and
I was kissing it better, warming the bruise with my breath. And when I
inhaled, breathing deeply in so as again to blow gently onto her bruise, I filled
my head with the heat of her desire, rankly sweet, like iron newly lifted from a
bog.
"I will show my journal to no one, fear not," I said. "Not even to the
likes of Jack Deemer himself, collect what he might." I breathed warmly onto
Julie's blue bruise. "And I begin to wonder if this is not the spa he most seeks
in the wide world." (A 135)
Medeiros's belief that "the cure is always, finally, in the acceptance ... of
desire" (A 125) acts in the text simultaneously as a metaphor for personal and cultural
displacement. At a personal level, Dorfs entry into a ternary sexual relationship with
Medeiros and Julie shows him that individual identity is constituted not by Deemer's
exclusivist vision of self but rather through a continual negotiation between first and
third person subject positions:
It was the marvelous possibilities of our little triangle that gave me no rest from
desire. I felt not the slightest touch of jealousy. Indeed, by pretending just
slightly that Manny was Karen, with his head of perfect blond hair, I was able
to add a further dimension to our already outrageous joy. I truly felt no
jealousy. I was able to write in my journal exactly on each day those two blind
words: he ... I. And what did it matter, the slightest difference? We were
together and as one. We were two as one and three as one and each of us, one
as three, isosceles in our splendor. We were our own geometry and arithmetic
too; we could add and subtract with perfect abandon. (A 130)
Dorfs hesitation here between the boundaries of "I" and "he" is amplified by Julie's
remark "We all live by our alibis, don't we, Dorf?" (A 125) which interprets Dorfs
search for an alibi as the quest for another reading of an other self. Attuned at last to
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his status as a desired and desiring subject, Dorf is able to renounce the centre or
"[ojmphalos" (A 128) and admit that "the nature of love is such that to be happy is,
paradoxically, to know suffering" (A 134). Equally, the decentring of the
phallocentric self which prefigures Dorfs apprehension of the sexual "other" and
precipitates his desire to be "twice myself (A 142) leads him to contest Deemer's
urge to impose masculine order on the randomness of existence. Dorfs opposition to
Deemer's continual assimilation and homogenisation of cultural difference is recounted
most fully in his journey to Greece, the cradle of epic and empire. Indeed, Dorfs
presence in Greece represents a reversal of major political significance since here
Kroetsch positions Greece as the "other" of the colonised sensibility within a dialectic
that momentarily redefines both cultures.
Wandering through Greece Dorf concentrates his experience of personal and
cultural estrangement into a remark that underlines the consistency of Kroetsch's
exploration of post-colonial alienation: "We are all exiles," he declares, "sometimes
even from our own hands" (A 151). In contrast to Deemer's refusal to come to terms
with Canada's ambivalent status within colonialist narratives of cultural identity, Dorfs
re-engagement with European civilisation exploits this ambivalence to forge a new
vision of the subject in which the decentred narratives of post-colonial life mirror the
endless displacements of the selfwithin the chain of desire. Gazing at the prone body
of an octopus, Dorf experiences an epiphany in which the "holdings" of the past are
reinterpreted in terms of the "octopus-embrace" of the self in its relationship with
others:
Is not life itself our own vexed adhesion to what we do not comprehend?
Perhaps I did not sit there long, but in the long-seeming and cool and fast
embrace of that octopus I had time to count arms, so to speak, the holdings I
thought had plagued me: Deemer, Julie, de Medeiros, Karen perhaps, my
sisters, my children, my devotion to work. And I realised the octopus-embrace
of that troubled being was all I had. It was all I was. Those reachings to each
other, tremulous, confused, mistaken, are as much the divine intimacies of
nature as were the infinite small kisses of that octopus. (A 153)
Dorfs belief that a communal re-definition of self can be achieved by an erotic
acceptance of cultural alterity receives powerful support from his experiences in the
village of Lapsi. In the mud-spa there presided over by the androgynous figure of the
mud-(wo)man he transforms the lack of a settled identity into a vehicle for his own
symbolic rebirth:
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The man facing me took in each hand a handful of mud. He raised both of his
hands to my head. Again, he put the mud on my head. I held still. Again he
raised up mud and put it on my head. He was not only placing the mud there,
he was somehow shaping it. He took my two hands, then, out of the mud, and
with his hands he raised mine, made me touch the top ofmy head.
He had made a dunce cap on my head, that man. A pointed cap of
good, rich mud. He spoke a word. In Greek, of course. You have never
heard such a cheer as the one I got from those men. They accepted me. I was
joined with them. I drew a mask on my face. A simple mask. Circles around
my eyes. Circles around my ears. A happy smile around my mouth. Some of
the men raised up their muddy hands out of the thick mud and ponderously and
slowly they clapped, laughing at the same time. I had drawn my mask and I
was one of the floating heads.
We were floating heads, all of us, joined in the mud, joined to the mud.
In that mud, there, up to my neck, to my chin, I realised, for the first time in my
life, my mud self. I was in touch with the world. My heart was warm inside
me; the world was my body. My whole body became a heart, a heart beating in
the mud world. I dabbed two mud tears, one under each real eye, inside each
eye's circle. That was my weeping. My body was deep in the mud and yet
afloat, buoyed into its being of mud by the mud of being, under the hot Greek
sun in the mud it shared with the other bodies. (A 167)
Dorfs mature recognition that identity is constituted by the intersubjective
relationship with others is splendidly encapsulated in his comic interplay with the
disembodied heads of the mud-covered villagers; his ritual acceptance of alterity puts
him "back in touch with the world." The transformation of his attitudes may be gleaned
by a comparison with his early encounter with Julie in the spa-waters, where the
bodiless heads of other bathers reflected his own fractured personality, leaving him
alienated and confused. With his realisation that, as Kroetsch says elsewhere, "[t]he
other is the not-me that is me,"19 Dorf achieves an individual expression of the
"abundance that is diversity and difference"20 that characterises (post)modern Canadian
identity. After viewing the ruins of the European colonialist adventure and
experiencing the transfiguration of his "mud-self," Dorf is ready to return to his own
home place and present an alibi for his other self denied expression by Deemer's
insistence upon univocity, closure, and narrative resolution.
Following Dorfs acquisition of the spa at Deadman Springs - a name that offers
a symbolic reprise of his own evolution from confinement to freedom - a brief scene
takes place that illustrates the text's negotiation between unitary and plural narratives of
cultural identity. Approached by a stranger who bears no name, Dorf is compelled to
reflect upon his own double naming and his own double nature. His realisation that he
can afford to give away one of his forenames is of signal importance because it shows
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that the subject does not need the external confirmation of a second name to
comprehend the multiplicity of its basic character. As Dorf acknowledges, "I am a man
who, in the mystery of what self is, can give away a name and still have it" (A 206).
Deemer's dependence upon the unitary self is therefore challenged by the dissolution of
the subject into the flux of language and desire. Dorfs assertion that love is "[t]he
confirmation into being that is the destruction too" (A 218) embodies the
deconstructive edge of his insight and lends clarity to the subtle formulation of his
intention to "relax, not to be myself but to let myself be" (A 181).
Dorfs final revelation at Deadman Springs of the interrelationship of language,
subjectivity, and desire prepares us perfectly for Deemer's non-appearance at his
perfect spa. Deemer's absence is crucial to Kroetsch's intentions since his presence at
the spa would bring the text's transcendental signified into alignment with one of its
prime signifiers and thereby effect the epistemological closure Kroetsch is committed to
prevent. Instead the failure of light (and, by extension, source and origination) within
the spa-passage precipitates each character's entry into the "lovely maze of our naming"
which unmakes and reinvents identity according to the dictates of desire:
I heard names. I could hear names. I heard the cave's sweet namings. Joe.
Arnie. Kay. Pat. And the laughter of the findings. Yes. The bodies,
bumping bodies. Carol. David. Yes. Dennis. Diane. Trojan. Esterhazy.
Yes. Jock. Yes. Mandel. Yes. Mick. Fat Annie. Estienne. The rub and
caress, the fingers, finding an arm, a face, a breast. Pete. Yes. Hjartarson.
Yes. Lome. Doris. Ricou. Garbonzo. Yes. Gerry. Lou. Jane. The
surprise of hips touching hips in the unseeable dark. And the waiting. And the
turning. Yes. The hand to the belly's sudden gasp. The lovely maze of our
naming. And the wet, invisible embrace. Cook. Vermeer. Pausanias.
Pauline. Our naming ourselves into new names. Vasco da Gama. And the yes
and the yes. And Karen, no doubt, somewhere in the cave, locked in hot
intercourse with anonymous arms. But we named our strangeness away. (A
226-27)
This passage, which brings the novel's central narrative to conclusion, is
Kroetsch's most developed fictional expression of Canada's position as a labyrinth of
voice in which the radical disunity of its various narrative traditions paradoxically holds
the Canadian story together. Cultural identity in Alibi, as in Canada, is defined by
Dorfs position between different modes of self-registration. But as Kroetsch knows,
it is not possible for the post-colonial subject simply to name its strangeness away: the
pressure of an alien language and history enforces a division between discourse and
experience that instils strangeness in the act of naming itself. In the last pages ofAlibi
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Kroetsch moves to reinforce our perception of this cultural contradiction. If the final
chapter of Dorfs text asks us to follow the trajectory of desire from stasis through
"ecstasy" to "ekstasis," the scant pages entitled "Dorfendorfs Journal" reassert the
binary structure of Kroetsch's artistic vision. Dorfs journal therefore brings the
various codes of the novel into a state of unresolved tension; the erotics of the text, as
Kroetsch is aware, inhere in its radical incompletion. Thus Karen, the artificer, and
Deemer, symbol of order and detachment, come together and swap roles as she
structures her history of the collector's momentous 'arrival' while he approaches again
and again like "an actor, thrilled at the marvelous task of playing himself' (A 231).
Meanwhile Medeiros, the "Magellan" (A 235) of desire, is implicated by Dorf, the
desirer, in the ultimate closure of death. In a momentary aside Dorf offers us an
interpretative model of the text he has presented couched in a hermeneutics of reversals,
inversions, and doubleness;
I type all and everything onto legal size rag paper, not dropping so much as a
letter, I happen to be something of a fanatic at a typewriter and it shows to good
cause as the manuscript grows in this cardboard box to the left ofmy typewriter
and the open journal; the heaped pages; each carefully numbered, each
proofread for the merest error, then slipped carefully over its predecessor so
that all I must do, when the manuscript is complete, is reverse the order of the
pages, make the top sheet the bottom, the bottom the top. (A 231)
The radical doubleness of Alibi, which encompasses both Dorfs
deconstruction of his former self and his heliotropic need to find "our way back to the
source of all desire, the sun itself' (A 137) continues to the last and finds an appropriate
image in the journey of the ospreys to the sun. The baby osprey's development is an
important symbol for Dorf; their movement into flight marks the beginning of a new life
for him. Considering his "oracular birds" (A 234) he confides he has decided "that
when the baby ospreys either fly or drown, then I too will know what to do" (A 230).
The novel's concluding image of the birds lifting into flight and tearing "the sadness
from [Dorfs] heart" (A 239) is perfectly pitched: the two birds, with their
counterpointed cry "Gwan-Gwan," inscribe the duplicity of being and desire as they
arc towards the sun, source of life itself. And this is where Kroetsch's text leaves us,
in that disquieting balance between oppositions and contraries where self blends into
"other" and an alibi prepares to moonlight for the illusion of truth itself.
If we return, in conclusion, to the Barthesian distinction between texts of
pleasure and bliss with which this chapter commenced, it becomes clear that in Alibi
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Kroetsch has managed to channel the textual erotics of Dorfs quest for personal and
cultural identity in such a way as to unsettle "the reader's historical, cultural,
psychological assumptions, the consistency of his tastes, values, memories" and to
bring "to a crisis his relation with language." Like Demeter Proudfoot and Mark
Madham, Jack Deemer fulfils the role of an encyclopaedic realist novelist; his desire to
corral the diversity of existence into a single narrative denies voice to the Canadian
subject who necessarily exists between stories, plots, and versions of identity. Dorfs
quest, which takes him to the ruined site of European imperialist culture, replaces the
Old World form of classical realism with a discourse of self-identification based upon
the politics of the erotic body. Drawing a direct comparison between the
transfigurations of language and desire Dorf tells us that "[t]o touch is to talk" while
"[ijntimacy is, finally, an intimacy of telling" (A 136). Unlike the boundless verbal
play of The Sad Phoenician, which invoked the politics of desire to express the over-
determination of narratives of post-colonial identity, the intricately plotted world of
Alibi continually restates the binary divisions that characterise post-colonial cultural
discourse. As Dorf demands closure and source he is confronted with a multitude of
narrative possibilities; as he prepares to lose himself in the protean world of Lapsi he is
reminded by Karen, and his dualistic daughters Jinn and Jan, of the binary tensions that
inform the surrounding world. Eventually Dorf finds, like Kroetsch, that it is only
through the process of narrative that system and difference can be held in tension; the
insistence of Dorf s alibi upon the continual re-invention of the border between truth
and illusion accounts for his "corrosive sense of style" (A 196). Talking his way
through the story of his own desire for story Dorf comes to embody the axiomatic
insight of all Kroetsch's postmodern fiction; estranged from origin and alienated from
source, it is his sense of the multiplicity of the world's labyrinthine plots that finally
brings him home.
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The critic invited to conclude a study of Robert Kroetsch is immediately
conscious of an overwhelming irony. For Kroetsch is, perhaps, the example par
excellence of the postmodern writer who resists closure, shifts backwards and
forwards between different identities, and insists that the dialectic between story and
form is played out in a multiplicity of ways. His stubborn refusal to conclude his
exploration of identity and alterity is signalled by his fascination with the doubled
figures of the doppelganger and trickster, as well as by the binary structures in which
his characters find themselves enclosed. Kroetsch's unconcealed hostility to endings is
also captured by the metaphor of the quest which runs through his fiction, linking each
of his novels without resolving or effacing the differences between them. This
predisposition towards an unbounded process of self-discovery marks him out as a
writer who searches for identity and meaning in "the continuing poem: not the having
written, but the writing. The poem as long as a life. The lifelost poem."1
Yet if the idea of conclusion is problematic with regard to the multiple openings
of Kroetsch's texts, it is possible to advance a broad statement about their fundamental
aims and concerns. I have argued that the core concern of Kroetsch's work is the
examination and politicisation of the relationship between identity and difference. He
therefore returns repeatedly to the problem of representing 'Canada' within the
constraints of a "mandarin language" that effaces, marginalises, or excludes the colonial
experience of history. In retrospect, his writing may be seen to revolve around the
conundrum that he discusses in the provocatively entitled essay "No Name Is My
Name":
The Canadian writer in English must speak a new culture not with new names
but with an abundance of names inherited from Britain and the United States.
And that predicament is in turn doubled - by the writing done in the French
language in Canada.
The problem then is not so much that of knowing one's identity as it is
of how to relate that newly evolving identity to its inherited or 'given' names.
And the first technique might be simply to hold those names in suspension, to
let the identity speak itself out of a willed namelessness.2
In this study I have attempted to establish the different ways in which Kroetsch
tries to hold the "given" names "in suspension" in order to "let the identity speak itself
out of a willed namelessness." I began with a reading of his poetry because it presents
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in microcosmic form the influence upon his work of the discourses of phenomenology,
post-structuralism, and postmodernism. Kroetsch's poetry, in common with certain
dominant strains of post-colonial thought, evolves from the desire to eradicate the sense
of alienation visited upon the Canadian subject by the cultural codes of Old World
discourse. It yearns for an experience of identity uncontaminated by difference. The
reciprocal and constitutive connection that phenomenology identifies between world
and consciousness appeared to offer Kroetsch an opportunity to surmount the obstacle
of alterity and to overcome the alienating distance imposed by language. His early
poetry therefore records his quest for a phenomenological poetics capable of exploring
the relationship between the intending subject and the lost origins of colonial history.
Kroetsch's poetry subsequent to "Stone Hammer Poem" is born out of the
contradictions implicit in his phenomenological poetics. For his recognition that the
status of language as a system of difference is inimical to the phenomenological
incorporation of the "other" into the "same" inaugurates the deconstructive strategies of
his major poems. From this point Kroetsch exploits the radical alterity of language to
uncover the dialectic between "same" and "other" inscribed within the documents of
colonial history. In The Ledger he deconstitutes the closed book of the pioneer
experience to recover the lost and marginalised voices excluded from the narrative of
nineteenth-century nationhood; while in Seed Catalogue he deconstructs the
metaphorics of closure that underwrite the 'organic' cultural totality. The success of
these poems is founded upon the connection Kroetsch manages to establish between the
play of the signifier and what Derrida calls "the play of the world." I have also pointed
out in my readings of The Sad Phoenician and Labyrinths ofVoice the difficulties that
beset Kroetsch's work when the tension between identity and difference is sacrificed to
the relativising discourse of textual 'play.'
The same desire to explore the dialectical relationship between identity and
difference suffuses Kroetsch's prose fiction. His first novel, But We Are Exiles, deals
with the paradox of articulating post-colonial identity in the discourse of the "same" by
challenging the capacity of mimesis to represent the radically "other." The idea of exile
or displacement from historical origin that haunts Exiles is given a human context in
The Words of My Roaring, Kroetsch's second novel. Here he internalises the
contradictions and tensions of post-colonial discourse in the comic figure of Johnnie
Backstrom. Words offers an excellent example of the allegorical power of Kroetsch's
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fiction, since Backstrom's urge to unite the binary divisions of post-colonial culture in
his own providential narrative denies the experience of difference that constitutes the
post-colonial condition, and leaves him bereft of voice or purpose. Words also
introduces one of the key themes of Kroetsch's work: the use of the patriarchal
relationship as a metaphor for the relationship between the imperial 'father' and the
post-colonial exile. This metaphor recurs, with various local adjustments, in The
Studhorse Man, Gone Indian, and Badlands.
Between the publication of Words and the completion of The Studhorse Man
Kroetsch's work comes under the influence of both American postmodern fiction and
Latin American 'magic realism.' I have suggested that an important tension exists in
Kroetsch's theory of postmodernism between a Lyotardian celebration of language
games and a Jamesonian concern with the political and cultural implications of
'difference.' The problem with the first of these positions, which enforces a separation
between meaning and the historical context in which it is engendered, is demonstrated
in The Studhorse Man. By shifting in Gone Indian from pastiche to the mode of
postmodern parody Kroetsch is able to establish a concrete connection between the
institutional sites from which hegemonic discourses are produced and the sanctioned
images of colonial history. Meanwhile, his glorious parody of Anna Dawe's revision
of patriarchal history in Badlands enables him to move beyond the limitations of
Sadness's counter-discourse and develop a deconstructive form that simultaneously
inscribes and displaces the binary codes of the Canadian cultural "paradigm."
The transition from a counter-discursive to a deconstructive position brings
Kroetsch's fiction into creative tension with with his critical writing. These two sides
of his work interact in What the Crow Said to produce a vision of modern Canada
united by the "bewildering multitude of fragments"3 that constitute the Canadian story.
In contrast to the assimilative and homogenising cultural model offered by the American
'melting pot,' Crow keeps the dialectic between identity and difference alive. Along
the multiple borders of Kroetsch's text, identity is challenged and affirmed by the
tensions between east and west, male and female, tradition and innovation, oral culture
and the post-Gutenberg typographic revolution. Fittingly, Alibi, the most recent of
Kroetsch's novels, advances beyond the postmodern cultural vision of Crow by
returning to the basic question of narrative. His elaboration of a new form of quest-
fiction indebted to the textual erotics of Barthesian criticism is at once a literary and
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political gesture, since it asks us to rewrite the narrative of our own lives in that
postmodern space in which the Author can no longer impose order upon a docile
world.
The ultimate importance of Kroetsch's work is his insistence upon examining
the question of post-colonial identity "without recourse to an easy vision of national
definition, and without easy recourse to old vocabularies."4 Kroetsch is able to
progress from the "old vocabularies" enforced by the imperial word towards the
"recognition of difference"5 by continually conceiving identity in dialectical relation to
the discourse of the "same." The range and power of his meditation upon the nature of
alterity makes his corpus an essential document for those wishing to understand the
status of post-colonial culture today. Moreover, Kroetsch's constant critical
engagement with the theoretical and philosophical implications of the literary work has
played a crucial role in introducing the discourses of post-structuralism and
postmodernism to the field of post-colonial studies. The interdependence of the literary
and philosophical interest in 'difference' does not, therefore, act as a prologue to
Kroetsch's work alone, but rather characterises the wider post-colonial desire for
identity and voice:
Canadian writing takes place between the vastness of (closed) cosmologies and
the fragments found in the (open) field of the archaeological site. It is a
literature of dangerous middles. It is a literature that, compulsively seeking its
own story (and to be prophetic after all: this will still be the case a century from
now) comes compulsively to a genealogy that refuses origin, to a genealogy that
speaks instead, and anxiously, and with a generous reticence, the nightmare and
the welcome dream of Babel.6
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